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# **Post-Conflict Social and Livelihoods Assessment in Lebanon**

**Prepared by**



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## **List of Abbreviations**

<b>CDP</b>	Community Development Program
<b>CDR</b>	Council for Development and Reconstruction
<b>CDS</b>	City Development Strategy
<b>CFD</b>	Central Fund of the Displaced
<b>CPI</b>	Consumer Price Index
<b>DGU</b>	Directorate General of Urban Planning
<b>ECI</b>	Expenditure Composite Index
<b>EDP</b>	Education Development Project
<b>ESFD</b>	Economic and Social Fund for Development
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FCE</b>	Free Compulsory Education
<b>FHH</b>	Female-Headed Households
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GoL</b>	Government of Lebanon
<b>HHD</b>	Household
<b>HRC</b>	Higher Relief Commission
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of Red Cross
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced persons
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>LCD</b>	Least Cost Diet
<b>LED</b>	Local Economic Development
<b>LRC</b>	Lebanese Red Cross
<b>MDGs</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>MoD</b>	Ministry of the Displaced
<b>MoEHE</b>	Ministry of Education and Higher Education
<b>MoH</b>	Ministry of Health
<b>MoL</b>	Ministry of Labour
<b>MoSA</b>	Ministry of Social Affairs
<b>NAP</b>	National AIDS Program
<b>NDP</b>	National Drug Program
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-Governmental Organisations
<b>NSSF</b>	National Social Security Fund
<b>PCI</b>	Poverty Composite Index
<b>PCM</b>	Presidency of the Council of Ministers
<b>PCs</b>	Poverty Clusters
<b>PHC</b>	Primary Health Care
<b>PRA</b>	Participatory Rapid Assessment
<b>RPA</b>	Regional Poverty Areas
<b>SALA</b>	Social and Livelihoods Assessment
<b>UBN</b>	Unsatisfied basic needs
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USJ</b>	Université Saint Joseph
<b>UXO</b>	Unexploded Ordnances
<b>VGs</b>	Vulnerable Groups
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organisation

# Executive Summary

## Introduction

As a contribution to informing the strategic planning processes related to post-conflict reconstruction following the July 2006 conflict with Israel, the Ministry of Social Affairs initiated a Post-Conflict Social and Livelihoods Assessment in Lebanon (SALA), with World Bank funding, to analyse the social impacts and potential short and medium term interventions.

The SALA will aim to answer the following questions:

- What are the most vulnerable social and economic groups in the short- and medium-term? The answer will reflect how the post-conflict experience is differentiated by geographic location, gender, age, and source of income.
- How have livelihoods been affected by the conflict? The answer will cover the various determinants of livelihoods: social relations, access to income and finance, access to services, access to infrastructure and access to natural resources.
- What coping strategies and recovery strategies are vulnerable groups using to respond to the post-conflict situation? Again, the answer will refer to social relations, income-generation, public and non-governmental institutions, key services and infrastructural and natural resources.
- How should domestic expenditure and external assistance be prioritised to strengthen the coping and recovery strategies that are most crucial to the most vulnerable socio-economic groups?

## Methodology

The methodology adopted in this study is composed of two main components. The first is a desk/background study providing a picture of the pre-war social situation, in addition to emergency and recovery responses. The second is a participatory rapid assessment (PRA) providing a qualitative account of the experiences of populations affected by the conflict. The villages surveyed were selected according to three criteria: severity of the damage, poverty clustering and diversity. Focus groups and in-depth interviews were undertaken at two levels: stakeholders (focusing on five aspects of livelihoods indicators – Physical Capital, Human Capital, Natural Capital, Financial Capital and Social Capital) and vulnerable groups (assessing their conditions during and after the war). Vulnerable groups are defined as the groups that are more susceptible to suffer from negative shocks, seasonality and uncertainty.

The indicators used in this report were compiled from the answers given by the stakeholders in the focus groups. A simple average of these grades was taken for each livelihood indicator and sub-indicator. Percentage changes of indicators were calculated to evaluate the impact of the war. As such, a decline in an indicator means that the focus groups evaluated this livelihood indicator to have deteriorated following the war.

The SALA framework can be used for further study and evaluation. At a later stage, the protocol can be amended to extend the SALA framework in order to assess new

developments, such as the progress in the reconstruction programs, the implementation of new social programs or the impact of the Paris III conference. The extension of this framework will benefit from this research as it provides the possibility for an evaluation of the developments of livelihood indicators over time.

### **Livelihoods Indicators**

Regarding the changes in the livelihoods indicators following the war, the study concluded that they are the result of three factors. The first factor is the low starting level of these indicators, with more than half starting at below-than-average level. The second factor is the actual destruction of the war, as measured by the decline of most indicators. The third factor is the developments that took place following the war, affecting the indicators in two opposite way. On one hand, the reconstruction programs and recovery interventions mitigated the impact of the war. On the other, the economic and political crises that followed the war worsened some indicators. The order of presentation of indicators in the study is based on the importance each indicator received in the qualitative interviews, the importance of the quantitative changes, and the priorities for future interventions selected by the stakeholders.

### **Physical Capital**

The war led to substantial destruction in the physical capital of most surveyed villages. According to participants in the focus groups, most of the villages saw the destruction or damage of all dwellings and enterprises. Despite the massive destruction brought by the war, the current below-than-average infrastructure, as evaluated by the participants in the focus groups, is also due to the low starting level of a number of indicators. For instance, the sewage and solid waste collection systems were in a bad condition even prior to the war. The reconstruction program and recovery interventions that followed the war also affected the development of these indicators. The limited deterioration in the electricity and water indicators, compared to the remaining physical capital indicators, is due to the fact that the reconstruction of these two sectors has been relatively prompt and successful.

### **Human Capital – Economic Activity**

The significant deterioration in the economic activity was brought about by two main factors. The first is the destruction of the war, especially affecting the agriculture sector, which is the main economic activity in most villages. The second is the economic crisis that followed the war and further aggravated its impact. The substantial deterioration in the economic performances of all economic sectors has naturally led to an increase in the unemployment rate and its duration, despite the reconstruction programs which resulted in job creation in some villages. Apart from the increase in the unemployment rate, the war did not have any impact on the structure of the labour market; there were no changes in child labour and women participation.

### **Financial Capital**

The change in the level of financial capital is similarly caused by the combination of two factors: the initial limited access to finance and the high amount of aid (in-kind and in-cash) provided during and after the war. The difficulty of accessing loans is a structural factor of the banking sector that pre-dates the war. Moreover, aid distribution was



inexistent and the provision of micro-credit was limited before the war. It is the aid component of the financial capital indicator that had the most dramatic change, explaining the temporary improvement of the financial indicator following the war. Non-public aid was evaluated more positively than public one, and in-kind aid better than in-cash one.

### **Natural Capital**

The deterioration of the level of natural capital is mainly due to the direct damages of the war. This relatively high decline needs to be taken with caution, since most participants suspected deterioration in the levels of pollution and quality of agricultural products, but without being able to confirm it. The presence of UXOs and the destruction of the cattle and poultry stocks contributed to the deterioration of natural capital.

### **Human Capital – Health**

The health component of the human capital indicator was not significantly affected by the war, remaining at a relatively acceptable level. The numerous interventions following the war mitigated its impact and maintained a stable health situation. Nevertheless, participants mentioned the psychological impact of the war as being one of the detrimental causes affecting students' learning capacity. The problems faced by this sector, in terms of availability of health services and their costs remained unresolved after the war.

### **Human Capital – Education**

The war did not have a significant impact on the education component of the human capital indicator. The immediate interventions, waving of schools fees and prompt rebuilding of the destroyed schools mitigated the impact of the war on this sector. Nevertheless, the long-term problems faced by this sector still prevail after the war and are related to the general conditions of the public education system in Lebanon.

### **Human Capital – Demography**

The demographic structure of the surveyed villages was not significantly affected by the war. The return of almost all inhabitants left the social fabric of these areas intact. The return was prompted by the inhabitants' desire to return to their village and the 'institutional' support to this return, as illustrated in the various interventions by political parties, local and international organisations. Nevertheless, the current economic crisis is leading to a gradual increase in the levels of migration.

### **Social Capital**

The level of social capital was not affected by the war. On the contrary, the heightened sense of solidarity brought out by the war, in addition to the political alliance between the two main Shiite political parties, improved the level of social capital. This improvement in the level of social capital was also due to the homogeneity in the areas surveyed. The political crisis following the war is estimated to have a detrimental impact on the level of 'bridging' capital between the various political parties and sects.

## **Vulnerable Groups – Literature Survey**

Regarding vulnerable groups, the study started by investigating the existing approaches in the literature. Researching studies and sources led to developing two approaches of identifying vulnerable groups: geographical and sectoral approach. The former identifies the vulnerable groups from the point of view of geographical poverty clusters, while the latter is concerned with identifying and profiling each of the groups. The two approaches lead to a comparable result in terms of inter-linkage between the concepts of vulnerability and of poverty.

The geographical approach examines the regional characteristics of poverty, as the Israeli July 2006 war affected areas with higher-than-average poverty rates. Four different studies were considered in this survey: Mapping of Living Conditions in Lebanon (MoSA and UNDP, 1995 and 2004), Social and Municipal Development: poverty targeting system (ESFD, 2002), Social Development Strategy (ESFD, 2004) and Rapid Social Assessment (CDP, 2006).

The sectoral approach identifies vulnerable groups and profiles their characteristics. MoSA adopts a definition of vulnerability to cover four different groups (women heads of households, working children, elderly and disabled); however other groups are also known to suffer from marginalisation (fishermen, farmers and the unemployed). The war was expected to lead to an increase in the number of vulnerable groups and to worsen their livelihood conditions.

## **Vulnerable Groups – Field Results**

The profile of the vulnerable groups that emerged from the field survey confirmed to a large extent the existing categories in the literature discussed above. Roughly speaking, the field survey found that the vulnerable groups in the surveyed villages were composed mainly of women heads of household, elderly, disabled and unemployed.

The main conclusion that emerged from the field survey is that the war worsened an already very difficult situation for most vulnerable groups. As most members of these groups pointed to, their social situation was already very difficult prior to the war. Although the war created some new problems, such as the destruction of dwellings or the presence of UXOs, they had been already facing a precarious situation.

According to the interviews with vulnerable groups, the war period was considered to be extremely difficult. Although most vulnerable households managed to flee their villages for safer areas, the process of leaving was difficult. Families that left their villages were relocated in schools and institutions in safer areas. During the interviews, participants expressed a positive evaluation of the support they received during their displacement. As for the groups that remained in the village, their ordeal was described as a nightmare. In addition to the fear and stress caused by the war, they ran out of food and drugs.

The return to the villages was described in terms such as 'catastrophic', 'disastrous' and 'terrible'. The sheer scope of the physical destruction, the size of infrastructural damages and the high level of pollution made the return very difficult. Some vulnerable groups had their dwellings destroyed or damaged. In addition, all of them suffered from lack of infrastructure, such as electricity and water, and from pollution and dust. Moreover, the presence of UXOs made walking in the villages very dangerous. The first

organisations to intervene were Hezbollah and municipalities, providing in-kind aid, indemnities and support.

The problems these groups currently face are no different than the ones they faced before the war, even though the war compounded these difficulties and added new ones. The main problem is the deterioration in the vulnerable groups' financial situation. The second problem relates to the health conditions and the expensive cost of health services. A third problem is the poor housing conditions, especially after the war. The fourth is the current economic situation. Some participants had their enterprises destroyed or suffered from the damage to the agriculture sector, leading to the loss of their only source of income. The presence of cluster bombs compounded this problem, by rendering access to neighbouring fields impossible. Lastly, the poor state of infrastructure and high costs of usage fees were cited as a major problem.

Regarding the question to whom they turn for support and aid, the most often-cited answer was to 'god', illustrating their acute sense of despair. The second answer given to this question was to 'no one', confirming the lack of social support provided to these particular groups. As for those who named an organisation or a group, Hezbollah, their family, NGOs and charity organisations were often cited. The government and public institutions were the subject to harsh critiques from these groups, accused of having been absent and inefficient.

### **Social Program, Relief and Recovery Interventions**

The last part of this study investigated the main social programs and the major relief and recovery interventions during and after the war. Regarding social programs, the conclusion was that although numerous entities attend to the social assistance issue, the low capacities of the public sector accompanied by a huge number of NGOs led to a state of disorder at the level of social programs, to ad-hoc programs based on the availability of funds and to the duplication of interventions.

Regarding relief activities, the civil society played a significant role during the war, providing immediate support to those in need. Nevertheless, all participating players faced serious difficulties, such as lack of resources, lack of sleeping space, low hygiene levels, lack of gas, lack of water, and insufficient kitchen equipment. Despite these various challenges and limited relief experience of some entities, interventions were relatively successful owing to particular strengths of participating bodies. Nonetheless, it is necessary that Lebanon develops a detailed emergency plan to be used in times of war and emergencies.

As for the recovery programs, they are facing several problems related to the pace of paying indemnities, slow recovery of municipal capacities, and pending maintenance of public services networks and infrastructures. At the organisational level, political rivalry between governmental actors and political NGOs and the overlap of activities are putting major obstacles for recovery works.

### **Proposed Interventions**

The proposed interventions emerged as the conclusion of the evaluation of the war impact and the priority selected by the participants in both focus groups and the interviews with vulnerable groups. Two main logics of interventions emerged from these

discussions. The first, mostly expressed by stakeholders, focused on long-term strategies aiming at improving the pre-war situation. The second, expressed by vulnerable groups, was directed at alleviating their current social and economic situation.

Physical capital was selected as a first priority by stakeholders and a fourth priority by vulnerable groups. There are three main areas for proposed interventions. The first is reconstruction of the infrastructure destroyed by the war, with a special focus on dwellings and enterprises and the element of the physical infrastructure, which has not been rehabilitated until now, such as the telecommunication and roads networks. The second element is resolving the problem of indemnities. As for the third area of intervention, it aims at improving the neglected parts of the infrastructure, such as the sewage system and the solid waste collection system.

The economic activity was selected as the second priority by stakeholders and the first by vulnerable groups. The importance of this issue is compounded by the current economic crisis and the increase in unemployment rate. The first set of proposals made in this respect is the creation of employment opportunities, through the improvement of the performance of the local economies. The second set of proposals focuses on the modernisation of the agriculture sector, the main sector for most surveyed villages. The participants proposed the provision of loans, technical know-how, support in the development of an agro-industry sector and marketing agricultural products.

The third area of concern was financial capital, selected as the third priority by stakeholders and the second by vulnerable groups. Two main proposals were made regarding the improvement of financial capital. The first is the provision of subsidised loans and micro-credit to finance economic activities, and especially the agriculture sector. In addition, financing for productive investment is to be encouraged. The second main proposal, voiced mainly by vulnerable groups, is the provision of in-kind and in-cash aid, as a means to alleviate the current social and economic crisis. Moreover, proposals for a fixed wages to poor families were made.

The health component was also selected as an area for future investment; it ranked fourth by stakeholders and third by vulnerable groups. In this respect, the provision of health services, improvement of equipment in existing health services, and the provision of specialised services were proposed as possible areas of intervention. Vulnerable groups focused more on the costs of health services, proposing the provision of free services and/or the government taking charge of persons with special needs.

One problem mentioned by the participants was the issue of UXOs. This problem was mostly approached from its economic dimension, being a major source of unemployment. Some participants predicted deterioration in the health situation if this problem was not resolved.

Participants could not reach a consensus as to which organisations should intervene. Even though, there is a unanimous condemnation of the central government and public institutions, there was not an agreement on which organisations should replace them. Lack of trust in the central government's capacity and willingness led a number of participants to prefer the interventions of political parties, NGOs and donor organisations. Nevertheless, for some participants, the state had to be in charge of the interventions reflecting the desire for a more intervening state.

# I. Introduction

The Israeli July 2006 war exposed the Lebanese population to disastrous conditions. It has profoundly affected residents' livelihoods through bringing down access to services, infrastructure and natural resources. Responding to these emerging problems poses further challenges for the Lebanese government and society. In this respect, different emergency measures have been undertaken to address the arising needs, starting with assessing physical, economic and social damages.

As a contribution to identifying short and medium term intervention needs, the World Bank initiated undertaking a Post-Conflict Social and Livelihoods Assessment in Lebanon (SALA) in order to analyse the population conditions from a livelihoods and social perspective. More specifically, the objective of this study is to inform strategic planning processes that are related to post-conflict reconstruction. As such, it is aimed at eventually identifying orientations for social policies and interventions to assist those impacted by the last conflict and the vulnerable segments of the society.

SALA also attempts at filling a serious information gap, as Lebanon suffers from lack of data in general, and on livelihoods and social conditions in particular. This dearth of information makes it harder to promptly respond to emergency situations and accordingly design recovery programs, as is the case today. In this respect, this study aims at answering the following main questions:

- how have livelihoods been affected by the war
- who are the most vulnerable segments of the society
- what social programs existed prior to the war
- what were the emergency and recovery initiatives
- major proposed interventions

The SALA framework can be used for evaluation in the future. At a later stage, the protocol can be amended to extend the SALA framework in order to assess new developments, such as the progress in the reconstruction programs, the implementation of new social programs or the impact of the Paris III conference. This extension will benefit from this research as it provides the possibility for an evaluation of the developments of livelihood indicators over time, taking the results of this study a baseline.

## ***1.1 Outline of the study***

The study comprises three main sections to reflect the stages of the assessment process. A synopsis of each of these sections is presented below.

### **Impact of the war on livelihoods**

This section addresses the impact of war on livelihoods of individuals from the points of view of stakeholders. All livelihood capitals are studied (physical, human, social, natural and financial) in a two-dimensional manner,

taking into consideration the pre-war level of each livelihood indicator and the extent of the damages brought about by the war. The section is concluded by a list of priorities based on ranking of the studied capitals.

### **Impact of the war on vulnerable groups**

This section addresses the impact of war on vulnerable groups of the society from the points of view of these groups themselves. First, a theoretical profile of vulnerable groups in Lebanon is presented with characteristics of each group, and geographical distribution whenever possible, based on existing literature. Second, a more specific profile of these groups is developed based on the results of the fieldwork. The two approaches lead to similar results in terms of vulnerability criteria, as well as linkage between the concepts of vulnerability and of poverty. Finally, a list of priorities is concluded based on the results of the PRA, as per interviews with concerned vulnerable groups.

### **Interventions**

This section briefly examines major social programs existing prior to the war that address vulnerability, as well as relief efforts during the war and post-war recovery actions of various local and international, governmental and non governmental players. The section is concluded by a list of proposed interventions emerging as the conclusion of the evaluation of the war impact and the priority selected by the participants, both stakeholders and vulnerable groups.

## ***1.2 Methodology***

The methodology adopted for SALA study comprises two complementary approaches consisting of:

1. **Desk/Background study:** this research method aims at providing a picture of the pre-war social situation, in addition to emergency and recovery responses. It covers main literature addressing vulnerability, major selected existing social programs, and relief and recovery activities. Different sources of information were used including published studies, internet searches and in-depth interviews with pertinent stakeholders.
2. **Participatory Rapid Assessment (PRA):** this research method aims at providing a qualitative account of the experiences of populations affected by the Israeli aggression (during summer 2006).

This section briefly describes the adopted methodology of the PRA<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> For more details, please refer to Annex 1: Methodology

## I.2.1 Selection of villages

According to the contract and the terms of reference, the number of villages<sup>2</sup> to be covered by the PRA is 25. However, as it will be explained later in this section (refer to footnote #3), the final number of selected villages for the PRA is 26. The selection of these 26 villages is performed according to the following three major criteria:

**Criterion 1: Severity of damages** In compliance with the first criterion, all selected villages are located in the ten Cazas that were “directly affected” by the Israeli aggression, i.e. where the bombings aimed at systematically destroying whole (or parts of) villages along with their housing units, establishments, infrastructure, etc. In this respect, the 26 villages reflect the severity of damages. The main sources of information pertaining to the “severity of damages” are: UN reports, NGO reports, Higher Relief Commission (HRC) reports and interviews conducted by CRI with regional key informants.

**Criterion 2: Poverty Clusters** During the selection process, priority was given to villages located in poor clusters. Accordingly, two main sources of information were used for the identification of the Poverty Clusters: the Rapid Social Assessment study (CRI for CDP/CDR, funded by the World Bank, 2006) and interviews conducted by CRI with regional key informants.

**Criterion 3: Diversity** The objective of applying this criterion aimed at diversifying the choice of the 26 villages in order to avoid similarities and duplications as much as possible. Thus, the selection criteria will take into account the variables such as village size, village location, main economic activity and social structure. In result, the villages included in the final list reflect the main specificities of each region, social segments and communities.

The combination of the above three criteria (Severity of damages, Poverty clusters and Diversity) allowed optimising the selection of 26 villages. The table below presents this final list.

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<sup>2</sup> It is meant by “villages” both the selected villages to be targeted by the Rapid Social Assessment and the neighbourhoods within southern suburbs of Beirut. In other terms, the term “villages” in this progress report means both villages (in rural areas) and neighbourhoods (in urban areas).

**Table 1: Final list of selected villages and neighbourhoods**

#	Village name	Caza	Mohafazat
1	Haret Hreik ( <i>hay madi</i> )	Baabda, Beirut Southern Suburbs	Mount-Lebanon
2	Chiyah ( <i>horch al katil</i> )	Baabda, Beirut Southern Suburbs	Mount-Lebanon
3	Borj el-Brajne ( <i>raml el wati</i> )	Baabda, Beirut Southern Suburbs	Mount-Lebanon
4	Mansouri	Sour	South Lebanon
5	Srifa	Sour	South Lebanon
6	Qana	Sour	South Lebanon
7	Marwahine	Sour	South Lebanon
8	Siddiqine	Sour	South Lebanon
9	Bint Jbeil	Bint Jbeil	Nabatieh
10	Ainata	Bint Jbeil	Nabatieh
11	Maroun er-Rass	Bint Jbeil	Nabatieh
12	Aita ech-Chaab	Bint Jbeil	Nabatieh
13	Ghandouriyeh	Bint Jbeil	Nabatieh
14	Kaouzah	Bint Jbeil	Nabatieh
15	Houla	Marjeyoun	Nabatieh
16	Deir Mimas	Marjeyoun	Nabatieh
17	Khyam	Marjeyoun	Nabatieh
18	Dibbine	Marjeyoun	Nabatieh
19	Kfarshouba – Halta <sup>3</sup>	Hasbaya	Nabatieh
20	El-Mary	Hasbaya	Nabatieh
21	Fardiss	Hasbaya	Nabatieh
22	Baalbeck	Baalbeck	Bekaa
23	Boudai	Baalbeck	Bekaa
24	Britel	Baalbeck	Bekaa
25	Hermel	Hermel	Bekaa

## I.2.2 PRA protocol

This part presents the steps that were followed in order to implement the Participatory Rapid Assessment (PRA) in the selected villages. The main objective of the PRA protocol is to standardise all the steps in order to limit, as much as possible, the divergences that could occur between the different teams (field officers) in charge of the field.

Each field officer and her/his assistant team invited a certain number of stakeholders (min. 8, max. 12)<sup>4</sup> to participate in a focus group(s) or interview them individually.

This exercise aimed at helping stakeholders analyse the impact of the Israeli aggression on the following livelihood factors (each factor is composed of a certain number of indicators):

- **Physical Capital:** includes indicators pertaining to infrastructure such as electricity, water, roads, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Kfarshouba and Halta were, at the beginning considered as one village. However, during the PRA implementation they were separated into two different villages, thus obtaining finally 26 villages.

<sup>4</sup> The stakeholders who participated in the focus group were chosen from a primary list of around 20 key stakeholders (e.g. mayors, members of the municipal council, school directors, doctors, NGO representatives, political/social/opinion leaders, cooperatives, trade unions, etc.)



- Human Capital: includes indicators that cover the following four main issues: Education, Health, Economic activity and Demography
- Natural Capital: includes indicators pertaining to environmental and natural resources
- Financial Capital: includes indicators pertaining to financial issues such as access to finance and remittances
- Social Capital: includes indicators pertaining to social issues such as social networks, social tensions and NGOs' activities

Each component was assessed in the focus groups through a series of related questions that sought to obtain the stakeholders' general qualitative assessment. Then, participants were asked to provide two different grades for each set of quantitative questions (indicators) evaluating the situation before the war and the situation after the war respectively. The adopted answer scale is composed of 4 levels: 0 for inexistent/non-applicable, 1 for unsatisfactory/bad, 2 for acceptable/average, and 3 for satisfactory/good. Each of the livelihood indicators and sub-indicators received a final grade that was compiled from the answers provided by the participants in the focus groups in the form of a simple arithmetic average. Percentage changes of indicators were calculated to evaluate the impact of the war. As such, a decline in an indicator means that the focus groups evaluated this livelihood indicator to have deteriorated following the war. For example, the deterioration in the level of physical capital indicator measures the evaluation of the stakeholders of a drop in the level of physical capital.

After completing the evaluation, the stakeholders ranked the livelihood factors according to their priority and proposed needed interventions.

Stakeholders provided field officers with a list of vulnerable households (within their corresponding villages). The field officers then interviewed these households in order to assess their situation at milestones: during the war (summer 2006), right after the war (September 2006) and eight months after the war (April 2007).

Finally, each field officer prepared a detailed report on the results obtained from PRA implementation.

### **I.2.3 Participants' Profile**

The PRA was conducted in 26 villages/districts and covered two types of respondents, namely, the village stakeholders and the vulnerable households that were designated by the stakeholders. These two groups were interviewed in two different focus groups. In result, the study relies on the obtained answers of a total of 277 respondent stakeholders and 444 respondent vulnerable household heads/members, i.e. 28 persons per village on average (11 stakeholders and 17 household heads).

The table below presents the distribution of stakeholders along various key sectors.

- The table shows that stakeholders who belong to municipalities, NGOs, and the education sectors (21%, 21%, and 19% respectively) have relatively larger shares in the pool of respondents.
- As for stakeholders who belong to the health and business sectors (8% and 10% respectively), the table shows that they are relatively well represented.
- “Notables” (12%) refer to persons who mainly have social status and are respected in the village, i.e. Mokhtar, old residents, etc.

This distribution adequately served the purposes of the study, since stakeholders in the sectors that have the higher percentages are highly involved in managing and providing services that are directly pertinent to villages’ conditions.

**Table 2: Profile of stakeholders**

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>%</b>
Municipality	59	21%
NGO	57	21%
Education	53	19%
Notables	32	12%
Business	28	10%
Health	22	8%
Other	12	4%
Political	8	3%
Religious	6	2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>277</b>	<b>100%</b>

### ***1.3 Limitations***

The study was faced with different limitations at the levels of both the background study and the fieldwork. Each of these limitations is discussed below.

#### **First, dearth of updated data**

Lebanon suffers from lack of published data especially that pertaining to vulnerable groups (VGs). Although many publications address these segments and were used in this report to assess the status of VGs, most of them date back to more than 3 years. This necessitated a lengthy process of data gathering through other sources, such as direct individual contacts efforts.

#### **Second, the different approaches used to identify VGs**

As Lebanon does not hold a nationally adopted definition of VGs, two approaches were adopted: a geographical approach (using poverty proxy variables) and a sectoral approach (based on, but not confined to, the identification of MoSA).

Although these two approaches almost converge in their results, confusion between the notion of vulnerability and the notion of poverty still prevails.

### **Third, scope of interventions**

As the subject of the study, i.e. social assessment, is quite broad, it incorporates various social aspects. However, this report intends to depict a brief overview of the vulnerable segments and the programs that address them, rather than drawing an exhaustive list of players along with a meticulous SWOT analysis. In this respect, it was a rather hard job to limit the analysis to certain aspects, given the significance of subject and the breadth of existing social programs.

### **Fourth, setting up focus groups**

The field officers faced a number of difficulties while undertaking the assessment exercise. In some areas, the field officers were not able to set up focus groups and instead had to rely on individual interviews for the following reasons.

- Make up for missing/weakly represented sectors in FG: Marwahine, Fardis, Mary, Kfarshouba, and Halta
- Preference of field officer and stakeholders\*: Hermel, Baalbeck, Boudai, and Brital
- Difficulty to hold focus groups: Hayy Madi, Horsh El-Qateel, Hayy El-Raml

### **Fifth, impact on some livelihood indicators**

The impact of the war on some livelihoods indicators could not be clearly determined. This was especially the case regarding pollution levels, quality of agricultural products and the extent of chronic disease. Answering these questions requires a longer time-span, since most of the impact is of a long-term nature. Moreover, the lack of scientific tests left the participants speculating on the extent of the impact.

### **Sixth, conceptual understanding of the term “vulnerability”**

The participants in the Mansouri's focus groups, for example, estimated the vulnerable groups to be around 60% of the village residents, mixing between vulnerability and poverty. This confusion was also illustrated in the determination of the causes of vulnerability, with a number of participants stating poverty as the main cause.

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\* Stakeholders in Brital, Hermel, Boudai and Baalbeck preferred to have individual interviews and then hold a focused session to discuss and reach consensus concerning the evaluation and ranking of priorities.

### **Seventh, interviews with the members of the vulnerable groups**

The large number of researches and field assessments that has been undertaken until now led to a reluctance on the part of members of the vulnerable groups to take part in this assessment exercise. Thus the main difficulty was in convincing them to participate in the interviews. Moreover, according to some of the participants in the focus groups, a number of assessments have been already undertaken without resulting in any practical benefits, leading to a lack of trust in the usefulness of such exercises.

### **Eighth, conducting the interviews with the vulnerable groups**

Some of the interviewees expected a direct gain from their participation; often field officers had to clarify during the meetings the goal of these interviews. In some cases, this clarification led some participants to abandon the interviews, being convinced that there was nothing to gain from such exercises.

## II. Impact of War on Livelihoods

### II.1 Introduction

The livelihood indicators can be analysed from two angles. The first angle is the extent of the damages brought about by the war, as measured by the percentage change in the indicators. The second angle is the starting level of the indicators, providing a snapshot of the pre-war situation. Analysing the impact of the war from these two perspectives provides a dynamic understanding of the changes in livelihood indicators.

**Table 3: Average and change of livelihood indicators<sup>5</sup>**

<b>Capital</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>Change</b>
Physical Capital	1.83	1.29	-29%
Human Capital (Economic Activity)	1.87	1.37	-26%
Financial Capital	1.09	1.34	22%
Natural Capital	2.32	1.69	-27%
Human Capital (Health)	1.98	1.73	-13%
Human Capital (Education)	2.37	2.22	-6%
Human Capital (Demography)	1.95	1.79	-8%
Social Capital	2.01	1.95	-3%

The narrative that emerges from the analysis of this table and of the qualitative interviews is one of dynamic changes whereby three main factors influence the development of the livelihood indicators. The first factor is the actual destruction of the war, as measured by the decline of most indicators. The second factor is the low starting level of these indicators, with more than half starting at below-than-average level. The third factor is the developments that took place following the war. This latter factor affects the indicators in two opposite way. On one hand, the reconstruction programs and recovery interventions mitigated the impact of the war on some indicators. On the other hand, the economic and political crises that followed the war worsened some indicators.

#### II.1.1 Physical Destruction of the War

The most direct impact of the war is physical destruction. The deterioration in the level of physical capital illustrates the extent of the damages and destruction. The average decrease by 29% hides the changes in the sub-indicators, with some of them declining by more than 50%. Similarly, the equally substantial deterioration of the level of natural capital is due to the direct impact of the war, namely in the increase in the levels of pollution and the decline in the quality of agricultural products. The destruction caused by the war is also one of the causes behind the deterioration in the level of economic activity, especially that the resulting damages to the agricultural sector and the destruction of commercial and industrial enterprises was massive

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<sup>5</sup> The order of presentation is based on the importance each indicator received in the qualitative interviews, the importance of the quantitative changes, and the priorities for future interventions selected by the stakeholders.

Most participants in focus groups gave the priority to the physical destruction of the war at the expense of other forms of damages. The majority of answers, as confirmed by the above table, attached very little importance to the changes in the level of social capital or to the demographic structure of the villages. The image that emerges from these interviews is one of physical destruction, rather than one that alters the social fabric.

### **II.1.2 Low Starting Levels of Indicators**

To understand the impact of the war on the livelihood indicators, the pre-war situation must be analysed. The areas surveyed were among the poorest regions in Lebanon, having a very low endowment of physical and social infrastructures. Most participants in focus groups highlighted the 'historical' neglect of their villages, especially regarding the physical infrastructure and health services. The increase in the financial capital indicator can be explained by the very low starting point, making the provision of aid in-cash, even in a limited form, a substantial improvement.

The qualitative interviews confirm the idea of problems pre-dating the war. The low level of financial capital is due to the difficulty of accessing normal loans, a problem that dates for decades in Lebanon. Similarly, most participants linked the problems in the education indicator to the general state of public education, and those of sewage and solid waste collection systems to their absence, rather than destruction caused by the war.

### **II.1.3 Economic and Political Development in the Post-War Period**

The third factor that explains the changes in the livelihood indicators is the political and economic developments that followed the war. These developments have opposite effects on the indicators: some worsening them and others improving them. The post-war economic crisis has a transversal impact on the indicators, affecting many. Obviously, the decline in the economic activity indicator is caused by the economic crisis. In addition, the deterioration in the natural capital indicator is also caused by this crisis, through the deterioration of the quality of agricultural products. Lastly, the high priority put by the participants in the focus groups on financial capital illustrates the acuteness of this crisis on their livelihoods. The political crisis indirectly affects the physical capital indicator, through the political deadlock regarding the payment of indemnities, blocking the reconstruction programs.

The relief and recovery interventions and the reconstruction program that followed the war mitigated the impact of the war and led to a relatively limited decrease in some indicators. This is especially the case regarding the health and education indicators, whereby the immediate interventions succeeded in subsiding the impact of the war. The government's reconstruction program similarly succeeded in rehabilitating part of the physical infrastructure, thus alleviating part of the decline in the physical capital indicator.

The focus on these three factors provides a more nuanced understanding of the current state of the livelihood indicators. The war led to the worsening of already unsatisfactory levels of livelihood indicators. As a large number of participants mentioned, the recovery interventions, even though successful, returned them to the unsatisfactory pre-war situation. Moreover, the period following the war saw a contradictory development in these indicators, with some interventions improving them, while the general economic

crisis deteriorating them. Most participants in focus groups proposed interventions aiming at responding to the economic crisis and affecting long-term change in their economic situation, rather than simply responding to the direct damages of the war.

#### **II.1.4 Priorities**

The priorities selected by the participants in the focus groups confirmed the evaluation made of the changes in the livelihood indicators. Responding to the pressing need for reconstruction of destroyed dwellings and enterprises, the participants ranked physical capital as their first priority. Nevertheless, the other two priorities, economic activity and financial capital, were linked to the current economic crisis and to the 'structural' problems faced by the inhabitants. The specific interventions proposed aimed at improving the economic performance of their villages, as a long-term solution to the problems of unemployment, poverty and migration. In addition, participants proposed the provision of loans to productive sectors. Lastly, health was selected as a priority, with a need to cater for the historical neglect of these areas in terms of health services. Even though it declined substantially, natural capital was not selected as a priority. The improvement in the performance of the agriculture sector was addressed under the heading of economic activity.

#### **II.1.5 Outline**

The following part addresses the developments that affected each indicator following the war<sup>6</sup>. The order of presentation is based on the importance each indicator received in the qualitative interviews, the importance of the quantitative changes, and the priorities for future interventions selected by the stakeholders. The first part addresses the changes in the physical capital indicator. It is followed by an assessment of the changes in economic activity, a sector that received a lot of attention in the qualitative interviews and was ranked high in the priorities. Even though it improved following the war, the level of financial capital will be addressed as the third part, in view of the high ranking it received in the priorities for future interventions and of the complex dynamics at work in the development of this indicator. The fourth part will address natural capital, as it received limited attention in the qualitative interviews and the priorities for future intervention, despite its substantial decline. The fifth part tackles the health components of human capital. The last three parts address the indicator that received limited attention in the interviews and were not selected as priorities for future interventions, respectively education, demography and social capital.

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<sup>6</sup> For more details on village level, please refer to Annex 2: Global Results, and Annex 3: Village Summaries

## II.2 Physical Capital

The change in the dynamics of physical capital indicators are the result of three factors: the direct effect of the war in terms of physical destruction, the low starting level of the physical infrastructure of a majority of the villages surveyed, and the post-war reconstruction program and its deadlocks. These three effects are captured by the pre-war levels of the indicators and the extent of the change in these indicators following the war.

The infrastructural indicators refer mainly to the availability and accessibility of these services, and to a lesser extent to their quality and cost. Moreover, they refer to the evaluation of the state of the infrastructure by the participants in the focus groups, rather than to their actual state.

**Table 4: Average and change of physical capital indicators**

Indicators	2006	2007	Change
Dwellings (residential buildings)	2.32	1.22	-47%
Enterprises (buildings for economic vocation)	2.27	1.13	-50%
Equipments (machinery, vehicles, etc.)	2.24	1.37	-39%
Social Infrastructure: Education	2.10	1.58	-25%
Social Infrastructure: Health	1.38	1.19	-14%
Roads: main roads	1.67	1.21	-27%
Roads: internal roads, agricultural roads	1.62	1.04	-36%
Electricity (public service)	1.97	1.67	-15%
Water (drinking and used water)	1.89	1.62	-14%
Telecommunication (fixed, mobile, internet)	2.48	1.45	-41%
Irrigation systems	1.35	0.99	-27%
Sewage system	1.02	0.96	-6%
Solid waste collection	1.47	1.35	-8%
<b>Average</b>	<b>1.83</b>	<b>1.29</b>	<b>-29%</b>

### II.2.1 Physical Destruction of the War

The war led to substantial destruction in the physical capital of most surveyed villages, with an average deterioration of 29%. According to participants in the focus groups, some villages saw the destruction or damage of all dwellings and enterprises. In other villages, up to 90% of the infrastructure was damaged by the war, according to the estimates of the participants. However, some villages were spared from this extensive damage, with the bombings targeting specific areas only. Nevertheless, there is a large variance between the deterioration of the sub-indicators, ranging from a 50% decline (enterprises) to a mere 6% decline (sewage system).

### II.2.2 Low Starting Levels of Indicators

Despite the massive destruction brought by the war, the current below-than-average infrastructure is also due to the low starting level of a number of indicators. For example, the sewage and solid waste collection systems were in bad conditions even prior to the war. The importance of this point was confirmed by the focus groups and the priorities selected by the participants. In some interviews, participants voiced their concern about the disastrous situation of the sewage and solid waste collection systems,



pointing that this problem pre-dates the war. Similarly, in the priorities and needed interventions, participants mentioned the construction of a sewage system, and not its rehabilitation, as one of their top priority.

### **II.2.3 Post-War Developments**

A third factor affecting the development of these indicators is the reconstruction program and recovery interventions that followed the war. More than six months have passed between the end of the war and this assessment exercise. During this period, a number of interventions aiming at the reconstruction and rehabilitation of these villages were undertaken, with various levels of success. The limited deterioration in the electricity and water indicators is due to the fact that the reconstruction of these two sectors has been relatively successful. Although the damage to these two sectors was substantial, according to focus groups, the reconstruction program has managed to restore them to their pre-war levels. Similarly, the interventions at the level of the social infrastructures have mitigated the impact of the war, leading to a lower-than-average decline.

The combined effects of these three factors (destruction of the war, low starting levels and reconstruction programs) provide a more nuanced understanding of the change in the level of physical capital. The war has worsened an already difficult situation, with the average dropping from a below-than-acceptable level to an unsatisfactory level. The reconstruction program managed to restore some of these indicators to their pre-war level, i.e. to their below-than-acceptable level. This conclusion is confirmed by the set of priorities selected by the participants, for whom a return to the pre-war level will not solve their 'structural' difficulties and 'historical' neglect.

### **II.2.4 Dwellings and Enterprises**

This logic of analysis can be used to investigate each sub-indicator on its own. Regarding dwellings and enterprises, the destruction was massive in most areas surveyed, with the decline of their indicators registering around 50%. In some villages, participants in focus groups estimated the damage to be between 90% and 100% of the existing stock of capital, for both dwellings and enterprises. The substantial deterioration of these two indicators is also due to the slow pace of the reconstruction program in these domains, where the political deadlock regarding the payment of the indemnities has blocked their reconstruction. Apart from some villages where progress has been achieved, reconstruction has not started yet or is slow. Participants in focus groups estimated the progress of reconstruction to be below 10%.

### **II.2.5 Social Infrastructures**

A different image emerges from the investigation of the social infrastructures of surveyed villages. Even though the damage was significant during the war, post-war interventions mitigated its effects. This is illustrated by the limited decline in the education and health indicators, 25% and 14% respectively. A number of organisations, local and international, intervened after the war in these two domains. The success of these interventions managed to alleviate some of the impacts of the war.

## II.2.6 Physical Infrastructures

A similar, yet more nuanced conclusion can be made regarding the state of physical infrastructure. The war led to substantial damage in the electricity, water and telecommunications sectors. According to participants in some villages, destruction of these sectors was complete. Nevertheless, the reconstruction program of the government, which focused mainly on the rehabilitation of the public infrastructure, restored the electricity and water networks to levels close to their pre-war situation, with a decline of only 15% and 14% respectively. This is confirmed by participants in focus groups, which positively evaluated this aspect of the reconstruction program. The telecommunication sector was not rehabilitated following the war, as illustrated by a much larger decline of the indicator (41%).

The roads networks were heavily hit, with their rehabilitation lagging behind the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure. Starting at a lower level than the electricity, water and telecommunication networks, reconstruction of roads has not been completed. Repair of main roads has taken prominence over the repair of the internal and agricultural roads, as illustrated by the relatively lower decline of the main roads indicator, 27% compared to 36% for internal and agricultural roads.

The last indicators include the sectors that suffered from neglect before the war, namely the sewage system, solid waste collection and irrigation system. The limited decline in the first two indicators is mostly explained by their low starting levels. The lack of sewage system is a problem pre-dating the war and was selected as one of the top priorities by participants in focus groups. This neglect is reaching catastrophic dimension in some villages; in Kfarshouba, the participants pointed that there are more than 60 pending lawsuits related to this problem, resulting in negative effects on the social fabric. As for the irrigation systems, out of the 23 villages surveyed that relied on agriculture, less than ten had a system in place.

## II.2.7 Conclusion

Table 5: Breakdown of physical capital into three groups

Group	2006	2007	Change
<b>1<sup>st</sup> Group:</b> dwellings, enterprises & equipments	2.28	1.24	-46%
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Group:</b> health, education, roads, electricity, water & telecommunications	1.87	1.39	-26%
<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Group:</b> irrigation systems, sewage systems & solid waste collection systems	1.28	1.10	-14%

The current situation of the surveyed villages' physical capital is the result of the combined effect of a low level of infrastructure predating the war, the destruction of the war and the selective reconstruction programs and interventions following the war. These three factors interacted differently with respect to each indicator. In one group (dwellings, enterprises and equipments), destruction was combined with a very limited reconstruction program. In a second group (health, education, electricity, water, telecommunication and roads network), the destruction caused by the war was relatively mitigated by the reconstruction program or interventions of various organisations. As for the third group (irrigation systems, sewage and solid waste collection systems), its neglect was preserved after the war, with the situation being unchanged.

## II.3 Human Capital (Economic Activity)

The significant deterioration in the economic activity is the result of two causes. The first is the destruction of the war, especially affecting the agriculture sector, the main economic activity of most villages. The second is the economic crisis that followed the war and further worsened its impact.

**Table 6: Average and change of human capital – economic activity indicators**

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>Change</b>
Unemployment rate	1.86	1.27	-32%
Unemployment duration	1.77	1.31	-26%
Job creation (new job opportunities)	1.36	1.27	-7%
Extent of child labour phenomenon	2.17	2.10	-3%
Participation of women in economic activity	2.10	2.09	-0%
Economic performance of the agriculture sector	2.02	1.14	-43%
Economic performance of small industries (handcraft)	1.71	1.21	-29%
Economic performance of trade sector	1.92	1.24	-35%
Economic performance of tourism sector	1.90	0.73	-61%
<b>Average</b>	<b>1.87</b>	<b>1.37</b>	<b>-26%</b>

### II.3.1 Economic Performance

The war led to a significant deterioration of all economic sectors. The average decline of the indicators of economic performances, i.e. the average of the indicators pertaining to the economic performance of the agricultural sector, the small industries sector, the trade sector and the tourism sector, is 43%. Most surveyed villages rely primarily on the agriculture sector for their economic survival. This sector was heavily affected by the war, especially that the war coincided with the harvest time. Participants in focus groups estimated the sector's damage in some villages to be complete (100%). Moreover, the war led to the loss of cattle and poultry stocks in the affected villages.

The damage is expected to last for another season, according to participants. This is mainly due to the inability of farmers to prepare their fields, due to the presence of unexploded ordnances (UXOs). Moreover, some participants suspected the war to have led to soil pollution, affecting the quality of the agricultural products. This situation is reflected in the priorities for future intervention, with a number of participants requesting indemnities for the lost output, as the sole way for farmers to survive the long-term economic impact of the war.

Small industries and trade sectors were mainly affected by the destruction of the enterprises and the limited reconstruction effort targeted at this domain. In areas less affected by the physical destruction, the impending economic crisis reduced the economic activities in these sectors. As for the tourism sector, only eight of the areas surveyed relied on it. Its decline was similarly caused by a mixture of physical destruction and economic crisis.

### **II.3.2 Unemployment Conditions**

The substantial deterioration in the economic performances of all economic sectors has naturally led to an increase in the unemployment rate. The duration of unemployment also increased, by 26%. Most participants in focus groups pointed to the increased unemployment rate as the main economic consequences of the war. This translated into a high priority allocated to the creation of employment opportunities in their proposed interventions.

Similarly, job creation was adversely affected by the war. However, according to a number of participants, the limited job creation had structural roots related to the economic situations of the villages. The limited borrowing capacity of the inhabitants, the absence of micro-credits, the lack of productive investments and the small markets all act as impediments to investment and thus job creation. These factors pre-date the war, and were identified as possible areas of future interventions in order to extract these villages from their state of chronic poverty.

It is worth mentioning that in some villages (Hermel, Aita ech-Chaab, Khyam, Mary, Marwahine, Bint Jbeil and Ainata), the reconstruction program and the presence of the UNIFIL mitigated the impact of the war by creating employment opportunities. This pull effect affected mainly the small industries sector, triggered by the reconstruction needs. This positive economic effect of the reconstruction programs was mostly cited in relation to the Qatari programs of reconstruction and the UNIFIL presence.

### **II.3.3 Child Labour and Women Participation**

Apart from the increase in the unemployment rate, the war did not have any impact on the structure of the labour market; there were no changes in child labour and women participation. In most rural areas, child labour was considered as nonexistent and women participation to be at a good level. In urban areas, and more precisely the Baabda Caza, child labour was considered to be a problem that pre-dates the war, caused by the high poverty levels. It is mostly in this environment that the war led to an increase in child labour.

### **II.3.4 Conclusion**

The war had a significant impact on the economic performance of most economic sectors in the surveyed areas, reflected in an increase in the unemployment rate. This situation was further worsened by the economic crisis that followed the war and blocked any possible economic recovery. The only sources of alleviation of this social and economic crisis came from the reconstruction program that provides employment for some inhabitants.

## II.4 Financial Capital

The financial capital indicator is the only indicator to have improved after the war. This is a misleading conclusion since the breakdown of the indicator shows a drastic division between the aid indicators that increased dramatically and the rest of the indicators that stagnated or slightly decreased.

**Table 7: Average and change of financial capital indicators**

Indicators	2006	2007	Change
Access to normal loans	1.38	1.18	-15%
Access to micro-credits	1.07	0.90	-16%
Access to other informal financial support (family, friends, others)	1.80	1.78	-1%
Importance of remittances from family members in Lebanon	1.73	1.72	-1%
Importance of remittances from family members abroad	1.88	1.79	-5%
Importance public aid in kind	0.52	1.12	116%
Importance public aid in cash	0.48	0.60	25%
Importance non-public aid in kind	0.53	1.70	223%
Importance non-public aid in cash	0.47	1.25	169%
<b>Average</b>	<b>1.09</b>	<b>1.34</b>	<b>22%</b>

### II.4.1 Low Starting Levels and High Aid Levels

The change in the level of financial capital is caused by the combination of two factors: the initial limited access to finance and the high amount of aid (in-kind and in-cash) provided during and after the war. The financial capital indicator was the worst indicator before the war, with its level being judged as unsatisfactory by participants in focus groups. The difficulty of accessing loans is a structural factor of the banking sector that pre-dates the war. Moreover, as there was no policy of aid distribution before the war, from either public or non-public sources, financial capital received the worst evaluation. With a low starting level, the increase in the aid provided to inhabitants of targeted areas led to a significant increase in the average.

In order to assess the different dynamics at work in the determination of the changes affecting the level of financial capital, the sub-indicators are divided into three groups, as per the table below. The first includes access to normal loans and micro-credit, and refers to the institutional provision of finance. The second includes informal financial support and remittances, and refers to the social source of finance. Lastly, aid indicators are grouped into one single indicator.

**Table 8: Breakdown of financial capital into three groups**

Group	2006	2007	Change
Institutional access to finance	1.23	1.04	-15%
Social access to finance	1.80	1.76	-2%
Aid	0.50	1.17	135%

## **II.4.2 Institutional Access to Finance**

The institutional access to finance, including access to normal loans and micro-credit, was limited for most inhabitants of surveyed villages. Traditionally, the banking sector has followed a conservative lending policy. The requirements to access normal loans, such as the collateral requirements and high interest rates, are serious obstacles for a considerable segment of the population. Moreover, the problem of unregistered lands or illegal occupancy was highlighted as a problem since these lands and dwellings cannot be used as collaterals. In addition, the presence of micro-credit is extremely limited; only six of the surveyed villages witnessed provision of micro-credit. In other words, the access to loans from financial institutions was difficult prior to the war.

The war worsened this situation by mainly destroying the collaterals that the inhabitants owned. The destruction of the dwellings and enterprises on one hand, and the destruction of the agricultural harvest on the other, obliterated the only possible collaterals for a large part of the population, thus leaving them without any access to institutional finance. The low starting level and the destruction of the war explains the levels of these indicators.

## **II.4.3 Social Access to Finance**

In the absence of institutional source of finance, remittances and informal sources of financing have been extremely important. Emigrants' remittances have been a major source of finance for the Lebanese macro-economy. Moreover, it has been a source of income for a large number of households at the micro-level. This fact was confirmed by participants in focus groups who highlighted the importance of this source of income, which represent the only source for some families.

The remittances from family members in Lebanon were deemed to be as important, especially for the villages with high levels of internal migration. Nevertheless, being part of the same macro-economy, households and migrants are affected by the same economic crisis. This point was raised by a number of participants, for whom the inflows from internal migration are less secure than those from external migration. The access to social sources of incomes was not affected by the war, remaining at its acceptable levels.

## **II.4.4 Aid**

It is the aid component of the financial capital indicator that had the most dramatic change. On average, aid increased by 135% during and after the war. Even though its post-war level remains at an unsatisfactory level, its starting level was close to nonexistent. It is this dramatic increase that explains the improvement of the financial capital indicator following the war.

The indicator for the public in-kind aid increased by 116%, due to the rather limited presence of in-kind aid prior to the war. The in-kind aid provided during and after the war was deemed to be acceptable by participants in focus groups. Nevertheless, most of them noted the limited time-span of this aid that mostly stopped shortly after the war.

Participants were much less impressed by the public in-cash aid provided during and after the war. Improving by a mere 25%, the extent of the public in-cash aid remained at

an unsatisfactory level. The absence of public in-cash aid is due to the deadlock regarding the indemnities to be paid by the government, with most participants complaining about the delays in paying these indemnities.

The non-public aid was judged much more favourably by participants, with in-kind aid increasing by 223% and in-cash aid by 169%. Regarding the in-kind aid, a number of NGOs, international organisations and political parties provided the inhabitants with in-kind aid during and after the war. Most displaced considered the level of aid provided by the host institutions to be acceptable. The same critique that has been addressed to its public counterpart has been directed to this form of aid, namely its limited time-span. This will be illustrated by the high priority put by the vulnerable groups on the need to re-provide inhabitants with in-kind aid.

Similarly, the non-public aid in-cash was judged positively by the participants. Mostly provided by Hezbollah, indemnities were paid to the owners of destroyed or damaged dwellings and enterprises. The prompt payment by the Hezbollah was contrasted to the slow process regarding the government's indemnities. In addition, the Council of the South was cited as having provided aid in-cash. In addition, to these two sources of aid in-cash, the UNDP and the Qatari government provided some indemnities.

These non-public aid in-cash were evaluated positively by most participants. Nevertheless, some participants, especially from the vulnerable groups, complained about the selectivity in the distribution of the aid in-cash and the political bias involved.

It is worth mentioning that the distinction between public and non-public aid is overstated in the comparison of the above indicators for two reasons. The first reason is the perception that some public institutions are non-public, due to the domination of one political party on these institutions. For example, the Council of the South, a public institution, provided indemnities in a number of villages. Nevertheless, it was not considered as part of the public institutions, due to its political control by a political party. The second factor affecting this distinction relates to the identity of the organisation distributing the aid to the final beneficiaries. In a number of cases, aid that was provided by the government or the Higher Relief Commission was channelled via municipalities or local NGOs. In a lot of cases, these institutions were controlled by political parties, giving the impression to the final beneficiaries that it was these parties that were providing the aid.

## **II.4.5 Conclusion**

The changes in the level of financial capital are mostly due to the combination of the emergence of a new, even though temporary, source of finance and to the low starting level of this indicator. The dramatic improvement in the aid component of this indicator contrasts with the stagnation in the other components. But this improvement is by definition temporary, with the indemnities being paid once, leading to the expectation of a future deterioration in this indicator.

## II.5 Natural Capital

The deterioration of the level of natural capital is mainly due to the direct damages of the war. This relatively high decline needs to be taken with caution, since most participants speculated deterioration in the levels of pollution and quality of agricultural products, but without being able to confirm it.

**Table 9: Average and change of natural capital indicators**

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>Change</b>
Water pollution	2.27	1.97	-13%
Air pollution	2.73	2.33	-15%
Soil pollution	2.81	2.08	-26%
Quality of agricultural products (including livestock)	2.43	1.37	-44%
Level of use of existing historical/natural sites	1.37	0.73	-47%
<b>Average</b>	<b>2.32</b>	<b>1.69</b>	<b>-27%</b>

### II.5.1 Quality of Agricultural Products

Analysis of the breakdown of natural capital indicator shows that a significant part of this indicator's decline is due to the deterioration in the quality of agricultural products (44%) and in the level of use of existing historical/natural sites (47%).

Regarding the former indicator, most participants agreed that the quality of agricultural products was relatively good before the war. This quality is expected to deteriorate significantly following the war. The decline in the indicator's level is due to the expectation of deterioration rather than to the actual deterioration. Most focus groups could not reach a consensus on the certainty and extent of this deterioration, since they will have to wait for the next harvest to be able to ascertain the exact impact of the war. Nevertheless, most of them suspected a decline in the quality to take place, a suspicion fuelled by scattered stories about strange phenomena affecting the agricultural products. In Mansouri, participants mentioned that the oranges and bananas harvested are of a smaller-than-normal size. In Bint Jbeil, an unknown disease is affecting bees. In Dibbine, the farmers claimed that there are areas where wheat is not growing anymore. These stories could not be confirmed by participants, but point to a possible decline in the quality of agricultural products. One research, undertaken by the National Council for Scientific Research, found that there was no presence of uranium in the soil.<sup>7</sup>

The confirmed impact of the war was on the livestock and poultry. The war and the displacement of the farmers led to the destruction of livestock and its scattering. For example, Maroun er-Rass lost more than 5,000 chickens and 115 cows, and Ghandouriye lost more than 900 chickens and 600 sheep.

As for the level of use of existing historical/natural sites, only seven villages had a site. The physical destruction and increased level of pollution greatly damaged these sites, whenever available, according to participants. The limited importance given to this sector can be explained by its small role in the economy of these villages.

<sup>7</sup> Published in An-Nahar newspaper, 21 October 2006, p. 14



## **II.5.2 Pollution Levels**

The average deterioration in the pollution indicators is around 18%. As for the quality of agricultural products, the decline is mainly caused by the expectation of an increase in pollution, rather than by any existing evidence. As such, focus groups could not reach a consensus on this point, with some members arguing for an increase in pollution while other argued that no change took place. Rumours about the nature of the weapons used by the Israeli army fuelled the suspicion about the increase in the air and soil pollution. The expectation of an increase in the soil pollution led to an expected deterioration in the quality of agricultural products, as mentioned above. Water pollution was confirmed, caused by the destruction of the sewage system.

One issue that was mentioned in relation to soil pollution and the quality of agricultural products was the problem of cluster bombs. This issue has a transversal effect, impacting a number of livelihoods indicators, namely economic activity, health and natural capital. Moreover, it was often cited by vulnerable groups as one of the main reasons behind their unemployment. In some villages, this problem has reached dramatic proportions leading to injuries and often deaths. As a result, it has often emerged as a priority for future interventions.

## **II.5.3 Conclusion**

The level of natural capital was affected by the pollution of water resources, the loss of cattle and poultry stocks, the presence of cluster bombs and the deterioration of the historical and natural sites. In addition to these confirmed effects of the war, the participants suspected, without being able to confirm it, an increase in the levels of air and soil pollution, in addition to deterioration in the quality of agricultural products. As many participants requested, there is a need for scientific tests to determine the existence and extent of this deterioration.

## II.6 Human Capital (Health)

The health component of the human capital indicator was not significantly affected by the war, remaining at a relatively acceptable level. The numerous interventions following the war mitigated its impact and maintained a stable health situation. Nevertheless, the problems faced by this sector, in terms of availability of health services and their costs remained unresolved after the war.

**Table 10: Average and change of human capital – health indicators**

Indicators	2006	2007	Change
General hygiene situation	2.15	1.82	-16%
General health situation	1.95	1.78	-8%
Availability of health services	1.31	1.11	-15%
Level or extent of malnutrition	2.30	2.12	-8%
Extent of chronic diseases	1.94	1.35	-30%
Spread of epidemics (incidents)	2.80	2.74	-2%
Conditions and incidents of persons with special needs	1.41	1.19	-15%
<b>Average</b>	<b>1.98</b>	<b>1.73</b>	<b>-13%</b>

The general health situation remained at an acceptable level after the war, with the indicator declining only by 8%. Numerous organisations intervened after the war to provide health services, in addition to the UNIFIL health institutions. These immediate interventions mitigated the impact of the war and avoided a health crisis.

### II.6.1 Health Services

Most problems facing this sector pre-date the war, as illustrated by the relatively low level of availability of health services. Most participants in focus groups complained about lack of services, specialised treatments, professional staff, modern equipment and cost of these services. This was mainly the case of rural areas, with urban areas being usually better endowed with health centres.

Vulnerable groups suffered relatively more from the health situation: higher incidence of disabilities and chronic diseases than the rest of the population. These groups are thus in more urgent need of health services. Moreover, the high cost of these services was cited as one of the main problems faced by the vulnerable households. This situation led these groups to give a much higher priority on interventions in the health domains than the stakeholders.

### II.6.2 Health Developments

According to participants in focus groups, the level of chronic diseases, such as diabetes, hearts diseases and blood pressure, increased after the war. The psychological impact of the war, the increased stress levels and the difficult conditions faced by the displaced were thought to be behind this increase in chronic diseases. As for the persons with special needs, the main problem was high treatment cost, rather than an increase in their numbers, especially amidst the current economic crisis. This is a problem mainly faced by vulnerable groups. The main cause for any future deterioration in the health situation was the presence of cluster bombs in the

neighbouring areas and fields. In some villages, this problem has already resulted in injuries and even deaths.

As for the deterioration in the level of hygiene, the extent of malnutrition and the spread of epidemics, they mainly occurred during the war. Inhabitants that remained in their villages faced difficulties in finding food and drugs. Some displaced people complained about the lack of hygiene and the spread of epidemics in the institutions hosting them.

Few of the participants ranked the psychological impact of the war as a main health threat. Nonetheless, regarding education, a large number of participants linked the deterioration in the level of education to the psychological stress faced by the students. According to a study undertaken by UNICEF, 3.5% of the children of the South are in need of psychiatrists and another 95% are in need of different forms of help to be able to get back to their normal lives<sup>8</sup>.

The problems in the health situation mostly pre-date the war. The immediate interventions following the war managed to mitigate its impact. The only sources of health danger were the psychological troubles and stress, causing chronic diseases, and the prevalence of cluster bombs. Nevertheless, participants in focus groups pointed to the 'structural' problems facing this sector, namely the lack of health services and most importantly their costs.

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<sup>8</sup> The results of UNICEF's study were published in Annahar Newspaper on the 12<sup>th</sup> of October 2006, under "Psychological Treatment for the Children of the South in which Teachers Participate"

## II.7 Human Capital (Education)

The war did not have a significant impact on the education component of the human capital indicator. The limited decline in this indicator (6%) maintained it at a good level. The immediate interventions, waiving of schools fees and prompt rebuilding of the destroyed schools mitigated the impact of the war on this sector. Nevertheless, the long-term problem faced by this sector still prevailed after the war.

**Table 11: Average and change of human capital – education indicators**

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>Change</b>
Overall level of education of residents	2.16	2.13	-1%
Drop out rates	2.34	2.12	-9%
Enrolment at primary education	2.74	2.66	-3%
Enrolment at intermediate and secondary education	2.56	2.42	-6%
Enrolment at technical and university education	2.27	2.16	-5%
Availability of teachers	2.29	2.18	-5%
Absenteeism in schools	2.53	2.41	-5%
Quality of the service (education)	2.22	2.12	-5%
Teaching conditions (environment)	2.23	1.78	-20%
<b>Average</b>	<b>2.37</b>	<b>2.22</b>	<b>-6%</b>

### II.7.1 Overall Level of the Education Sector

The deterioration in the level of education is limited as a result of the war. Most participants did not see the war as greatly altering the performance of the education sector. This limited impact is due to the immediate interventions targeting this sector following the war. The government's decision to waive fees, the rebuilding of the destroyed schools in addition to the numerous interventions by NGOs, international organisations and foreign and Arab countries, mitigated the impact of the war and were cited as the main reasons behind the relatively good performance of this sector.

The main problems faced by this sector pre-date the war and are related to the general conditions of the public education system in Lebanon, according to participants. The problems faced are the lack of professional and qualified teachers, lack of modern equipment and the outdated curriculum. The state of public schools was often contrasted to private schools, thought to be better-equipped and funded. Few interventions were proposed in this respect as this problem requires a centralised initiative.

### II.7.2 Teaching Conditions

The only indicator to be significantly affected by the war was the teaching conditions' indicator. Under this heading, the participants raised a number of disparate problems. Some participants mentioned the psychological impact of the war and its effect on students' learning capacities. Other mentioned the forced displacement of some families and its detrimental effect on the students. A few participants mentioned the current political situation as affecting the teaching conditions.

### **II.7.3 Drop-out Rates, Absenteeism and Enrolment Rates**

The drop-out rates and absenteeism was not considered a serious problem in rural areas, however mostly affecting urban ones. The causes of these two problems were specific to each area. Some participants mentioned the economic crisis as the main cause, as more students are forced to work or their parents being unable to pay school fees. Another cause is the forced displacement of some families and the difficult access to schools. These two factors were also cited as causes of the limited decline in enrolment rates.

### **II.7.4 Conclusion**

The post-war education sector managed to maintain its pre-war levels. Nevertheless, it still suffers from 'structural' problems related to public education sector in Lebanon. The current economic crisis is of an adverse impact on students' enrolment rates, drop-out rates and absenteeism.

## **II.8 Human Capital (Demography)**

The demographic structure of the surveyed villages was not significantly affected by the war. The return of almost all the inhabitants left the social fabric of these areas intact; in around fifteen villages, the indicators were left unchanged following the war. Nevertheless, the current economic crisis is leading to a gradual increase in the levels of migration.

**Table 12: Average and change of human capital – demography indicators**

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>Change</b>
Extent of internal migration	2.04	1.80	-11%
Extent of external migration	1.70	1.55	-9%
Number of permanent residents (out of total)	2.11	2.01	-5%
<b>Average</b>	<b>1.95</b>	<b>1.79</b>	<b>-8%</b>

### **II.8.1 Number of Permanent Residents**

The number of permanent residents was evaluated as mostly unchanged as a result of the war. The prompt return of most inhabitants following the war maintained the level of permanent residents at its pre-war level. Some surveyed villages saw an earlier wave of migration, during the first years of the civil war and the Arab-Israeli conflict. But the July 2006 war did not see such movement of population. In very few villages, around 10% of the inhabitants, whose dwellings are still destroyed, did not return. The level of permanent residents declined relatively more in urban areas, where some inhabitants returned to their hometowns.

The rapid return of most of the displaced inhabitants was the result of two causes. The first cause is the willingness and sense of belonging of citizens, which prompted them to return to their villages immediately after the end of the hostilities. The second cause was the 'institutional' support of this return, illustrated by the support and compensation provided by non-governmental bodies, including political parties, the government and the Arab and international community.

### **II.8.2 Levels of Migration**

The levels of migration were deemed to be a more serious problem, with the migration indicators declining by an average of 10%. The increase in these levels is not directly caused by the war, but is a reflection of the economic crisis, forcing some inhabitants to leave their areas in search of employment opportunities. As for the extent of external migration, the decline in the indicator reflects the increased willingness among some inhabitants to emigrate, rather than the actual emigration levels. Most participants in focus groups mentioned the constraints imposed by the host countries as an obstacle for emigration. Without these constraints, the levels of emigration would have been higher.

### **II.8.3 Conclusion**

The war did not have a significant impact on the demographic structure of the areas surveyed. The limited change in the migration levels was caused by the current economic and political crises, leading some inhabitants to leave their towns.

## II.9 Social Capital

The level of social capital was not affected by the war. On the contrary, the heightened sense of solidarity brought out by the war, in addition to the political alliance between the two main Shiite political parties, improved the level of social capital.

Table 13: Average and change of social capital indicators

Indicators	2006	2007	Change
Level of family separation	2.35	2.16	-8%
Level of neighbourliness	2.79	2.70	-3%
Level of people participation in community projects	2.09	1.96	-6%
Level of social and political tensions	2.33	2.46	6%
Availability of public spaces for “networking”	1.99	1.90	-4%
Presence of NGOs/CBOs	1.30	1.26	-3%
Performance of NGOs/CBOs	1.22	1.18	-3%
<b>Average</b>	<b>2.01</b>	<b>1.95</b>	<b>-3%</b>

### II.9.1 Improvement in the Levels of Social Capital

The social capital indicator declined by a mere 3%, maintaining an acceptable level. If the indicators related to the NGOs’ presence and performance are removed, the value of this indicator jumps to 2.31 before the war and 2.24 after the war. “The catastrophe unites”, as most participants mentioned to explain this feeling of solidarity, illustrated in the good level of neighbourliness. Moreover, the subsequent political developments, and most precisely the alliance between the two main Shiite political parties, Amal and Hezbollah, reduced the level of social and political tensions, with this indicator improving by 6%. In very few cases, the politics of aid distribution led to some political tensions, especially that political parties played the main role in this domain.

The level of family separation was limited to the war period. In only five villages the respondents deemed this level to have significantly increased. It was mostly due to the separation of extended families, brought about by the displacement of some households due to the destruction of their dwellings. The level of participation in community projects and the availability of public spaces for “networking” registered acceptable. Nevertheless, participants in some of focus groups complained about the lack of public spaces, mostly explained by the small sizes of the villages, a fact that pre-dates the war.

### II.9.2 Presence and Performance of NGOs

The presence and performance of NGOs received a much less positive evaluation; their presence in the villages was very limited. Moreover, their performance was judged in even more negative terms, with many organisations thought to be just a ‘façade’ with no concrete activities. As for intervening organisations, participants considered the scope of their interventions to be below expectations regarding the extent of the damage. Moreover, some organisations were criticised as lacking professionalism and resources and more interested in advancing their private interests to public ones.

NGOs in Lebanon are very heterogeneous, including family, political or regional organisations. Moreover, they are of a very unequal capacity, with some being present

on the field on a national basis and others being restricted to a very limited presence both regionally and interventions-wise. The wide array of associations subsumed by the category NGO explains the variability in the evaluation of their work.

### **II.9.3 Conclusion**

The sense of solidarity brought about by the war and the political alliance that followed the war led to an improvement in the level of the social capital of most surveyed areas. This positive situation contrasted with the rather negative evaluation of the presence and performance of the NGOs.



## II.10 Priorities

The priorities for future interventions selected by participants in focus groups confirmed the above diagnoses. Physical capital, economic activity and financial capital came as the first three priorities, closely followed by the health component of the human capital.

The priorities for future intervention are the results of the ranking made by the stakeholders. The ranking is based on the number of times a certain indicator was selected as a 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> priority. For example, in 14 villages, Physical Capital was selected as the first priority for intervention, in 7 villages as the 2<sup>nd</sup> priority, and in 5 villages as the 3<sup>rd</sup> priority. The total is the simple arithmetic sum of the number of times an indicator was selected as a top three priority<sup>9</sup>.

**Table 14: Priorities for future interventions (stakeholders)**

Capital	1 <sup>st</sup> Priority	2 <sup>nd</sup> Priority	3 <sup>rd</sup> Priority	Total
Physical Capital	14	7	5	26
Human Capital – Economic Activity	9	12	3	24
Financial Capital	2	5	6	13
Human Capital – Health	1	3	8	12
Human Capital – Education	1	2	2	5
Natural Capital	0	0	4	4
Social Capital	0	0	1	1
Human Capital Demography	0	0	0	0

### II.10.1 Physical Capital

Physical capital came as the top priority for participants in focus groups. It was ranked consistently in the top three needed interventions in all villages, except for four villages, in which destruction was limited (Mary, Fardiss, Boudai, Britel). Physical capital was the most cited, as both the top priority and among the top three priorities. This ranking confirms the diagnosis made in the abovementioned analysis. Physical capital is the livelihood indicator that sustained the heaviest deterioration during the war. Moreover, the slow pace of the reconstruction program maintained its urgency.

Physical capital includes a wide array of interventions. The most often-cited area for intervention was the rehabilitation of the infrastructure that has not been repaired. More precisely, the sewage system emerged as the most urgent priority, closely followed by the rehabilitation of the roads networks, the construction of a solid waste collection system and the repair of the water networks. These areas of concern were those not covered by the government reconstruction program or historically neglected.

A second broad area for intervention was the reconstruction and rehabilitation of dwellings and enterprises. A number of participants asked for a prompt solution to the indemnities problem so as to start the reconstruction of the damaged or destroyed buildings.

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<sup>9</sup> The total sum of number of times the indicators were selected as a priority is not equal to 78 (26 villages x 3 priority) because some villages mentioned more than one capital as a top priority for intervention.

## **II.10.2 Human Capital – Economic Activity**

The second priority selected by participants was the improvement of the economic activity. This priority came as a response to the war damages and to the current economic crisis. Most participants focused on the creation of employment opportunities, illustrating the acuteness of the unemployment crisis. In this respect, they proposed the provision of loans for productive investments and the improvement of the various economic sectors.

The second area of concern was the performance of the agriculture sector. As most surveyed areas depend on this sector, its improvement has wide repercussions on the livelihoods of the underlying population. In this respect, the participants proposed the modernisation of this sector through various means: development of an agro-industrial sector, provision of loans for the agriculture sector, payment of indemnities for lost output, provision of technical know-how, and support in marketing the output.

## **II.10.3 Financial Capital and Human Capital – Health**

The third priority was financial capital, closely followed by the health component of human capital. The focus on financial capital is an answer to the current economic crisis and to the historical dearth of finance. Participants were unanimous in asking for more micro-credit and subsidised loans to the agricultural sector and to finance productive projects. This focus emerges as a way to avoid the obstacles to access normal loans. Some participants proposed the provision of in-kind and in-cash aid as a means to alleviate some of the poverty in these areas. Regarding health, participants proposed provision of health services, improvement of equipment of existing health centres and provision of drugs. Some participants asked for a better handling of the persons with special needs.

Even though natural capital emerged as one of the heaviest sectors hit, it was rarely selected among the top three priorities. The few times it was selected, it was in conjunction with the problem of UXOs and the improvement of the quality of agricultural products, two problems that were addressed by the first three priorities.

## **II.10.4 Conclusion**

The priorities selected by participants point to the need to engage in long-term developmental strategy in these areas. Apart from the first priority, which addressed the direct impact of the war, most selected priorities aim at tackling structural weaknesses and historical neglect in these villages. As such, development interventions rather than recovery ones are urgently required.

### III. Impact of War on Vulnerable Groups

This section of the study aims at briefly identifying the vulnerable groups (VGs) of the society, assessing their situation prior to July 2006, as well as studying how the war has further aggravated their situation<sup>10</sup>. In this respect, this section can be divided into three main parts:

#### 1. First: profile of vulnerable groups

Profiles of vulnerable groups were identified at two levels: desk study (theoretical) and fieldwork (actual). The former covers main literature addressing vulnerability; it led to developing two approaches of identifying vulnerable groups: geographical (identifies the vulnerable groups from the point of view of geographical poverty clusters) and sectoral (concerns identifying and profiling each of the groups) approach. The latter comprised in-depth interviews with vulnerable groups, the names and addresses of whom were provided by the villages' stakeholders. As illustrated below, the desk study and fieldwork not only lead to analogous categorisation of vulnerable groups, but also to a comparable result in terms of inter-linkage between the concepts of vulnerability and poverty. In this respect, not all persons in each of the identified vulnerable groups are actually vulnerable, but they are more susceptible to vulnerability due to the poverty phenomenon.

#### 2. Second: findings based on the fieldwork

This part assesses the situation of vulnerable groups before and after the 2006 war based on the interviews conducted with these groups during the fieldwork.

#### 3. Third: priorities based on the fieldwork

This part assesses the priorities of vulnerable groups based on the interviews conducted with these groups during the fieldwork. As illustrated below, the emerging priorities are similar, to a large extent, to those identified by stakeholders.

### ***III.1 Profile of Vulnerable Groups***

#### **III.1.1 Geographical Approach – literature review**

The geographical approach examines the regional characteristics of poverty, as the Israeli July 2006 war affected areas with higher-than-national poverty rates. Four different studies were considered:

##### **1- Mapping of Living Conditions in Lebanon, MoSA and UNDP 1995 and 2004**

Objectives: This study adopts the “Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN)” approach and aims at providing information and analysis needed for the formulation of policies that contribute to the improvement of living conditions in Lebanon. It measures the degree of satisfaction of basic needs in Lebanon for households and individuals, and to deduce the regional,

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<sup>10</sup> For more details, please refer to Annex 4: Review of Vulnerable Groups Prior to and Post July 2006 War

demographic, economic and social characteristics of the population. It was conducted at the Caza level in 1995, and updated in 2004 on the Mohafazat level.

**Findings:** **Households with low levels of satisfaction represented 31% of the population in 1995, dropping to 25% in 2004.** Households with intermediate satisfaction represent the largest share (40% in 2004, down from 42% in 1995). The shares of households with low and medium satisfaction of basic needs dropped to give way to a rise in high satisfaction level; the share of households having a high degree of satisfaction improved notably from 27% in 1995 to 36% in 2004.

At the Mohafazat level, Nabatieh comes first in terms of households with low satisfaction (50.3% and 46.3% in 1995 and 2004 respectively). Beirut has the best standing in terms of satisfaction with basic needs (15.8% and 9.3% for low satisfaction and 45.3% and 62.3% for high satisfaction in 1995 and 2004 respectively).

At the Caza level, Bint Jbeil is considered to have the lowest level of needs satisfaction, with 67.2% of its households living below the threshold index, followed by Hermel (65.9%), Akkar (63.3%) and Marjeyoun (60.0%). Fourteen cazas fall below the national index of poverty and twelve fall above it, with Keserwan registering the highest degree of satisfaction (13.5% for low and 48.2% for high), followed by the capital Beirut (18.4% for the low and 43.0% for the high).

## **2- Social and Municipal Development: poverty targeting system, ESFD 2002**

**Objectives:** This study aims at providing a sound operational definition of poverty per Caza in the Lebanese context. It develops criteria for the targeting of geographical areas.

**Findings** Poverty lines are derived as means to quantify the severity of poverty. Although this measure varies across regions of the same country, it remains a good indicator of the extent of poverty. In this view, the lower poverty line was developed; it is the level of income necessary to sustain physical existence, mainly food items.

The study adopted a least cost diet methodology in order to establish a lower poverty line, estimated at US\$ 314 per month per household in 2001. This figure undergoes regional disparities: highest in Minyeh (US\$ 365 for an average household size of 5.68) and lowest in Jezzine (US\$ 244 for an average household size of 3.49). The **national headcount index was 7.1%**, i.e. on average 7.1% of households in Lebanon were not able to ensure their existence on a sustainable basis. This rate varies among different districts; the highest headcount was reported in Hermel (22.2%) and the lowest in Keserwan (0.4%). The study thus classified 7 Cazas of Lebanon (Minyeh, Akkar, Bint Jbeil, Hermel, Tyre, Baalbeck and Hasbaya) to be very poor, in terms of both income and social poverty.

### 3- Social Development Strategy, ESFD 2004

Objectives: This study aims at proposing an overall strategy for social development in Lebanon, identifying geographical and sectoral pockets of poverty, and developing a tool for different actors and stakeholders to better-coordinate their efforts and increase their efficiency and effectiveness of development initiatives. It also aims at specifying regions, zones, and target groups that will benefit from poverty alleviation measures.

Findings The study showed that poverty pockets are concentrated in the Cazas of Hermel, Akkar, Minyeh, Jezzine, Hasbayya, Bint Jbeil, Tyre, Marjeyoun, Baalbeck, Saida-Zahrani, Nabatieh, Zahleh, West Bekaa and Tripoli.

### 4- Rapid Social Assessment, CDP 2006

Objectives: This study aims at detecting and then analysing the geographic areas that are considered to be poor. In this respect, 10 regional poverty areas (RPAs) were selected, comprising 72 poverty clusters (PCs), which in turn cover about 200 villages. PCs were grouped based on similarity in characteristics; especially that discrepancies among PCs within the same RPA and similarities among PCs in different RPAs were detected. This allowed regrouping different PCs (of different RPAs) into four significantly more homogeneous clusters: Urban areas, Deserted Rural areas, Agricultural Rural areas and Stop & Move areas. The identified categories comprise geographically disconnected PCs of different RPAs that are homogeneous in terms of identified poverty factors.

Findings **Urban areas** hold mainly poverty bands that exist in or around main cities, such as Beirut and Tripoli, in addition to the Old city of Saida. They are characterised by demographic and infrastructure factors more balanced than the remaining clusters, and worse housing and social factors.

**Deserted Rural areas** are characterised by a more balanced housing factor, and worse demographic and infrastructural ones than those of the remaining clusters.

**Agricultural Rural areas** are characterised by two poor factors, infrastructure and partnership, the worst among the remaining clusters; they do not suffer from demographic and social problems, as severe as those of other clusters.

**Stop & Move Rural areas** are characterised by two more positive factors, partnership and social; they suffer mainly from historic problems, such as civil wars to foreign occupation.

### **III.1.2 Sectoral Approach – literature review**

The sectoral approach identifies vulnerable groups and profiles their characteristics. Although the July 2006 war posed further challenges for Lebanon as a whole, already-marginalised segments were more concerned than others. MoSA adopts a definition of vulnerability to cover four different groups (women heads of households, working children, elderly and disabled); however other groups are also known to suffer marginalisation (fishermen, farmers and the unemployed). Moreover, the war came to add the displaced to the list of vulnerable groups. Each of these groups is briefly discussed below.

#### **1. Women heads of households**

It is estimated that women-headed households represent 14.2% of total heads of households in Lebanon, with the highest concentration reported in either urban areas, such as Beirut, or some districts of South Lebanon, such as Jezzine, Marjeyoun, Bint Jbeil and Nabatieh.

This group is classified as vulnerable mainly due to the poverty phenomenon: a higher percentage of female-headed households fall into the low degree of satisfaction than male-headed households. Widowhood, and thus loss of household primary income, is also a factor that plays a role in aggravating satisfaction conditions and thus poverty.

Although no official pertaining to the gender distribution of the victims, “Impact of the Israeli Aggression on the Status of Women and Children<sup>11</sup>” estimated that the victims were distributed equally among children, women and men. Thus, this source implies that the number of male deaths is 400; hence, female-headed households are expected to rise by a figure close to 400.

#### **2. Working children**

The number of working children between 10 and 19 years of age in Lebanon is estimated at 76,000, equivalent to about 10% of total children in this age group. Some sources estimate that working children represent about 3% of economically active population, translating into a figure of around 50,000. This figure undergoes regional disparities, where it is highest in the North.

Working children face different difficulties at many levels, namely education. In fact, it is noted that the drop out-rate rises with the educational level, a finding that could be attributed to the fact that boys enter into the labour market at an earlier age due to economic needs. Despite the adverse effects associated with this issue, the number of working children remains high in Lebanon, driven mainly by the tight economic conditions, which drive parents to allow their children to join the workforce and support their families. Not applying the law of making primary education free and compulsory could be another motive for school drop-out.

The impact on children is double-fold. Many have become orphans, as a result of the death of one or two of their parents, thus raising the chance of child labour incidence.

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<sup>11</sup> Impacts of the Israeli Aggression on the Status of Women and Children: a Preliminary Analytical Approach, UNDP, 2006

Besides, the psychological damage has been so massive that it has to be tackled promptly and efficiently.

### **3. Elderly**

The elderly are defined as the segment of residents who are aged 65 and above; they constitute 7.5% of total Lebanese population, translating into a figure of 277,000.

The elderly face various problems, such as low coverage by social security (less than half of the elderly aged 65 and above are covered), low economic activity, prevalence of permanent diseases, and illiteracy.

### **4. Disabled**

The disabled are estimated at 75,000 citizens on a national basis, of whom 84.8% suffer from one disability, 10.5% suffer from two disabilities and 4.7% from three or more. More than a quarter of the disabled are aged above 64 years.

Laws that aim at facilitating access by the disabled to services and integrating them into society have been issued, however, still lack actual application. Not all disabled individuals benefit from services provided by the Government. Besides, NGOs and other providers of services to the disabled are not evenly distributed; the majority are located in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, a distribution which need not reflect that of the disabled.

The war left 4,405 people injured, of which about 15% will remain disabled for life, which translates into a figure of more than 600 individuals.

### **5. Farmers**

On a national level, agricultural workers are estimated at either 7.5% of the total active population. This figure undergoes huge disparities from one region to the other, where Marjeyoun and Hermel are reported to have the highest share of agriculture labour out of active population.

The incidence of poverty in Cazas with high share of agricultural workers is high, where Cazas with a higher than national ratio of agricultural active population to total active population hold elevated figures for headcount index. Besides, almost two-thirds of those who work in the "agriculture, hunting and forestry sector" fall into the low satisfaction category.

The war has had immense adverse effects on the agriculture sector at many levels, leading to both physical (such as harvest, equipment and machinery) and non-physical damages (losses in income).

### **6. Fishermen**

The number of fishermen was estimated at 6,550 in 2004, with a ratio of 2.62 fishermen for each boat. Almost half of the fishermen were between 25 and 44 years of age, with more than three-quarters being illiterate or with elementary education.

They face various difficulties, such as high initial costs (boats and equipment), seasonal work, low-paid job and no protection benefits.

Fishing activity was heavily disrupted during the war. Three major fishing ports were damaged: Tyre, Saida and Ouzaii, along with 400 boats destroyed in addition to fishing nets and accessories. The activity was grounded to a full-month's halt and about 5,000 fishermen were unable to work even after the end of the war, due to the oil spill, prolonged embargo and halted export channels.

## **7. The unemployed**

The national unemployment rate<sup>12</sup> was 11.5% in 2001. This figure rises to 15.2% when assessing youth unemployment (18-35 age group), with notable gender disparities (23.2% for females and 11.8% for males of this age group). More recent figures indicate that unemployment dropped to 7.9% in 2004, undergoing some gender disparities (9.5% for females & 7.3% for males).

As unemployment is related to economic activity and income earning, it is a poverty indicator that is inversely related to income levels and could measure the standard of living of both individuals and households. Unemployment, coupled with low levels of education, is highly correlated in most of the cases to extreme poverty.

The massive war destruction brought many economic activities to a halt, leading either to reduced salaries or laying-off of many employees. As many enterprises were fully or partially destroyed, the employment rate is not expected to catch up before reconstruction is completed. Unemployment levels reached very high levels during the war, not only due to the inability to access workplaces, but also to employee dismissals arising as a result of closure and/or reduced activity.

## **8. The displaced**

The displacement process as a result of the civil war was in its closing stages prior to the Israeli 2006 war. However, the brutal war of July 2006 forced about a million citizens to leave their homes in search of safer places for the whole war period. They left their homes for over a month mainly in the South, Bekaa, and Beirut's Southern Suburbs, seeking security and shelter in other regions of the country.

The displacement process during any war proves that attaining security comes at the expense of maintaining social well-being. Displacement, along with its adverse corollaries, is a transitional stage that people undergo during periods of conflicts. The majority of the stricken areas represent poverty pockets, and thus low-income residents could not afford to rent individual residences. In this regard, most displaced settled in schools, social centres and public gardens and were prone to restricted access to (clean) water, lack of hygiene in toilets and unhealthy sleeping environment facilitated the spread of some minor diseases, such as flu, especially among children.

The following table shows the profiles, number and major characteristics of the identified eight vulnerable groups.

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<sup>12</sup> These figures are based on the standard measurement of unemployment, i.e. satisfying the following three criteria: (1) not carried out any work during a reference period (one week prior to the survey), (2) available for work, and (3) sought work. However there is another more expanded definition of unemployment that fits into the first two criteria only; i.e. the interviewee need not actually seeking a job. This raises the unemployment rate in Lebanon to 9.7% in 2004 (12.3% for females and 8.9% for males).



**Table 15: Profiles and major characteristics of vulnerable groups**

#	Vulnerable Group	Profile	Estimated number <sup>13</sup>	Major characteristics
1	female heads of households	financially responsible for their families	more than 120,000 <sup>14</sup>	- more liable to have low living conditions and deprivation
2	working children	less than 14 years of age involving in economic activity and domestic work	more than 50,000 <sup>15</sup>	- low education levels (high drop-out) - work under hazardous conditions
3	the elderly	residents who are aged 65 and above	more than 270,000 <sup>16</sup>	- low economic activity - prevalence of diseases - low coverage by social security
4	the disabled	partial or complete inability to perform one or more of the major activities in daily life	more than 75,000 <sup>17</sup>	- low economic activity - high levels of illiteracy - prevalence of inequality at many levels, including social and legal
5	workers in agriculture	labour involving in plant-raising activities as a source of income	more than 80,000 <sup>18</sup>	- small-sized farmers - limited diversity and volume of production - mostly wholesale
6	fishermen	labour involving in fishing activities as a source of income	more than 6,000 <sup>19</sup>	- high investment cost - seasonal work - no protection benefits - mostly wholesale
7	the unemployed	individuals not working but actively looking for a job	more than 90,000 <sup>20</sup>	- limited jobs - competition from foreign labourers
8	the displaced	individuals leaving their homes/villages due to conflict	more than 130,000 <sup>21</sup>	- health problems

<sup>13</sup> It should be noted that these numbers represents all the members of the said vulnerable group, and not only those who are poor.

<sup>14</sup> Source: Living Conditions of Households, MoSA & UNDP, 2004

<sup>15</sup> Source: Formulation of a Strategy for Social Development in Lebanon, ESFD, 2004 --- this figure is slightly higher than what been mentioned in Child Labour in Lebanon: Present Situation and General Recommendations for a Future National Policy, ILO, 2004

<sup>16</sup> Source: Living Conditions of Households, MoSA & UNDP, 2004

<sup>17</sup> Source: Living Conditions of Households, MoSA & UNDP, 2004

<sup>18</sup> Source: Living Conditions of Households, MoSA & UNDP, 2004

<sup>19</sup> Source: Poverty Mapping & Profiles, ESFD, 2004

<sup>20</sup> Source: Living Conditions of Households, MoSA & UNDP, 2004

<sup>21</sup> Source: CRI calculations based on Stockholm Conference for Lebanon's Early Recovery, August 2006

### **III.1.3 Profile of Vulnerable Groups – field results**

The following presentation is based on the samples of vulnerable groups visited in twenty villages. Although broad, the profile of the vulnerable groups that emerged from the field survey confirmed to a large extent the existing categories in the literature discussed above. A number of the causes of vulnerability were often associated in the same household, a fact that made it impossible to identify one source of vulnerability per household.

In terms of gender distribution of vulnerable respondents, in 16 out of the 26 villages surveyed, the share of males was 58% and the proportion of female 42%. These percentages refer to the composition of the vulnerable groups that attended the focus groups, rather the vulnerable group per se.

Roughly speaking, the sample of vulnerable groups can be divided into three groups. The first suffers from health problems, leading either to unemployment or impoverishment. The second suffers from lack of support, discrimination and absence of a breadwinner. The third suffers from the economic situation, being unemployed or unqualified.

Around 30% of the causes of vulnerability identified in the villages surveyed were related to health problems, either to cases of disability or chronic diseases. A household was deemed to be vulnerable whenever the head or a member of the household faced health problems. In the former case, this source of vulnerability is associated with unemployment and loss of income; while in the latter, it is associated with rising health costs and impoverishment. Similarly, age was considered as a source of vulnerability, with the elderly making up 9% of the vulnerable groups.

The second group included the widows and women heads of households. This group accounts for 20% of the vulnerable households. The main problems associated with this group were the absence of support and precarious employment pattern. In addition, some participants mentioned lack of support as a cause of vulnerability (5%).

The third group includes the causes of vulnerability related to the labour market or the professions of the head of household. This group represents 12% of the total vulnerable groups. The main causes of vulnerability were unemployment, seasonal or sporadic employment pattern or employment in the agriculture sector.

Some participants mentioned family size as a cause of vulnerability, amounting to 5% of the total vulnerable groups. The large size of the family, with the related financial pressure, was considered as a source of vulnerability.

Around 18% of the vulnerable groups were deemed to be vulnerable because of their lack of income. This causal relation drawn between lack of income and vulnerability illustrates the confusion between the concept of vulnerability and of poverty. This led some participants to identify poverty as a form of vulnerability rather than its consequences. Moreover, it led some participants to conclude that a large number of the inhabitants were vulnerable.

## ***III.2 Findings of the PRA with respect to Vulnerable Groups***

The main general conclusion that emerges from the field survey is that the war worsened an already very difficult situation for most vulnerable groups. As most members of these groups pointed to, their social situation was already very difficult prior to the war. Although the war created some new problems, such as the destruction of dwellings or the presence of UXOs, they had been already facing a precarious situation.

### **III.2.1 During the War**

According to the interviews with vulnerable groups, the war period was considered to be extremely difficult. Even though the majority of vulnerable households managed to flee their villages for safer areas, the process of leaving was difficult. Lack of transportation and its associated high costs were major obstacles for vulnerable groups, in addition to the presence of disabled and elderly. Some families had to remain for a long period in their villages during the conflict, before they could flee. Part of the vulnerable groups could not or did not want to leave and remained in their houses for the whole war period.

Families that left their villages were relocated in schools and institutions in safer areas. During the interviews, participants expressed a positive evaluation of the support they received during their displacement. In-kind aid was provided to most displaced, and its level was deemed acceptable. Some participants mentioned that they had to use their limited savings to survive.

This positive picture did not include the members that were not relocated to these institutions. Some families stayed with friends or family members, and others relied on themselves for accommodation, all of which were not provided with any aid or support. As for the groups that remained in the village, their ordeal was described as a nightmare. In addition to the fear and stress caused by the war, they ran out of food and drugs. Moreover, destruction of the infrastructure left them without water or electricity. These families complained about the lack of aid and support provided during the war.

### **III.2.2 Return to the Village**

The return to the villages was described in terms such as 'catastrophic', 'disastrous' and 'terrible'. The sheer scope of the physical destruction, the size of infrastructural damages and the high level of pollution made the return very difficult. Some vulnerable groups had their dwellings destroyed or damaged. In addition, all of them suffered from lack of infrastructure, such as electricity and water, and from pollution and dust. Moreover, the presence of UXOs made walking in the villages very dangerous. The first organisations to intervene were Hezbollah and municipalities, providing in-kind aid, indemnities and support.

### **III.2.3 Problems Currently Faced**

The problems these groups currently face are no different than the one they faced before the war, even though the war compounded these difficulties and added new ones related to destruction. This deterioration of the financial situation was mainly illustrated by the high priority put on the provision of free health services.

The war did not herald a new period with a new set of problems, as much as it rendered existing problems more acute:

- Poor housing conditions were considered as a problem even before the war; the war came only to worsen this problem
- Many vulnerable groups suffer from the high cost of living, especially concerning health services. As a group, the incidence of disability is very high, making the share of health services out of total expenditure high. The high costs of living were felt in relation to food prices, electricity fees and school fees.
- A significant part of vulnerable groups suffer from the economic situation. Some participants had their enterprises destroyed or suffered from the damage to the agriculture sector, leading to the loss of their only source of income. The presence of cluster bombs compounded this problem, by rendering the access to the neighbouring fields impossible. Lastly, the economic crisis, with the increase in unemployment, led a number of families to lose their only source of income.
- Another difficulty is the poor state of infrastructure and high costs of usage fees. Some households mentioned their need to buy potable water after the destruction of the water network, further adding a financial burden on their already limited resources.

### **III.2.4 Evaluation of Intervening Organisations**

Regarding the question to whom they turn for support and aid, the most often-cited answer was to 'god', illustrating their acute sense of despair. The second answer given to this question was to 'no one', confirming the lack of social support provided to these particular groups. For example, one participant in Qana said: "When I go to the Mosque, I feel as a snake, people avoiding from me fearing that they will have to help me". As for those who named an organisation or a group, Hezbollah, their family, NGOs and charity organisations were often cited.

The government and public institutions were the subject of harsh critiques from these groups. Accused of neglecting them, the government was deemed to be inefficient and corrupt. Speaking of the government's projects, one participant in Marwahine said that "They are mere promises and unfulfilled projects. Even worse, the government begs in the name of the inhabitants without giving them anything". The political parties, NGOs and foreign organisations were evaluated more positively, even though some participants complained about the selectivity in the distribution of aids. NGOs, in this respect, referred to a large array of organisations, including political associations, religious organisations and family-based organisations, in addition to the civil society groups.

### III.3 Priorities

The priorities selected by the members of the vulnerable groups interviewed did not differ in their content from the priorities given by the stakeholders. The difference was in the ranking and justification given for such priorities.

**Table 16: Priorities for future interventions (vulnerable groups)**

<b>Capital</b>	<b>1<sup>st</sup> Priority</b>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Priority</b>	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Priority</b>	<b>Total</b>
Human Capital – Economic Activity	8	3	7	18
Financial Capital	10	6	1	17
Human Capital – Health	5	7	3	15
Physical Capital	4	3	5	12
Human Capital – Education	0	5	2	7
Natural Capital	1	0	0	1
Social Capital	0	0	1	1
Human Capital Demography	0	0	0	0

The vulnerable groups' priorities tend to express the urgency of the problems they face. Rather than focusing on long-term solution and proposals, their concern is with the alleviation of their current situation and problems. As such, in-cash and in-kind aid or free health services, measures that could immediately improve their livelihoods were given top priorities.

#### III.3.1 Human Capital – Economic Activity and Financial Capital

The economic activity and financial capital were given top priorities, illustrating the vulnerable groups' concerns with the current social and economic crisis. Regarding economic activity, participants pointed to the urgency of providing employment opportunities. As for financial capital, the main proposal was to re-provide in-cash and in-kind aid. Some participants stated the government should provide a monthly wage or a fixed source of income to the families in need. The provision of subsidised loans and micro-credit for productive investment was selected as a link between these two indicators.

#### III.3.2 Human Capital – Health

The health component of the human indicator came third, receiving more attention than in the priorities set by the stakeholders. The acute health problems of these groups, with disability and disease being one of the major sources of vulnerability, explain its high priority. In addition to the provision of better health services, participants proposed either to provide free services or for the government to take charge of people with special needs. The costs of health services emerged as a priority, much more than their specialisation or improvement.

#### III.3.3 Physical Capital

Lastly, physical capital was selected as the fourth priority. As with the stakeholders' priorities, participants focused on the reconstruction of the dwellings and solving the indemnities deadlock on one hand, and on rehabilitating the infrastructure on the other.

One problem mentioned by the participants was the issue of UXOs. For vulnerable groups, this problem was mostly approached from its economic dimension, being a major drive for unemployment. Mostly employed in agriculture, the presence of cluster bombs threatens their only sources of income.

### **III.3.4 Intervening Organisations**

As to which organisation should intervene, the answers were divided among those who wished that the government intervened and those who preferred to rely on political parties, NGOs and municipalities. The latter group expressed their lack of trust of the central government, accused of neglecting the population. Instead, they preferred to rely on local and international organisations, deemed to be less corrupt and more effective.

## IV. Interventions

Post-civil strife efforts were channelled mainly towards reconstruction, focusing largely on infrastructure rehabilitation, without incorporating the latter into a global economic and social vision that corrects major macroeconomic imbalances and inter-regional social disparities. Thus Lebanon's social conditions gradually aggravated, despite the relatively high increase of the share of "public social expenditure" out of total public expenditures.

The low capacities of the public sector, short of comprehensible cost-effective measures and coordination priorities, accompanied by a huge number of NGOs led to a state of disorder at the level of social programs. In other words, different entities conduct various social programs on an ad hoc basis upon the availability of funds, not following a certain strategy based on regional needs assessment. It could be thus said that the various interventions were supply-side, rather than demand-side ones based on regional needs assessment. This absence of a national set plan causes many entities to undertake similar programs that often overlap, leading to duplication of work in terms of both beneficiaries and geographical coverage. The same is believed to apply to relief activities undertaken during the war, as well as recovery efforts.

This section of the study aims at providing a brief overview of what was being done prior to the July 2006 war, in addition to relief efforts during the war and post-war recovery actions of various local and international, governmental and non governmental players.

### ***IV.1 Overview of Major Existing Social Programs***

Various entities hold social programs to address the less advantaged segments of the society. Major public institutions, UN organisations and NGOs are shown in the table below, focusing on the scope of work of each and targeted beneficiaries prior to the July 2006 war<sup>22</sup>.

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<sup>22</sup> For more details, please refer to Annex 5: Review of Social Programs before the July 2006 War

**Table 17: Overview of major existing social programs**

Entity		Name of Social Program	Description of Social Program
Public Institutions	Ministry of Social Affairs	<b>Social Care Services</b>	- address the marginalised segments of the society: children, elderly, disabled and children prone to delinquency - services are provided through social development services centres contracted by MoSA in all Lebanese regions - number of beneficiaries in institutions contracted by MoSa was about 40,000 in 2005
		<b>Development Services</b>	- implementation of projects is done in partnership with NGOs, local authorities, committees, municipalities and cooperatives - include: social development centres; rural & urban development projects; voluntary work camps; & handicrafts development
		<b>Other Services</b>	- include: illiteracy eradication and adult education; and school food program
	Ministry of Health	<b>National Drug Program</b>	- reduce the national drug bill, and make drugs in Lebanon more affordable and accessible to those in need for them - beneficiaries are all segments of the society; however impact on the poor will be greater since households with lower income spend a notably higher share of total expenditures on health care
		<b>Primary Health Care Centres</b>	- Lebanon enjoys a large number of health care, dispensaries and social services centres, reaching about 850, of which about only 11% as designated as PHC centres; most are operated by the non-governmental sector - utilisation of PHC centres is still low and their geographical distribution is not even
	Ministry of Labour	<b>National Social Security Fund</b>	- addresses Lebanese citizens who are workers and employees in the private non-agricultural sector - beneficiaries include the spouse, children, and parents living in the same house and not capable to self-support - three sub-funds: sickness & maternity, end of service indemnity and family allowances
		<b>Child Labour Laws</b>	- In 2002, MoL proposed a new labour law referred to the government, however not ratified. It addressed minimum working age, work conditions, allowed sectors of employment, prohibited activities and working hours
	Ministry of Education	<b>Drop-outs</b>	- special program for poor students to reduce cost of education through the provision of in-kind donations or exemptions
		<b>School Food Program</b>	- provide daily meals children in schools
		<b>Basic Education</b>	- providing school books and stationery and cancel registration fees in public schools
Council for Development and Reconstruction	<b>ESFD</b>	- alleviate poverty through: job creation (provision of credit to and generation of income for small enterprises), and community/local development (improve access, distribution and quality of social services in order to improve living conditions of low-income groups, through financial and technical support to projects proposed by local communities)	
	<b>CDP</b>	- address various segments of the disadvantaged society through: Basic Infrastructure, Social Services and Economic Opportunities (improve access to basic rural infrastructure, social services, education & health, in addition to vocational training and capacity building programs); and Special Social Programs (thematic programs on a national basis: disability, gender and children, and youth)	
UN Organisations	UNDP	<b>Capacity building to eradicate poverty</b>	- strengthen the role of MoSA in realising social development and eradicating poverty, and to increase its efficiency in providing the best services to the poor and needy
		<b>Socio-economic development program for Akkar</b>	- support socio-economic development in Akkar, through promoting "Balanced Regional Development" and reducing poverty in one of the most deprived districts. The program concentrates on empowering communities and enhancing its capacities
		<b>Socio-economic program to support the return of the displaced</b>	- support reconciliation between the returnees and residents, and provide basic social services to residents of Chouf, Aley & Baabda
		<b>Post-conflict socio-economic development program in south Lebanon</b>	- intervene in the formerly occupied areas and the bordering strips within the Caza of Bint-Jbeil, Marjeyoun and Hasbaya
	UNICEF	<b>Child Care and Development Program</b>	- improve child care in pre-schools and promote parental & community education in health, nutrition and psychosocial care practices
		<b>Learning Program</b>	- provide access for all to quality basic education, including for the poorest; and improve retention to prevent child labour
		<b>Youth Empowerment and Protection Program</b>	- provide youth with skills and knowledge for the future through supporting operational research to identify priorities and actions; promoting policies and plans specific to youth; and building partnerships
Non-Governmental Organisations	<b>Supporting Childhood Program</b>	- improve the quality of MoSA's services, develop early childhood and to spread knowledge and skills about early childhood	
	<b>Health Care Services</b>	- raise public awareness on health issues, promote reproductive health, ensure access to vaccination, provide basic drugs, and carry out school health programs	
	<b>Socio-psychological support</b>	- psychological counselling, psychotherapy services, and awareness-raising sessions on mental health issues	
	<b>Training</b>	- improve the skills of individuals, especially youth, in order to facilitate their entrance into the labour market	
	<b>Development: rural, economic and environmental</b>	- create income generating opportunities to residents of rural regions in order to enhance independence, self-reliance and improve standard of living	
	<b>Gender Equality/Promotion</b>	- empower women, promote family welfare, spread the culture of human and women's rights, combat violence against women, and address the issue of discrimination against women in laws.	
	<b>Agriculture</b>	- provide agricultural services such as guidance campaigns, train farmers, promote awareness on chemical pesticides and agricultural chemicals, and supply equipment.	
<b>Micro-credit</b>	- provide micro-credit to undertake productive projects covering the agriculture, industry and trade sectors, in order to provide a source of income, and improve social conditions		



The above-discussed programs are designed and undertaken in order to provide significant assistance to poor segments of the society. However, many vulnerable groups rely on alternative informal sources of aid, such as assistance programs of certain families, political and religious parties.

The efforts exerted by the entities presented above show the significance that the social aspect is currently gaining; however the multiplicity of programs need not be a positive indicator. In fact, Lebanon still lacks a clear vision for social development, one that identifies national goals and divides the roles of intervening entities accordingly. Although the undertaken programs address a wide range of beneficiaries and geographical areas, Lebanon still witnesses low levels of coordination among entities, resulting in the prevalence of many social programs undertaken by different players, the works of which are often similar and thus overlap. Besides, the prevalence of informal sources of social assistance makes coordination even harder. Thus, better coordination of social programs is bound to yield efficiency and thus better results, be it in terms of wider beneficiary-base, more focused programs, or broader geographical coverage. Besides, developing a national assistance formula would allow for precise identification of informal assistance providers, and thus unify the beneficiary base according to clear and common eligibility criteria. It would also facilitate exchange of expertise and best practices among social services providers.

As most of the participants in the focus groups pointed to, there is a problem of trust between the central government and the population. The roots of this problem are historical and relate to the laissez-faire of the state, especially in the social field. A second reason that was apparent from the field survey was the detrimental impact of the state capture by local politicians. State institutions, such as the Council of the South, were perceived as a partisan institution by the population. Similarly, part of the aid distributed by the government was 'repackaged' politically, with the credit going to political parties. As such, a crucial long-term aim is to foster trust between the state and the population and to strengthen the citizen relation to the state. This can be done through an improvement of the social role of the state and a strengthening of the administration and state institutions to avoid fragmentation and capture.


## IV.2 Relief Activities

### IV.2.1 Overview of relief activities during the war

Many social programs were suddenly halted in July 2006 due to the break of the war; they were replaced by other emergency programs. The immediate repercussions of the war necessitated that a change in priorities, interests and scope of activities of many organisations takes place. This section looks at relief efforts of various local and international, governmental and non-governmental players, showing contributors, beneficiaries, and geographical coverage<sup>23</sup>.

The challenges of the massive internal displacement, duration and density of military actions, and the prolonged embargo caused by the July war were met by several immediate relief interventions undertaken by various governmental and non-governmental players. In fact, the civil society played a significant role during the war, providing immediate support to those in need. These interventions aimed at reducing the ramifications of humanitarian conditions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and lessening the factors that could inflate their crisis situation. The major modes of contribution, partnerships between the different involved players, beneficiary vulnerable groups and the geographical coverage of relief works are listed in the diagram below.

**Figure 1: General structure of relief activities**



Distribution of aids took place along several modes/channels depending on the nature of donor agencies and the intermediary entities that delivered these donations to IDPs and affected social groups. These modes of aid distribution ensured an acceptable reach of aids to IDPs. The following diagrams show the mode of aid distribution of Higher Relief Commission (HRC), political parties and international organisations.

<sup>23</sup> For more details, please refer to Annex 6: Relief and Recovery Activities During and After the July 2006 War

Figure 2: Actual HRC's mode of aid distribution<sup>24</sup>




Figure 3: Political parties' mode of aid distribution





Figure 4: International organisations' mode of aid distribution



<sup>24</sup> This diagram illustrates HRC's **effective** mode of aid distribution. As per a phone interview with the Higher Relief Commission, during the war HRC distributed aid in two stages to eventually address IDPs. Stage one addressed State Commissioners and Governors, who in turn had the freedom to distribute the received aid to civil society organisations, municipalities, and NGOs that are closely-related to, or one wing of, political parties. In the second stage, HRC provided aid to 1,250 municipalities.

Not only were pre-war activities of various entities replaced by emergency programs to respond to the advent of the war, but also new organisations were established. All participating players faced serious difficulties, such as lack of resources, lack of sleeping space, low hygiene levels, lack of gas, lack of water, and insufficient kitchen equipment. Despite these various challenges and limited relief experience of some entities, interventions were relatively successful owing to particular strengths of participating bodies. For example, international organisations attempted to organise convoys to the South and local NGOs enjoyed a large volunteer base that facilitated administrative and logistical activities. In order to achieve better levels of efficiency and in order to fill the gap left by the government (i.e. HRC, which was not able to address all arising needs), some participating relief agencies cooperated among each other. This measure aimed at ensuring wider coverage and avoiding duplication of work.

In this respect, it is necessary that Lebanon develops a detailed emergency plan to be used in times of war and emergencies. The plan is to list available potential stakeholders (governmental and non-governmental), identify the role and scope of work of each, and determine the inter-connection among the set players. This plan would not only allow prompt responsiveness, targeted interventions and broader coverage in case of emergencies, but also avoid duplication of work.

#### **IV.2.2 Evaluation of relief activities**


In terms of Most of the respondents evaluated positively the immediate relief interventions during the war. The in-kind aid and support provided to the displaced were thought to be satisfactory. As for the relief interventions following the war, they were considered to be less than acceptable, especially due to the absence of any government interventions. The organisations that were most often mentioned as having intervened immediately following the war were: the Hezbollah, various NGOs, the municipalities and other political parties. Nevertheless, the participants raised some critiques regarding these organisations' interventions, namely their limited scope and time-span. Some of the participants, mostly among the vulnerable groups, also complained about the selectivity in the distribution of aid, especially with the prominent role played by the political parties.

## IV.3 Recovery

### IV.3.1 Overview of post-war recovery activities

At the end of the war and with the ceasefire on August 14, 2006 some organisations that participated in relief activities developed recovery programs. Their interventions focused on supporting the return of IDPs to their hometowns. Part of the relief programs conducted during the war continued for some time after the end of war, especially in regard to food and health services provision, as well as shelter equipment. However, the large scale of war inflicted destruction necessitated rapid rubble removal and reconstruction works, in addition to the treatment of oil-spill pollution, de-mining and removal of UXOs. Such works are important prerequisites for the long-term recovery actions, especially those pertaining to reconstruction works and livelihood recovery projects. This section presents an overview of targeted beneficiaries, geographical locations, and types of interventions that occurred during the early phase of recovery; the loopholes and challenges faced in operating these projects are also presented. The diagram below presents the general thematic structure of the section.

**Figure 5: General structure of the section**



WFP conducted a rapid food security assessment in late August and early September and released its report on September 15, 2006. The assessment report confirmed that although over 90% of the displaced returned to their hometowns back then and a substantial part of the population is expected to remain in need of humanitarian

assistance in the short run as many people have lost their homes and livelihoods. Recovery requirements extend beyond the return of the displaced because whole communities have been affected. It is however expected that Lebanon will soon be food secure again, as its commercial sector is improving quickly. However, there is a need of developing sanitary programs in recovering areas. The joint efforts in massive demining programs and awareness sessions on the dangers of UXOs will help in reducing risks for farmers and citizens of the South in general, as well as help them recover their livelihoods in a faster manner.

The recovery and reconstruction process is a window of opportunity to repair municipal structures for local service delivery and improve schemes among local NGOs, public institutions and International organisations for future projects. However, community-based discussions were put on hold due to the current political crisis Lebanon has been facing.

As for psycho-social support activities, children will benefit in overcoming the traumatic experiences they had. Artistic animation is helping them use their imagination and thus diverting from their daily environment and destabilisation caused by their displacement. Children interact with each other and become more responsive.

Recovery works however are facing several problems related to the pace of paying indemnities, slow recovery of municipal capacities, and pending maintenance of public services networks and infrastructures. At the organisational level, political rivalry between governmental actors and political NGOs and the overlap of activities are putting major obstacles for recovery works.

### **IV.3.2 Evaluation of recovery activities**

Most of the participants judged positively the first interventions aiming at recovery. They gave two reasons for their success. The first was the pressing needs for interventions in most domains, making any interventions successful. The second was the positive evaluation of the organisations implementing the interventions. Private sector organisations, NGOs, political parties and foreign donors were deemed to be more professional and less corrupt than the government, leading to a better implementation of the interventions.

Even though the participants did not mention failed interventions, they raised some critiques regarding the existing interventions. The first critique was an almost unanimous condemnation of the central government, accused of having neglected its responsibilities regarding the population. The second set of critiques were addressed to some of the interventions deemed to suffer from a number of defects such as: lack of coordination among organisations, lack of long-term thinking, limited scope, incompleteness of the intervention, and selectivity in the distribution of aid. It is worth mentioning that the vulnerable groups' evaluation of these interventions was consistent in criticising their limited scope and thus their uselessness in effecting real changes in their situations.

## ***IV.4 Proposed Interventions***

The proposed interventions emerged as the conclusion of the evaluation of the war impact and the priority selected by the participants in both focus groups and the interviews with vulnerable groups. The following recommendations are the summaries of the discussions with stakeholders and vulnerable groups.

Two main logics of interventions emerged from these discussions. The first, mostly expressed by the stakeholders, focused on long-term strategies aiming at improving the pre-war situation. Even though concerned with the alleviation of the direct effect of the war, participants in focus groups stressed the importance of interventions that would correct the pre-war neglect of their villages and 'structural' weaknesses of their economies.

The second logic of interventions, expressed by vulnerable groups, was directed at alleviating their current social and economic situation. The acuteness and urgency of their problems do not provide these groups with the luxury of long-term projects, even though they stressed their importance. The two groups emphasised the pre-war roots of most problems faced in the post-war period.

### **IV.4.1 Physical Capital**

Physical capital was selected as a first priority by the stakeholders and a fourth priority by the vulnerable groups. There are three main areas for proposed interventions. The first is the reconstruction of the infrastructure destroyed by the war, with a special focus on the dwellings and enterprises and the element of the physical infrastructure, which has not been rehabilitated until now, such as the telecommunication and roads networks. The second related element is the resolving of the problem of the indemnities.

As for the third area of intervention, it aims at the improvement of the neglected parts of the infrastructure, such as the sewage system and the solid waste collection system. A number of participants focused on the pre-war needs as the central focus of any strategy of intervention. In the rural areas, the problems of sewage system, water networks and agricultural roads were deemed to be essential. In the urban areas surveyed in the Baabda Caza, the legal problem was highlighted as a main issue for future interventions.

### **IV.4.2 Human Capital – Economic Activity**

The economic activity was selected as the second priority by stakeholders and the first by vulnerable groups. The importance of this issue is compounded by the current economic crisis and the increase in the unemployment rate. The first set of proposals made in this respect is the creation of employment opportunities, through the improvement of the performance of the local economies.

The second set of proposals focuses on the modernisation of the agriculture sector, the main sector for most surveyed villages. The participants proposed the provision of loans, technical know-how, support in the development of an agro-industrial sector, and help in marketing agricultural products.

### **IV.4.3 Financial Capital**

The third area of concern was financial capital, selected as the third priority by stakeholders and the second by vulnerable groups. Two main proposals were made regarding the improvement of financial capital. The first is the provision of subsidised loans and micro-credit to finance economic activities, and especially the agriculture sector. In addition, financing for productive investment is to be encouraged.

The second main proposal, voiced mainly by vulnerable groups, is the provision of in-kind and in-cash aid, as a means to alleviate the current social and economic crisis. Moreover, proposals for a fixed wages to poor families were made.

### **IV.4.4 Human Capital – Health**

The health component was also selected as an area for future investment; it ranked fourth by stakeholders and third by vulnerable groups. In this respect, the provision of health services, improvement of equipment in existing health services, and the provision of specialised services were proposed as possible areas for intervention. Vulnerable groups focused more on the costs of health services, proposing the provision of free services and/or the government taking charge of persons with special needs.

One problem mentioned by the participants was the issue of UXOs. This problem was mostly approached from its economic dimension, being a major source of unemployment. Some participants predicted deterioration in the health situation if this problem was not resolved.

### **IV.4.5 Intervening Organisations**

Participants could not reach a consensus as to which organisations should intervene. Even though, there is a unanimous condemnation of the central government and public institutions, there was not a consensus on which organisations should replace them. Lack of trust in the central government's capacity and willingness led a number of participants to prefer the interventions of political parties, NGOs and donor organisations. Nevertheless, for other participants, the state had to be in charge of the interventions, despite its past experiences.