

Social Cohesion and Intergroup Relations: Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Nationals in the Bekaa and Akkar

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Abbreviations:

Casual Labor Initiative	CLI
Focus Group Discussions	FGD
Informal Tented Settlements	ITS
Save the Children International	SC
United Nations High Commissioner for	UNHCR
International Non-Governmental	INGO

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Context:

Social Cohesion: The influx of over a million Syrian refugees has severely strained the socio-economic fabric and infrastructure of Lebanon, especially as most refugees settled in some of the poorest areas (e.g. the Bekaa and Akkar – UNHCR 2013, 2014). Tensions between Syrian Refugees and Lebanese nationals competing for the same resources and services are at a breaking point. Multiple social cohesion and community support initiatives were implemented to improve intercommunity relations, and this report focuses on Save the Children’s Casual Labor Initiative (CLI) and its impact on intercommunity social cohesion.

The Casual Labor Initiative engaged over 8000 Syrian Refugees and Lebanese nationals between November 2013 and January 2014, to collaboratively carry out public works in both Informal Tented Settlements (ITS) and surrounding host communities in 10 locations in Akkar and 30 locations in the Bekaa. The work was paid and lasted for ten days over a period of one month. The works consisted of improvements to the community infrastructure and environment, including site improvements in ITS.

Objectives:

The aims of our research were to 1) evaluate the *CLI* project design and implementation, and assess its impact on intercommunity perceptions and 2) assess social cohesion in Akkar and the Bekaa, in the locations that benefited from the CLI. Specifically, we assessed an array of socio-political indicators of emerging conflict (e.g. threat perceptions, contact quantity and quality, readiness for violence) and identified locations of potential concern (mapping). We also assessed the levels of support for violent forms of collective action targeting Lebanese nationals, Syrian refugees, Lebanese authorities, and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs).

Methods:

We used a multi-stage, multi-method research design to address the objectives stated above. We first conducted 17 Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with two sets of populations: a) Stakeholders (Municipality officials, community leaders, and Save the Children staff), and b) Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals who either did, or did not benefit from the CLI. We then designed and pilot tested a questionnaire on a small sample of 20 participants. Finally, we conducted a systematic random sampling survey of 600 Syrian refugees and 600 Lebanese nationals from 16 locations in the Bekaa, Sahel Akkar and Wadi Khaled. The questionnaire used measured perceptions of threat (existential, economic, symbolic, and status/dignity), contact quality and quantity, justice perceptions, corruption perception, and collective action tendencies among other variables.

Findings:

SES: The socio-economic status of Lebanese nationals differed substantially by area. Unemployment rates ranged from 58% in Wadi Khaled, to 44% in Sahel Akkar to 23% in the Bekaa, while the educational profile of Bekaa residents was significantly higher than Sahel Akkar and Wadi Khaled residents. These differing profiles may explain some of the differences and grievances between areas found in the present report.

Three quarters of Syrian refugees were registered with the UNHCR and were receiving aid, whilst the remaining 25% were either not registered or not receiving aid. This substantial exclusion from aid is fuelling widespread negative sentiments and perceptions towards INGOs.

Casual Labor Initiative: CLI builds on the assumption that intergroup contact through mixed, equal status groups working collaboratively towards a common super-ordinate goal would reduce inter-community prejudices and improve attitudes. However, several conditions which need to be met for such an intervention to be effective were violated in the implementation of CLI in both Akkar and the Bekaa, or in one of the areas.

Recruitment bias: The process of advertisement and recruitment for the CLI did not uniformly follow the “first come first served” basis. Instead, it was made through municipality officials and Syrian refugee community leaders in some areas. The latter selection process fuels perceptions of cronyism and organizational corruption. Furthermore, recruitment did not meet the equal distribution quota of Lebanese to Syrian participants. Recruitment of Syrian Refugees also tended to favor ITS residents to non-ITS residents, fuelling perceptions of bias among the latter group.

Equal status cooperative contact: Two main conditions for a successful outcome in mixed group interactions are that members are of equal status and that work is cooperative rather than competitive. Both these conditions were violated in some areas, as selected team leaders tended to be Lebanese nationals, and in some instances, participants refused to work in mixed groups.

Willingness to work together: The future implementation of CLI may face challenges in terms of recruiting Lebanese nationals in some areas. A majority of Lebanese participants (55%) did not favor working in mixed groups, and only a quarter (23%) were willing to do so. The reverse was true for Syrian Refugees, with 55% supporting and 20% against working in mixed groups. Lebanese participants’ attitudes towards working in mixed groups also differed by region, ranging from a 20% support in Sahel Akkar, to 40% support in Wadi Khaled.

Social cohesion indicators:

Contact: A quarter of Lebanese nationals and a quarter of Syrian refugees never came into contact with one another. Furthermore, a quarter of Lebanese nationals and almost half of Syrian refugees reported positive contact quality, with only a small minority in both populations reporting negative contact experiences (15.2% of Lebanese and 4.3% of Syrian Refugees). While the quality of contact varied across locations for Lebanese nationals, Syrian refugees reported more negative than positive contact in large municipalities (e.g. Qab Elias Bar Elias, Bebnine, Mhammara), than in smaller ones.

Threat perceptions: Over 90% of Lebanese nationals perceived Syrian refugees as both symbolic and economic threats (i.e. a threat to their economic livelihood and to their value system); Over two thirds perceived refugees as an existential threat. Rates were particularly high in Sahel Akkar. On the other hand, a majority of Syrian Refugees perceived Lebanese nationals as symbolic and economic threats (especially in Akkar), but not as an existential threat.

Support for discriminatory policies: Worryingly, 90% of Lebanese nationals supported nightly curfews and restrictions on political freedom. Furthermore, 90% of Lebanese nationals in Akkar and 75% of nationals in the Bekaa would like Lebanon to stop receiving refugees altogether, and would like to forbid them all access to work.

Corruption perceptions: A third of Syrian refugees perceived INGOS as corrupt (especially in Wadi Khaled), and half perceived health care services (especially in the Bekaa) and business persons and landlords (especially in Wadi Khaled) as corrupt. Corruption perceptions were lower among the Lebanese, with a fifth of Lebanese nationals perceiving INGOs as corrupt, and half perceiving business persons and landlords as such.

Collective action: We measured potential for collective action both directly (willingness to support violent forms of actions against specific targets) and indirectly (assessing participants' subjective estimates of conflict between the two communities).

Two thirds of Lebanese nationals in the Bekaa and Sahel Akkar, and half of nationals in Wadi Khaled estimated violence between the communities as likely, but less than a fifth of Syrian refugees believed this to be so. Direct measures did indicate support for violent forms of collective action against INGOs among Syrian refugees, particularly in Akkar, and particularly among those who live outside ITS. On the other hand, direct measures also indicated high levels of support for violence against Syrian refugees among Lebanese nationals, particularly in Akkar but also in the Bekaa.

Both FGD discussions and survey results indicated little potential for organized collective violence among Syrian refugees against Lebanese nationals, but a serious threat of Lebanese to Syrian violence, especially in Sahel Akkar. We speculate that one reason Syrian refugees are unlikely to engage in organized collective violence against Lebanese nationals is the imbalance of power between the two communities. The precarious and vulnerable situation of refugees leaves them defenseless against abuses from Lebanese nationals backed by the apparatuses of state power (biased judiciary, security forces, etc.). Furthermore, while Lebanese nationals are able to organize quickly due to kinship and neighborhood ties, Syrian refugees are unable to do so effectively because of their wide dispersion across the Lebanese territory and their weak organizational networks.

CLI & Social Cohesion: While direct beneficiaries of the CLI constituted less than 2% of the population, indirect beneficiaries reached 17% of the Lebanese and 14% of the Syrian refugees in affected areas. CLI beneficiaries (direct and indirect) reported lower symbolic and status/honor threat perceptions, and lower support for violence in both groups. Furthermore, Lebanese beneficiaries expressed lower support for employment discriminatory policies against Syrian refugees. On the other hand, Syrian refugee beneficiaries expressed higher perceptions of economic threat and higher perceptions of communal corruption (businesses, health care services). Intriguingly, Lebanese beneficiaries reported a slightly higher support for violence against Lebanese authorities than non-beneficiaries. These comparisons should be handled with care due the small differences between groups (5-10%), and the overall small number of beneficiaries.

Recommendations:

Both the focus group discussions and the survey results suggest that the CLI was viewed favorably by both communities, and that it could be a promising interim strategy to improve relations between Syrian Refugees and Lebanese nationals, but its implementation must be modified to maximize its benefits. Specifically, a) the work should be of longer duration and offer higher wages, b) the project should be properly advertised and recruitment should occur on a first come first served basis, c) there should be equal participation from both communities and equal opportunities to take leadership positions, d) the activities should be cooperative in nature and consist of works that are considered common goals to both groups, e) adequate monitoring and feedback mechanisms should be implemented and f) the types of activities in each area should cater to the needs and skills present in that area.

There are indications of support for violent forms of collective action against INGOs among Syrian refugees, particularly in Akkar, and particularly among those who live outside ITS. It is therefore imperative that aid organizations attend to the underlying factors that might fuel such violence, namely perceptions of corruption as well as perceptions of unfair and biased treatment. In particular, the exclusion from UNHCR criteria must urgently be revised to achieve greater equity in aid distribution. Furthermore, aid organizations should strengthen aid schemes targeting Syrian refugees

living outside ITS. Aid organizations must also increase coverage of health services and medical care. Finally, they must devise better strategies to prevent intermediate providers of basic products and services (e.g. health care organizations, food stores and landlords) from taking advantage of Syrian refugees' vulnerable situations.

There are indications of high support for violence against Syrian refugees among Lebanese nationals particularly in Akkar but also in the Bekaa. In some areas, there is noteworthy support for violence against INGOs. It is therefore imperative that adequate programs are put in place to benefit host communities and address the underlying factors that might fuel this violence, such as the widespread view among the Lebanese that Syrian refugees constitute a threat to their economic livelihood, their value system, and their physical existence. These threat perceptions are particularly pronounced in Sahel Akkar. Long-term economic development projects, and interactional and normative interventions that highlight the common value systems and worldviews that Lebanese nationals and Syrian refugees share should be developed. A greater involvement of the Lebanese government is essential, and a wider police and ISF presence would strengthen safety perceptions.

I- ASSESSING SOCIAL COHESION AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS

A. The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon – Contextualization:

1) *Population surge*

Since the Syrian crisis began in 2011, Lebanon has witnessed a growing influx of Syrian refugees, due to its open border policy with Syria and relatively unrestricted access to Syrian refugees, in contrast to other bordering countries such as Jordan and Turkey. The latest figures by UNHCR indicate that there are now over 1 million displaced Syrians in the country, with 995,221 registered as refugees as of April 30, 2014 (UNHCR, 2014). The figure is staggering considering that the Lebanese population is estimated to be just over 4 million people.

Around 12% of registered refugees are estimated to live in tented settlements (World Food Program, 2013)¹, which include both formal and informal settlements. Of particular interest to this report are Syrians living in *informal* tented settlements, (ITS), who numbered 100,000 as of October 2013 and who are scattered over 400 sites (Witworth, 2013). Occupants face extremely poor living conditions, as the settlements are vulnerable to water flooding and fire; they provide limited access to water, sanitation, electricity, refuse collection and other services. Syrian refugees living in these informal settlements constitute some of the most economically vulnerable group within the refugee population (Witworth, 2013). These difficult conditions should not however occlude the dire (and often undocumented) conditions of the less visible refugees living within the town, often in garages or sheds that barely qualify as shelter.

2) *Economic strain*

This influx of Syrian refugees has put a severe economic, social and political strain on Lebanon, particularly as most of the refugees settled in some of the poorest areas, namely in the Bekaa and North Lebanon (UNHCR, 2013c). Many refugees compete with host communities for jobs, resulting in increases in unemployment, and the prices of rent, goods and services (World Bank, 2013). By the end of 2014, around 170,000 Lebanese citizens are expected to plunge into poverty as a result of the Syrian crisis, and this figure is over and above the 1 million Lebanese who are considered poor (living on less than 4 USD per day) and are expected to plunge even deeper into poverty (World Bank, 2013). This 30-50% increase in labor supply is likely to double the unemployment rate, particularly among unskilled youth (World Bank, 2013).

3) *Inter-community tensions*

Unsurprisingly, the influx of Syrian refugees is leading to growing tensions between the Lebanese host communities and the Syrian refugee communities. A May 2013 public opinion poll of 900 Lebanese citizens (Christophersen, Liu, Thorleifsson, & Tiltnes, 2013) showed that over 90% of those polled in both the North and the Bekaa think that a) the Syrian crisis is causing Lebanese wages to fall, b) Syrian refugees are taking jobs away from the Lebanese, c) Syrian refugees are straining Lebanon's water and energy resources, d) the Syrian crisis is hurting Lebanese commerce/businesses, and e) the Syrian conflict had a negative impact on the government's capacity to govern and to protect Lebanese citizens. Furthermore, 84% and 64% of those polled in the North and the Bekaa respectively think that Syrian refugees are supported financially to an unfair degree.

¹ Recent population parameters obtained from UNHCR and Save the Children databases put the number of ITS residents closer to 20% of the total population.

Recent focus group discussions by the World Bank (2013) similarly reveal that competition over resources, overcrowding, restricted access to basic public services, and increased competition over jobs, are increasing tensions between the communities. The growing resentment among host communities is also fuelled by the perception that Syrian refugees are receiving disproportionately high amounts of international aid, while poverty-stricken Lebanese citizens are left neglected (World Bank, 2013). Focus groups also report increased perceptions of criminality threat, and complaints of values and cultural differences between host communities and Syrian refugees.

Perceptions of threat and insecurity are also present among Syrian refugees. A recent countrywide survey of Syrian refugees in Lebanon shows that around 32% do not feel safe in their new settlements, mainly due to crime and prejudice against them (BRIC, 2013). Another World Food Program (2013) country-wide survey of registered Syrian refugees revealed that around 10% of Syrian refugee households reported experiencing some type of harassment during the three months prior to the survey, including robberies, threats, and different types of discrimination perpetrated mainly by neighbors (42%), hosts and landlords (14%), shops (11%), local authorities (10%) or others (30%). In Akkar, there have also been reports of an increase in the number of evictions in informal settlements, potentially exploitative work conditions for Syrian labor, and reports of sexual harassment and abuse among women moving in and out of the settlements (Protection Working Group, 2013).

Finally, a study by Mercy Corps (2013) consisting of focus groups with Lebanese and Syrian populations in the North, Bekaa, Nabatiyeh and South, revealed that the main sources of economic hardship included less jobs, lower wages and high prices. While there is frequent contact in the North between Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals, they are both troubled by economic issues. Furthermore, some Lebanese nationals fear that Syrian refugees will influence the confessional balance in the country and negatively affect security. On the other hand, Syrian refugees viewed Lebanese employers as profiting from and exploiting their desperate conditions, and cited incidents of discrimination and humiliation by their neighbors. The same study included a survey of 1200 households of Syrian and Lebanese nationals. Results revealed greater inclination toward political violence among respondents in the North and Bekaa compared to respondents in Nabatiyeh and South, with the North showing greater inclination toward violence than the Bekaa. Propensity toward violence was also found to be associated with lower social interaction with the outgroup, in both communities. Furthermore, propensity toward violence was linked to negative perceptions of local government performance among Lebanese respondents, and economic pessimism among Syrian refugees.

In sum, available published reports on Syrian-Lebanese relations identified a series of factors that cover the spectrum of potential tension indicators. These factors include actual socio-economic hardships, the amount and quality of intergroup contact, the perceived fairness of international aid organizations (INGOs), the perception of corruption of various powerful actors (e.g. landlords) as well as mutual inter-community perceptions of economic and existential threats, or threats to honor and dignity. We aimed to assess all the above indicators in this study.

B- SAVE THE CHILDREN'S SOCIAL COHESION INTERVENTION

Multiple interventions have been implemented around the country to improve refugees' living conditions, including efforts to improve refugees' access to food, shelter, water, education and health services. However, there is a growing recognition that in order to effectively assist refugees, the international response to the crisis must include support to the host communities which are most

affected by the influx of refugees (United Nations, 2013). While a few interventions to boost social cohesion between Lebanese citizens and displaced Syrians have already been implemented (e.g. training in mediation and conflict resolution as well as peace-building activities in schools (UNHCR, 2013a)), these are not nearly enough to mitigate tensions between the communities. Maintaining and enhancing social cohesion between Lebanese and Syrian communities continues to be one of the important objectives of the United Nations' planned response to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon (United Nations, 2013). As of October 2013, 25 areas accommodating Syrian refugees and some of the poorest segments of the Lebanese population have been identified as requiring urgent intervention to prevent the deterioration of intercommunity relations, and avoid hostilities against refugees (e.g. denial of access to services, shelter evictions, restrictions of movements (UNHCR, 2013b)). Many of these areas lie in the Bekaa and in Akkar.

The present research is focused on the assessment of a community support program with desired social cohesion outcomes between Syrian and Lebanese refugees, in Bekaa and Akkar, implemented by Save the Children International (SC). As part of their Food Security & Livelihood (FSL) program, SC have been providing food assistance through e-vouchers in Akkar, cash assistance for winter protection in Bekaa and Akkar, in addition to youth skills training activities to registered and unregistered refugees. However, it is the community support projects using casual labor (known as "Casual Labor Initiative" (CLI from here-on)) that constitute the focus of this assessment (Save the Children, 2013b).

This CLI program is built on existing cash for work programs in Lebanon, which recruited Syrian refugees and host community workers in joint communal projects involving public works. Following positive anecdotal feedback showing increased social cohesion, SC decided to widen the geographic scope of areas benefiting from this program and to modify the selection criteria for workers in order to allow more vulnerable communities, particularly Syrians in ITS, to also participate in CLI (Save the Children, 2013a).

The Casual Labor Initiative aimed to engage over 8000 people between November 2013 and January 2014, to carry out public works in both ITS and surrounding host communities in 10 locations in Akkar and 30 locations in the Bekaa. The duration of the work was ten days over a period of one month, with a daily rate of 15USD for laborers, 20 USD for team leaders and 25USD for supervisors. The works consisted of improvements to the community infrastructure and environment, including site improvements in ITS. Casual labor opportunities were open to any community member through a self-selection process (first come first served), with a stronger recruitment focus on Syrian Refugees residing in ITS. The initial goal was to recruit 50% Syrians and 50% Lebanese in the workforce, with equal wage rates for members of both communities, in cooperative tasks aimed to foster positive interpersonal experiences.

The project assumed that: a) by including equal numbers from both communities, Lebanese nationals' attitudes toward Syrian refugees would change from perceiving them as passive recipients of aid to active participants in their host communities, b) collaborative work between the two communities would reinforce positive relationships between them, c) equal wage rate to both communities would reinforce a perception of equal value assigned to work by both communities, and d) equal income generating opportunities would lessen the perceptions that Syrian refugees are disproportionately benefiting from external assistance.

C- RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Within this context of emergency humanitarian intervention with a vulnerable refugee population, and building on existing research on relations between Syrian refugees and Lebanese citizens, we conducted a multi-stage and multi-method research project to:

- 1) Assess the Casual Labor Initiative through:
 - a. Assessing the implementation of the initiative, and identifying field challenges to it
 - b. Seeking the feedback of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals who participated in the CLI
 - c. Assessing the impact of the CLI on reduction of intercommunity tensions
- 2) Assess Social Cohesion in Akkar and the Bekaa, and identify locations where interventions such as CLI might be needed to enhance social cohesion through:
 - a. Assessing willingness to work in mixed groups in the two communities
 - b. Assessing intercommunity levels of contact quantity and quality, differential threat perceptions, affect toward members of the other community, and perceptions of corruption among local actors
 - c. Assessing the perceived fairness of INGOs among Syrian refugees
 - d. Assessing support among Lebanese nationals for discriminatory policies against Syrian refugees
 - e. Identifying (mapping) the areas that are most vulnerable to potential violence against members of the other community, toward INGOs, and toward Lebanese authorities.

II- RESEARCH OVERVIEW & METHODS

The research used a multistage, multi-method approach to address the questions raised above. We give a quick overview of each stage, after which we detail the procedures involved in each. Note that this research project was cleared for implementation by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the American University of Beirut (IRB ID: FAS.CH.33).

A. Research Design

1) STAGE 1: FOCUS GROUPS

The first stage consisted of 17 focus group discussions, and aimed to 1) assess perceptions of the Casual Labor Initiative, 2) identify factors that affect Syrian and Lebanese inter-community relations, and d) examine contextual and regional variations and specificities. Two sets of FGD were carried out: one set focused on key stakeholders such as SC staff, Syrian community leaders and municipality officials, while the second set of FGD focused on Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals.

The first set of FGD sessions investigated the views of three groups (SC staff, Lebanese municipality leaders and Syrian community leaders or “shawish”). We interviewed around eight Save the Children staff members in each of the SC offices in the Bekaa (Zahle) and Akkar (Qubeyiat). We then interviewed municipality leaders and Syrian leaders in each of Bar Elias, Qab Elias and Bebnine.

The second set of FGD sessions investigated the views of two groups (Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals) across three regions (Sahel Akkar, Wadi Khaled, and Bekaa), and were divided into beneficiaries from the Casual Labor Initiative and non-beneficiaries. In each session, we interviewed between 4-8 participants. In Borj el Arab (Akkar Sahel) and Kwachra (Wadi Khaled²), we interviewed both Syrians refugees and Lebanese nationals, while in Qab Elias we interviewed only Lebanese nationals, and in Bar Elias only Syrians refugees. Participants were recruited via SC staff members with the help of municipality leaders, using convenience sampling. Although we attempted to use random selection of casual labor beneficiaries, this proved logistically difficult as the lists provided by SC did not include nationalities of the beneficiaries, nor did they specify whether these were past, current or upcoming beneficiaries. Sessions were led by one or the other investigator, thereby altering the gender of the FGD leader. Both investigators were involved in leading sessions in the two regions (Bekaa and Akkar). All second set FGD sessions took place in private rooms of the municipality halls in the absence of any SC or municipality staff member. Sessions were not audio-recorded, nor were any personal identifiers taken from participants. However, an accompanying research assistant took detailed notes during the sessions. All sessions took place between January 14 and January 28, 2014, and each session lasted between 1.5-2 hours.

2) STAGE 2: PILOT STUDY AND SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Findings of the FGDs informed the construction of a questionnaire targeting 600 Syrian refugees and 600 Lebanese nationals in the Bekaa and Akkar. The questionnaire design also built on previous research reports on Lebanese-Syrian relations (as summarized earlier) and on the social psychological literature. The aim was to produce a multidimensional assessment of the factors that

² Although Kwachra is in the Middle Dreib area outside of Wadi Khaled, we included it in the “Wadi Khaled region” rather than “Akkar Sahel region” because of its rural nature and geographical proximity to Wadi Khaled.

might be straining relations between the two groups and to identify through these various social cohesion indicators the locations that require interventions. Before engaging in the main data collection, a pilot study assessing the strength and weaknesses of the questionnaire was conducted on a small sample of participants in Bebnine Akkar (10 Syrian and 10 Lebanese participants). The pilot field report and preliminary exploration of responses led to minor (linguistic) revisions to the questionnaire.

Instruments Used:

The final questionnaires consisted of a number of scales assessing social cohesion in both communities and are displayed in full in appendix A. Measures in the survey included: Prejudicial Attitudes (Stephan et al., 1998), Relational Attitudes (adapted from Haddock et al., 1993), Perceived Threats (Stephan and Stephan, 2000), Intergroup Contact (Islam & Hewstone, 1993), Life Satisfaction (Pavot, & Diener, 1993), Justice Perceptions (adapted from Colquitt, 2001), Efficacy, Collective Action, and satisfaction with aid distribution (adapted from Fritz Institute, 2007).

3) STAGE 3: SURVEY IN AKKAR & THE BEKAA

The third stage involved a survey of 1200 participants from 16 locations in the Bekaa (Bar Elias, Qob Elias, Majdal Anjar, Al Marj, Majdaloun/Taybi, Housh Refaa, and Saaidy camp) and Akkar (Bebnine, Borj al Arab, Mhammara, Kwachra, Tal Hayat, Qonieh, Hisheh, Machta Hamoud and Machta Hassan). Participants were selected from all the locations/Municipalities that benefited from Save the Children's CLI. Information International, a Beirut-based research and consulting firm that conducts market and feasibility studies and social and economic research was contracted to conduct the field work. The field work was started on February 19, 2014 and was completed on February 26, 2014³.

Four hundred participants were selected from the Bekaa region (200x2), 500 participants were selected from Sahel Akkar (250x2) and 300 participants from Wadi Khaled (150x2)⁴. Random sampling was used within each of the three regions as per sampling descriptions below.

B. Sampling Procedure:

Based on UNHCR and Save the Children population data provided by Save the Children and UNHCR (see Table 1 below), Information International distributed the number of questionnaires allocated to each village proportionally between Syrian refugees in ITS and non-ITS locations.

For ITS residents, Information International adopted a systematic random sampling, based on the number of tents available in the selected location. For both Lebanese nationals and Syrian Refugees not residing in ITS, Information International adopted a multi-stage probability sampling to ensure a random, representative sample for identifying households and main respondents. The first stage consisted of selecting relevant neighborhoods inside each selected village, the second stage consisted of selecting households based on a systematic random sample in each selected neighborhood according to the estimated number of buildings in the neighborhood, and finally the third stage was sampling a primary respondent within each household based on the most recent birthday.

³ Due to sampling issues, a 2nd round of data collection for 400 participants in the Bekaa was conducted between March 28 and April 7, 2014.

⁴ FGD sessions pointed to three distinct regional dynamics, and thus required sufficient sample sizes in each location to allow for adequate statistical analyses. This weighing was also needed because of the large differences in population size across the 16 locations.

Table 1: Syrian and Lebanese Population and Sample data in Akkar and the Bekaa

Village Name	Population Data ⁵		Sample Data ⁶		
	SC Lebanese residents Numbers	Syrian Refugees – SC 2014	Lebanese Participants	Syrian Refugees: ITS	Syrian Refugees: Non ITS
Bebnine	40,000	13,700	165	7	123
Borj al Arab	7,000	3,500	30	7	25
Mhammara	10,000	4,600	41	12	32
Kwachra	2,500	1,200	14	8	12
Tal El Hayat	3,500	4,600	18	38	6
Qonieh	2,000	850	14	1	13
Hisheh	2,800	4,200	20	8	59
Machta Hassan	6,350	850	45	1	13
Machta Hammoud	7,500	2,127	53	2	33
Barelias	60,000	20,000	70	29	40
Qabelias	55,000	15,000	64	17	35
Majdal Anjar	25,000	10,000	29	5	29
Al Marj	20,000	10,000	23	7	27
Majdaloun/Taybi	4,000	1,010	5	3	0
Housh Refaa	5,000	1,530	6	6	0
Saaidy	3,000	520	3	2	0
TOTAL	253,650	93,687	600	153	447

C. Sample Descriptives:

The majority of Syrian refugees were married (82.7%), and almost three quarters were unemployed (71.5%). Furthermore, the large majority of Syrian refugees had a basic education (65.2%), and a small minority had a secondary education (11.2%), or were reported as illiterate (16.7%). By contrast, only half the Lebanese sample were married (57.2%), and almost half had a basic education (46.2%), while a third had a secondary degree (31.7%). A staggering 40.5% of Lebanese participants stated they were currently unemployed. These rates varied by area, with unemployment rates in Wadi Khaled, Sahel Akkar and Bekaa of 58%, 44% and 23% respectively. Furthermore, the educational profile of Lebanese participants also differed by area: in the Bekaa, half the Lebanese had a secondary degree (45.5%) and a quarter had a basic education (26.5%), while in Sahel Akkar half the participants had a basic education (46%) and a quarter had a secondary degree (16.6%). In Wadi Khaled, three quarters of the Lebanese participants had only a basic education (72.7%), and a fifth had a secondary degree (20%). A majority of both Syrian refugees (99%) and Lebanese nationals (94%) were Muslim Sunni. Importantly, the average monthly household income for the Lebanese stood at US\$ 802.67 ($SD^7 = 823.33$) and for Syrian Refugees at US\$ 259.46 ($SD = 200.95$). Furthermore, both populations were relatively young,

⁵ Latest population data were obtained from Save the Children and UNHCR databases

⁶ There was a 91% response rate for Syrian Refugees, and a 94% response rate for Lebanese nationals

⁷ SD refers to standard deviation, a measure of dispersion of the variable.

with an average age of 33.96 ($SD = 11.57$) years for the Lebanese and 34.96 ($SD = 11.37$) years for Syrian Refugees.

Table 2: Distribution of the Educational level of Participants

Educational Level	Syrian Refugees		Lebanese Nationals	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Illiterate	<u>100</u>	<u>16.7</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>2.5</u>
Elementary/Intermediate	<u>391</u>	<u>65.2</u>	<u>277</u>	<u>46.2</u>
Secondary	67	11.2	<u>190</u>	<u>31.7</u>
University/BA/BS	25	4.2	68	11.3
Graduate Studies	0	0	4	0.7
Vocational	2	0.3	26	4.3
DK/NA	15	2.5	20	3.3
<i>Total</i>	<i>600</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>600</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Table 3: Gender, Marital, and Employment Status of Participants

		Syrian Refugees%	Lebanese Nationals%
Gender	Male	53.8	<u>59.2</u>
	Female	46.2	40.8
Marital Status	Single	14.5	41
	Married	<u>82.7</u>	57.2
	Widowed/Divorced	2.8	1.8
Employment status	Employed	28.5	59.5

Three quarters (74.52%) of all Syrian refugees sampled were registered with the UNHCR and were receiving aid, while a quarter of refugees were either not registered or not receiving aid (7.5% and 18% respectively). Furthermore, a quarter of the Syrian Refugee participants were from ITS ($N = 153$; 25.5%) and the remainder resided in municipalities ($N = 447$; 74.5%). Syrians from ITS constituted 34.5% of Syrians in Bekaa, 25.6% of Syrians in Sahel Akkar, and 13.3% of Syrians in Wadi Khaled.

The average time Syrian Refugees have spent in Lebanon is 12.5 months ($SD = 7.3$). As figure 1 below shows, three large waves of refugees are noted starting January 2012, with spikes every 6 months. The largest influx happened a year ago, with no major increases since.

III- RESULTS



A. Focus Group Discussions

1) Focus Group Discussions on CLI:

We aimed to test the validity of the underlying assumptions of the CLI project, and assess whether the various components of the initiative (selection of beneficiaries, team composition, community committee, daily wage rate, duration of the project, choice of the site improvement projects, procedures used to ensure accountability) reinforced or harmed community cohesion. The themes emerging from the discussions are presented next.

Recruitment strategies & biases: The SC teams reported implementing different recruitment strategies for the CLI in the Bekaa and Akkar. In Akkar, CLI was advertised through posters in main spaces in the town and via text messages. Participants were recruited on a first come first serve basis. In the Bekaa, however, the organization relied on municipalities and Syrian community leaders to select participants. The approach adopted in the Bekaa created a serious selection bias that harmed the CLI objectives as it would reinforce perceptions of bias, cronyism, and corruption, and would further increase social tensions between and within the communities.

Recruitment targets & biases: SC staff in Akkar reported initial difficulties recruiting participants and reaching their target numbers even though participants noted that demand exceeded supply, especially among Syrian refugees. SC staff in the Bekaa speculated that some reasons for low Lebanese participation in their area might be the low wages paid or what the chores imply in terms of



social standing. This imbalance in the work teams defeats one of the main goals of the CLI.

While the original project included directives to include women in the CLI, few women were targeted or participated in the initiative. Some FGD participants commented on the inappropriateness of the tasks for women employment (e.g. construction work) and referred to potential problems when genders are publicly mixed in conservative communities.

Equal Status Cooperative Contact: Two main conditions for a successful outcome in mixed group interactions are that members are of equal status, and that work is cooperative rather than competitive in nature. Both these conditions were violated in the implementation of CLI in Akkar. In both Sahel Akkar and Wadi Khaled, hierarchy was re-affirmed through the selection of mostly Lebanese nationals as team leaders, reinforcing social dominance orientations the CLI was supposed to challenge. In some locations, Syrian and Lebanese participants refused to work in mixed teams, and labored separately (e.g. Bebnine in Akkar, and some locations in Bekaa, particularly in contexts involving working in ITS). In Wadi Khaled, Lebanese participants indicated that assigning Syrian team leaders over Lebanese laborers would be problematic. Nevertheless, future applications of the CLI need to take a firmer position in the recruitment and assignment of participants (see recommendations in discussion, p. 28).

Types of casual labor activity: Some of the reported types of casual labor activities included cleaning of public areas and infrastructure improvements. Cleaning activities were reported by some to be problematic for two reasons: 1) the work was perceived as demeaning and led to drop outs in participation and 2) it led to negative experiences, with some Syrian refugees experiencing abusive and condescending comments from members of the public (especially in Sahel Akkar).

Informational and Procedural Justice: Several complaints were raised about mis-information about the CLI in both the Bekaa and Akkar, leading potential participants to be confused about goals, type of work, payment procedures, duration of the project, intended beneficiaries etc.; this confusion led to both an increase in drop-outs and anger upon completing the works. Furthermore, some participants complained about their inability to provide adequate feedback, either because no contact numbers were provided or because feedback was solicited in public and thus discouraged candid evaluations (privacy, coercion). Some participants complained that there was no health insurance plan in case of accidental injuries on the job.

Overall Participant Appraisal of CLI: Despite the negative comments made above, participants across most of the FGD groups praised the CLI, and wished it to continue, with higher wages and for a longer duration of time. The projects were perceived to increase income generation sources, to improve the municipality's infrastructure and general conditions of living, even if for a short duration. While municipalities welcomed the CLI, a few felt they were not sufficiently consulted on the types of work implemented, while others were concerned about the short temporal nature of the CLI, preferring more sustained development solutions.

2) Focus Group Discussions on Social Cohesion

We aimed to identify the factors that are increasing tensions between the two communities. The themes emerging from the focus group discussions are presented next.

Economic threats: Lebanese participants across locations complained of high levels of unemployment, and blamed Syrian refugees for unfair competition (willingness to work for lower wages while receiving international humanitarian aid). Many expressed suspicion towards Syrian refugee intentions, claiming that refugees were in Lebanon for personal economic gains rather than for safety and security. While many had originally welcomed Syrian refugees to their town, they now complained of strained infrastructure and drained resources. Sewage networks, national electricity and

water supplies were no longer sufficient to support the sudden population surge, with many municipality leaders warning of catastrophic breakdowns.

Existential threats: Perceptions of existential threats varied in kind, and by region. Some Lebanese nationals in the Bekaa and Akkar perceive Syrian refugees as a source of criminality and a threat to women (honor, status). Municipality leaders reported no noticeable increase in criminal behavior, and most altercations were of the interpersonal (rather than organized) type. Wadi Khaled provided a differentiated profile, with both Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals reporting negligible levels of tension in these heavily tribal areas. Threats, they said, came mostly from shelling from the Syrian border. On the other hand, Syrian refugees reported being both physically and verbally harassed and discriminated against in Sahel Akkar, but reported no significant difficulties in the Bekaa. Altercations in Sahel Akkar (especially around ITS) sometimes turned violent, leading to loss of property. Syrian refugees in all three locations felt that shelter security is quite precarious, with rampant threats of eviction amidst rising housing costs.

Symbolic threats: Surprisingly, Lebanese nationals in both the Bekaa and Sahel Akkar complained of values dissimilarities with Syrian refugees. In particular, they stated that Syrian refugees engaged in alcohol consumption (not an encouraged practice within these communities), and that refugees stayed up late on the streets, when the locals slept much earlier. This was especially more pronounced in Sahel Akkar. These views were not shared by Syrian refugees, and contrast with a World Bank Report (2013) that assumed Syrian refugees would be more conservative than their Lebanese counterparts.

Sexual exploitation, harassment and threats: Lebanese nationals and officials in both Sahel Akkar and the Bekaa mentioned cases of prostitution among Syrian women, and reported that some property owners were sexually exploiting refugees for rent. Some Lebanese women were reportedly threatened by their husbands taking on a second wife (Sahel Akkar). On the other hand, Syrian refugees complained about humiliation and the public verbal harassment of some Syrian women by Lebanese men in Sahel Akkar. Sexual exploitation and harassment were less prevalent in Bekaa, and were not reported in Wadi Khaled.

Corruption and Discrimination: Corruption perceptions and accusations were reported by both communities. Lebanese nationals perceived Syrian refugees as abusing the aid system, selling goods and aid vouchers, claiming multiple benefits from different aid organizations or different locations (municipalities), registering as refugees when they've resided in Lebanon for years prior to the Syrian crisis, or working for low wages while receiving financial assistance. Interestingly, Lebanese participants in coastal Akkar also expressed anger against Lebanese property and business owners as prime beneficiaries of the Refugee crisis – forcing Syrian refugees to work for low wages, and extracting highly inflated rents for shabby accommodations.

Some Syrian refugees in both the Bekaa and Sahel Akkar complained of exploitation and discrimination in food stores, where they had to pay higher prices than Lebanese nationals for the same goods. They also complained about coercion to buy goods from a select number of aid organization partner stores, some of which blatantly exploited the refugees' plight for profit in the absence of true competition. Syrian refugees in Sahel Akkar also noted discrimination in healthcare, with pharmacies at times refusing to provide them with medicine, or hospitals charging higher prices for medical services. Refugees in Sahel Akkar also reported cases of miscarriages and deaths when refugees were denied access to hospital services if they could not front a 100% of the bill. both SC staff and Syrian participants spoke of an emerging black market where Syrian refugees sell their food vouchers for less than their monetary value in return for cash, apparently to cover rent and healthcare expenses, which are not (fully) covered by existing aid schemes.

Grievances toward INGOs: Among the Lebanese, the primary grievance toward INGOs is a widespread feeling of unfairness in that INGOs are only targeting Syrian refugees, offering them food, clothes, healthcare, fuel, education, employment and training, when the Lebanese are themselves struggling to access these same goods and services. Furthermore, some Lebanese perceived INGOs as selective in their partnerships with local businesses and in their hiring procedures, leading to further tensions within the community (this was especially pronounced in Wadi Khaled).

All Syrian participants without exception complained about the UNHCR exclusion from aid policy. They perceived the criteria for exclusion to be random and unfair, and the process of appeal lengthy, costly (transport wise), and often ineffective. This is compounded by their untenable status vis-à-vis the Lebanese government, as many are unable to pay the 200 US\$ entry/residency permit fee or are unable to re-cross the border to acquire/renew their permit for security reasons.

Furthermore, Syrian participants living outside ITS noted across all focus groups that they were severely and unfairly disadvantaged in terms of humanitarian aid compared to Syrian refugees living in ITS. All FGD participants (SC staff, Municipality leaders, and Lebanese and Syrian participants) concurred and recommended a shift of attention. Non-ITS refugees may be reluctant to seek aid and may shy away from the media spotlight (pride and dignity).

Syrian participants across all locations complained of perceived corruption among aid organizations, claiming that some refugees bribed their way back onto the aid lists and, that some employees were selling aid vouchers. Some participants complained about diverted funds and resources to intermediaries, and complained about unfulfilled promises (registration, aid, follow ups, etc.). They also commented on aid organizations' rapid expansions at the expense of refugee needs (e.g. high wages, excessive amount of new cars, etc.).

Collective action: Syrian participants in the Bekaa and Sahel Akkar expressed low interest in engaging in collective action against the Lebanese out of fear of being arrested, jailed, and deported or for fear for their families' safety. They felt that authorities would not be sympathetic to their complaints, and they tried to solve their conflicts through their contacts and networks. Municipality leaders did not allow Syrian refugees to engage in political activism, or any form of collective action, and many neighboring municipalities reportedly placed curfews to restrict refugee movements beyond certain hours or specific locations.

Some municipality leaders in the Bekaa and Wadi Khaled proposed that the tribal system in their areas acted as a deterrent for Lebanese-Syrian conflicts, because individual conflicts could easily turn collective.

In all three locations, Lebanese collective actions against Syrian refugees were reported. These took the form of protests to the municipalities and other authorities, threats against Syrians, evictions, verbal abuse and physical violence against Syrians, and destruction of their property. On the other hand, Syrian refugees' anger targeted INGOs and showed rudimentary forms of organizational action. Refugee actions varied from protest against UNHCR policies, to physical altercations and rowdiness towards aid distribution workers.

Future outlook: Almost all Syrian participants expressed pessimism about the future and expected their situation to get worse, citing shrinking aid, increased influx of refugees, and no end to the Syrian conflicts in sight. Many wished to return to Syria, especially as they described feelings of humiliation in Lebanon, but they feared detention by Syrian authorities. Lebanese participants, including

municipality leaders, also expected the situation to get worse, and appealed for increases in aid to both communities and a greater intervention and involvement from the Lebanese government.

B. Survey Analyses



1) Casual Labor Initiative

The Casual Labor Initiative affected about 8000 beneficiaries in a total population exceeding half a million individuals (i.e. less than 2% of the population). This is reflected in the sample size of participants recruited for the survey, with 8.5 % of Lebanese and 7.3% of Syrian participants stating they participated in CLI⁸. Overall, those who participated in the CLI tended to be satisfied with their experience (76.8% reporting a positive evaluation), but Lebanese participants reported more positive evaluations than did Syrian participants (91% vs. 61.4%). Interestingly, 17.2% of Lebanese participants and 14.3% of Syrian refugees⁹ stated that someone within their family participated in the CLI.

Working in Mixed Groups: Attitudes towards working in mixed groups differed substantially between the two communities: a majority of Lebanese nationals (55.1%) were not in favor of working in mixed groups, with only a quarter (23.7%) expressing favorable attitudes. By contrast, a majority of Syrian refugees expressed favorable attitudes to working in mixed groups (55%), and only a minority expressed negative attitudes (20.5%).

Further analyses indicated large disparities between regions: Almost 40% of Lebanese nationals residing in Wadi Khaled were willing to work in mixed groups compared to less than 20% in Sahel Akkar, where two thirds of the population rated mixed work negatively. Opinions were relatively equally divided in the Bekaa. By contrast, Syrian refugees were favorable to working in mixed groups across areas, and especially so in Wadi Khaled. Among Lebanese youths, willingness to work with Syrians in mixed groups is low in Bekaa and Sahel Akkar, but relatively high in Wadi Khaled (slightly below midpoint).

As Appendix B shows, the only municipality where a majority of Lebanese attitudes to working in mixed groups were positive were in Tal al Hayat (57%). About 40% of residents in Machta Hammoud, Machta Hassan and Kwachra (Wadi Khaled) expressed positive attitudes. On the other hand, more than 66% of Lebanese participants in Hicheh, Mhammara, Bebnine and Borj el Arab expressed negative attitudes towards working in mixed groups. By comparison, over 60% of Syrian refugees in Qob Elias, Hicheh, Machta Hammoud and Tal el Hayat had positive attitudes, and only in Machta Hammoud did a majority of refugees express negative attitudes. CLI interventions in locations where negative attitudes predominate will face serious field challenges, and would require



⁸ Numbers are higher than the population because we surveyed only municipalities that had participated in CLI activities. Adding other municipalities would probably half those estimates.

⁹ Lower numbers for Syrian refugees may be due to over sampling for the CLI of Syrian refugees within ITS


additional attention during implementation. On the other hand, CLI interventions in locations where positive attitudes predominate are likely to be easier to implement and may propagate positive intercommunity feelings. Troubled areas may require a more sustained development effort.

2) Social Cohesion

The survey included key variables associated with intergroup dynamics and that are known to predict collective action. These variables include Contact (quantity and quality), Threat Perceptions (Existential, Symbolic, Economic, and Status/Honor), Justice (Interactional and Distributive), and Emotions (positive and negative emotions towards outgroups). We also included perceptions of corruption, a measure that a) identifies potential targets of collective action and b) provides an indirect measure of trust in specific actors. We also measured readiness of violence through collective action items (towards outgroup, INGOs, and state institutions) and a subjective assessment of conflict potential. Finally, we measured support for discriminatory policies against Syrian refugees among Lebanese nationals. We first provide an analysis of each of the main predictors, and then provide an overall assessment for collective action.

a. Contact Quantity and Quality

A quarter of Lebanese nationals and a quarter of Syrian refugees had never come in contact with one another (24% and 25.5% respectively). Almost half of the Lebanese and Syrians population come in frequent contact with one another. There is significantly less contact between the two communities in Akkar than in the Bekaa, but the quality of the interaction is assessed similarly across regions.



The quality of contact differed between the two communities – with a quarter of Lebanese nationals (25.8%) and almost half of Syrian refugees (41%) expressing positive contact. Small minorities in both communities (15.2% Lebanese, 4.3% Syrian refugees) expressed negative experiences, while the rest of participants experienced neither a pleasant nor an unpleasant interaction.

An exploration of contact quality across municipality for those who do have contact shows a more positive than negative contact for Lebanese nationals in Bar Elias, but the opposite pattern in Qab Elias (see Appendix C for details). Bebnine, which also sees a large quantity of interactions, provided a mixed assessment, with equal levels of negative and positive contact. Syrian refugees provided a contrasting profile, with more negative than positive contact reported in all large municipalities (e.g. Qab Elias, Bar Elias, Bebnine, and Mhammara). Contact quality was mixed in smaller municipalities.

b. Threat Perceptions:

Threat perceptions were analyzed along four dimensions: Existential (threat to life, material property), Symbolic (threat to value system and worldview), Economic (threat to economic livelihood), and Status-Honor (threat to social status and personal/family honor). Lebanese participants perceived Syrian refugees as a threat on all four dimensions, while Syrian refugees perceived Lebanese nationals as symbolic and economic threats only.


Table 4: Threat Perceptions across nationality and region

Nationality	Region	Threat %			
		Symbolic	Economic	Existential	Status-Honour
Lebanese Nationals	Bekaa	94.5	93.5	60.5	66.5
	Sahel Akkar	94	89.6	82	78
	Wadi Khaled	97.3	98.6	66.1	66.7
Syrian Refugees	Bekaa	56	71	8.5	23
	Sahel Akkar	79.6	54.4	29.2	34.8
	Wadi Khaled	83	84	20.7	28.8

Note: numbers are percentages of participants who scored under the midpoint three (e.g. threat perception).

Blue indicates low threat perceptions, yellow indicates moderate threat perceptions, & red indicates high threat perceptions.

As table 4 above indicates, there are clear differences between regions and nationalities. There is a near ceiling effect for Lebanese nationals on both symbolic and economic threat, with over 90% of participants stating Syrian refugees are a threat to their economic livelihood and to their value system. Moreover, over sixty percent of Lebanese nationals perceive Syrian refugees as an existential and a status-honour threat. This is particularly more pronounced in Sahel Akkar.



On the other hand, a majority of Syrian refugees perceive Lebanese nationals as a symbolic and an economic threat. There are clear value differences between Syrian refugees and Lebanese Nationals in Akkar (compared to Bekaa), and a significant economic threat perception in Wadi Khaled and Bekaa. A majority of Syrian refugees did not see Lebanese nationals as a significant existential or status/honor threat¹⁰.

¹⁰ It may be that Syrian refugees reported lower existential and status honor threats because local threats may be less severe than current threats in Syria.

We conducted further analyses to explore threat perceptions at the municipality levels, and focused on Existential and Status/Honor threats for the Lebanese (other threats suffer a ceiling effect), and Symbolic Threat for Syrian refugees (highest threat perception). None of the Syrian refugee samples had means below the midpoint on existential or status honor threats.




The figures below display the bar graphs of existential and status-honor threats across municipalities, with scores below 3 indicating higher perceptions of threat.

All municipalities sampled except Kwachra and Qonieh estimated Syrian Refugees to constitute high levels of existential threats. These perceptions were particularly high in Sahel Akkar, with the three municipalities of Bebnine, Bourj el Arab and Tal el Hayat scoring highest.

Similar trends were noted for Status-Honor threats, with Kwachra and Qonieh nationals reporting the least amount of threat perceptions (Wadi Khaled), while municipalities of Tal el Hayat, Bourj el Arab and Bebnine reporting some of the highest scores¹¹. None of the Syrian samples scored below the midpoint across municipalities on status and honor threat perceptions.

On the other hand, Syrian refugees residing in all municipalities in Wadi Khaled areas (e.g. Kwachra, Qonieh, Hicheh, Machta Hassan) perceived Lebanese nationals as a serious symbolic threat. However, in Tal El Hayat, symbolic threat perceptions were lower than in all other areas.

In sum, Lebanese nationals in Akkar (especially Sahel Akkar) perceived Syrian refugees as both an existential and status/honor threats more than residents in the Bekaa did. On the other hand, the value system of Syrian refugees is under threat in the tribal areas of Wadi Khaled, possibly because the plurality of refugees in Wadi Khaled do not share the tribal value system that dominates the area.




¹¹ There may be a differential within Wadi Khaled, with Hicheh and Machta Hassan scoring opposite to Qonieh and Kwachra. These may reflect tribal differences and distribution in the area.

c. Emotional Experience:



Emotions tend to play important mediating roles between attitudes and collective action, and often constitute a motivational drive for action (both in their negative and positive valences). We explore distributions of negative and positive emotions across regions and nationalities.

Interestingly, emotional experiences between the two communities differ greatly. Syrian Refugees expressed feeling positive emotions in all three regions, and felt no negativity towards the Lebanese. On the other hand, Lebanese nationals felt differently by region towards Syrian refugees. While Lebanese nationals in the Bekaa showed almost a similar profile to Syrian refugees (experiencing positive emotions and the absence of negative ones), nationals in both Sahel Akkar and Wadi Khaled expressed feeling less of both emotions. Importantly, Sahel Akkar residents tended to experience more negative than positive emotions towards Syrian refugees – and perceived positive emotions significantly less than both Bekaa and Wadi Khaled nationals.



d. Corruption Perceptions:

Corruption perceptions differed between the communities and regions. Syrian Refugees reported favorable evaluations of local authorities (ISF, family leaders and Municipality officials), but perceived INGOs and local businesspersons and landlords as significantly corrupt. Health services were rated as most corrupt. Almost a third of Syrian refugees rated INGOs as corrupt, and almost half perceived the health care system and businesspersons and landlords as corrupt. Regional analyses indicate that landlords and businesspersons were perceived as significantly more corrupt in the Bekaa and Wadi Khaled than in Sahel Akkar. The health care system was evaluated negatively in the Bekaa, but less so in Akkar. INGOs were perceived significantly negatively in Wadi Khaled, and borderline in Bekaa and Sahel Akkar. In other words, action to reform health care services in the Bekaa and INGOs operations in Wadi Khaled would significantly improve Syrian refugee perceptions.




Lebanese nationals on the other hand expressed their most favorable attitudes towards family leaders (importance of local community networks) and the ISF, and provided average evaluations of municipality officials, INGOs and health care systems. They rated local businesspersons and landlords as significantly corrupt. A fifth of Lebanese nationals (21.3%) perceived INGOs as corrupt, and half (47.2%) estimated businesspersons and landlords as such.

On the other hand, regional analyses indicated that Lebanese nationals expressed less corruption concerns than their Syrian counterparts, expressing more favorable opinions towards the health care system and INGOs across regions. However, these positive ratings are marginal in Sahel Akkar, where perceptions of corruption were more generalized. Landlords and businesspersons were rated as particularly corrupt in Wadi Khaled.

e. Justice Perceptions

We assessed Syrian Refugees' assessment of INGOs services through two measures of Justice Perceptions: Distributive Justice (fairness, equal treatment, bias free allocation of aid) and Interpersonal Justice (Dignity and respect of persons). While Syrian refugees reported low levels of mistreatment, they did report high levels of unfairness and bias from INGOs.

Inspection of results across regions indicate significant distributive justice problems in the Bekaa (between 25 and 60% of participants reported dissatisfaction with distributive justice), and somewhat lower levels in Sahel Akkar and Wadi Khaled. Furthermore, there were more complaints of interpersonal injustice in the Bekaa than in Akkar (10-15% of participants report dissatisfaction; numbers would increase to 25-30% if midpoint responses are included).




f. Lebanese support for discriminatory policies

While high levels of negative emotions and widespread perceptions of threat may increase support for discriminatory policies, the levels of support for discriminatory policies measured in the Lebanese community were staggering.

90% of Lebanese nationals in Akkar and 74% in the Bekaa would like to stop receiving Syrian refugees altogether, and would like to see them leave immediately, and similar rates would like to forbid them access to work.

Over 90% across all three areas supported nightly curfews against Syrian refugees, and another 90% supported restricting the political freedoms of Syrian refugees.



Support for discriminatory policies was less severe in the Bekaa region when it came to creating refugee camps or allowing refugees access to work. Interestingly, corruption perceptions regarding municipality leaders as well as

business owners and landlords are relatively lower among the Lebanese in the Bekaa than in other areas. Support for discriminatory policies was particularly pronounced in Wadi Khaled.

3) Collective Action:



We assessed the likelihood of intercommunity violence both directly and indirectly through questions assessing participants' subjective estimate of conflict (indirect) and participants' willingness to support violent forms of collective action against specific targets (direct).

Estimating violence between the two communities:

There were significant differences between the two communities in their estimate of intercommunity violence, with Syrian refugees assessing it as unlikely while Lebanese nationals thinking the opposite.

Specifically, two thirds of Lebanese nationals in both the Bekaa and Sahel Akkar, and half of Lebanese nationals in Wadi Khaled estimated violence as likely. By contrast less than a fifth (<20%) of Syrian refugees believed this to be so.

Closer inspection of scores per municipality shows a heterogeneous pattern of estimates across regions. The population size of the municipality appeared to be a better indicator of negative estimates, with the most pessimistic ratings in Qob Elias, Majdal Anjar, Bebnine, and Bar el Elias. Surprisingly, Tal el Hayat participants expressed the most conservative estimates with a majority of the population perceiving conflict as unlikely.



Collective Action¹²:

We assessed support for violence by analyzing data in two ways: the percentage of respondents who support violence at least a little (scores lower than 5 on violence scales¹³) and those who support violence to a large or great extent (scores lower than scale midpoint). The former identifies popular base support for violence, and the latter identifies municipalities where people might move from support to the actual use of violence. In our analyses, we flag areas which show both a noteworthy percentage of people who support violence (base support, $\geq 20\%$) and a noteworthy percentage who would engage in violence ($\geq 10\%$). Areas which show a relatively high percentage of people who support violence to a large or great extent, but a low percentage of people who support


¹² Readiness for violence items were highly inter-correlated, indicating generalization across targets. Furthermore, predictor variables (e.g. contact, threat, etc.) tended to have small prediction coefficients (small variance explained).

¹³ Figures presented in Appendix D

violence at least a little, are not flagged as violence in those locations is likely to result from small isolated groups.

Support for violence among Syrians:

Among Syrian refugees, there was very high support for violence against INGOs in Machta Hassan, and support in Bebnine, and Machta Hammoud. Furthermore, Bebnine showed noteworthy support for violence against both Lebanese nationals and authorities.




Syrian youths and Syrian refugees living outside ITS, showed noteworthy support for violence against INGOs, Lebanese people and Lebanese authorities in Sahel Akkar. Among Syrians in ITS, there was relatively little to no support for violence against any target in all three areas.

In sum, Syrian refugees residing in the communities in Akkar were more likely to engage in violence against INGOs (especially in Machta Hassan), and were particularly ready for violence against all targets in Bebnine.

Support for Violence among Lebanese nationals:

There was high support for violence against INGOs in Tal el Hayat, followed by Machta Hassan (both in Akkar), and Bar Elias. There was also relatively high support for violence against Syrian refugees in Tal el Hayat, Qonieh, Borj el Arab, Machta Hassan (all in Akkar), followed by El Marj, Bar Elias, Bebnine, Majdal Anjar and borderline support in Qab Elias (mostly Bekaa). Furthermore, there was noteworthy support for violence against Lebanese authorities in Majdal Anjar, and borderline support in Bar Elias, Bebnine and el Marj. Lebanese youths showed noteworthy support for violence against INGOs and Lebanese authorities in Bekaa and Sahel Akkar, and they showed noteworthy support for violence against Syrian refugees in all three areas.






4) Differences between CLI beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on social cohesion indicators:

We assessed the impact of the CLI by comparing beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on social cohesion indicators. About 17% of Lebanese nationals and 14% of Syrian refugees were either direct beneficiaries or had someone within their family directly benefit from the CLI (indirect beneficiaries), and were thus considered “beneficiaries of the CLI” project in the analysis below¹⁴.

Among Syrian refugees, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries had similar levels of positive and negative emotions toward the Lebanese and similar willingness to work in mixed groups. However, compared to non-beneficiaries, CLI beneficiaries had lower levels of symbolic, existential, and status and honor threat perceptions (8-14% lower), but higher perceptions of economic threat (17.6% higher). This economic threat perception was accompanied by perceptions of greater corruption of business owners, landlords, and medical and healthcare institutions. Furthermore, compared to Syrian non-beneficiaries, CLI beneficiaries expressed marginally lower estimates of violent conflict (4% lower) and lower support for violence against all targets (averaging 10% decrease across targets).

Among Lebanese participants, positive emotions, economic and existential threat perceptions, willingness to work in mixed groups, estimates of violent conflict, support for night curfews, creation of refugee camps and forbidding Syrians to engage in political activity had similar levels across both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. However, negative emotions toward Syrian refugees were lower compared to non-beneficiaries. Furthermore, compared to non-beneficiaries, CLI beneficiaries had more positive attitudes toward Syrians, lower symbolic and status and honor threat perceptions (averaging 7%



¹⁴ We combined both direct and indirect beneficiaries because the small numbers of the former did not permit separate analyses.

decrease across the two targets), and lower support for violence against Syrians and against INGOs (8-12% lower). Furthermore, support for policies that forbid Syrians from working were substantially lower among beneficiaries (65%) than among non-beneficiaries (82.1%). Surprisingly, however, support for violence against Lebanese authorities was higher among beneficiaries than among non-beneficiaries by about 5%. These results merit further investigation.

The present data is cross-sectional in nature and does not allow us to conclude whether the CLI had a direct causal effect on social cohesion indicators. It could be, for instance, that participants whose family members were interested in partaking in CLI had a different social psychological profile than those that were not interested in partaking in CLI. Furthermore, both the small effects detected and the small sample size of beneficiaries prevent firm statistical conclusions, and thus statements made above should be handled with care. Nevertheless, and in many ways, the present results are encouraging as they show that CLI beneficiaries tended to fare better than non-beneficiaries on many social cohesion indicators.

IV- Discussion

A. Main Findings, Conceptual Assessment and Recommendations

1) Casual Labor Initiative

The Casual Labor Initiative that was recently implemented directly employed about 8000 individuals. However, the CLI implementation suffered from serious methodological biases that may have negatively affected the expected social cohesion outcomes.

Intergroup contact theorists and researchers (e.g. Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011) recognize four main necessary conditions for an effective intergroup contact: a) members of both groups must have equal status within the contact situation (e.g. equal opportunity for participation and for shaping the rules of the interaction), b) the groups must jointly work to achieve common goals, c) group members must cooperate (rather than compete) to achieve those goals, and d) institutional authorities must support the intergroup contact. These conditions facilitate the reduction of prejudice but are not necessary for it to occur. Accordingly, the idea of creating mixed teams equally divided between Syrians and Lebanese to work cooperatively on a common project (public works) with equal remuneration and with the support of Syrian and Lebanese community leaders should theoretically be effective in helping to reduce intergroup prejudice between Lebanese and Syrians refugees.

However, some features of the CLI do not necessarily meet the aforementioned criteria. Regarding the equal status condition, intergroup mixing did not always occur, and when it did, the number of Syrians and Lebanese participants was not necessarily equal. Furthermore, team leadership tended to be assigned to Lebanese participants. While we do recognize the difficulties and challenges of applying CLI in the field, we strongly recommend adhering to the recruitment methodologies initially set, namely respecting allocation quotas (e.g. 50%) and equality status. Many members in both communities may perceive the inherent difference between refugees and citizens as a de facto dividing and hierarchical categorization that would prevent equal status between members. This threat may be diminished if interactions within mixed groups are continuously monitored to avoid hierarchical dynamics from emerging. Relatedly, SC staff need to be cautious when assigning team leaders and supervisors to groups since bias may undermine the equal status condition. To maintain this necessary condition, it is preferable not to have a leader at all - if feasible. Alternatively, the leader position could be *randomly* selected by SC staff in front of team members, or rotated amongst different group members on a daily basis, or held by a third party (e.g. an SC staff member)¹⁵.

Regarding the common goals condition, SC may need to refrain from implementing CLI projects in ITS. Projects in ITS may reinforce perceptions of favoritism and do not constitute common goals to all participants. Hence, at this point in time it could be best to focus on activities which are easily seen to benefit both groups and which involve durable outcomes. Regarding the cooperation condition, there was no evidence in the focus groups that this was violated as the works selected require cooperation rather than competition. Finally, regarding the institutional support condition, there was evidence that some municipalities did not feel sufficiently consulted on the projects. Thus, it is important to increase the consultation of municipalities about the types of projects needed and those that would be suitable for a sustained development strategy (participatory governance). Importantly, if the four conditions for a successful intergroup contact situation cannot be met, then a CLI should not be implemented, as interactions are likely to backfire and feed tensions and prejudice. The problems

¹⁵ Equal status condition may prove challenging in places where few refugees are living in ITS and most are treated as “guests” in the locals’ own homes (e.g. Wadi Khaled). Requesting guests to take a leadership position over hosts may be uncourteous.

related to the implementation of the CLI and that were reported in the focus group discussions might account for some of the differential impact of CLI on Syrian and Lebanese participants.

Additionally, other important criteria (listed below) need to be met in order to maximize the social cohesion outcomes of CLI. First, recruitment of participants need to be clearly and visibly identified as a random process or on a “first come first served” basis to avoid perceptions of favoritism, and to reduce actual nepotistic behavior and cronyism. Second, communication about the CLI projects needs to be strengthened, with clear and detailed information about the project presented during the recruitment and advertisement phases. Thirdly, complaint procedures that respect an individual’s privacy and ensure confidentiality need to be created and adequately communicated to participants. These measures would enhance both informational and procedural justice perceptions. Fourthly, the choice of work needs to be carefully selected to ensure that a) participants are positively inclined towards the chosen/selected task and b) intercommunity interactions are protected from potentially negative experiences with members of the public. Finally, attention should be turned to including a greater number of Syrian refugees living outside ITS because a) perceptions of unfairness and bias would be significantly reduced and b) non-ITS refugees are as vulnerable as ITS refugees.

An important obstacle for past and future implementation of CLI is the willingness of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals to partake in CLI and work in mixed groups. Ironically, it is precisely where willingness to work together is very low that interventions are needed in order to boost social cohesion. Survey results showed differential attitudes towards CLI between communities and regions. A majority of Lebanese nationals did not favor working in mixed groups of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals, while a majority of Syrian refugees favored it. The strongest contrast emerged between Wadi Khaled and Sahel Akkar, with the former expressing the more favorable attitudes and the latter the least. Bekaa participants fell in the middle. Thus, although SC staff reported difficulties recruiting Lebanese in Bekaa compared to Akkar, the survey results suggest that this is may not be due to their greater reluctance to work in mixed groups. Rather, given the differences in educational profiles and differences in unemployment rates between the three areas, it is possible that the types of work involved in CLI in the Bekaa were not attractive to most of its residents.

With 8000 direct beneficiaries in a population that exceeds half a million, the implemented CLI benefited less than 5% of the population. Importantly, the survey results suggest that of those that did participate in CLI projects, 76% expressed satisfaction with their experience. This feedback is corroborated by the results of the focus group discussions. However, the survey results also revealed that although majorities in both groups expressed satisfaction with the CLI, Syrian participants expressed lower rates of satisfaction than Lebanese participants. Some of the problems reported in the focus group discussions and related to the implementation of the CLI might account for some of the differential impact of CLI on Syrian and Lebanese participants. The survey results also indicated that 17.2% of Lebanese participants and 14.3% of Syrian refugees reported being *indirect* beneficiaries. This shows a potential for a wider community reach: a 4-7 fold increase may lead to a majority in both populations knowing someone who benefited from CLI. In light of the positive feedback on the CLI, the findings of this research clearly suggest that a development of the CLI intervention in line with the recommendations in this report have promising potential for enhancing social cohesion. Hence, a significant increase in the number and duration of CLI projects is likely to have a substantial effect on both communities.

2) Social Cohesion

Results of both FGD and the survey indicated serious and substantial challenges to social cohesion. Grievances ranged the spectrum of social instability indicators and affected both communities across locations.

Intercommunity violence

Both FGD discussions and survey results indicated little potential for organized collective violence among Syrian refugees against Lebanese nationals, but a serious threat of Lebanese to Syrian violence, especially in Sahel Akkar.

While Lebanese nationals in the Bekaa reported feeling positively towards Syrian refugees (and no negative emotions), residents in Sahel Akkar reported significantly less positive emotions than both Bekaa and Wadi Khaled residents. By contrast, Syrian refugees reported positive emotions and no negative emotions towards Lebanese nationals across regions.

Two thirds of Lebanese nationals in the Bekaa and Sahel Akkar¹⁶ estimated conflict between the communities as likely. By contrast, less than a fifth of Syrian refugees thought so. Lebanese nationals from large municipalities (e.g. Qob Elias, Bebnine, Bar Elias) were inclined to perceive conflict as more likely those residing in smaller municipalities. On the other hand, actual support for violence against Syrian refugees was particularly pronounced in Tal el Hayat, Qonieh, Borj el Arab and Machta Hassan, all in the Akkar region. There were fewer levels of readiness in El Marj, Bar Elias, Bebnine and Majdal Anjar. Youth readiness for violence against Syrians did not differ between the three areas of Sahel Akkar, Wadi Khaled and Bekaa.

Importantly, Lebanese nationals expressed strong support for discriminatory policies against Syrian refugees. Over 90% of Lebanese nationals across all regions supported nightly curfews restricting refugee movements, and 90% supported restricting refugees' political freedoms. 90% of nationals in Akkar would like to see Syrian refugees leave immediately, and would like Lebanon to stop receiving them.

One of the reasons Syrian refugees are unlikely to engage in organized collective violence against Lebanese nationals is the imbalance of power between the two communities. The precarious and vulnerable situation of refugees leaves them defenseless against abuses from Lebanese nationals backed by the apparatuses of state power (perceptions of biased judiciary, security forces, service providers, etc.). Furthermore, while the Lebanese in various municipalities are able to organize quickly due to kinship ties, Syrian refugees are unable to do so because of their wide dispersion across the Lebanese territory. Syrian refugees are more likely to turn their anger locally towards INGOs, which they perceive as biased in their treatment, corrupt, and partially responsible for their protection.

Violence against INGOs:

Lebanese nationals seemed particularly ready for collective violence against INGOs in Tal el Hayat, Machta Hassan, and to a lesser degree in Bar Elias. On the other hand, Syrian refugees expressed high support for violence against INGOs in Machta Hassan, and some support in Bebnine and Machta Hammoud.

¹⁶ Tal el Hayat in Sahel Akkar proved a noteworthy exception. While they estimated the probability of conflict as unlikely, they were also highly ready to engage in collective violence against both Syrian Refugees and INGOs. Further exploration of dynamics in Tal el Hayat may be warranted

A third of Syrian refugees in Akkar and a fifth of refugees in the Bekaa perceived INGOs as corrupt. Serious efforts to control corruption perceptions, favoritism, and bias may be beneficial to stymie potential aggression against INGOs. Syrian refugees' perceptions of INGO injustice were also noted across regions, especially in terms of fairness and preferential treatment in delivering aid. This was especially pronounced in the Bekaa area, where a majority of Syrian refugees expressed dissatisfaction with INGO fairness. The over emphasis in aid towards ITS residents at the expense of non ITS refugees, as well as the large number of registered refugees that were cut off from INGO aid may be seriously contributing factors. Steps to remedy these imbalances may reduce violence threats against INGOs in these locations.

Health care and services for Syrian refugees also need serious attention. Current systems of INGO support do not provide sufficient aid in healthcare, with Syrian refugees overwhelmingly complaining of bias in treatment and corruption, especially in Wadi Khaled and the Bekaa. Insufficient financial support for health care as well as perceptions of corruption in these institutions has an existential impact on refugees that could turn to desperation and violence.

Contact

A quarter of both Lebanese and Syrian populations have never come in contact with one another. Of those that do, only a small minority in both communities (<10%) expressed a negative interactional experience. A third of Lebanese nationals and a small majority of Syrian refugees reported a qualitatively positive experience. Increasing opportunities for positive non-competitive interactions may be beneficial to intercommunity relations and perceptions (skills workshops, fairs, etc.).

Threat Perceptions

There are important threat perceptions that need to be addressed in both communities. An overwhelming number of Lebanese nationals (> 90%) across all areas perceive Syrian refugees as both a symbolic and an economic threat. While the latter may be difficult to tackle without adequate financial investments and developmental projects, the former may be addressed through interactional and normative interventions that highlight the common value systems and worldviews that Lebanese nationals and Syrian refugees share. Both populations are mostly of the same sectarian background with similar value systems. Collective events and festivities that tap into shared value systems would thus be beneficial.

Special attention is needed in Sahel Akkar. Nationals scored highly on all threat measures, including existential and status-honor threats. The latter two may be substantial in motivating residents towards violence. A greater qualitative ISF presence, and better security coordination between the two communities may prevent isolated incidents from turning into collective anger. Note that the absence of positive emotions and the presence of negative emotions towards Syrian refugees in Sahel Akkar is a serious aggravating factor. Efforts must be made with the Lebanese government to facilitate the plight of these refugees.

A group of landlords and aggressive businessmen are taking serious advantage of the Syrian refugee crisis and the international aid dedicated to them. Widespread perceptions of corruption against these profiteers exist in both the Lebanese and the Syrian populations, especially in Akkar.

B. Limitations:

Temporal Validity: The present research is a snapshot in time, and thus does not capture developing trends. It is possible that results obtained in this study are increasing/decreasing over time, and only a repeated measure design (i.e. time 2 data collection) is likely to identify trends and slopes.

Sample Selection Bias: The research faced two major challenges in the selection of participants, one during the FGD sessions and one during the survey of participants in the Bekaa. While we hoped for a random sampling of participants for the FGD discussions, this was not possible, and we had to rely on SC convenient sampling in all locations. The selection bias was more pronounced in the survey research, when the sampling of the 400 participants in the Bekaa appeared to suffer a potentially random sampling error. Information International conducted a second data collection phase, and recruited 400 participants anew. While unlikely, a history effect may have occurred between the two collection times in the Bekaa.

Internal Validity: Data collection was carried out over a period of a month, and as such it may be possible that events may have occurred in one location but not another (i.e. Sahel Akkar but not Bekaa) and thus affected scores differentially (history threat to validity). However, we could not identify any event or incidents to support this potential threat.

Presentation bias: as with all human research, participants may be keen on presenting themselves in the best of light or respond in ways that they assume the researcher would like. This response and presentation bias affects both FGD and surveys. The fact that the primary researchers (FGD) and the field surveyors were all Lebanese nationals may bias responding especially for Syrian refugees. This inherent bias may require a careful interpretation of the Syrian Refugees' data.

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Appendix A – Questionnaire (Syrian refugees)

البيانات التالية تتعلق بتواصلك مع اللبنانيين في البلدة. نرجو أن تحدد ردة فعلك بالنسبة إلى كل من هذه البيانات من خلال وضع دائرة حول الرقم الذي تعتبر أنه الأقرب إلى موقفك. علماً أنه كلما تددت الأرقام، زادت نسبة تواصلك مع اللبنانيين، وكلما ارتفع الرقم، تقلصت نسبة التواصل.

- ما هي الوتيرة التي تفعل بها ما يلي:

أبداً	نادراً	أحياناً	مراتٍ عديدة	في أغلب الأحيان	
5	4	3	2	1	1. تلتقي مع لبنانيين من البلدة
5	4	3	2	1	2. تمضي وقتاً مع لبنانيين من البلدة

- نرجو أن تحدد ردة فعلك على البيانات الواردة في ما يلي عبر وضع دائرة حول الرقم الأقرب إلى موقفك:

سلبياً إلى حد كبير جداً	سلبياً إلى حد ما	ليس إيجابياً و ليس سلبياً	إيجابياً إلى حد ما	إيجابياً إلى حد كبير جداً	
5	4	3	2	1	3. حين اجتمع أو ألتقي بلبنانيين من البلدة يكون التواصل غالباً
5	4	3	2	1	4. حين اجتمع أو ألتقي بلبنانيين من البلدة يكون التواصل غالباً

تقييم العلاقات في المجتمع: نرجو منك أن تقيم العلاقات الاجتماعية التالية وفق المقياس المدرج أدناه. علماً أنه كلما ارتفع الرقم، شعرت بالسلبية تجاه هذه الجماعات، وكلما تددت الرقم شعرت بالإيجابية تجاه هذه الجماعات. الرجاء رسم دائرة حول الرقم المناسب.

- حدد كيف تشعر تجاه المذكورين في ما يلي:

أشعر بالسلبية إلى حد كبير جداً	أشعر بالسلبية إلى حد ما	حيادي	أشعر بالإيجابية إلى حد ما	أشعر بالإيجابية إلى حد كبير جداً	
5	4	3	2	1	5. المسؤولين السوريين في البلدة/المخيم
5	4	3	2	1	7. المرجعيات العائلية والأهلية السورية
5	4	3	2	1	8. المسؤولين في البلدية
5	4	3	2	1	9. منظمات الإغاثة في هذه المنطقة
5	4	3	2	1	10. الشرطة - القوى الأمنية
5	4	3	2	1	11. الجيش اللبناني
5	4	3	2	1	12. اللبنانيين عموماً
5	4	3	2	1	15. اللبنانيين في البلدة

نرجو منك أن تصف علاقتك أو نظرتك للبنانيين عبر الإجابة على الأسئلة التالية من خلال وضع دائرة حول الرقم الذي يعد الأقرب إلى موقفك.

- إلى أي مدى تشعر بالتالي تجاه اللبنانيين:

لا، أبداً	إلى حد بسيط	إلى حد ما	إلى حد كبير	إلى حد كبير جداً	
5	4	3	2	1	16. الخوف
5	4	3	2	1	17. التعاطف
5	4	3	2	1	18. الغضب
5	4	3	2	1	19. الاحترام
5	4	3	2	1	20. الحقد
5	4	3	2	1	21. المودة

- في ما يلي بيانات حول اللبنانيين. قد تجد نفسك تؤيد بعضاً من هذه البيانات وتعارض بعضها الآخر بدرجات متفاوتة. نرجو أن تحدد ردة فعلك بالنسبة إلى كل بيان من خلال وضع دائرة حول الرقم الذي يعد الأقرب إلى موقفك:

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة	
1	2	3	4	5	22. إن قيم السوريين تختلف بشدة عن قيم اللبنانيين
1	2	3	4	5	23. إن طريقة عيش السوريين تختلف بشدة عن طريقة عيش اللبنانيين
1	2	3	4	5	24. اللبنانيون لا يفهمون الطريقة التي ينظر فيها السوريون إلى الحياة
1	2	3	4	5	25. حين يحقق اللبنانيون أرباحاً اقتصادية، يخسر السوريون على الصعيد الاقتصادي
1	2	3	4	5	26. زيادة الوظائف بالنسبة إلى اللبنانيين تعني تدني الوظائف والأجور أمام السوريين
1	2	3	4	5	27. يريد اللبنانيون تقديم مصالحهم الاقتصادية على حساب مصالح السوريين
1	2	3	4	5	28. أخشى أن تلحق مجموعات لبنانية الضرر بأملأكي الخاصة
1	2	3	4	5	29. أخشى أن أتعرض لهجوم من مجموعات لبنانية
1	2	3	4	5	30. أخشى أن تلحق مجموعات لبنانية الضرر بالأملأك العامة
1	2	3	4	5	31. أخشى أن تلحق مجموعات لبنانية الأذى بكرامتي وكرامة أهلي
1	2	3	4	5	32. أخشى أن تلحق مجموعات لبنانية الأذى بمكانتي الاجتماعية
1	2	3	4	5	33. أخشى ان يسيء بعض اللبنانيين إلى نساء عائلتي

- إلى أي مدى أنت مستعد للدفاع سلمياً عن حقوق النازحين السوريين في منطقتك (عبر التظاهر، الاعتصام...):

لا، أبداً	إلى حد بسيط	إلى حد ما	إلى حد كبير	إلى حد كبير جداً	
5	4	3	2	1	34. السلطات اللبنانية أو المحلية
5	4	3	2	1	35. منظمات الإغاثة الدولية
5	4	3	2	1	36. اللبنانيين في البلدة

لا، أبداً	إلى حد بسيط	إلى حد ما	إلى حد كبير	إلى حد كبير جداً	
5	4	3	2	1	37. إلى أي مدى أنت مستعد للدفاع سلمياً عن شرف المجموعة التي تنتمي إليها
5	4	3	2	1	38. إلى أي مدى أنت مستعد للدفاع سلمياً عن معتقداتك السياسية

- إلى أي مدى تؤيد أعمال عنفية ضد المجموعات التالية دفاعاً عن حقوق جماعتك:

لا، أبداً	إلى حد بسيط	إلى حد ما	إلى حد كبير	إلى حد كبير جداً	
5	4	3	2	1	39. السلطات اللبنانية
5	4	3	2	1	40. منظمات الإغاثة
5	4	3	2	1	41. اللبنانيين في البلدة

إلى حد كبير جداً	إلى حد كبير	إلى حد ما	إلى حد بسيط	لا، أبداً
1	2	3	4	5
42. إلى أي مدى أنت مستعد للقتال دفاعاً عن شرف المجموعة التي تنتمي إليها				
43. إلى أي مدى أنت مستعد للقتال دفاعاً عن معتقداتك السياسية				

- إلى أي حد تعتقد بأن الفساد هو مشكلة لدى:

إلى حد كبير جداً	إلى حد كبير	إلى حد ما	إلى حد بسيط	لا، أبداً
1	2	3	4	5
44. منظمات الإغاثة في هذه المنطقة				
45. المؤسسات الطبية و الصحية				
46. الشرطة - القوى الأمنية				
47. المسؤولين في البلدية				
48. المرجعيات العائلية في البلدة (أو المخيم)				
49. التجار وأصحاب المصالح				

- في ما يلي بيانات حول النازحين السوريين في البلدة. قد تجد نفسك تؤيد بعضاً من هذه البيانات وتعارض بعضها الآخر بدرجات متفاوتة. نرجو أن تحدد ردة فعلك بالنسبة إلى كل بيان من خلال وضع دائرة حول الرقم الذي يعد الأقرب إلى موقفك:

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة
1	2	3	4	5
50. لدى النازحين السوريين في البلدة القدرة على تنظيم عمل جماعي ضد اللبنانيين كي يحسنوا أوضاع جماعتهم				
51. يستطيع النازحون السوريون أن يحسنوا أوضاعهم عبر أعمال جماعية سلمية مثل الاحتجاجات والاعتصامات ضد اللبنانيين				
52. يستطيع النازحون السوريون أن يحسنوا أوضاعهم عبر أعمال عنفية ضد اللبنانيين				

إلى حد كبير جداً	إلى حد كبير	إلى حد ما	إلى حد بسيط	لا، أبداً
1	2	3	4	5
53. إلى أي حد أنت مستعد للعمل مع مجموعة مختلطة من اللبنانيين والنازحين السوريين؟				
1	2	3	4	5
54. واقعياً، متى تعتقد بأن النازحين السوريين سوف يعودون إلى سوريا؟				
1	2	3	4	5
55. إن النازحين السوريين الذين يعيشون في المخيمات يتلقون مساعدات أكثر بكثير من السوريين الذين يعيشون خارج المخيمات (أي في البلدة)				
1	2	3	4	5
56. إن النازحين السوريين يحصلون على دعم مادي أكثر بكثير من اللبنانيين في البلدة				
1	2	3	4	5
57. برأيك، ما هو احتمال حدوث صراع عنيف بين اللبنانيين و النازحين السوريين خلال الأشهر القادمة				

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	حيادي	أعارض	أعارض بشدة
1	2	3	4	5
58. تبدو حياتي مثالية في معظم الأحيان				
59. إن ظروف حياتي ممتازة				
60. إنني راض بحياتي				
61. لقد حصلت حتى الآن على الأمور المهمة التي أريدها في الحياة				

5	4	3	2	1	62. لو استطعت أن أعيش حياتي مرة أخرى، لما بدلت شيئاً تقريباً
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- في ما يلي بيانات حول منظمات الإغاثة. قد تجد نفسك تؤيد بعضاً من هذه البيانات وتعارض بعضها الآخر بدرجات متفاوتة. نرجو أن تحدد ردة فعلك بالنسبة إلى كل بيان من خلال وضع دائرة حول الرقم الذي يعد الأقرب إلى موقفك:

أعترض بشدة	أعترض	حيادي	أؤيد	أؤيد بشدة	
5	4	3	2	1	63. تعامل منظمات الإغاثة السوريين باحترام
5	4	3	2	1	64. تعامل منظمات الإغاثة السوريين بكرامة
5	4	3	2	1	65. يمتنع موظفو منظمات الإغاثة عن إبداء ملاحظات أو تعليقات غير لائقة
5	4	3	2	1	66. تتصرف منظمات الإغاثة على أساس معلومات دقيقة
5	4	3	2	1	67. منظمات الإغاثة غير متحيزة
5	4	3	2	1	68. تسمح منظمات الإغاثة للسوريين بمراجعة القرارات الصادرة عنهم
5	4	3	2	1	69. تعامل منظمات الإغاثة السوريين على قدم المساواة
5	4	3	2	1	70. منظمات الإغاثة غير منحازة في اتخاذ قراراتها
5	4	3	2	1	71. منظمات الإغاثة تأخذ في الاعتبار حاجات كافة السوريين لدى اتخاذ قراراتها
5	4	3	2	1	72. إن المساعدات الإنسانية كافية تماماً
5	4	3	2	1	73. إن توزيع المساعدات يحصل بشكل منظم جداً
5	4	3	2	1	74. لا تتأخر المساعدات الإنسانية في الوصول إلى النازحين السوريين
5	4	3	2	1	75. إن الخطوات - الإجراءات المطلوبة للحصول على المساعدات الإنسانية صعبة جداً

82. هل شاركت في برنامج فرص العمل الذي نظّمته البلدية بالتعاون مع منظمة إنقاذ الطفل Save the Children (العمل لعشرة أيام مع فريق مختلط من العمال اللبنانيين والسوريين)؟
 1. نعم 2. كلا

83. إذا نعم، كيف تقيم هذا البرنامج؟

1	إيجابي إلى حد كبير جداً	2	إيجابي إلى حد ما	3	ليس إيجابياً و ليس سلبياً
4	سلبياً إلى حد ما	5	سلبياً إلى حد كبير جداً		

84. هل شارك أحد من أفراد عائلتك في برنامج فرص العمل الذي نظّمته البلدية بالتعاون مع منظمة إنقاذ الطفل Save the Children (العمل لعشرة أيام مع فريق مختلط من العمال اللبنانيين والسوريين)؟
 1. نعم 2. كلا

85. بصورة عامة، ما هو انتماؤك السياسي:

0	معارض للنظام السوري	1	موالٍ للنظام السوري
2	حيادي	97	أفضل عدم الإجابة

86. مدة الإقامة في لبنان: _____ شهر

7. وضع اللجوء:

0	مسجل لدى الأمم المتحدة واحصل على بعض المساعدات منهم	1	مسجل لدى الأمم المتحدة و لكنني فصلت عن لائحة توزيع المساعدات
2	غير مسجل لدى الأمم المتحدة	3	غيره، حدد _____

89 الجنس: 0. ذكر 1. انثى

90. العمر: _____ سنوات

91. ما هو أعلى مستوى تعليمي وصلت اليه؟

0	أمي	1	ابتدائي/تكميلي	2	ثانوي
3	شهادة جامعية-بكالوريوس	4	شهادات عليا أو اختصاصية	5	مهني/تقني

92. الوضع العائلي: 0. أعزب 1. متزوج 2. أرمل/مطلق

93. وضع العمل: 0. أعمل 1. لا أعمل

94. إذا كنت تعمل، حدد المهنة: _____

95. كم يبلغ مدخول أسرتك الشهري (بما فيه مدخولك، مساعدات من أفراد الأسرة، مساعدات من الدولة، الخ). في حال لم تكن أكيدا من الجواب، الرجاء إعطاني أفضل تقدير: _____ دولار أميركي شهرياً



96. الطائفة:

0	ماروني	1	سني	2	ثياعي	3	أرثوذكس
4	كاثوليك	5	مسيحي آخر	6	علوي	7	درزي



97. الجنسية:

0	لبناني	1	لبناني وسوري	2	سوري
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Appendix B – Attitudes to working in mixed groups



Appendix C: Contact Quality



Appendix D: Support for Violence

