



# iM MONTHLY

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
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# AWORD

## A Railway between Sunni and Shia'a so we don't miss the Train



Having received some comments from a descendent of Al-Saifa of A'akkar (accused in school history books of being traitors) on the previous editorial in issue no. 57 "Saints, Traitors, Villains, and Fools with Two Airports", a further examination is required.

In January 2007, we had a leader that Lebanon may soon have two presidents, two parliaments and two prime ministers, so why not two airports? Having seen that "Hariri International Airport" can be easily closed, (like what happened on January 23, 2007), a good 'planner' will make sure that an alternative is available.

"René Mouawad International Airport", is almost ready and the planes can be easily diverted. In the future, as cantonization becomes more probable and alliances shift, a third airport might be called for.

What does this have to do with current fights and debates about democracy, peace, "Shia'a" and "Sunni"?

As always, ideologies are a cover up, a decoy and a cause that people live and die by and for. Before and after World War I, Pan-Arabism and independence were convenient banners to fight the Ottomans and insure that minorities run to the "West" for protection. The "ideological wars" went on. In order to fight communism, we sometimes resorted to the "Arab Nation" and at other times to "Islam".

Today, our leaders are hiding behind banners of "Freedom, Sovereignty and Independence" on one side and "Arabism, Dignity and Accountability" on the other side.

Friends, enemies, crises and wars were and still are made under those banners.

During World War I, T.E. Lawrence befriended King Faisal I to oust the Ottomans, blew up the Hijaz railway and participated in paving the way for British and French dominance in the region. Consequently, coups d'états were launched in the region starting with Husni Al-Zaim, Jamal Abdel Nasser to Abdel Karim Qasim and the Ba'ath Party in Syria and Iraq to Libya and Sudan. The leaders of the Arab Revolt and their descendents were butchered mercilessly.


In the meantime, Sykes-Picot Agreement (with modification) and Balfour Declaration were implemented and are perhaps yet to achieve their full potential, while 'we the people' of the region, were fighting each other and our leaders were studiously abiding by the instructions of external forces.

Even when T.E. Lawrence had something to say on Iraq against his government, his allies in the region were praising Great Britain.

*"The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honour. They have been tricked into it by a steady withholding of information. The Bagdad communiqués are belated, insincere, and incomplete. A recent proclamation about autonomy circulated with unction from Bagdad.*

*We say we are in Mesopotamia to develop it for the benefit of the world. How far will the killing of ten thousand villagers and townspeople this summer hinder the production of wheat, cotton, and oil? How long will we permit millions of pounds, thousands of Imperial troops, and tens of thousands of Arabs to be sacrificed on behalf of a form of colonial administration, which can benefit no body but its administrators?"*

Even when T.E. Lawrence expressed his doubts about Sykes-Picot geographical rationales, his allies were singing praise and queuing for positions in the newly founded states.



**Railway in Tripoli - Before**  
Badr El-Hage Collection c.1920



**Railway in Tripoli - After**  
Waddah Joma'a - 2006

*"Actually it not only seriously compromises the political future of the Arab Provinces, but also seriously jeopardizes the peace of the Near and Middle East and will result in serious local disorder which all agree, will spread to Kurdistan, Mesopotamia and Palestine, and perhaps to the entire Moslem world".*

What does all of this have to do with airports, trains, "Sunni" and "Shia'a"?

All the governments since T.E. Lawrence have abided by his legacy; they did neither restore the Hijaz railway nor attempted to undo his work. We can lecture as much as we like about the "Arab Nation" but never attempt to have a simple railway working again. Now we will claim success that "René Mouawad Airport" will be operational soon, but no railway, not even between Tripoli and Beirut.

Just in case a railway is built, T.E. Lawrence has written a manual about how to demolish it from Ras Ba'albeck to the Arabian Desert.

*"I therefore went west to Ras Baalbek on June 10th and dynamited a small plate girder there.*

*The effect on the traffic was of course very slight but the Metowila [Shia'a] of Baalbek were most excited and it was to arouse them that I did it. The noise of dynamite explosions we find everywhere the most effective propagandist measure possible.*

*It was still necessary for us to cut the railway between Deraa and Amman.*

*After long experiment, we found this the cheapest and most destructive demolition for a line with steel sleepers [Tulip System]".*

Why all those wars and why the "Sunni"- "Shia'a" schism now? Apparently, T.E. Lawrence had his eyes on the "Shia'a" [Metowila] long before Mr. Bush invaded Iraq. The "Shia'a" of Ras Ba'albeck were happy that an "Inglizi" was liberating them from the tyranny of Turkey.

T.E. Lawrence of Scotland, of England, of North Wales of Westmeath of Arabia of Dorset later apologized for many promises he made. Apparently, he was duped by his government.

"Lawrence had written that he had been led to believe that the British

Government meant to live up to its promises to the Arabs, and that it was because of this belief he had encouraged the Arabs. He wished to inform the Arabs and the British public that he regretted what he had done because the government evidently had no intention of living up to the promise it had authorized him to make to the Arabs".

Promises are easily made and broken. Men of substance will learn from history but what can hollow men do, except repeat with T.S. Elliot:

We are Hollow men  
We are stuffed men  
Leaning together  
Head piece filled with straw. Alas!  
Between the idea  
And the reality  
Between the nations  
And the act  
Falls the Shadow

King Faisal I, descendent of the Prophet, the leader of the Arab Revolt and the signatory on an agreement with Chaim Weizmann for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, was left wandering in a hotel in Paris on 18 January 1919 at 2 a.m. T.E. Lawrence pleaded Faisal's case to Balfour, who said that he "simply forgot" to invite him to the meeting. The Paris Peace Conference gathered victorious nations but not pity zu'ama. The vacuum created by inapt Arab regimes depending on the West to survive is now being filled by Turkey, Israel and Iran.

A government, unwilling or unable to connect the "Sunni" of A'akkar with the "Shia'a" of Sour by a railway, what use would it have for two airports? Faisal, Jamal Pasha, Saddam Hussein, Bush and Ahmadinajad have the answer, while both our "pro-government and opposition leaders" are yet to learn from history. Soon the country will be in worse turmoil and they will all be left in the lobby of a hotel or at a train station where there is no train.

*Citations in Italic from  
The Letters of T.E. Lawrence of Arabia  
David Garnett (ed.) 1938*

Jawad N. Adra



# Nasrallah and Aoun at the Top but with Fewer Supporters

## Geagea Moving Ahead among the Maronites 30.9% are willing to emigrate while 8.9% have applied for emigration

In the previous issue, *Information International* surveyed the opinion of the Lebanese on various issues, namely their political belonging, their position toward Hizbullah's arms and rearmament of political parties, their most preferred candidates for presidency and premiership, as well as the party behind assassinations and explosions.

In this article, *Ii Monthly* presents the opinions of the Lebanese about foreign ambassadors' role in internal affairs, their most favorite za'im, emigration and many other issues.


## I- Political Figures

### Most Supported Figure for its Positions and Statements

Politicians and religious men issue daily statements, some of which are positively welcome by the Lebanese while others meet rejection. 25.4% of respondents said they supported the statements made by Hassan Nasrallah, compared with 12% who reported to support Sa'ad Hariri's statements, 10.7% for Michel Aoun's statements, 8.6% for Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, 7.8% for Walid Jumblat, 5.7% for Samir Geagea, 4.7% for Nabih Berri, 2.2% for Suleiman Franjeh, 2% for Fouad Sanioura and 10.3% said they did not like statements made by any of these figures. Others (7.5%) named other personalities, while 3.1% did not answer (Graph no.1).

[Graph 1] The leader most supported for his political stands and statements (%)

February 2007  
Base: 957




### First Lebanese Za'im (leader)

"No one" remains at the top of the list with 24.6% of supporters while 20% of respondents said that Hassan Nasrallah was the first Lebanese za'im (leader), followed by Sa'ad Hariri (13.9%), Michel Aoun (13%), Walid Jumblat (6.9%), Samir Geagea (6.7%), Nabih Berri (6.5%) and Patriarch Sfeir (2%). 6.4% named other figures with less than 2% for each.

In comparison with results of previous opinion polls, Hassan Nasrallah remained the most supported za'im, but

with fewer supporters (Graph no.2). However, the support for Walid Jumblat and Sa'ad Hariri increased, while Michel Aoun maintained the same position. Moreover, a quarter of the Lebanese did not believe in the existence of any first za'im. 34% of university students between 18 and 34 years old said that "no one" was the first or main za'im in Lebanon.

The respondents' answers by confession show that 46.5% of Shia'a regard Hassan Nasrallah as their first za'im, while 23% support Berri.



As to the Maronites, 20.2% voted for Michel Aoun and 19.7% for Samir Geagea, while 26.8% of Maronite respondents said there was not any first Lebanese za'im. A large majority of Druze respondents (78.9%) said Walid Jumblat was their first leader, while 44.6% of Sunni voted for Sa'ad Hariri and 33% of respondents from the same confession reported to not believe in the existence of a first za'im.

The distribution of answers by confession showed that Nabih Berri was gaining further Shia'a supporters. It also showed that Geagea was moving ahead against a drop in the number of Aoun's supporters (20.2% in February 2007 compared with 29.8% in August 2006 and 51.2% in a poll conducted in March 2006, which surveyed only the population of greater Beirut).

## II- Foreign Roles

### Ambassadors' Performance

The majority of respondents (35.4%) welcome the performance of the Saudi ambassador, compared with 15.5% who support the performance of the British ambassador, 19.2% support the US ambassador and 18.5% support the Iranian ambassador.

Table no.1 shows the positions toward the performance of main foreign ambassadors to Lebanon.

Positions towards the Performance of Main Ambassadors to Lebanon					Table 1
Ambassador	Performance	Blatant but welcome interference	Blatant but unwelcome interference	Neutral and Diplomatic performance	Don't know
United States		19.3%	57.4%	15.7%	7.6%
France		23.6%	51.8%	16.5%	8.1%
Britain		15.5%	50.5%	20.6%	13.4%
Saudi Arabia		35.4%	30.2%	25.4%	9%
Egypt		25.7%	33%	28.2%	13.1%
Iran		18.6%	52.2%	16.2%	13%

Source: Information International – February 2007


The distribution of answers by confession highlighted a strong Shia'a rejection of the US ambassador's performance (88.1%).

Meanwhile, 40.5% of Sunni respondents said the US ambassador's "interference was blatant and unwelcome," compared with 49.6% of Maronites who said the same.

42.5% of Maronites did not welcome the performance of the French ambassador.


However, the majority of respondents positively regarded the "Saudi diplomacy", including the Shia'a respondents (32.7%).

Graph no.3 shows a comparison between the respondents' positions toward the performance of the Saudi, Iranian and US ambassadors.



### International Support to Lebanon

Paris 3 international conference to support Lebanon was held in January 2007 in the French capital resulting in pledges, loans and grants to finance development projects and support the treasury. More than half of respondents (56.3%) said that Lebanon was in need of financial support to reduce the public debt, while 19.6% called for a diplomatic support to mediate between pro-government and opposition forces and 15.5% said the country needed support on the security level to help it rebuild its security bodies. 7.6% of respondents called for international support to the Lebanese government and 1% had no answer (Graph no.4).



### Government's 'Reform Plan' to the Paris 3 Conference

The Lebanese government submitted to the Paris 3 Conference a 'reform plan' that included a series of measures the Cabinet is willing to implement, such as increasing working hours from 32 to 36 hours per week, imposing new taxes and raising the Value Added Tax from 10% to 12% in 2008 and 15% in 2010. The majority of respondents (67.1%) were against these measures, against 21.6% of respondents who supported the 'reform plan' and 11.3% who said they did not know. The respondents' answers are distributed by confession according to table no.2, which shows that the majority of Maronites, Orthodox, Catholics and Shia'a are against these measures.

Position towards the Increase of Taxes and Working hours by Confession						Table 2
Confession \ Position	Maronite	Orthodox	Catholic	Sunni	Shia'a	Druze
With	23.2%	21.2%	20.4%	36.8%	1.9%	50.9%
Against	62.8%	70%	61.2%	53.2%	91.4%	29.8%
Don't know	14%	8.8%	18.4%	10%	6.7%	19.3%


Source: Information International – February 2007

### III- The Lebanese and the Future

#### Return of Civil War

44.2% of respondents said they did not believe that a civil war would break out against 14.8% who said they were sure there would be a war. However, 41% of respondents said they “did not know”.

Graph no.5 shows the respondents’ answers by political affiliation.




#### Lebanese and Emigration

In light of security, political and economic developments in the country, 30.9% of Lebanese reported to be considering emigrating, while 68.8% were opposed to such idea and 0.3% did not answer.

Of the 30.9% of Lebanese who are considering emigrating, 28.9% said to have submitted emigration applications over the past six months, thus constituting 8.9% of the total number of respondents (Graph no. 7). In an opinion poll conducted by *Information International* in August 2006, 58.9% of respondents expressed their determination to remain in Lebanon and 21.5% said they were waiting to see how the situation would develop, while 15.3% said they were determined to emigrate and 4.3% of respondents did not answer (Graph no.6). A comparison between the two polls shows that 71% of the people who were waiting to see how things would develop, are now considering emigration as an option.


The respondents’ answers are distributed by confession as illustrated in table no.3, which shows that the Maronites and Druze are more favorable to the emigration choice than respondents from other confessions.




Confession	Maronite	Orthodox	Catholic	Sunni	Shia'a	Druze
<b>Are you considering emigrating?</b>						
Yes	43%	28.8%	38.8%	26.4%	22.3%	45.6%
No	57%	71.2%	61.2%	72.5%	77.7%	54.4%
No answer	-	-	-	1.1%	-	-

Source: Information International – February 2007

As to the emigration destination, Canada ranked first (23.6%), followed by the United States (21.3%), France (14.6%), Australia (13.5%), Sweden (5.6%) and other destinations (21.4%). (Graph no.7)



“Of the 30.9% of Lebanese who are considering emigrating, 28.9% said to have submitted emigration applications over the past six months, thus constituting 8.9% of the total number of respondents.”



Graph no.8 shows the distribution of respondents (total number surveyed) who submitted emigration applications over the past six months by confession.

Respondents who submitted emigration applications are distributed by age category as illustrated in table no.4, which shows that 11.3% of respondents between 18-24 years-old have submitted applications. The percentage increases to reach 12.5% for respondents between 25-34 years-old.

**Respondents who submitted emigration applications by age category Table 4**

Age category	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and above
<b>Have you applied for emigration?</b>						
Yes	11.3%	12.5%	6.3%	6.5%	4%	7.7%
No	88.7%	87.5%	93.7%	93.5%	96%	92.3%

Source: Information International – February 2007

The respondents' answers by educational level are equally distributed, as shown in table no.5

**Respondents who submitted emigration applications by educational level Table 5**

Educational level	Elementary and below	Intermediate	Secondary	Vocational Education	University	Higher studies
<b>Have you applied for emigration?</b>						
Yes	6.8%	8.5%	6.9%	15.5%	11.7%	8%
No	93.2%	91.5%	93.1%	84.5%	88.3%	92%

Source: Information International – February 2007



## Lebanese Carrying Foreign Nationalities Official records do not reflect Exact Numbers

Emigration from Lebanon reached its peak during and after the civil war. Recent statistics showed a surge in the number of Lebanese emigrants.

Not all the Lebanese officially declare acquiring foreign nationalities.


### Acquiring Foreign Nationalities

A law issued in January 31, 1946, pertaining to the Lebanese nationality, stated that Lebanese nationals must drop their nationality in four cases, one of the most important being “if he has acquired a foreign nationality upon the issuance of a decree by the head of state”. However, the majority of the Lebanese, who acquire foreign nationalities, do so without getting an official permit from the head of state. 100 people declared to have acquired foreign nationalities between 2001 and 2006 as illustrated in graph no. 9.

Naturally those figures do not reflect the reality of the situation.

[Graph 9] **Distribution of Lebanese who officially declared acquiring foreign nationalities 2001-2006**

Source: Information International - Lebanese Official Gazette



138,047 Lebanese have permanently emigrated from Lebanon between 1991 and 2000. They are distributed as follows:

United States: 43,441

Canada: 36,823

Australia: 12,984

Europe: 44,799

Source: *Facts about Lebanese Emigration (1991-2000)* by Information International.

### Lebanese and the United States

① 3,288 Lebanese were naturalized in the United States in 2005, compared to 3,314 in 2004 and 2,499 in 2003.

② As for the Lebanese immigrants in the States, 3,811 were reported to have been admitted in 2004, compared to 2,964 in 2003 and 3,966 in 2002.

Source: *Yearbook of Immigration and Statistics Homeland Security*.

### Lebanese and Canada

The number of Lebanese-Canadians reached 250,000 in 2006, including 143,000 who currently live in Canada.

Source: *Citizenship and Emigration Canada*

### Lebanese and Australia

The total number of Lebanese-Australians according to 2001 Census is 162,239. Of these, 71,310 were born in Australia.

Source: *Australia Ministry of Immigration and Citizenship – Media Center*

## Two Explorers... from Lebanon

The first "Arab man" to go to the United States of America was a Lebanese from the town of Sleima (Matn). His name was Antoun Youssef Daher al-Basha'alani. He was born in 1827 and traveled to the United States in 1845 on board a sailboat: (How much time did he spend on the way?) He resided in the States and wore Lebanese traditional clothes (*Sherwal*, *Mintian* [underwear] and Moroccan *tarboush*). He passed away in New York in 1856.

The first "Arab man" to go to Brazil was a Lebanese from the town of Meziara (near Ehden). His name was Youssef Moussa Meziara. He traveled on board a sailboat to Portugal. We do not know how long he resided in the country. What is confirmed is that he traveled to Rio de Janeiro, where he resided in 1880 and died in Sao Paulo in 1930.

*Translated from: "Awraq Loubnaniah" (Lebanese Papers) Volume 2 - Part 3 p.141, by Youssef Ibrahim Yazbek, 1983*

## Sounding the Alarm

Emigration is not a new trend of the Lebanese people. However, it is necessary to sound the alarm, especially when emigration rates today remind us of the exodus of Lebanese people during civil war. Determining the exact numbers of people who left the country during the July-August 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon could not be achieved, as Rafik Hariri International Airport was closed for 36 days and many Lebanese fled the country through land and maritime borders.

In an attempt to highlight the rising emigration rate, *li Monthly* referred to the number of people who left the country via the airport in the month of January in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. The numbers showed that the Lebanese who left the country exceeded those who entered Lebanon by 19,575 people in 2004, 18,029 people, 15,321 people and 21,140 people respectively; thus, the number of Lebanese departing from Rafik Hariri International Airport in January 2007 increased by 38% compared with January 2006 and by 8% compared to January 2004.

*Note: These numbers are an estimate and they will be further examined in the coming issues.*

Media reports said that General Security records over the last five months of 2006 highlighted a significant rise in issuing and renewing passports compared to the beginning of the same year.

**Information International** February 2007 opinion poll shows that around the third of Lebanese between 18 and 34 years-old have submitted emigration applications to foreign embassies and 11.7% of university students and 15.5% of professionals are also seeking to emigrate. These percentages indicate that:


- ⦿ The Lebanese society is facing a decrease in population growth, which today reaches 1.2%
- ⦿ The Lebanese population is aging and this fact is apparent in several Lebanese villages
- ⦿ Production costs are rising which leads to an increase in importation costs
- ⦿ The rate of celibacy will further increase and will yield negatively on the social situation.

## Opinions about the Future

The majority of respondents (34.1%) said there would not be any major solutions to the current deadlock, but added that a minor progress would be achieved and key issues would remain unresolved. However, 26.7% of respondents said that a comprehensive agreement would be reached over the international tribunal, elections, government and political sharing arrangements.

19.7% of respondents have a negative perception of the future, as they said that the situation would remain stagnant, while 11.5% are strongly pessimistic about the future, saying that a clash would break out between the different confessions and parties, resulting in a deterioration of the political and economic situation.

Meanwhile, 7.3% of respondents believe that the political and economic situation would deteriorate to a certain extent and 0.7% said they did not know how the situation would be in the coming months (Graph no.10). These results highlight the presence of two divergent opinions; one optimistic about the future (60.8%) and another pessimistic (38.5%).



## Civil Marriage: Fewer Supporters

Lebanon does not have unified laws that regulate people's affairs, as each of the 18 confessions has its own law and specialized bodies. Several attempts were made since the 1950s to adopt an optional law for civil marriage. The last attempt was made in 1996 but was not adopted by the Cabinet. With an absence of such laws, the Lebanese go to Cyprus, Europe or Turkey to conclude a civil marriage and then notify the Lebanese public authorities to acknowledge it.

## What do the Lebanese think about Civil Marriage?

In an opinion poll conducted by *Information International* in February 2007, 45.3% of respondents were against an optional law for civil marriage against 30.2% who reported to be with the adoption of such law. However, 24.5% of respondents said they were not concerned by this issue (graph no.11). The respondents' answers are distributed by confession as shown in table no.6.




Table no.6 shows that the majority of Orthodox, Catholics and Druze support the optional civil marriage while the majority of Maronites, Sunni and Shia'a are against it.

Positions about optional civil marriage by confession							Table 6
Confession	Maronite	Orthodox	Catholic	Sunni	Shia'a	Druze	Position
With	38.6%	58.8%	53.1%	10.8%	22.7%	47.4%	
Against	46.5%	22.5%	26.5%	63.2%	41.3%	31.6%	
Not concerned	14.9%	18.7%	20.4%	26%	36%	21%	

Source: Information International – February 2007

Respondents' answers by age category show that the youth are the most supportive of the optional civil marriage, as illustrated in table no.7.

Position \ Age category	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and above
With	33.5%	32.4%	32.9%	19.5%	21.3%	19.2%
Against	49.4%	43.4%	42.2%	52%	41.3%	42.3%
Not concerned	17.1%	24.3%	24.9%	28.5%	37.4%	38.5%

Source: Information International – February 2007

In an opinion poll conducted by *Information International* in early 2006 on 675 university students, 69.5% of respondents said they were with the optional civil marriage against 30.5% who were against it.



In another opinion poll conducted by *Information International* in 2002, 57.3% of respondents were against civil marriage and 36.8% were supporting it. Only 5.9% said they were not concerned by the issue.

## Responsibility of Media Institutions


Media institutions, in particular television channels, play an important role in leading or misleading the public opinion. In fact, some television channels affiliated with political parties have raised campaigns in support of their parties and were criticized by observers for trying to “instigate street conflicts”. As a result, many called for the need to stop broadcasting news bulletins and political shows. 35.3% of respondents approved the proposal, while a majority of 54% opposed it. 10.7% said they did not know (graph no. 12).

## Relocating, Real Estate Ownership and Confession

Despite the increase in political and confessional tensions accompanied by security developments, the overwhelming majority of respondents (93.7%) reported not to have considered changing residence to more secure places. Only 5.5% said they thought about this option, while 0.8% did not reply. (Graph no. 13)



The majority of respondents (60.4%) reported not to have concerns at all over the ownership of real estate in their areas by people belonging to different confessions than theirs. 29.3% reported to have some concerns (10% to a large extent, 8.5% to a certain extent and 10.8% have little concerns). 10.3% of respondents said they were not sure. (Graph no. 14)



The respondents' answers are distributed by confession as illustrated in table no.8, which shows that the Maronites and the Druze are the ones who have the highest level of concern.

Lebanese Positions toward Real Estate Ownership by Confession

Table 8

Confession	Maronite	Orthodox	Catholic	Sunni	Shia'a	Druze
<b>Concern over real estate ownership by a different confession</b>						
To a large extent	23.7%	5%	8.2%	3.3%	4.5%	28.1%
To a certain extent	13.2%	6.3%	10.2%	6.7%	5.2%	15.8%
Little concern	14%	8.8%	10.2%	9.7%	8.2%	19.3%
No concerns at all	35.5%	61.2%	65.3%	72.5%	75.8%	29.8%
Not sure	13.6%	18.7%	6.1%	7.8%	6.3%	7%

Source: Information International – February 2007

“Despite the increase in political and confessional tensions accompanied by security developments, the overwhelming majority of respondents (93.7%) reported not to have considered changing residence to more secure places.”





## Conclusion

- ⦿ 20% of respondents said that Hassan Nasrallah was the first za'im (leader), compared with 31.3% who said the same in August 2006.
- ⦿ Hassan Nasrallah, Sa'ad Hariri, Walid Jumblat and Michel Aoun are the first leaders (za'im) in their confessions, but with a minor difference between the supporters of Aoun (20.2%) and that of Samir Geagea (19.7%).
- ⦿ Around the quarter of respondents (24.6%) did not acknowledge the existence of any first or main za'im.
- ⦿ Around a third of the Lebanese (30.9%) are considering emigrating, against 15.3% of respondents last August, which reflects a lack of trust in the situation in Lebanon.
- ⦿ Around 11.9% of Lebanese youth between 18 and 34 years-old have submitted emigration applications and intend to leave the country. Their number is estimated at 135,000 people. It is noteworthy that the number includes those who actually submitted a visa application and those who acquired passports and who are waiting for a work opportunity abroad.
- ⦿ The emigration of youth leads to brain drain, which yields negatively on economic growth and productivity. Observers believe that emigration is due to political and economic instability and lack of trust in the future of Lebanon.
- ⦿ 55.8% of respondents have concerns over the resumption of the civil war. However, the majority of Lebanese look positively at the future, as 60.8% of respondents believe that positive developments would occur by the end of November 2007.
- ⦿ It seems that around half the respondents rule out the resumption of the civil war and the other half have concerns in this matter. Divergence of positions within political groups highlights incoherence in the political group itself.
- ⦿ 35.4% of respondents are satisfied with the performance of the Saudi ambassador, while the percentage of respondents who are opposed to the interference of the US ambassador, reached 57.4%, the Iranian ambassador reached 52.2%, the French ambassador reached 51.8% and the British ambassador reached 50.5%.
- ⦿ 56.3% of respondents said that the country was in need of financial and economic aid to reduce the public debt. ●●

### Description of the sample

The opinion poll was conducted between February 22-28, 2007 on a sample of 1,000 citizens in different Lebanese areas, with a proportional distribution according to the number of residents and the electoral size of each confession in each qada'a.

Males represented 58.3% of respondents and females 41.7% distributed by age categories as follows:

24% between 18-24 years old	27.3% between 25-34 years old
23.7% between 35-44 years old	12.3% between 45-54 years old
7.5% between 55-64 years old	5.2% over 65 years or did not specify

The margin of error was  $\pm 1.8\%$

# 2006 Budget: Attempts to Pass Partial Reforms that might not be Achieved

[Graph 1] **Budget expenses in 2005 and 2006** (in billion LBP)  
Source: Lebanese Official Gazette



The budget law of 2005 was adopted in February 2006 (law no.715 of February 3, 2006). The Cabinet adopted on January 12, 2007 the 2006 budget-draft law and referred it to President Emile Lahoud, who refused to sign it as he considered the government illegitimate following the resignation of five Shia'a ministers on November 11, 2006.

Article 56 of the Constitution states that "if the Council of Ministers insists on the Decision or if the time limit passes without the Decree being issued or returned, the Decision or Decree is considered legally operative and must be promulgated". Based on this article, the government of Fouad Sanioura issued legally operative decree no.40 on February 8, 2007, and passed it to Parliament which failed to convene, hence did not promulgate the law.

*Ii Monthly* addresses the main articles set in the draft-law submitted by Sanioura's government.

## Expenditures and Revenues

### 1-Expenditures

The general budget expenditures reached 11,195 billion LBP in 2006 compared with 10,000 billion LBP in 2005 or an increase of 1,195 billion LBP (12%) – graph no. 1.

While an increase was registered in the budgets of the ministries of interior, finance, public works and transport, defense and education, the budgets of the ministries of agriculture, tourism and information was reduced.

Table no.1 shows the distribution of expenses by ministry and institution in 2005 and 2006.

**Distribution of budget expenses by ministry and institution in 2005 and 2006 (amounts in thousands of LBP)** Table 1

Institution or ministry number	Ministry or Institution	Expenditures in 2006 (est.)	Expenditures in 2005 (est.)	Difference
1	Presidency	5,735,000	4,571,000	1,164,000
2	Parliament	49,220,000	43,900,000	5,320,000
3	Premiership	513,601,782	497,354,853	16,246,929
4	Constitutional Council	2,219,590	1,724,190	495,400
5	Ministry of Justice	49,142,750	49,053,902	88,848
6	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants	114,302,200	106,246,050	8,056,150
7	Ministry of Interior and Municipalities	518,984,583	443,952,908	75,031,675
8	Ministry of Finance	1,302,919,228	1,197,881,338	105,037,890
9	Ministry of Public Works and Transport	275,892,288	167,332,347	108,559,941
10	Ministry of Defense	914,999,250	852,267,250	62,732,000
11	Ministry of Education and Higher Education	922,860,504	877,734,000	45,126,504
12	Ministry of Public Health	346,939,332	360,266,913	-13,327,581
13	Ministry of Economy and Trade	6,701,220	7,008,370	-307,150
14	Ministry of Agriculture	36,029,799	41,106,044	-5,076,245
15	Ministry of Telecommunications	11,390,500	12,127,750	-737,250
16	Ministry of Labor	107,422,494	108,580,244	-1,157,750
17	Ministry of Information	22,648,200	29,102,500	-6,454,300
18	Ministry of Energy and Water	66,539,870	61,201,900	5,337,970

Institution or ministry number	Ministry or Institution	Expenditures in 2006 (est.)	Expenditures in 2005 (est.)	Difference
19	Ministry of Tourism	11,649,096	14,156,788	-2,507,692
20	Ministry of Culture	18,752,605	17,482,960	1,269,645
21	Ministry of Environment	4,973,480	3,909,000	1,064,480
22	Ministry of the Displaced	5,785,371	5,590,000	195,371
23	Ministry of Youth and Sports	11,403,500	9,314,500	2,089,000
24	Ministry of Social Affairs	96,915,069	87,299,569	9,615,500
25	Ministry of Industry	5,443,400	5,843,400	-400,000
Due debts		4,653,000,000	3,900,000,000	753,000,000
Retirement, compensation and end-of-service salaries		935,000,000	900,000,000	35,000,000
Budget reserves		184,528,890	194,992,224	-10,463,334
<b>Total</b>		<b>11,195,000,000</b>	<b>10,000,000,000</b>	<b>1,195,000</b>

*Source: 2005 Budget Law and 2006 Budget Draft-Law – Official Gazette*

## 2-Revenues


Revenues were estimated at 6,657 billion LBP, or a deficit of 4,538 billion LBP or 40.5% in 2006 compared with a deficit of 30.8% in 2005.

### What is new in the Budget?

- 1- Imposing new taxes and fees: a fee of 2.5 million LBP for each license to invest groundwater for industrial purposes or fill and buy water; an additional tax of 500,000 LBP on private tourist vehicles with a 3-number plate; 250,000 for each 4-number plate; 100,000 LBP for 5-number plate; and an additional tax of 200,000 LBP for every driving license compared to 115,000 LBP previously;
- 2- Canceling the Council of the South by December 31, 2008;
- 3- Canceling the Central Fund for the Displaced and the Ministry of the Displaced by December 31, 2008;
- 4- Cutting 3% of salaries of civil servants who are not registered in the Civil Servants Cooperative;
- 5- Canceling the exemption of the deputy's vehicle from customs, registration and other taxes;
- 6- Decreasing monthly compensations and allowances of the president, prime minister, speaker, ministers and deputies, as shown in graph no.2. If political officials' monthly compensations and allowances are reduced according to the draft-law, the government would save 3.740 billion LBP per year (considering that 15 out of the 30 ministers are deputies);

[Graph 2] **Monthly compensations and allowances of ministers and deputies presently and after the proposed reduction** (in millions of LBP)

*Source: Law no. 717 of November 5, 1998 - Budget draft law of 2006 - Official Gazette*



- 7- Allowing the government to transform commercial or industrial public institutions into joint-stock companies owned by the government;
- 8- Granting exemptions and facilitations to citizens who were afflicted by the July-August 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon;
- 9- Amending the income tax law.

# Will Civil War ravage the Country Again?

## The Signal Today is Yellow

**A**pril 13, 1975: a day the Lebanese will never forget. A long war broke out that shaped Lebanon's modern history.

The Lebanese live in a state of fear and anxiety and are comparing today's developments with the situation that prevailed over the country on the eve of the war.

Did the Lebanese learn anything from this war? Many have not lost hope but some wonder whether history will repeat itself.

A look into today's developments shows that the situation is neither exactly the same nor totally different. However, four main factors control Lebanon's peace and war.

### 1- The Palestinian Factor

**1975:** On the eve of the war, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) represented a "state within a non-state entity". The Palestinians enjoyed organized military power with a decision-making monopolized by the Palestine Liberation Organization, mainly Fatah Movement and its leader Yasser Arafat.

Palestinian leaders imposed their authority over the South of Lebanon, in addition to refugee camps in other areas. They were defended by Lebanese Muslim leaders and strongly opposed by the Christian leaders.

**2007:** Today, the situation is very different. It is true that the Palestinians are still bearing weapons but they no longer form a unified force. Furthermore, the establishment of a Palestinian Authority (PA) on some Palestinian territories weakened their presence in Lebanon. The Palestinian organizations' concerns and demands are mainly social and civil. They seek the right to work and own a residence and call for health and educational services.

### 2- The Syrian Factor

**1975:** It is the second regional factor that contributed to stirring internal conflicts in 1975. While its presence is still strong today, its options changed. Syrian forces entered Lebanon back then to achieve a political goal by preventing the PLO from establishing its state in the country. Some Syrian officials might have wanted to unite Syria and Lebanon and cancel the stipulations of Sykes-Picot Agreement (as stated by Syrian former vice-president Abdel-Halim Khaddam).

**2007:** Syria's political and military presence in Lebanon that extended over 30 years ended with a "disappointing withdrawal" for the Syrian leaders. This fact might have made the Syrian

regime reconsider its options in the country, as noted by President Bashar Assad in his speech before Syrian Parliament in March 2005. Moreover, the political environment today does no longer allow the recurrence of the 1975 developments, despite the fact the Syrian-Lebanese relations might stir or resolve internal disputes.

### 3- The Israeli Factor

**1975:** It is still a lurking threat but its influence in Lebanon weakened following the Israeli forces' withdrawal from the South in the year 2000. Moreover, wars launched by Israeli forces against Lebanon in 1978, 1982, 1993, 1996 and recently in 2006, have increased the feelings of rejection toward Israel among the majority of Lebanese. In fact, Israel's conduct with its former "friends, agents and allies" in Lebanon disappointed those and perhaps convinced them not to trust Israel in the future.

**2007:** Israel's role today is perhaps limited to forming security cells to hit Lebanon's security, (Mahmoud Abu Rafeh's cell discovered in June 2006), although the Lebanese government did not raise it before the Security Council.

### 4- Internal Divisions

Divisions among the Lebanese today are even stronger than their disagreements in 1975. Even though divisions are perhaps more political than confessional, the confessional factor is still the main fuel in the political arena.

There are wide disagreements between Shia'a and Sunni leaders and between the Maronite leaders themselves, in addition to a Druze-Sunni leadership against a Shia'a leadership.

However, these divisions alone cannot lead to war. The Lebanese leaders, although armed and reinforcing their ranks, will not be able to engage in a civil war in the absence of an adequate regional and international will. Lebanese leaders are ready, but await the signal.

The signal today is yellow.

#### The Lebanese and the Return of the War

In an opinion poll conducted by *Information International* in March 2006, 61.1% of the respondents did not believe that civil war would break out against 14.1% who believed it would. In return, 24.5% of the respondents said they did not know.

As for the opinion poll conducted in February 2007, 44.2% of respondents said they did not believe that a civil war would break out against 14.8% who said they were not sure there would be war. However, 41% of respondents said they "did not know".

*Note: For more information on the July-August 2006 Israeli war against Lebanon, please refer to li Monthly issue no. 50 (August 2006).*

# Legal Quorum for Presidential Elections

## Two-thirds of Deputies since Independence

The constitutional period for the election of a new president will start in less than five months amid political debates about the legal quorum of the election session.

### Date of the Session

Article 73 of the Constitution states: "One month at least and two months at most before the expiration of the term of office of the President of the Republic, the Chamber is summoned by its President to elect the new President of the Republic. However, should it not be summoned for this purpose, the Chamber meets of its own accord on the tenth day preceding the expiration of the President's term of office".

Emile Lahoud's presidential term ends on the night of November 23-24, 2007, which means that the constitutional period of the elections starts on September 23. If Speaker Nabih Berri did not call for a parliamentary session by November 13, ten days before the expiration of Lahoud's term, the deputy-speaker or any deputy chosen by Parliament can convene a session to elect a new president.

### Legal Quorum for the Session

Article 49 of the Constitution states: "...The President of the Republic shall be elected by secret ballot and by a two thirds majority of the Chamber of Deputies. After a first ballot, an absolute majority shall be sufficient. The President's term is for six years. He may not be re-elected until six years after the expiration of his last mandate..."

Parliament is formed of 128 deputies, which means that the president is elected in the first round if he receives 86 votes. If he does not receive this number of votes, a second round (or more) is held and whoever receives the absolute majority of 65 votes wins. However, some parties in pro-government forces (March 14 Forces) are arguing that the legal quorum for the first round is two thirds of deputies, while the following rounds require the presence of 65 deputies with an absolute majority of 33 votes. If implemented, such hypothesis would allow the pro-government forces to hold a session headed by the deputy speaker ten days before the expiration of Lahoud's term and elect the new president.

*For more details on the election of the President of the Republic, please refer to li Monthly issues no. 48 and 56.*

### An Overview of Presidential Elections since the Independence

Presidents from the Independence in 1943 and until the last elections in 1998 were elected by the two thirds majority. However, during the elections of 1982 and 1989, the legal quorum adopted was that of living deputies, as several deputies passed away during the war and no

parliamentary elections were held to fill the vacant posts. Table no.1 presents information on presidential elections from 1943 till 1998.

Election date	Total number of deputies	Number of attending deputies	President elected
21-9-1943	55	47	Bshara al-Khoury with 44 votes in the first round
27-5-1948	55	46	Bshara al-Khoury with 46 votes in the first round
23-9-1952	77	76	Kamil Chamoun with 74 votes in the first round
31-7-1958	66	56	Fouad Chehab with 48 votes in the second round (7 votes for Raymond Eddeh and one blank ballot)
18-8-1964	99	99	Charles Helou with 92 votes in the first round (5 votes for Pierre al-Gemayel and two blank ballots)
17-8-1970	99	99	Suleiman Franjeh with 50 votes in the second round (Elias Sarkis received 49 votes, while in the first round Franjeh received 38 votes and Sarkis 45)
8-5-1976	99 (number of living deputies was 98)	69	Elias Sarkis with 66 votes in the second round (he received 63 votes in the first round with 3 blank ballots)
23-8-1982	99 (number of living deputies was 92)	62	Bashir al-Gemayel with 57 votes in the second round (he received 58 votes in the first round with 5 blank ballots)
21-9-1982	99 (number of living deputies was 92)	80	Amin al-Gemayel in the first round with 77 votes (3 blank ballots)
5-11-1989	99 (number of living deputies was 73)	58	Rene Mouawad with 52 votes in the second round with 6 blank ballots (he received 35 votes in the first round)
24-11-1989	99 (number of living deputies was 72)	52	Elias Hrawi with 47 votes in the second round with 5 blank votes (he received 46 votes in the first round)
15-10-1998	128	118	Emile Lahoud with 118 votes in the first round

*Source: Minutes of Parliament sessions*

Most of presidential elections held since 1943 were based on consensus, except for the elections of 1982 (victory of Bashir al-Gemayel in the absence of national agreement on his election) and those of 1989 (elections of Rene Mouawad and Elias Hrawi without the legal quorum due to the death of several deputies during the war).

Today, neither the pro-government forces (March 14 Forces) nor the opposition (March 8 Forces) alone can ensure the legal quorum. The argument presented by the pro-government forces (two-thirds as the legal quorum for the first round and 65 deputies for the following rounds) can represent a precedent based on a personal and political interests.



# Legislative Decrees:

## Many in the presidencies of Chehab, Sarkis and Gemayel and none after the Taif Accord

Legislative decrees are issued upon a delegation from Parliament to the Cabinet, which in turn, sets legislations for specific issues within a specific time. These legislations are issued under legislative decrees. They are called “legislative,” because they have the power of the law and “decrees” because they are issued by the executive power.

Unlike Article 38 of the French Constitution which allows the government to “ask Parliament to authorize it, for a limited period, to take by ordinance measures normally within the legislative sphere”, the Lebanese Constitution does not have any such article. A constitutional custom set in 1930 stated that Parliament should authorize the government to enact ordinances. However, since 1992, the government was never authorized to issue decrees.

### Introduction

Parliament authorized the government to issue legislative decrees for the first time on December 26, 1929. It assigned the Cabinet to issue decrees pertaining to amendments in civil posts within a specific deadline.

Consequently, the first legislative decree was issued on January 21, 1930 and granted compensations to civil servants whose positions were canceled.

On November 9, 1955, the Shura Council (Majlis al-Shura) issued Decision no.522 stating that “the legislative authority may extend the competence of the executive authority and allow it for a specific period, to enact decrees in specific legislative issues”.

In order to become valid, legislative decrees pass by three phases.

### First Phase: Parliament’s Delegation

A draft-law can either be submitted by a certain number of deputies or by the Cabinet, which asks Parliament to allow it to issue legislative decrees.

All Cabinets that were formed before the Taif Accord were given this permission, with an exception of Rashid Karami’s Cabinet in 1968.

The delegation law passed by Parliament should specify the time period in which the government is allowed to

issue legislative decrees. The time period ranges between three months and one year.

When a delegation law is passed due to a certain crisis, Parliament gives the Cabinet a short period of time to issue decrees, such as Law no. 41 of June 3, 1967, which allowed the government to issue necessary decrees to fight rise and monopoly of prices within a one-month period. Law no.45 issued on June 5, 1967 allowed the government to issue decrees within 2 months due to the war of 1967. The delegation law should also specify which subjects the government is allowed to issue decrees about, whether financial and economic, or security.

### Second Phase: Adopting Legislative Decrees by Parliament

The Cabinet is authorized to issue legislative decrees since it has bodies specialized in different fields, hence is able to prepare drafts faster than Parliament.

The government should abide by the issues specified in the delegation law.

### Third Phase: Ratifying Decrees by Parliament

The delegation law usually requires the Cabinet to submit the legislative decrees to Parliament immediately after their adoption by the Council of Ministers.

Parliament should study the laws thoroughly and do necessary amendments.

However, this is not the case in reality, as Parliament only takes notice of the decrees and ratifies them according to the Constitution.

### Legal Nature of Legislative Decrees

The nature of legislative decrees was a disputed issue. Are they considered administrative decrees that can be challenged before the Shura Council or they have a legislative characteristic that puts them out of the competence of the administrative judge?

The Shura Council answered this question in its decision no.522 of November 9, 1955, which states: “...whereas legislative decrees are considered administrative because they are issued by the executive power, they are subject to

the control of the Shura Council until these decrees are ratified by the legislative power”.

Consequently, the legal nature of these decrees varies between a phase and another:

- a- **Before they are submitted to Parliament:** the decrees are considered administrative procedures that can be challenged before the Shura Council, especially if they surpassed the terms stipulated in the delegation law pertaining to the time period or issues that should be addressed.
- b- **After they are submitted to Parliament:** the Shura Council studies the legislative decrees and decides whether they meet the delegation law or not. The decrees are classified as laws when Parliament ratifies them. However, before the Taif Accord, no party could control the constitutionality of these decrees as the Constitutional Council was not created yet.

## Delegation Laws in the Customs

Parliament usually passes delegation laws and authorizes the Cabinet to enact legislations related to the customs. According to this law, the Cabinet grants the Higher Customs Council the right to issue decrees. It is noteworthy that the customs call these decrees “laws” although they are issued by the Council of Ministers or the Customs Council.

Cabinet’s delegation to the Higher Customs Council is different from the delegation law passed by Parliament to authorize the Cabinet to issue legislations for several reasons, including:

- ⦿ Delegating the Higher Customs Council to issue laws is very limited; the first law was issued on May 18, 1965;
- ⦿ The time period given to the Customs is longer than that given to the Cabinet; usually it extends over two years;
- ⦿ Legislations issued by the Higher Customs Council are not submitted to Parliament; they are issued according to decrees made by the Cabinet or the Council and become automatically valid;
- ⦿ The laws issued by the Higher Customs Council are administrative procedures that can be challenged before the Shura Council;

- ⦿ Post-Taif Parliaments are still passing delegation laws authorizing the Cabinet to issue legislations pertaining to the Customs. The current Parliament passed Law no.746 of May 15, 2006, authorizing the Cabinet to issue legislations related to the customs through decrees made during Cabinet’s sessions and that within a period of three years.

## Number and Importance

Post-independence Cabinets issued 446 legislative decrees, mostly during the terms of Presidents Fouad Chehab, Elias Sarkis and Amin al-Gemayel. Chehab’s presidential term was described as the period of administrative reforms due to the large number of legislative decrees issued in the various sectors. 54 legislative decrees were issued in 1959, including 42 decrees issued on June 12, 1959. Table no.1 lists some of them.

**Some legislative decrees issued during the presidency of Fouad Chehab in 1959**  
Table 1

Date	Decree number	Subject
12-6-1959	111	public administrations organization
	112	public order of employees
	114	establishment of the civil service council
	115	creation of central inspection department
	116	administrative organization
	118	Court of Audit organization
	119	Shura Council statute (canceled)
	144	income tax law

Source: Compiled by Information International from the Official Gazette and other sources

During the presidency of Elias Sarkis, 124 legislative decrees were issued in 1977, including 39 decrees issued on June 30, 1977. Some of them are mainly included in table no 2.

**Some legislative decrees issued during the presidency of Elias Sarkis in 1977**  
Table 2

Date	Decree number	Subject
30-6-1977	87	public service institutions
	100	establishing a joint-stock company under the name of “Télé Liban”
	118	municipality law

Source: Compiled by Information International from the Official Gazette and other sources

During the presidency of Amin al-Gemayel and under the premiership of Chafik al-Wazzan, 134 legislative decrees were issued in 1983, 65 of which were issued on September 9, 1983. Some of them are mainly included in table no. 3.

**Some legislative decrees issued during the presidency of Amin al-Gemayel in 1983** Table 3

Date	Decree number	Subject
16-9-1983	82	court of audit organization
	90	civil procedure law
	136	work emergencies
	150	judicial law
	151	ministry of justice organization

Source: Compiled by Information International from the Official Gazette and other sources

“Chehab’s presidential term was described as the period of administrative reforms due to the large number of legislative decrees issued in the various sectors.”

Decrees issued by al-Wazzan’s Cabinet were criticized by Rashid Karami in 1984. In the ministerial policy statement, Karami asked Parliament to authorize his Cabinet to issue legislative decrees during a 6-month period in order to reconsider decrees issued between 1982 and 1983. In March 23, 1985, his Cabinet canceled 13 decrees issued by the previous Council of Ministers in 1983. Table no. 4 shows the Cabinets allowed to issue Legislative Decrees following the Independence\*.

**Cabinets allowed to issue Legislative Decrees following the Independence** Table 4

Prime Minister	Law number and date	Time period	Number of decrees
Riad al-Solh	16-3-1950	6 months	1
Khaled Shehab	15-11-1952	6 months	9
Sami al-Solh	18-10-1954	3 months	10
Abdullah al-Yafi	27-2-1956	6 months	1
Rashid Karami	12-12-1958	6 months	54
Rashid Karami	No.41 of 3-6-1967	1 month	3
Rashid Karami	No.45 of 5-6-1967	2 months	43
Salim al-Hoss	No.2 of 30-12-1976	6 months	103
Salim al-Hoss	No.8 of 11-8-1977	4 months	21
Chafik al-Wazzan	No.2 of 20-2-1981	6 months	3
Chafik al-Wazzan	No.36 of 17-11-1982	6 months	134
Rashid Karami	No.4 of 22-6-1984	9 months	41

Source: Compiled by Information International from the Official Gazette and other sources

\* 51 decrees were issued before the independence when the legislative and executive powers were limited to the Cabinet because either the Parliament or the Constitution was suspended. These decrees were ratified by the higher commissioner during the presidency of Charles Debbas (1932), Emile Eddeh (1939) and Alfred Naccash (1941).

# A Comparison between Parliaments in Six Arab Countries

“Political, social and economic analysts in the world agree that fair legislative elections in Arab countries should not be regarded as a futile matter.”

Members of parliament are generally appointed by the people, through a free and direct ballot. However, not all parliaments in the Arab world have the same structure and election mechanisms. In some Arab countries, a deputy has no parliamentary immunity and plays the role of a public servant whose main duty is to make statements and approve laws.

*Li Monthly* draws a comparison between electoral laws and the number of deputies and voters in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Palestine and Iraq.

## Voting Age

While the voter in Lebanon should be 21 years old and above, the voting age in the five other countries is 18.

## Number of Deputies and Voters

Palestine has the largest number of deputies compared with the number of people.

1.3 million voters elect 132 deputies, one deputy representing 10,000 voters. On the other hand, in Egypt, every deputy represents 70,000 voters.

Table no.1 shows the number of deputies compared with the number of voters entitled to vote in each of the six Arab countries.

Number of Deputies, Voters and Participation Rate in the Six Countries							Table 1
Country	Number of deputies	Number of voters	Number of voters who cast their ballot	Number of votes per deputy	Participation rate	Period of parliament term	
Lebanon	128	3.003.008	1.395.016	23,461	46.4%	4 years	
Syria	250	10.800.000	4.500.000	43,200	41.7%	4 years	
Jordan <sup>(1)</sup>	110	2.300.000	1.352.400	20,900	58.8%	4 years	
Egypt <sup>(2)</sup>	454	31.858.286	8.100.000	70,172	25.4%	5 years	
Iraq	275	15.379.169	11.191.133	55,924	72.7%	4 years	
Palestine	132	1.350.655	1.042.424	10,232	77.1%	4 years	

Source: Published election results

Note: These are the official figures from the last elections in the 6 examined countries: Egypt (December 2005), Lebanon (June 2005), Iraq (December 2005), Palestine (January 2006), Syria (March 2003) and Jordan (June 2003).

<sup>(1)</sup> In Jordan a senate of 55 members is appointed by the king for a 4-year term.

<sup>(2)</sup> The Egyptian president appoints 10 deputies to parliament and 88 to the Magistrate Council, which is composed of 264 members. The remaining 176 members of the Magistrate Council are elected by the people.

## Laws and Electoral Districts

Each country has its own electoral system and law and a specific distribution of electoral districts.

### Egypt

Elections in each district take place in two rounds. During the first round, all the candidates compete and the candidate with the absolute majority wins. During the second round, the competition is restricted to the two candidates who received the higher number of votes during the first round and the candidate with the majority of votes wins.

There are 222 electoral districts with two deputies for each. Egyptian laws set quotas for workers and farmers but these quotas are never applied.

### Iraq

Elections in Iraq take place in one round according to the proportional law. Each of the 18 governorates constitutes one electoral district. 230 deputies represent the governorates, while 45 deputies are elected by the total number of voters in the country. 25% of deputies should be females.

### Lebanon

In Lebanon, elections take place in one round according to the majority system. There are 14 electoral districts and the seats are distributed according to a confessional distribution.

### Palestine


Elections are held according to a mixed electoral system. 88 seats are distributed among 27 governorates according to the proportional system and the remaining 44 seats are distributed in Palestine as one district according to the majority system. There is a quota of five Christian deputies in Al-Qods, Al-Khalil, Ramallah and Al-Bira.

### Syria

Elections are held according to the majority system and each of the 15 governorates is considered as an electoral district. The quota stipulates that at least half of the deputies should be farmers and workers.

### Jordan

In Jordan, each voter chooses one candidate. There are 44 electoral districts and the laws stipulate that there should be six female deputies, nine Christian deputies, three Charkas and nine Bedouin.

Political, social and economic analysts in the world agree that fair legislative elections in Arab countries should not be regarded as a futile matter. They are a necessity that largely contributes to the reform of societies, the improvement of citizens' participation in decision-making and the achievement of their interests. 



# Government Sells its “Remnants”\*

The Lebanese Government owns vast plots of land all over Lebanon. Some properties stretch to thousands of square meters while others are smaller and scattered.

The government tends to sell these small lands - deemed “useless” for any public project - in order to generate extra income. In 2005, particularly during the last months of the year, the government sold 15,745 square meters of land valued at 2.8 billion LBP.

## On the Legal Level

Law No. 275 dated May 25, 1926, and decreed by Henri de Jouvenel -- the French High Commissioner in Syria, Loubnan al-Kabir, Bilad al-Alawiyin, and what was then Jabal al-Druze -- marked out the government’s real estate holdings as well as the methods for the administration and sale of its properties.

Eighty years have passed since that law was issued and it remains valid today, as neither the government nor Parliament has passed any other decree suspending or annulling it. All transactions pertaining to the government’s real estate holdings have so far been implemented according to De Jouvenel law, which includes 87 articles.

Such sales transactions require the buyer to own property adjacent to the property intended to be purchased. The buyer must also submit an application after which the technical office prepares a report on the condition of the land. That report also reiterates the prohibition on using the land for construction projects. Finally, the land’s value is assessed and the buyer must wait for an approval from the Court of Audit to finalize the transaction.

## Sales During 2003-2004

Between 2003 and 2004, no sale transactions for government real estate properties were registered. However, during this time, the government donated numerous tracts of land to foreign parties and governments for the purpose of establishing headquarters or embassies, as illustrated in table no. 1.

Government Real Estate Donated to Foreign Parties and Governments, 2003-2004					Table 1
Decree # and Date of Issuance	Real Estate # and Location	Real Estate Area	Beneficiary	Purpose	
11568 of 22-12-2003	2069-2070-2071-2072-2073 / Nakkach-Matn	7,864 m <sup>2</sup>	Republic of Brazil	Establishing headquarters for the Brazilian Embassy in Lebanon	
12085 of 7-3- 2004	Part of real estate No. 3016 / Chiyah-Ba’abda	3,150 m <sup>2</sup>	General Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture for Arab Countries	Establishing headquarters for the union in Lebanon	
12349 of 23-4- 2004	Part of real estate No. 3016 / Chiyah-Ba’abda	3,000 m <sup>2</sup>	Qatar	Establishing headquarters for the Qatari Embassy in Lebanon	
12350 of 23-4- 2004	Part of real estate No. 3016 / Chiyah-Ba’abda	3,007 m <sup>2</sup>	United Arab Emirates	Establishing headquarters for the United Arab Emirates Embassy in Lebanon	
12758 of 30-6-2004	7313 / Chiyah-Ba’abda	975 m <sup>2</sup>	Embassy of Kuwait	Building parking spaces (this decree was later amended so that a consulate was also established on the property)	

Source: The Official Gazette

\* This is the official word for plots of land that are deemed as such.

## Sales in 2005

Contrary to the previous two years, 2005 witnessed a large number of sale transactions, as 15,745 square meters of governmental land were sold, valued at 2.8 billion LBP (table no. 2).

Sales of Governmental Land in 2005					Table 2
Sales License Decree # and Date	Date of Application	Real Estate # and Location	Real Estate Area	Land Value (in LBP)	
15272 on 1-10-2005	14-4-2000	2588 / Zouq Mkayel Kesrouane	100 m <sup>2</sup>	60 million	
15273 on 1-10-2005	30-8-1999	296 / Bqosta-Saida	92 m <sup>2</sup>	16.1 million	
15274 on 1-10-2005	16-12-1998	30 / Ain al-Delbe-Jbeil	65 m <sup>2</sup>	6.9 million	
15275 on 1-10-2005	15-10-2004	432 / Laylaké-Ba'abda	223 m <sup>2</sup>	100.3 million	
15276 on 1-10-2005	10-6-1998	748 9/ Mheilib-Sour	880 m <sup>2</sup>	35.2 million	
15294 on 5-10-2005	13-12-1996	116/Ba'abda	210 m <sup>2</sup>	73.5 million	
15432 on 14-10-2005	11-12-2002	179 / Al-Mansouriyeh –Matn	124 m <sup>2</sup>	62 million	
15498 on 19-10-2005	1-9-1979	15 / Ba'abda	65 m <sup>2</sup>	22.7 million	
15546 on 26-10-2005	24-1-2001	1621 / Antelias-Matn	55 m <sup>2</sup>	46.7 million	
15547 on 26-10-2005	6-7-2002	1145 / Helta-Batroun	403 m <sup>2</sup>	10.8 million	
15548 on 26-10-2005	4-12-2002	301 / Mina-Trablous	200 m <sup>2</sup>	180 million	
15549 on 26-10-2005	17-8-1998	160 / Aain Zhalta- Chouf	355 m <sup>2</sup>	28.4 million	
15550 on 26-10-2005	15-9-1998	1735 / Al-Hadath-Ba'abda	275 m <sup>2</sup>	89.4 million	
15551 on 26-10-2005	23-3-1998	999 & 1015 / Deek al-Mehdi-Matn	70 m <sup>2</sup> & 122 m <sup>2</sup>	48 million	
15552 on 26-10-2005	26-1-1999	668 / Wata Salam-Kesrouane	71 m <sup>2</sup>	28.4 million	
15553 on 26-10-2005	5-2-1998	21 / Al-Hraiche-Koura	21 m <sup>2</sup>	630,000	
15554 on 26-10-2005	29-6-1998	9622 / Al-Fanar-Matn	415 m <sup>2</sup>	83 million	
15555 on 26-10-2005	12-1-2000	2462 / Berhalioun-Bcharre	16 m <sup>2</sup>	240,000	
15556 on 26-10-2005	16-2-1999	1826 / Al-Wustani-Saida	131 m <sup>2</sup>	186.7 million	
15557 on 26-10-2005	13-2-1999	1295 / Bqosta-Saida	99 m <sup>2</sup>	17.3 million	
15558 on 26-10-2005	10-6-1998	453 / Al-Mseileh-Saida	882 m <sup>2</sup>	48.5 million	
15559 on 26-10-2005	12-1-2001	970 / Beit Chlala-Batroun	23 m <sup>2</sup>	5.8 million	
15560 on 26-10-2005	2-10-2000	5187 / Borj Hammoud-Matn	52 m <sup>2</sup>	26 million	
15561 on 26-10-2005	4-9-2000	972 / Al-Daphne Adma-Kesrouane	121 m <sup>2</sup>	72.6 million	
15562 on 26-10-2005	25-6-2002	6565 / Amioun-Koura	22 m <sup>2</sup>	2.2 million	
15563 on 26-10-2005	12-11-2002	1294 / Bqosta-Saida	53 m <sup>2</sup>	13.2 million	
15564 on 26-10-2005	10-3-2001	496 / Kfar Kiddé- Jbeil	185 m <sup>2</sup>	8.3 million	
15565 on 26-10-2005	1-12-1998	1698 / Borj al-Brajneh –Ba'abda	37 m <sup>2</sup>	25.9 million	
15566 on 26-10-2005	6-12-1999	3050 / Ehden-Zgharta	214 m <sup>2</sup>	12.8 million	
15567 on 26-10-2005	11-6-1999	973 / Furn al-Chebbak-Ba'abda	268 m <sup>2</sup>	402 million (bought by the Doctors' Syndicate)	
15568 on 26-10-2005	11-12-2001	1559 / Daraoun-Kesrouane	648 m <sup>2</sup>	162 million	
15569 on 26-10-2005	22-3-1999	1101 / Ba'abda	487 m <sup>2</sup>	779.2 million	

Sales License Decree # and Date	Date of Application	Real Estate # and Location	Real Estate Area	Land Value (in LBP)
15570 on 26-10-2005	29-9-1999	358 / Mea'ad-Jbeil	112 m <sup>2</sup>	5 million
15571 on 26-10-2005	27-7-2001	103 / Ansarieh-Saida	266 m <sup>2</sup>	12 million
15594 on 29-10-2005	2-8-2000	371 / Bkhichtay-A'aley	160 m <sup>2</sup>	24 million
15595 on 29-10-2005	30-8-1999	190 / Al-Ghassanieh-Saida	72 m <sup>2</sup>	7.2 million
15596 on 29-10-2005	10-3-1998	1363 & 1364 Hazerta-Zahle	2,963 m <sup>2</sup> & 958 m <sup>2</sup>	50 million
15597 on 29-10-2005	28-9-1998	2450 / Qornet al-Hamra-Matn	75 m <sup>2</sup>	9.7 million
15646 on 1-11-2005	Public Auction held on 9-3-2001	390 / Boussit Zgharta	1,280 m <sup>2</sup>	20.1 million
15647 on 1-11-2005	Public Auction held on 29-3-2001	302 / Al-Sheikh Taba-A'akkar	2,210 m <sup>2</sup>	13.2 million
15704 on 4-11-2005	7-8-2000	2027/ Maghdoushe-Saida	2 m <sup>2</sup>	200,000
15984 on 22-12-2005	11-8-2000	106/Tal al-Akhdar-Zahle	452 m <sup>2</sup>	407 million

Source: The Official Gazette

## Sales in 2006

Sale transactions decreased in 2006 compared to 2005, as only 9 transactions were registered. 1,065 square meters were sold for around 281 million LBP, as shown in table no. 3.

**Governmental Land sold in 2006**

**Table 3**

Sales License Decree # and Date	Date of Application	Real Estate # and Location	Real Estate Area	Land Value (in LBP)
16123 on 16-1-2006	7-11-2005	441/Badbahoun- Koura	76 m <sup>2</sup>	1.748 million
16331 on 16-2-2006	29-8-2005	2495/Kosba-Koura	9 m <sup>2</sup>	1.350 million
16542 on 9-3-2006	18-7-2005	3564/Baouchrieh- Matn	60 m <sup>2</sup>	48.6 million
17651 on 13-9-2006	13-10-2005	1704/Borj al-Brajneh-Ba'abda	113 m <sup>2</sup>	62.2 million
17652 on 13-9-2006	17-12-2005	1187/Wadi al-Arayesh-Zahle	42 m <sup>2</sup>	21 million
17679 on 13-9-2006	16-9-2003	838/Deir Qubel-Aley	85 m <sup>2</sup>	8.5 million
17680 on 13-9-2006	13-10-2005	4546/Bsatin-Trablous	234 m <sup>2</sup>	124 million
17726 on 25-9-2006	11-3-2006	481/Ansarieh-Saida	413 m <sup>2</sup>	12.4 million
17771 on 4-10-2006	2-7-2006	2871/Asia-Batroun	33 m <sup>2</sup>	1.3 million

Source: The Official Gazette

It is worthy to note that most of these applications were submitted four or five years ago. The reason behind the delay in the sales remains unknown. Could it be due to bureaucratic and administrative reasons or to a conflict over the land valuations? Have these transactions been made in the best interests of the government, given that the price of land per square meter has, more than ever, witnessed dramatic fluctuations from one region to another as well as within the same region, going from 10 USD to more than 1,000 USD. Furthermore, is the increase in the price of the real estate due to location or to the manipulation of its value? ●●

# LOTO competing with YANASIB

## Is someone lurking in the Shadow?

The Directorate of National Lottery issued its annual report presenting the directorate’s administrative situation and the profits achieved in the different lottery games. *li Monthly* addresses in the following article the situation of lottery today.

### Administrative Situation

According to Decree no. 8350 of December 30, 1961, the number of positions at the Directorate of National Lottery is 31 posts. However, there are currently 10 occupied posts and one sub-contractor; hence 67.7% of positions are vacant.

### Financial Situation

The Directorate of National Lottery supervises the three lottery games, which include: the Lebanese Lottery (YANASIB), the Lebanese LOTO and the Instant Lottery, in addition to private and charity lottery games. The directorate assigns private companies to distribute lottery tickets to the sellers. Revenues from lottery games in 2006 reached 76,655,004,000 LBP distributed by game as shown in graph no.1.

In 2006, the government treasury share of these revenues reached 57,479,984,000 LBP, with an increase of 9,479,984,000 LBP (19.7%) compared with the previous year. The estimated value set by the government was 50 billion LBP. Lottery revenues increased significantly over the past years, as they did not exceed 24 billion LBP in 2000 and 36 billion LBP in 2003. Revenues from the 10% tax on the prizes are also to be added to the returns. These revenues reached 6,233,155,000 LBP in 2006, as shown in graph no.2.

However, the selling of YANASIB tickets was 67.1% lesser than the estimates set in the budget, while LOTO revenues were 91.5% higher than the estimates, as a YANASIB ticket costs 5,000 LBP with prizes amounting to 150 million LBP and a LOTO ticket costs 1,500 LBP with prizes amounting to 3 billion LBP.

With the beginning of 2007, the contract with the company in charge of YANASIB has ended, while the contract with the other company responsible for LOTO and Instant Lottery will end in 2009.



However no bidder has so far presented concession proposals.

Will the government decide to cancel the YANASIB with the absence of proposals? Will it accept the bidders’ conditions (amending the shares to increase benefits) and redress the YANASIB status?

Analysts indicate that the government did not appropriately study the market and introduced the LOTO before redressing the YANASIB status.

Other critics point out to a kind of a scheme aimed at driving the returns of YANASIB down in order to give the concession at favorable conditions to a private party.

Note: For more information on distribution of lottery shares between the government and private companies, kindly refer to issue no.40 of October 2005.



# Shia'a Religious Authorities

## Traditions and Al-Faqih Authority

The Shia'a confession is one of the Islamic denominations and it is divided into 14 different branches (mainly the Twelvers, al-Kayssanieh, al-Zaydieh and al-Isma'iliyeh) due to disagreements over the rightful succession of Imams.

The Shia'a follow Imams, who are the "divinely appointed rulers" of the confession. They believe that the Imams should be deferred to in matters of religion and consider the three ruling Sunni caliphs as historical rulers without religious authority, holding Prophet Muhammad's descendants as the true source of guidance.

### Authority

The Shia'a believe in al-Imam al-Mahdi al-Muntazar, Mohammed bin Al Hassan the twelfth Imam, who was born in 870 A.D. and became Imam at the age of 5. According to their theology, al-Mahdi al-Muntazar, who has been hidden by God since 946 (referred to as occultation), will later emerge to fulfill his mission on the Qiyamah day or the day of Judgement. In the absence of al-Mahdi al-Muntazar, Shia'a religious men replace him in guiding the Shia'a in their spiritual and daily life, as many of daily issues were not mentioned in the Qoran and numerous Qoranic verses need to be interpreted to the people. This is why the Shia'a defer questions of this kind to a religious leader or authority (Moqaled).

Shia'a religious men teach in religious schools whether in Qum in Iran or Najaf in Iraq. They "transfer" their ideas and perceptions to the students through lessons, books and publications. After completing the lessons, students return to their countries, where they communicate these ideas to Shia'a followers. The Shia'a confession stipulates that every adult Shia'a should follow (or imitate) a high religious authority and implement its teachings in religious and daily affairs.

The Shia'a follower chooses the religious authority based on the level of identification with the latter. However, a Shia'a cannot imitate a religious man who has passed away, unless he/she started following him before his death. In such case, the relation between the follower and the authority is made through the latter's books or through questions addressed to him via his representative in the authority's country of origin.

The follower often pays the Zakat (the tax to the poor), Khums (one-fifth of savings) or Hibat (donations) to the authority or his representative, who in turn distributes them to the needy people.

Today, there are tens of Shia'a religious authorities in the world, each of them forming a separate institution, with financial, religious, social and cultural bodies. Many Shia'a authorities, whose renown surpassed their country of origin, have marked the history of the confession and played an important role in conflicts within Islamic societies. In fact, Shia'a followers often argue about the higher authority that should be followed and other issues of competitiveness between these authorities.

### Al-Faqih Mandate

The Iranian Revolution, led by Ayatollah al-Khomeini in 1978-1979, introduced the comprehensive mandate of Al-Faqih to replace al-Imam al-Mahdi in his absence. Al-Faqih (literally means legal scholar or jurist) now represents the Imam's deputy and leads the Islamic nation until the reappearance of the Imam. However, Al-Faqih concept raised controversy among the Shia'a, some of whom rejected his mandate and chose to defer their inquiries to one of the authorities while others accepted it. There is also a controversy about Al-Faqih's authority and whether it is absolute or limited to fatwas (legal pronouncement in Islam made by a mufti).

Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah says that al-Faqih is not infallible and that people should not consider everything he says as the absolute truth.

In Iran, Al-Faqih's authority is absolute, just like al-Khomeini wanted it to be. After the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, al-Khomeini became the first Wali al-Faqih or the guardian of the jurisconsult. He was succeeded by Imam al-Khamane'i.

The Iranian Constitution has set the mechanism for choosing a Faqih by an experts' council (Majlis al-Khoubara') elected by the Iranian people. The twelve Shia'a Imams are listed below by mandate.

### The Twelve Shia'a Imams

- |   |              |
|---|--------------|
| 1- Ali bin Abi Taleb                              | (600-661 AD) |
| 2- Al-Hassan bin Ali bin Abi Taleb                | (624-670 AD) |
| 3- Al-Hussein bin Ali bin Abi Taleb               | (625-680 AD) |
| 4- Ali bin al-Hassan "Zein al-A'abidin"           | (658-712 AD) |
| 5- Mohammed bin Ali "Mohammed al-Baqer"           | (676-732 AD) |
| 6- Ja'afar bin Mohammed "Ja'afar as-Sadeq"        | (699-765 AD) |
| 7- Moussa bin Ja'afar "Moussa al-Kazem"           | (745-799 AD) |
| 8- Ali bin Moussa "Ali al-Rida"                   | (770-818 AD) |
| 9- Mohammed bin Ali "Mohammed Jawad"              | (811-839 AD) |
| 10- Ali bin Mohammed "Mohammed al-Hadi"           | (829-868 AD) |
| 11- Al-Hassan bin Ali "Al-Hassan al-A'askari"     | (846-874 AD) |
| 12- Mohammed bin al-Hassan "Al-Mahdi al-Muntazar" | (870 AD)     |

It is noteworthy that their average age was 47 years and all were either poisoned or murdered except for al-Mahdi al-Muntazar.

### Most Imitated Authorities

**Iran:** Al Wahid al-Kharasani, Jawad al-Tabrisi, Nasser Mkarem al-Shirazi, Hussein al-Muntaziri, Mohammed Rida al-Kalbikiani, Kazem al-Ha'eri, Mohammed Hashimi Shahroudi, Fadel al-Lankrani, Mohammed al-Araki, Jawadi Aml

**Iraq:** As Sayyed Abu Qassem al-Khawa'i, Mohsen al-Hakim, Ali as-Sistani, Mohammed Baqr as-Sadr

**Lebanon:** Mohsen al-Amin, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, Ibrahim Suleiman



# The Greek Orthodox Confession

77,000 in 1932, 280,000 residents today and 11 civil servants in first-grade positions

The Greek Orthodox Confession is the second largest Christian confession in Lebanon after the Maronite. It was called "Greek" in reference to the peoples of the Greek-speaking eastern half of the Roman Empire and "Orthodox" to distinguish itself as the "body that preserved the original principles of Christian belief".

In Lebanon, the Greek Orthodox confession follows the Patriarchate of Antioch and All the East, which is based in Damascus.

## Historical Background

Apostles Paul and Barnaba established the Antioch Apostolic See in 42 A.D. The term "Christian" was first used in Antioch.

In 451 A.D., an ecumenical council, known as the Council of Chalcedon, resulted in a major schism in the Christian Church and the birth of new churches due to some bishops' repudiation of the council's doctrine which recognized the "full humanity and full divinity" of Jesus.

Consequently, the Armenians, Syriac and Copt withdrew from the Christian Church, which continued to gather those who believe in the "full humanity and full divinity" of Jesus and were surnamed the Melchites.

Another schism inside the Christian Church occurred in 1054, due, among other causes, to the Pope's wish in the 4th century to lead the Church in Rome and the East.

As a result, the Church split to a western Catholic Church headed by the Pope and an eastern Orthodox Church based on independent patriarchates. The Crusades afflicted the Eastern Orthodox Church with great losses, destroying its churches and overthrowing its patriarchs, who were forced to take refuge in Constantinople and Cyprus. After the Crusades, the Mameluks also oppressed the Orthodox followers, confiscating their properties and imposing high taxes on their merchants. As a result, their presence in the Levant declined and their patriarchal seat was moved to Damascus around the half of the 14th century.

In 1898, the last Greek patriarch was overthrown and an Arab Patriarch – Maletius II – succeeded him.

In the first Christian eras and until the schisms, the Antioch seat included all Asia, the countries of the Levant and India. Today, according to Article 1 of the Antioch Patriarchate's Charter, the Antioch Church is an independent church linked with the other Orthodox churches by unity of faith, sacraments and traditions. The Antioch Patriarchate extends over Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Turkey, Iran, the Arab Jazeera, Northern, Central and Southern America, Australia and New Zealand.

## The Holy Synod

The Holy Synod is the highest judicial and legislative authority in the Greek Orthodox Church. The Synod is formed of a patriarch and bishops. The Holy Antioch Synod is currently headed by Patriarch Ignatius IV (Hazim). Table no.1 lists the Greek Orthodox Patriarchs who presided over the Church from 1791 till present.

Greek Orthodox Patriarchs from 1791 till present		
Patriarch	From	Until
Ethymius	1791	1813
Seraphim	1813	1823
Methodius	1823	1850
Hierothios	1850	1885
Gerasimos	1885	1891
Spyridon	1891	1898
Meletius II	1899	1906
Gregory IV Haddad	1906	1928
Alexander III Tahan	1931	1958
Theodosius VI Abou Rjaily	1958	1970
Elias IV Mua'ad	1970	1979
Ignatius IV (Hazim)	1979	Present

Source: "The Church of the City of God, Antioch the Great", Assad Rustom

## Archdiocese

The Greek Orthodox Church is formed of several archdioceses headed by archbishops. According to Article 25 of the Charter, the archbishop is the official representative of the Church to the government. The Greek Orthodox archdioceses include:

1. Archdiocese of Latakia, based in Latakia and headed by Archbishop Youhanna Mansour
2. Archdiocese of Basra, Houran and Jabal al-Arab, based in Soueida' and headed by Archbishop Saba Esber
3. Archdiocese of Bagdad and Kuwait, based in Bagdad and headed by Archbishop Constantine Papa-Stefano
4. Archdiocese of Beirut, based in Beirut and headed by Archbishop Elias Aoude
5. Archdiocese of Jbeil and Batroun (Lebanon), based in Broumana and headed by Archbishop George Khodr
6. Archdiocese of Aleppo, based in Aleppo and headed by Archbishop Boulos Yazigi
7. Archdiocese of Hama, based in Hama and headed by Archbishop Elias Saliba
8. Archdiocese of Homs, based in Homs and headed by Archbishop George Abu Zakhm
9. Archdiocese of Zahle and Ba'albek (Lebanon), based in Zahle and headed by Archbishop Spyridon Khoury

10. Archdiocese of Sour (Tyre) and Saida - (Lebanon), based in Marja'ayoun and headed by Archbishop Elias Kfoury
11. Archdiocese of Trablous and Koura, based in Trablous and headed by Archbishop Elias Qorban
12. Archdiocese of A'akkar (Lebanon), based in Sheikh-Taba in A'akkar and headed by Archbishop Youssef Bandali
13. The Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America, based in Englewood, New Jersey and headed by Archbishop Philip Saliba
14. Archdiocese of Buenos Aires and the Entire Argentina, based in Buenos Aires and headed by Archbishop Kirilos Doumat
15. Archdiocese of Sao Paulo, based in Sao Paulo, Brazil, and headed by Archbishop Damaskinos Mansour
16. Archdiocese of Mexico and Venezuela, based in Mexico and headed by Archbishop Antonio Chedraoui
17. Archdiocese of France and Europe, based in Paris and headed by Archbishop Gabriel Salibi
18. Archdiocese of Australia, based in Sydney and headed by Archbishop Boulos Saliba
19. Archdiocese of Chile, based in Santiago and headed by Archbishop George Abed.

## The Greek Orthodox Church and Politics

The Greek Orthodox Church was briefly engaged in a war against the Druze leaders in 1841 in the Mountain, as mentioned in the book of Henry H. Jessup, *"Fifty Three Years in Syria"*.

After the adoption of the Mutassarifia system in 1861, the confession was granted two seats in the administrative board (Koura and Matn seats). It was the first time the confession participates in Lebanon's political life. The Church has also been one of the bases of Russia's influence in the country, particularly after the Kuçuk Kanarci Agreement of 1774, which granted Russia the right to protect the Greek Orthodox confession in the East.

The Greek Orthodox Church in Lebanon built the majority of its educational institutions during the Ottoman era. Those include Deir al-Balamand school, the Three Moons Institute and Zahrat al-Ihsan school, in addition to some hospitals.

However, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the fall of the Russian Tsar and the establishment of the French mandate in Lebanon, the Greek Orthodox Church lost major foreign support and had to make its choice. Despite its rejection of the French mandate, it became part of Greater Lebanon in 1920.

However, this did not stop the Church from regarding the mandate as an occupation of the Lebanese territories, despite the French support of the election of Charles Debbas, of Orthodox confession, to the presidency.

The Greek Orthodox Church's position toward the French mandate was perhaps due to the fact that the Orthodox of Wadi al-Nasara were separated from the Orthodox of Lebanon, hence the Maronites became the largest Christian confession in Lebanon.

The American missionaries sent to the area were not in good terms with the Greek Orthodox Church. In his book, *"American Interests in Syria 1800-1901"*, Abdel Latif Tibawi quoted the secretary of the American missionaries in Jerusalem as saying: "It is humiliating to see godly men in the Protestant Church of England proposing to fraternize with such Oriental ecclesiastics".

Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the Palestinian Cause represented a priority on the Greek Orthodox Church's agenda.

After Lebanon's independence, the confession gained a strong presence in the various sectors. In line with the Pact of National Accord, it was granted two high positions in the government: deputy speaker of parliament and deputy prime minister.

Table no.2 lists the deputy-speakers from 1960 till present.

Lebanese deputy-speakers from 1960 till present			Table 2
Deputy-Speaker	From	To	
Fouad Boutros	July 1960	October 1961	
Munir Abu Fadel	October 1961	October 1963	
	October 1968	October 1969	
	October 1975	October 1976	
	October 1978	January 1987	
Fouad Ghosn	October 1963	May 1964	
	October 1972	October 1973	
Adib Ferzli	May 1964	May 1968	
Nassim Majdalani	May 1968	October 1968	
Michel Sassine	October 1969	October 1971	
	October 1976	October 1977	
Michel Ma'alouli	October 1973	October 1974	
	March 1990	October 1992	
Albert Moukheiber	March 1987	March 1990	
Elie Ferzli	October 1992	November 2004	
Michel al-Murr	November 2004	June 2005	
Farid Mkari	June 2005	Present	

Source: Minutes of Cabinet Sessions

Table no.3 lists the deputy prime ministers from 1943 till present by Cabinet.

Deputy prime ministers from 1943 till present by Cabinet				Table 3
Deputy Prime Minister	From	To	Cabinet	
Habib Abou Chahla	25-9-1943	3-7-1944	Riad al-Solh	
	3-7-1944	9-1-1945	Riad al-Solh	
Nicolas Ghosn	9-1-1945	22-8-1945	Abdel-Hamid Karami	
Gabriel al-Murr	22-8-1945	3-4-1946	Sami al-Solh	
	22-5-1946	14-12-1946	Sa'adi al-Manla	
	7-6-1947	26-7-1948	Riad al-Solh	
	26-7-1948	20-7-1949	Riad al-Solh	
	16-9-1954	9-7-1955	Sami al-Solh	
	9-7-1955	19-9-1955	Sami al-Solh	
	20-7-1949	1-10-1949	Riad al-Solh	
Gebran Nahas	1-10-1949	14-2-1951	Riad al-Solh	
	20-2-1964	25-9-1964	Hussein al-Aouni	
	25-9-1964	18-11-1964	Hussein al-Aouni	
	7-6-1951	11-2-1952	Abdallah al-Yafi	
Philippe Boulos	20-5-1961	31-10-1961	Sa'eb Salam	
	31-10-1961	20-2-1964	Rashid Karami	
Fouad al-Khoury	11-2-1952	9-9-1952	Sami al-Solh	

Deputy Prime Minister	From	To	Cabinet
Bassil Trad	9-9-1952 14-9-1952	14-9-1952 18-9-1952	Nazem A'akari Sa'eb Salam
Fouad Ghosn	19-9-1955	19-3-1956	Rashid Karami
	12-10-1968	20-10-1968	Abdallah al-Yafi
	25-11-1969	13-10-1970	Rashid Karami
	25-4-1973 8-7-1973	8-7-1973 31-10-1974	Amin Hafez Taqieddine al-Solh
Nassim Majdalani	1-8-1960	20-5-1961	Sa'eb Salam
	18-11-1964	25-7-1965	Hussein al-Aouni
	15-1-1969	25-11-1969	Rashid Karami
Fouad Boutros	9-4-1966	6-12-1966	Abdallah al-Yafi
	8-2-1968	12-10-1968	Abdallah al-Yafi
	9-12-1976	16-7-1979	Salim al-Hoss
	16-7-1979	25-10-1980	Salim al-Hoss
	25-10-1980	7-10-1982	Shafik al-Wazzan
Ghassan Tuani	13-10-1970	20-1-1971	Sa'eb Salam
Elias Saba	20-1-1971	27-5-1972	Sa'eb Salam
Albert Moukheiber	27-5-1972	25-4-1973	Sa'eb Salam
Michel Sassine	31-10-1974	23-5-1975	Rashid al-Solh
	25-11-1989	24-12-1990	Salim al-Hoss
Moussa Kena'an	23-5-1975	1-7-1975	Noureddine al-Rifa'ai
Elie Salem	7-10-1982	30-4-1984	Shafik al-Wazzan
Issam Abu Jamra	22-9-1988	25-11-1989	Michel Aoun
Michel al-Murr	24-12-1990	16-5-1992	Omar Karami
	16-5-1992	31-10-1992	Rashid al-Solh
	31-10-1992	25-5-1995	Rafik al-Hariri
	25-5-1995	7-11-1996	Rafik al-Hariri
	7-11-1996	4-12-1998	Rafik al-Hariri
	4-12-1998	26-10-2000	Salim al-Hoss
Issam Fares	26-10-2000	17-4-2003	Rafik al-Hariri
	17-4-2003	26-10-2004	Rafik al-Hariri
	26-10-2004	19-4-2005	Omar Karami
Elias al-Murr	19-4-2005	19-7-2005	Najib Mikati
	19-7-2005	Present	Fouad Sanjouara

Source: Official website of the Premiership

Table no. 4 lists the number of Greek Orthodox deputies from Independence till present.

Parliament	Total number of deputies	Number of deputies
5th Parliament: 21-9-1943 until 8-4-1947	55	6
6th Parliament: 5-6-1947 until 4-6-1951	55	6
7th Parliament: 5-6-1951 until 30-5-1953	77	8
8th Parliament: 13-8-1953 until 11-8-1957	44	5
9th Parliament: 12-8-1957 until 4-5-1960	66	7
10th Parliament: 18-7-1960 until 19-2-1964	99	11
Post-Taif Parliaments	128	14

Source: Compiled by Information International from different sources

## Greek Orthodox in the Public Sector

There are 11 first-grade positions dedicated to the Greek Orthodox confession, including the ministry of labor director general, the director of the Higher Disciplinary Council, the president of the National Fund for the Displaced, Beirut governor and the director general of local administrations and councils at the ministry of interior and municipalities.

The number of Orthodox judges at the ministry of justice reaches 50 judges or 8% of the total number of judges in Lebanon.

## Numbers

The number of Orthodox voters reached 237,307 people or 7.8% of the total number of voters. The number of registered Greek Orthodox reaches 350,000 people or 7.8% of the total number of registered Lebanese. However, there are 280,000 Greek Orthodox residents in Lebanon, representing 7.5% of the total number of residents.

It is noteworthy that 115,118 Greek Orthodox lived in Latakia and Jabal-al-Druze in 1938 and 77,312 lived in Lebanon in 1932.

## Educational and Health Institutions

- ⦿ University of Balamand
- ⦿ Mar Youhanna Institute for Theology
- ⦿ Al-Roum Hospital
- ⦿ Orthodox Cooperative Fund
- ⦿ Al-Balamand High School
- ⦿ Saint George School
- ⦿ Mar Antonios School

In 1946, a spiritual movement called the Orthodox Youth Movement was created with the aim to promote the role of youth in the Greek Orthodox Church and implement cultural and social reforms.

## Greek Orthodox Archeological Sites

The Church owns a number of ancient monasteries, mainly the monastery of Saydet al-Nourieh, Al-Natour monastery, Kaftoun monastery and al-Balamand monastery. The latter is located between the towns of Anfeh and Qalamoun and was built in 1157 by the followers of Saint Bernard.

## Prominent Figures

Unlike other large confessions in Lebanon, the Greek Orthodox Confession did not have any single political za'im (leader) in all its history. Moreover, Greek Orthodox religious leaders did not seek to monopolize the political decision-making, or perhaps could not do so even if they wanted. Antoun Sa'adeh for example, did not have a political project specific for his confession, but rather a secular project and was not regarded as an Orthodox leader.

Among prominent figures, Michel A'aflaq, who was a founding member of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party and Charles Malek, who was the only Arab man to sign the declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and later became a founding member of the Lebanese Front during the civil war. Other figures include Fares Al-Khoury, of Lebanese origin, who presided over Syrian Parliament and Council of Ministers for several terms since 1936 and represented Syria at the United Nations and Human Rights Committee. Other Greek Orthodox figures that marked Lebanon's cultural life are, Assi, Mansour and Elias Rahbani, who laid the foundations of musical plays in Lebanon and Assi's son Ziad, a renowned theater and musical composer.

# Beshwat

Known for its Miraculous Lady

## Etymology

Beshwat is a Syriac word formed of two parts "bet shwita". The word "bet" means a "place" and "shwita" or "shawyata" means "flat". Consequently, Beshwat means a "flat place".

## Location

The town is located in the qada'a of Ba'albeck in the Beqa'a mohafaza and stands at an altitude of 1,260 meters above sea level. Beshwat is 99 kilometers away from Beirut and 49 kilometers from Zahleh. It extends over an area of 1,446 hectares and can be reached through the road of Ba'albeck- Deir al-Ahmar.

## Population

The number of registered residents reaches around 1,000 people, who belong to the Maronite confession. The town has around 120 to 150 residential houses and 10 shops.

## Voters

The number of voters in 2004 reached 589 people, compared with 577 voters in 2000. The majority belong to Keyrouz family, in addition to two small families.

The voters are distributed as follows:

Keyrouz: 490

Habchi: 74

Sukkar: 25

## Local Authorities

Beshwat has a municipal council formed of 9 members presided by Hamdan Keyrouz. There is also a mukhtar and a mayoral council of two members. The municipality was created in line with decision no. 488/ad of November 18, 1966. Its share from the revenues of the independent municipal fund reached 28.9 million LBP in 2004 compared with 69.7 million LBP in 2003 and 41.6 million LBP in 2002.

## Educational Institutions

The town has a public school for boys and girls, called Beshwat Intermediate School and is composed of about 200 students distributed in 12 classes, in addition to Beit al-Halal Center for the disabled, with 12 to 15 students.

## Archeological and Cultural Sites

The town is characterized by Ain Beshwat sites and grottos containing stone sarcophagi and potteries. Ancient money dating back to the Roman era was also discovered in Beshwat. The town is famous for the miraculous Lady of Beshwat Church, which attracts a large number of visitors.

## Economic Activities

Residents depend on cattle breeding and agriculture, mainly the cultivation of fruit trees and grapevines. Tourism also generates income to some families, especially when the town became an important religious site. An agricultural cooperative was established in 1985 to improve the sector.

## Problems facing the Residents

Residents suffer from the difficult economic situation, especially in the wake of the July-August 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon.



# Sarda Wa Aumra

## Two Grottos and an Ancient Building

### Etymology

“A’amra” is a Syriac word that has two meanings: the first, spelled “umra”, means “monastery” and the second, spelled “aumra” means “wool”. The word “Sarda”, also of Syriac roots, can either mean “sieve” or “fear”.

### Location

The town is located in the qada’a of Marja’ayoun in the Mohafaza of Nabatiyeh. It is 110 kilometers away from Beirut and stands at an altitude ranging between 450 and 500 meters above sea level. The town extends over an area of 1,250 hectares and can be reached via the following roads: Zahrani – Nabatiyeh – Marja’ayoun – Khiam or Nabatiyeh road – Kfar Kila.

### History

In the past, the town was formed of agricultural lands, and farmers used to come from nearby villages to work there. However, the town suffered from lack of water, as there was a dispute over the Wazzani River. In 1953, an international envoy was dispatched to the area to determine the Lebanese and Israeli shares of the river. Lebanon got 35% of the resource, and in a short time, agricultural projects started to burgeon in the town. However, in 1955, Israeli forces reduced the land to ashes.

Today, Sarda Wa Aumra gathers around 30 residential houses and 8 shops.

### Population

The number of registered residents in Sarda Wa Aumra reaches around 435 people. Most of them had left the town in the wake of the Israeli invasion, but returned after the withdrawal of the troops in the year 2000. The town’s Christian families belong to the Maronite confession, while Muslim families belong to the Sunni and Shia’a confessions.

### Voters

In 2004, the number of voters reached 256 people compared with 234 in 2000. The voters are distributed by families as follows:

Rajab: 34 voters	Abbas: 11 voters
Ahmad: 32 voters	Chalhoub: 11 voters
Sayyed: 25 voters	Mahmoud: 10 voters
Khaled: 24 voters	Francis: 9 voters
Ali: 22 voters	Assaf: 9 voters
Jabbour: 13 voters	Bou Farhat: 7 voters
Boutros: 11 voters	Hassan: 5 voters
	Other: 7 voters

### Local Authorities

The town has a mayoral council formed of three members, in addition to a mukhtar, currently Ahmad al-Ahmad. The town reports to the court of Marja’ayoun and the Police Station of Khiam.

### Educational Institutions

There are no schools in the town and students go to the school of Qlaia’a, a nearby village.

### Archeological and Cultural Sites

Despite the fact that the town does not have many archeological sites, some explorers of the 18th century mentioned the presence of the remains of an ancient building. The town also has two grottos.

### Economic Activities


The citizens depend on the cultivation of beans, wheat and chick-peas. Agriculture flourished after the liberation in 2000. The Catholic parish in the town granted the citizens plots of lands to build development projects, water pumps and artesian wells, which enabled them to develop their production. A drainage plant for organic soils was also established on an area located 4 to 5 kilometers away from Sarda and where around 40 farmers are employed.

The citizens also employ around 250 workers from outside Marja’ayoun, in particular from the Beqa’a. These workers have set up tents for their families in the village.

### Problems

In the aftermath of the July-August 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon, Sarda burdened losses that amounted to 100,000 USD, as it is located on the borders with Israel.

Today, the town’s farmers are rehabilitating their lands within private initiatives in the absence of any government plans.

On January 7, the town celebrates Eid Mar Youhanna. 



## “History Repeats Itself”

### The Events of 1840 that Led to the Massacre of 1860

*“History repeats itself”...Foreign interference, ambassadors calling on our leaders, and disputes waiting to be resolved through regional and international compromises...It seems that Lebanese leaders have shed down their pretenses of authority and admitted that the solution awaits Saudi Arabia, Iran, France and the United States. In the past, the Lebanese were used as a tool in the hands of the Ottoman, Egyptian, French and British powers. This extract of Henry H. Jessup’s “Fifty-three Years in Syria” depicts bloody skirmishes in the Mountain that claimed the lives of many citizens from two different confessions and that were nurtured by foreign interests.*

On the 16th, Colonel Rose<sup>(1)</sup>, with Ayub pasha arrived from Beirut, just in time to save the male population from a ruthless massacre. Colonel Churchill<sup>(2)</sup> says, “When Druse vengeance is once aroused, it is remorseless. They imbrue their hands in blood with a savage joy that is incredible. Yet as a general principle, they never touch women.”

The war now became general throughout Lebanon, the Greek Christians joining the Druses in attacking the Maronites. In less than ten days the Druses had completely subdued the Maronites residing among them, sacking and burning their villages and convents, and, but for the moderation and intense activity of Naaman Beg Jumblatt<sup>(3)</sup>, the war would have been carried into Northern Lebanon. “The Maronite patriarch<sup>(4)</sup>, bewildered by the sweeping successes of those he thought to exterminate, shut himself up at first in a room in his convent, and finally negotiated for refuge on a British man-of-war.”

On November 5th, Deir el Komr surrendered to the Druses, and the Emir Beshir Kasim rode out, deprived of his arms and his turban, in great chagrin, and as he approached Beirut, saw the villages of Baabda and Hadeth in flames, together with his own palace and those of the Shehab emirs and he saw the Maronite fugitives being wounded, plundered even to the women, and stripped by the Turkish irregular cavalry, sent out to restore order. The Maronites declared that “they would sooner be plundered by the Druses than protected by the Turks.”

The crushing of the Maronite power in Lebanon encouraged the Druses and certain Turkish officials to attack Zahleh and even exterminate the Christians of Damascus. But by the energy of H.B.M. Consul Wood<sup>(5)</sup> in Damascus, the effort failed and the bloody wave was stayed. For two years Lebanon was in constant ferment, until January 1, 1843, the Porte invested the Emir Haidar Abu Lama, a Maronite, as Kaimakan for the Christians of Lebanon, and the Emir Ahmad Arslan as kaimakam for the Druses south of the Damascus Road. As a large body of Maronites lived in the district they protested against being under Druse rule. The Greeks, however, were quite content to have a Druse governor. The Maronite patriarch then declared that “all Lebanon must be under either Druse or Maronite rule, the blow must be struck, and he who strikes first will have two chances to one in his favour.” This principle the Druses acted

upon. Colonel Churchill says that large funds had been received by the Maronite patriarch from France and Austria to relieve the sufferers from the last civil war, and he used these funds for the promotion of a second.

In January, 1845, Said Beg Jumblatt summoned a grand meeting of all the Druse sheikhs at Mukhtara. Being the wealthiest chief of the Druses his influence was supreme. In April, the storm burst, in Deir el Komr, Jezzin and Abeih. In Abeih Dr. Thomson bore a flag of truce to the Druse leader who had besieged the Shehab emirs and the Maronites in the castle. Hostilities ceased and the timely arrival of Colonel Rose saved the lives of hundreds of Christians. A Turkish governor was placed in Deir el Komr and matters settled down to the usual quiet of alarms and rumours. The feudal chief, Beshir Beg Abu Nakad, driven out of his ancestral seat in Deir el Komr, vowed vengeance and bided his time.

Deir el Komr increased in wealth, in silk weaving and various industries, and its merchants built elegant stone houses paved with marble, while, as Colonel Churchill says, “their wives and daughters were apparelled in silks and satins, and blazed with jewelry, gold and pearls and diamonds. They boasted of having 2,000 warriors, who, if properly led, could have defended their town against any army the Druses could raise. Beshir Beg Abu Nakad wished to build a house on his land about a mile west of the town, but they refused him permission, and threatened to raze as fast as he would build. He desisted, but exclaimed, “Those dogs, I will yet lay the foundations of my house with their skulls!”

The town of Zahleh, the other Lebanon Christian stronghold on the east of Lebanon, and facing the great plain of the Bookaa, had risen rapidly to wealth, by its trade in sheep, wool, and in wheat from Hauran. Its population was about 12,000, boasting 3,000 warriors, horse and foot, and claiming that they protected the great plain of the Bookaa from the marauding raids of the Druses and Bedawin Arabs. They were Orthodox Greeks and Greek Catholics, and were in a kind federal alliance with Deir el Komr for general protection against the Druses.

In the Anti-Lebanon, at the foot of Mount Hermon, was the large village of Hasbeiya, with a population of 6,000 Orthodox Greeks and scarcely 1,500 Druses. The Mohammedan Shehab emirs, worried and in constant conflict with the Druses, had a warm friendship for the Greeks and the few Protestants of the town. Long before this time Protestantism was well established in Hasbeiya, a church edifice built, and Rev. John Wortabet, M.D., was the faithful pastor. But the whole region around Hermon was insecure. Highway robbery and murder were constant. In Druse Lebanon, Colonel Churchill declares that “In ten years, upwards of eleven hundred murders were committed without an attempt at investigation or inquiry.”

French intrigue was active, and as Churchill says, “In Northern Lebanon the Maronite kaimakam, the Maronite patriarch and the French consul-general formed a triumvirate,

animated by two principles, submission of the civil to the ecclesiastical power, and exclusive devotion of both to France.” France was at that time the “elder son of the Church,” and all Catholic sects in Syria looked to France as their protector. It was even proclaimed that Lebanon would be occupied by a French army. The Greeks on the other hand looked to Russia, and the Druses to a great extent to England for protection.

I cannot enter into the part borne by Khurshid Pasha of Beirut in the events which culminated in the awful massacres of 1860. I would refer the reader to Colonel Churchill’s book, “The Maronites and the Druses” for his views of the political situation and the treachery of that infamous character.

But in 1859 we saw clearly that a crisis was at hand. Arms and ammunition were being imported freely by both parties without objection from the custom-house officials. Dr. Thomson said to me that the then existing dual government of Lebanon could not last. A murderer in the north would find a refuge in the south, and a murderer in the Druse region had only to cross the Damascus Road and he was safe from arrest. The mountain thronged with untried and unhung murderers. The blood of their victims cried to God for vengeance.

The Maronite Bishop of Tobiya of Beirut organized a Maronite Young Men’s League, for the extermination of the Druses. His chief lieutenant was one Aiub Beg Trabulsy, who once presented blooded Arab mares to Secretary William H. Seward. In Damascus itself, the new liberties granted to the Christian sects, their growth in wealth, the appointment of their prominent men of foreign consular offices, with armed kavasses before whom haughty Moslem effendis must stand aside and give way, and the inroads made on the pride and exclusiveness of Damascene Mohammedans, whose city was third of the holy cities, ranking after Mecca and Jerusalem; all these and other causes had kindled fires of fanatical hatred and preparations were made for the destruction of their Christian vassals and the restoration of the ancient glory of Islam. So holy was this city, and so strong the feeling of its divine rights, that up to that time the Ottoman government had exempted its population from the military conscription.

Colonel Churchill lays great stress upon the point that the then existing dual kaimakamate in Lebanon was utterly distasteful to the Turkish government, and that “their object was to show (to the European Powers) that no government but their own could possibly succeed in Lebanon.”

In 1859 I was living in Tripoli, a seacoast city fifty miles north of Beirut. It is a Moslem city whose aristocratic families and Ulema look with disdain on the small population of Greeks and Maronites dwelling among them. But, as is generally the case, where the Christians are in a small minority, there had never been any attack by the Moslems on the Christians, but the chief reason was probably the existence of a powerful Maronite population in Lebanon, near by on the east, who often, out of mere bravado, threatened to attack the Moslems of Tripoli should they injure their Maronite and Greek fellow citizens.

But in the Southern Lebanon matters had become critical.

On the 30th of August, 1859, a quarrel between a Druse and a Christian boy about a chicken led to a bloody affray, in the village of Beit Mirri, nine miles east of Beirut on a high mountain range 2,500 feet above the sea. Both Druses and Maronites were reinforced and the battle raged a whole day in which the Druses lost in killed twenty-eight more than the Christians. The Druses, chafing under their defeat, began to prepare for civil war. All through the fall and winter, both sides hastened their preparations. The government of Beirut could have stopped these movements at any moment, and prohibited the importation of arms and ammunition. But for some reason they did not interfere.

On the 26th of March, 1860, I left my home in Tripoli with my wife, to attend the annual meeting of the mission in Beirut, expecting then to spend the spring and summer in Abeh, in Southern Lebanon, preparing an Arabic atlas and assisting Mr. Calhoun in the boys’ seminary. The mission meeting was interesting and yet saddening. The Civil War in America had crippled the resources of the Board, and we were obliged to retrench, disbanding schools and reducing work in the press. We had the counsel of Mr. William A. Booth of New York, and Mr. Alpheus Hardy of Boston, who were in Beirut, having just completed the tour of Palestine, and while the general outlook was encouraging, all felt that a cloud of ominous portent hung over the land. Some of the American tourists, coming from Damascus early in April, found the Metawileh attacking the Christian villages southeast of Baalbec. Threatening rumours came from all parts of Lebanon, but it was felt that there would be no general outbreak until after the gathering of the silk crop and the sale of the cocoons, as all parties depend on the silk crop for their livelihood. Mr. Calhoun, therefore, left April 5th for Aintab<sup>(6)</sup> to visit that wonderful mission station, and returned May 22nd. Mr. and Mrs. Bird of Deir el Komr, with Mr. and Mrs. Bliss, left on the same steamer for a visit to Tripoli, returning April 20th.

“The government of Beirut could have stopped these movements at any moment, and prohibited the importation of arms and ammunition. But for some reason they did not interfere.”

(1) Colonel Rose: British consul-general for Syria in 1841-1848. He was a key player in the Druze-Maronite feud favoring the Druze and implementing the strategies of Great Britain

(2) Colonel Charles Henry Churchill: British consul in Syria. He wrote books on Mount Lebanon, including: “The Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860”.

(3) Naaman Beg Jumblatt: the son of Bashir Jumblatt and brother of Said Jumblatt

(4) Patriarch Youssef Hobeish

(5) Consul Richard Wood: British Consul in Damascus (1840-1841). He started as a dragoman for British diplomats and was promoted to become a consul.

(6) Aintab: North of Aleppo, now in Turkey.

Note: This chapter of Jessup’s book will be continued in the coming issues of *Ii Monthly*.

# American University of Beirut Characteristics and Students' Opinions

After addressing in the previous issue AUB's establishment, educational system, number of students and graduates, as well as tuition fees and financial aid, *li Monthly* presents in this article the characteristics of the university, as well as students' enrollment at AUB and their stands toward politics and confessionalism.

“This College is for all conditions and classes of men, without regard to color, nationality, race or religion.”

*Dr. Daniel Bliss*

## AUB Characteristics

- 1- The American University of Beirut offers around 100 specializations, including unique specializations in Lebanon, such as petroleum studies.
- 2- The university is described by the students as a “city inside the city”, where they have everything they need from dorms to cafeterias and a post office, as well as internet and research centers, gardens, sports courts, conference and seminar rooms, in addition to exhibitions and other cultural and entertaining activities. AUB also provides a strong security system to prevent any riots or disorder inside the campus.
- 3- AUB has the largest alumni association in Lebanon that groups around 44,000 graduates who live in different countries around the world.
- 4- Students can register their classes via the internet.
- 5- AUB was one of the three universities in the Middle East (along with the American University of Al-Sharjah and the American University of Cairo) that received a certificate of acknowledgment from the Middle States Associations for Colleges and Schools. It is also one of the six American institutions that received American certificates of acknowledgment. The Middle States Commission on Higher Education was assigned to audit the quality and educational level at AUB before granting it this certificate.
- 6- The university has an International Advisory Council formed of 21 members, including Al-Akhdar al-Ibrahimi, former US Ambassador to Lebanon Charles Hostler and director general of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development Abdel-Latif al-Hamad. AUB has a Board of Trustees formed of 37 members, including former US Ambassadors Richard Murphy and Frank Wisner.

## Students Talk

### Why AUB?

Students said they chose to enroll at AUB for various reasons, mainly the high educational level in the institution and the flexible American system. Furthermore, the university is internationally accredited which allows the graduates to find job opportunities abroad. As to Arab students, they believe that AUB is one of the best higher educational institutions in the region, which allows them to pursue their education while staying close to their families in neighboring Arab countries.

### Students and Politics

Like students in other universities, AUB students are influenced by the political mood prevailing over the country. The students stressed that they “express their political positions freely and hold dialogue despite their differences”.

They added that political disagreements never developed into fights but remained limited to a “clash of words only when electoral fever is at its most”.

The university witnessed in this academic year (2006-2007) political tensions during the elections of the students' committees. Two blocs competed in the elections: the pro-government bloc (formed of the Future Movement, the





**Main gate - College Hall - AUB**  
AUB - 2006



**College Hall newly renovated - AUB**  
AUB - 2006

Lebanese Forces and the Progressive Socialist Party) and the opposition bloc (formed of Hizbullah, Amal Movement, the Free Patriotic Movement and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party), in addition to few independent candidates. It was the first time in the history of the university that the counting of votes was suspended for two days and brought about debatable results, as both parties claimed victory.

In fact, the pro-government bloc announced its victory with 44 seats against 32 seats for the opposition and 19 seats for the independents while in the following day the opposition claimed victory with 41 seats, against 38 for the pro-government and 15 for the independents.

However, the final and official results announced the victory of the pro-government bloc.

## Students and Confessionalism

In 1871, AUB founding father, Dr. Daniel Bliss, said as he was laying the cornerstone of the central building: “This College is for all conditions and classes of men, without regard to color, nationality, race or religion. A man, white, black, or yellow; Christian, Jew, Muhammedan or heathen, may enter and enjoy all the advantages of this institution.... and go out believing in one God, in many Gods, or in no God. But it will be impossible for any one to continue with us long without knowing what we believe to be the Truth and our reasons for that belief”.

According to the students, “confessionalism at the university appears only during student elections, as political parties mainly reflect the students’ confessional belonging”. In other words, students said that confessionalism at AUB was a “temporary political confessionalism”.



**Students socializing in the cafeteria**  
AUB - 2006



**Students walking out of AUB post office**  
AUB - 2006

# For whom the Bells of Beit Chabab Toll

“Only one bell factory survived out of ten in Beit Chabab.”

The town of Beit Chabab was known as a center of various crafts and industries, in particular for bell and pottery making.

## Origin of Bell Industry

Only 23 people in the world are masters in bell making and meet once every year. In Lebanon, this industry dates back to the 18th century A.D., but historians disagree on the exact date of the manufacture of the first bell.

According to 160 year-old documents, the Russians brought this craft to Lebanon and made the first bell for the Mar Abda Church in Bekfaya.

However, a different story says that the Russians came to Dhour al-Shweir, where they taught the bell making to Lebanese Youssef Gabril from Beit Chabab, who in turn made the first bell. The story also says that the town's residents acknowledged Youssef's useful making of the bell, so they invented a new family name "Naffa'a", which in Arabic means "useful".

## Development of the Industry

As days and years went by, Beit Chabab became known for bell making. Between 1700 and 1900, ten homes - all Naffa'a families - were specialized in this industry.



Oven phase of bell making  
Beit Chabab - 2006

When World War I broke out in 1914, around 60% of Beit Chabab residents, mostly from Naffa'a family, fled to safer areas, such as Zouk Mosbeh, Qobeyyat and A'akkar and to some neighboring countries like Syria, Palestine and Egypt. As a result, only four people continued to practice this industry in the town: Fares Naffa'a, Youssef Suleiman Naffa'a, Amin Naffa'a and Youssef Habib Naffa'a.

During World War II, Amin and Fares Naffa'a passed away without passing on their skill to their sons, while Youssef Suleiman Naffa'a taught the craft to his two sons, Jamil and Suleiman, both who later died.

Consequently, only Youssef Habib Naffa'a continued to practice the business and taught it to his son, Naffa'a Youssef Naffa'a.

## How Bells are made


Bell making developed over the years and the artisan is now able to make a bell in 15 days instead of 40. The completion of the work requires two phases: making the mold and then shaping the bell.





 The final phase of bell making  
Beit Chabab - 2006



 Phase 2 of bell making  
Beit Chabab - 2006

In the first phase, the artisan mixes soil with water, to which he adds cotton. The mold is formed of two layers with an empty space between them. The second phase consists of shaping the bell, which is made of bronze, a mixture of 77% of red copper and 23% of tin. These materials are usually imported from European countries, such as Britain, Sweden and France. The bronze is melted on 1,050 degrees Celsius for five hours, after which, it is poured in the empty space of the mold. This procedure takes around two minutes.

Finally, the mold is placed in a warm place for 4 to 5 hours, after which the artisan breaks the mold and cleans the bell.

## Bell Making Today

Only one bell factory survived out of ten in Beit Chabab. Another town – Mazra'at Yashou' – has a bell factory owned by Mene'm Mene'm, who did not teach the craft to anyone and he is getting old.

Bells are sold to churches and monasteries in Lebanon and are also exported to Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, United States, France, Cyprus and Africa.

## Stats and Figures

A bell weighs between 50 and 1,000 kilograms. Each kilogram costs 15 USD, while its production cost reaches 11 USD. Consequently, the margin of benefit does not exceed 4 USD per one kilogram. In the past, profit marked 50% of the selling price.

## Problems

The bell industry suffers from a tight local market and a difficulty to export with the absence of marketing plans or any financial support from the government.

It is also burdening the loss of its Lebanese masters, for whom the bells of the town toll. 



## liMonthly Meets Barbara Shahin Batlouni

Since its opening in Beirut in 1968, AMIDEAST has implemented many development and educational projects in the country and has worked to promote education and training to help students and professionals develop their skills. *li Monthly* met with Director of AMIDEAST/Lebanon Barbara Shahin Batlouni in an interview to discuss the organization, its programs and goals.

### What is AMIDEAST and when did it start working in Lebanon?

AMIDEAST is an American non-profit organization founded in 1951, with a mission to help bridge the cultures between Americans and peoples of the Middle East and North Africa region. We have conducted many diverse programs over the decades, and we make long-term commitments to all countries where we establish offices. Our office in Lebanon opened in 1968, and we have been working in Lebanon non-stop for almost 40 years. In 2006 alone, we welcomed over 50,000 visitors to our office and reached over 70,000 Lebanese with educational, English training, professional training, testing, and development programs.

### What are the programs offered by AMIDEAST in Lebanon?

We have many different programs, all related to education, training and development. Our Training Department manages several donor-funded programs for short-term training and internship programs: a USAID project for professional training; a US Department of State Middle East Partnership Initiative internship for young women in business and law; a business internship program in the US sponsored by a leading American corporation; and graduate level studies in Lebanon for Iraqi civil servants. All of these programs are designed to support promising professionals who can use the skills and experience gained to further develop their companies or organizations. In addition, we also design and deliver training programs on diverse topics, such as Teamwork, Project Management, Human Resource Development, and Marketing. These training workshops are typically sponsored by companies or government agencies and are tailored to their needs, but we will soon offer these training workshops to the broader public.

The Education Department hosts an Education USA student advising center, which means we represent all 4,000 accredited American universities, and we help people apply to these universities. We also administer a number of scholarship programs: the DOS-funded YES program for Lebanese high school students to spend a year in the US, going to school and living with an American host family; the DOS Fulbright scholarship for talented Lebanese to pursue a master's degree in the US; and some smaller privately-funded scholarship programs, such as the Hope Fund, which secures scholarships for Palestinian refugees and the H&M Scholarship Search program for bright Lebanese students.

English language training programs are also a key service at AMIDEAST: we have public courses for individuals as well as sponsored courses for corporate and government employees. We also manage a DOS-funded program to provide micro-scholarships for 578 underprivileged Lebanese youth in 29 locations nationwide.

Important development projects include the USAID-funded Transparency and Accountability Grants (TAG) project, which has provided grants to local NGOs to develop projects to promote transparency, accountability or good governance. Many projects have supported public-private

partnerships to further Lebanon's development. We are also partnered with several other NGOs in the ACCESS-MENA project to address child labor in Lebanon, Yemen and throughout the region.

### What is your annual budget to implement these programs?

Our annual budget this year in Lebanon is approximately 5.2 million USD. Yet this amount varies from year to year as some programs end and new programs are launched. We have been expanding our programs every year and we hope to continue expanding the services we are able to offer.

### What is the mechanism to receive funding from AMIDEAST?

There are several ways we can help individuals and institutions. Our TAG project makes grants to local NGOs. Individuals can apply for different training and scholarship programs. And we offer different English and professional training courses and exams. All of these programs help Lebanese access the best of what the US has to offer: higher education, skills, and development.

### What are the funding sources of AMIDEAST?

AMIDEAST has very diverse sources of funding: private donations; fees for services, such as courses and test fees; and donor-funded programs, including both US and Arab governmental, corporate, and individual sponsors.

### Do you think that AMIDEAST has succeeded in achieving its goals in Lebanon?

We are proud of what we have accomplished since 1968 and of our success in helping thousands of Lebanese. But we will never reach the point where we say that we are done, we have succeeded. We always have new ideas, dreams and programs and new people we want to reach. So we will continue to identify innovative ways to serve the Lebanese people and help them achieve their goals.

### What are the obstacles facing your work in Lebanon and what are the solutions that you offer?

My longtime dream is to open additional offices in the North, Beqa'a, and South, so that we can better reach people outside of Beirut with year-long programs in an American cultural center style. We do not have the funds to open three additional offices, so I hope to identify donors who will offer us space to use from which we can help more people. 🌟

“We will continue to identify innovative ways to serve the Lebanese people and help them achieve their goals.”

# Syria Health Sector: A Success in the Pharmaceutical Industry; a Failure in Managing Services

## The Health Sector at a Glance

The private as well as the public sector (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Higher Education), provide health care in Syria. Public hospitals and centers provide 35% of the people's need in health services, with the private sector handling the rest.

## Hospitals and Health Centers

In 2005, there were 460 private and public hospitals in Syria, compared to 406 hospitals in 2001 and 308 hospitals in 1996. The number of beds increased from 17,657 beds in 1996 and 19,716 beds in 2001, to 21,221 beds in 2005.

This amounts to one bed for every 850 citizens, which is still far below the international standard of one bed per 250-300 citizens.

There has also been an increase in health centers in Syria from 794 centers in 1996 and 1,046 centers in 2001, to 1,243 centers in 2005.

## The Labor Force in the Health Sector

In 2004, 175,987 people worked in the health sector in Syria compared to 146,067 in 2000. Most of health sector workers are employees at the Ministry of Health (71,411 employees) constituting 40.5% of the labor force working in the health sector.

Table no. 1 illustrates the distribution of the labor force in the health sector according to profession in 2000 and 2004.

Distribution of the labor force in the health sector according to profession		
Profession	2000	2004
Employees at the Ministry of Health	59,528	71,411
Doctors	22,408	25,890
Dentists	11,160	15,312
Pharmacists	8,868	12,724
Technical assistants	12,030	16,542
Nurses	27,164	28,665
Midwives	4,909	5,443
Total	146,067	175,987

*Source: Technical Rehabilitation Center at the Syrian Health Ministry*

## Medicine

During the last decades, intensive research in the pharmaceutical industry has led to a reform in the medications sector.

In 1970, Syria imported 94% of the medicines it needed, and it produced the remaining 6%. However, in 2005, Syria produced 90% of its needs in medicines and imported the other 10%. Syria also managed to produce 5,165 different types of medicine, compared to only 100 medicines in 1970. This progression in the pharmaceutical field has allowed Syria to export 44 various types of locally manufactured medicines.

“In 1970, Syria imported 94% of the medicines it needed, and it produced the remaining 6%. However, in 2005, Syria produced 90% of its needs in medicines and imported the other 10%.”

## Future Prospects

The Ministry of Health adopted a new five-year plan (2006-2010), which includes the opening of 35 new hospitals with different specializations and capacities. With this plan, the ministry intends to focus on the establishment of specialized hospitals, such as children and tumor hospitals, heart disease centers and cancer hospitals.

Several international organizations are also backing two important projects with a cost of 50 million USD: cancer centers in Aleppo and in Homs, with 160 beds each.


The Ministry of Health also announced the opening of hospitals in Damascus specialized in pediatrics and genetics and another one specialized in internal and communicable diseases, in addition to a tumor center in El-Hasaka and a heart surgery center in Deir Al-Zour.

In 2003, the European Investment Bank granted 100 million Euro to Syria in order to equip 15 regional hospitals.

## Challenges facing the Sector

The main challenges facing the health sector in Syria are as follows:

- ⦿ The unequal distribution of hospitals and health centers between the urban and rural regions; as a result the rural population suffers from lack of basic medical services.
- ⦿ The inadequate coordination between the different medical institutions and the inappropriate distribution of the human resources in the medical sector, according to their professions and to the institutions they have been assigned to. This is mainly due to the absence of a medical council, which could organize and supervise all health-related institutions.
- ⦿ Between 2004 and 2005, the cost of health care increased by 26.8%, which prevents many Syrian citizens from receiving quality medical services.
- ⦿ The difficulty of scheduling for major surgeries at short notice causes hardship for patients with severe conditions. They are forced to go to private hospitals which many can hardly afford.
- ⦿ The weak performance of many doctors due to their lack of superior training.

Although many endeavors have been achieved in the past years, the health sector in Syria requires further development in order to keep up with the increasing health needs of its population. 

# Health Sector in Egypt

## Population Growth Overcoming Health Services

Egypt is the most populated country in the Arab world. At the beginning of 2006, population reached around 73 million with an estimated growth of 2 million people with the beginning of 2007. This significant population growth is met by lack of sufficient financial means to provide the people with basic needs such as health. The following article addresses the health situation in Egypt.

### Number of Hospitals, Beds and Physicians

Egypt has 870 hospitals equipped with 260,000 beds, or one bed for every 288 people. The number of doctors reached 41,948 or six doctors for every 10,000 people. Hospitals, beds and physicians are distributed by governorate as shown in table no.1.

**The distribution of hospitals, beds and doctors in Egyptian governorates**

**Table 1**

Governorate	Number of people (in thousands)	Number of Hospitals	Number of Beds	Number of Physicians	People per Bed	People per Physician
Cairo	8,000	457	18,946	5,210	422	1,535
Al-Jizah	5,656	38	5,518	3,974	1,025	1,423
Ash-Sharqiya	5,220	27	-	-	-	-
Ad Daqahliyah	5,024	117	8,174	5,992	614	838
Al-Buhayra	4,777	-	-	-	-	-
Al-Mina	4,139	43	3,830	1,631	1,080	2,537
Al-Gharbiyah	4,000	-	-	-	-	-
Al-Qalyubiyah	3,947	-	-	-	-	-
Al-Iskandariyah	3,885	30	10,459	7,930	371	490
Suhaj	3,886	75	1,776	1,570	2,188	2,475
Asyut	3,495	-	-	-	-	-
Al-Manufiyah	3,290	48	2,892	1,411	1,137	2,331
Qina	2,994	24	2,820	852	1,061	3,514
Kafr Ash-Shaykh	2,638	33	2,367	1,598	1,114	1,650
Al-Fayyum	2,474	-	-	-	-	-
Bani Suwayf	2,302	30	2,298	710	1,002	3,243
Aswan	1,141	8	1,523	412	750	2,769
Dumiat	1,100	29	2,271	1,330	484	827
Al-Isma'iliyah	883	11	2,006	898	440	983
Bur Sa'id	546	32	949	539	575	1,012
As Suways	499	21	867	350	575	1,425
Madinat al-Aqsor	429	-	-	-	-	-
Shamal Sina' (Northern Sinai)	317	4	470	162	674	1,956
Matruh	378	11	595	219	635	1,726
Al Bahr al-Ahmar	190	6	374	273	508	696
Al-Wadi al-Jadid	173	-	-	-	-	-
Janub Sina' (Southern Sinai)	66	10	390	134	170	492

Source: Egyptian governorates – Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies


Graph no.1 shows a comparison between the numbers of physicians in some Arab countries per 100,000 people.

### Health Expenses

Health expenses represent 3.7% of the total GDP in Egypt (which amounted to 78,8 billion USD in 2005) compared with 12% in Lebanon. Health insurance covers 51.6% of the Egyptian population. In order to cover the expenses of the other half, the ministry of health issues daily around 5,000 approvals for hospitalization and treatment. In 2005, the number of approvals reached 1,397,000 approvals worth 1,568 billion EGP.

[Graph 1] **Number of Physicians per 100,000 people in 2004 in some Arab countries (%)**

Source: Information International - UNDP 2006





# Stats & Numbers

Issue 58 - April/May 2007

**114.6 billion LBP** is the increase in value of Lebanese Army and Internal Security Forces' salaries and allowances in 2006 compared with 2005. The increase resulted from a rise in the numbers of recruits to meet security needs. ISF salaries and allowances increased by 76.8 billion LBP and those of Lebanese Army by 37.8 billion LBP.

**1,560 billion LBP** is the estimated net revenue of the telecommunications sector in 2006, including 882 billion LBP from the mobile lines sector with a decrease of 34 billion LBP compared with 2005.

**115 billion LBP** is the estimated revenues of General Security in 2006 compared with 87 billion LBP in 2005 and 85 billion LBP in 2004.

**4,600 billion LBP** is the value of government's debts to several parties, including 1,500 billion LBP as difference in salaries of civil servants. These amounts, in addition to soft-loans granted to Lebanon "to finance reconstruction projects" will raise the public debt to around 51 billion USD.

**1.05 million** was the number of Lebanese people in 1932 according to the only official census that was ever conducted in Lebanon. Those included 255,000 emigrants or 24% of the total population. In 2006, the Lebanese population reached 4.5 million, in an increase of around 3.5 million people in 75 years.



**INMA, SRI and USAID in Horeca, march 2007**  
Horeca - Biel - Beirut - 2006

## Horeca 2007

The 14th edition of the Levant's leading hospitality and food event – Horeca – kicked off on March 27 at the Beirut International Exhibition and Leisure Center (BIEL).

One hundred and seventy local and regional companies and institutions and around 15,000 visitors participated in the event, which featured around 300 exhibitors, who displayed their food products and services.

The event's activities included:

- ⦿ Lebanese Food Tasting Event: featuring on-site cooking demonstrations by star chefs and tasting of traditional and innovative Lebanese food products
- ⦿ Exhibition of traditional crafts and designs
- ⦿ Cooking competitions and presentation of latest innovations
- ⦿ Bartending competitions
- ⦿ Souk al-Tayeb and presentation of organic food products
- ⦿ Olive Oil Contest: funded by USAID, and organized by Social and Cultural Development Association (INMA) and SRI International and Hospitality Services, with the participation of 46 producers, 6 commercial brands and 13 labels. A panel of jurors selected winners after a blind tasting test for three prizes:
  - ⦿ Best Label won by Zejd
  - ⦿ Best Emerging Producer won by Joseph Khoury (Willani Oil)
  - ⦿ Best Commercial Brand for Extra Virgin Olive Oil won by Zejd.

The event ended on March 30 with a prize distribution ceremony.

### Corrections

In an article entitled, "The Shia'a Confession: from Marginalization to Mainstream Politics," published in issue no.57, *li Monthly* mistakenly referred to the second Sunni caliph as Omar bin Abi Taleb. The correct name is Omar bin al-Khattab. *li Monthly* regrets the error.

In an article entitled "The Maronite Confession in Lebanon" published in *li Monthly* issue no.56 of February-March 2007, it was written: "The Maronites came to Lebanon near the end of the fifth century". It is more accurate to say that Christianity entered in Lebanon in the first century A.D. and was spread in the 5th century A.D.

As for the Maronites, historical facts point out that a split with the Byzantine Church occurred in the 7th century A.D. and a Maronite Patriarch was declared in 687 A.D.



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# John Zogby in Beirut: Concerns over the Importance of Lebanon in US Strategies

John Zogby, the president of Zogby International, a Washington based research company, visited Lebanon upon an invitation from AUB's Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs and the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud Center for American Studies and Research (CASAR). Zogby met on Monday, March 19, 2007, with AUB professors and researchers in a discussion about recent opinion polls conducted by the company in Arab and Islamic countries. Zogby then gave a lecture entitled "Love, Hate, Envy or Respect? Recent Trends in Arab and American Public Opinion", in which he addressed priorities and perceptions of Arab and American citizens and the American people's interest in knowing about the Arab world.

Addressing an audience of around 200 Lebanese pollsters, AUB students and professors, Zogby doubted the importance of Lebanon in US strategic policies.

Zogby also visited the offices of **Information International**, the local and regional partner of Zogby International.



[1] From left, Mr. Rami Khouri and Mr. John Zogby in College Hall AUB - March 2007

[2] Mr. John Zogby with *Information International* staff in its offices in Al Borj building - March 2007

[3] From left, Mr. Jawad Adra, Managing Partner of *Information International* and Mr. John Zogby President of Zogby International - March 2007



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