

# DIALOGUE AND LOCAL RESPONSE MECHANISMS TO CONFLICT BETWEEN HOST COMMUNITIES AND SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

SOUTH LEBANON AND TRIPOLI

**CONFLICT SCAN**  
(NOVEMBER 2013 - JANUARY 2014)

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Published in May 2014

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
تتخذ هذه المطبوعة بدعم من الاتحاد الأوروبي. إن **Search for Common Ground** هو المسؤول الوحيد عن محتويات هذه المطبوعة التي لا يمكن بأي حال أن تعكس وجهات نظر الاتحاد الأوروبي.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

CSO	CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION
DPNA	DEVELOPMENT FOR PEOPLE AND NATURE ASSOCIATION
GoL	GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON
INGO	INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
NGO	NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
SFCG	SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND
UNHCR	UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
UNICEF	UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN EMERGENCY FUND



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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Search for Common Ground is pleased to express its gratitude to all those who contributed to the production of this report, including SCFG's coordinators who were tasked with research design and field coordination; UTOPIA and DPNA's staff members, for their extensive contribution in conducting field research and facilitating focus groups. The success of this report could not have been accomplished without the following contributors:

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Search for Common Ground would also like to acknowledge the hospitality of Lebanon in receiving and hosting Syrian refugees. In fact Lebanon is the only country that has never closed its borders to the influx of refugees, despite the challenges and difficulties that this entails.

<sup>1</sup> See annex 6 for biography.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Lebanon and Syria share particularly intricate and complex historical ties that span the social, economic, and political spheres. Such complexity is all the more evident when one country falls into a protracted conflict. Almost immediately the effects are felt across the border, as was the case during the 2006 Lebanon War, when hundreds of thousands of Lebanese crossed the border into Syria seeking refuge from Israeli bombardments. During the current conflict in Syria, Lebanon has borne the brunt of a severe refugee crisis, in addition to a continuing deterioration of political, economic, and security conditions. These circumstances, coupled with heightened tensions surrounding the involvement of Lebanese factions in the Syrian conflict, have arguably led to a new phase of Lebanese-Syrian relations.

As the conflict in Syria rages and takes on new dimensions, the number of Syrian refugees flowing into Lebanon continues to rise.

### Syrian refugee population in Lebanon

A country of around 4.2 million people, Lebanon has received more than one million Syrian refugees since the beginning of the crisis (in addition to the existing 455,000 Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA, with many living in camps). This represents around 25% of the total pre-crisis Lebanese.

UNHCR data indicates that Syrian refugees are now present in more than 1,738 localities. In over 133 locations, Syrian refugees already account for more than 30% of the overall population.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the lack of a clear, official government policy on how to deal with the influx has resulted in the haphazard and dispersed settlement of Syrian refugees. Meanwhile, humanitarian coordination efforts led by the Government of Lebanon (GoL), UNHCR, and its partners face dwindling resources

overstretched capacities. In search of affordable accommodation and livelihoods, many Syrian refugees opt to settle in low-income communities. However, their prolonged presence, compounded by severe resource constraints, has generated substantial refugee-host community tensions. Memories of the not-so-distant Syrian military presence in Lebanon coupled with on-going sectarian divides that mirror those in Syria exacerbate these tensions, which at times manifest themselves in violent incidents.

Although Syria has always been “close,” both geographically and socially, the sheer scale of Syrians in Lebanon’s main cities, towns, and rural villages is a relatively new phenomenon that has taken many Lebanese by surprise. Syrian license plates are abundant on the roads, Syrian families occupy vacant apartments, and the Syrian accent is heard more frequently than ever before. This level of proximity and interaction between the two nationalities has opened the door to various social phenomena that range from curiosity and apprehension to resentment and violent conflict. Suppressed disputes, stereotypes, and cultural differences are emerging with time. But so too is the realisation that Lebanese and Syrians share many similar customs, traditions, and values. While the necessary humanitarian response and sympathy of host communities has played a crucial role in providing sustenance and livelihoods to Syrian refugees, over time deteriorating economic and security conditions have given rise to bitter sentiments and, in some cases, outright hostility.

In response to the rising levels of tensions, SFCG conducted a conflict scan of 11 host communities in rural South Lebanon as well as the city of Tripoli and its environs.<sup>3</sup> These communities were selected from the localities at the highest risk of tension and conflict throughout the country.


<sup>2</sup> World Bank, *Lebanon - Economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian conflict*, September 2013

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18292074/lebanon-economic-social-impact-assessment-syrian-conflict>

<sup>3</sup> Please note that in this report “the South” refers to the 6 targeted communities covered by the conflict scan, while “Tripoli” refers to the 5 targeted neighborhoods of Tripoli and Mina.



Target communities in Tripoli



Target communities in South Lebanon

The purpose of the scan was to identify the prominent layers and dynamics of local conflict and cooperation between Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees in these communities, in addition to identifying trustworthy leaders and agents of change. The scan focused on the root causes of inter-communal tensions, perceptions, and relations. The mapping activities of this report consist of a survey with 900 respondents (50% Syrians and 50% Lebanese) across all target communities as well as a total of 40 qualitative focus groups and 41 interviews with key local informants from the 11 target communities.

While assessing various conflict and peace drivers, the conflict scan observed multiple interwoven issues that constitute the main sources of division between Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees. Principal among these are the economic pressures on local economies, in addition to the strain on public services and a perceived lack of access to and shortages in housing. The increase in local labour supply that the waves of Syrian refugees sparked has led to a downward pressure on wages and resentment among multiple segments of Lebanese working class. According to an ILO assessment conducted in 2013, the average income of Syrian refugees is significantly lower than the minimum wage in Lebanon of LBP 675,000 and less than the 2007 poverty line of USD 4.00 (LBP 6,000) per person per day.<sup>4 5</sup>

At the same time, Syrians feel economically exploited, as rent prices continue to rise<sup>6</sup> and the ability to secure a job becomes more difficult. Conflict over humanitarian aid targeting Syrians only increases as economic conditions worsen. The results of this report indicate that Lebanese suffering economic hardships due to the crisis have become increasingly unsympathetic towards the Syrian newcomers and perceive humanitarian aid targeting only Syrians as discriminatory and unjust.

### Economic impact

Poverty incidence among Lebanese has risen to 53% in the North, 42% in the South and 30% in Beqaa, compared with the national poverty rate of 28%. The sudden increase in the labour supply and the availability of cheap Syrian labour explains the decline in wages and the strain on jobs, which is translated into more limited job opportunities for Lebanese nationals.

#### INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION: REGIONAL OFFICE FOR THE ARAB STATES, ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON AND THEIR EMPLOYMENT PROFILE, 2013

Difficult economic conditions manifest themselves in local resentment as well as discriminatory practices and restriction of movement, whereby Lebanese, feeling the brunt of the refugee crisis, enacted curfews aimed at endowing them with a perceived state of power and normalcy.<sup>7</sup> Old grudges dating back to the period of Syria's military presence in Lebanon have also resurfaced. The old distrustful image, which was briefly ameliorated following the massive demonstrations in Syria, seems to persist. As a result, Syrian refugees and labourers are instinctively blamed for crime, sexual harassment, and security incidents. The hostility and discrimination of Lebanese residents towards Syrians was found to be prevalent regardless of geographic location, political allegiances, or sectarian identity.

Conscious of the Lebanese attitudes and their status as refugees, Syrians rarely voice negative feelings towards their Lebanese counterparts. In line with shared cultural traditions, Syrians overwhelmingly perceive themselves as 'guests'. In traditional Levantine hospitality, hosts must fulfil their obligation to be generous while guests should be modest and polite; guests are not entitled to protest but rather to receive without demands.

This report's findings show that the greatest risk of violent conflict between Syrian refugees and Lebanese

<sup>4</sup> International Labour Organisation: Regional Office for the Arab States, Assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their employment profile, 2013 [http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms\\_240134.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_240134.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> According to ILO the average monthly income for a male Syrian refugee worker is 432,000 LBP (US\$287) and 248,000 LBP (US\$165) for a female Syrian refugee worker. [http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS\\_240126/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_240126/lang--en/index.htm)

<sup>6</sup> According to UNHCR estimates the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has led to increasing rent prices (44% increase in rental prices between June 2012 – June 2013), which affects Lebanese as well as Syrians. UNHCR, Meeting on vulnerable municipalities, 26 July 2013 <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=2490>

Due to the protracted nature of the crisis, the Lebanese seem weary and tired of playing the role of the host. The dynamics and ramifications of this new relationship are playing themselves out throughout the neighbourhoods of urban centres as well as the rural villages and towns hosting Syrian refugees. Due to these sensitivities, the majority of Syrians and Lebanese attested that they prefer to reside in separate neighbourhoods, reflecting tensions between the two nationalities.

residents stems from the lack of employment opportunities. Yet results indicate that political allegiances also have the potential to result in bloody conflict and act as a trigger once tensions have escalated. Moreover, the motivations for violence and perceptions of safety differ between the South and Tripoli, mainly because perceptions of safety have deteriorated in Tripoli, while security in the South was viewed as relatively stable.

In terms of peace drivers, local institutions, conflict resolution mechanisms<sup>8</sup>, as well as political parties are seen to be more effective in addressing conflicts in the South than in Tripoli. The main reason for this difference is that the political framework in the South is more resilient than in Tripoli. Political forces and their associated local institutions in the South can enforce security measures and law enforcement that assert control over the population far better than Tripoli. That said, no matter how great is the influence of local actors, wider structural conditions remain ripe for the spread of conflict even in the South.

Perceptions of local institutions also differ in the South and Tripoli. Survey results indicate that Syrians and Lebanese in the South look more favourably upon the role that municipalities play in handling conflicts. At the same time, results indicate a correlation whereby when there is a favourable perception of municipalities then individuals tend also to resort to mediation to resolve inter-group disputes.

Attitudes towards the use of violence also differ between Syrians and Lebanese. The Lebanese showed a higher propensity towards physical confrontation than Syrians who were more conciliatory.

Meanwhile, the conflict scan discovered a general trend whereby unemployment was considered the major cause of violent incidents. Among Lebanese, political affiliation was thought to be a main trigger of violent conflicts while Syrians were less assertive about the topic.

### SUMMARY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

#### 1. IMPLEMENT ECONOMIC AND POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMS TARGETING SYRIANS AND LEBANESE IN HOST COMMUNITIES

To adequately respond to the various issues and challenges in communities hosting Syrian refugees, it is incumbent that an official comprehensive policy to empower host and refugee communities be drafted by the government and international organizations.

Feelings of frustration rooted in the economic consequences of the Syrian refugee influx among the Lebanese host communities are founded upon increased competition for jobs, lower average wage levels (especially in low-income segments), as well as the perceived impact on the Lebanese of rising rental prices and shortages in housing. Syrians confirm that economic issues form the basis of discrimination and animosity that manifests in violent conflict, which then take on political and sectarian dimensions.

<sup>7</sup> Curfews are not in place in the 5 communities targeted by this project in Tripoli. In the South 4 communities have formal curfews enforced by the municipality or political parties, while in Sarafand and Bourj El Chamali, individuals have mentioned restrictions of movement for Syrians but SFCG has been unable to confirm with the local authorities who are responsible for such measures.

<sup>8</sup> Such as seeking legal advice or resorting to mediation.

### The aid community should be attentive to the regional political differences between the South and Tripoli.

In the South, constant coordination with municipalities and political parties is essential to project success because of the faith that communities have in local institutions and political actors. In Tripoli, where there is a lack of confidence in local authorities, short-term humanitarian and development interventions should be directed through local trusted civil society organizations that have the residents' support and respect. However, this strategy should be complemented with the involvement of local authorities such as municipalities in order to empower them to better cope with the influx of refugees and eventually play an active role in addressing conflicts within the communities they serve. Over the medium-to-long term, support should also be provided to municipalities in order to strengthen their role in conflict mitigation and resolution.

Economic interventions should be complemented with regulation of Syrian labour in a manner that protects their rights as workers, specifically in terms of safety and fulfilment of employers' obligations. Accordingly, Syrians should also be aided in forming credible representative collective bargaining bodies that can lobby for their rights and interests as workers and human beings.

## 2. INVEST IN LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES AND INSTITUTIONS

Results of the conflict scan indicate that stronger local institutions in the South have a positive effect on conflict mitigation. The study observed a correlation between collaborative methods of conflict resolution and stronger local institutions. According to the data, people who experienced a stronger role for municipalities in addressing conflicts tended in parallel to use more collaborative methods in addressing conflicts. Furthermore, perceptions of safety come hand-in-hand with perceptions of a strong municipal role. The fact that none of the respondents in Tripoli and its surroundings said that the municipality is playing a prominent role in addressing conflicts is a case in point.

The presence of refugees in most localities across the country requires an integrated official response plan that targets the local authorities such as municipalities, union of municipalities as well as *Muhafazat* Councils (Regional Councils), which are appointed by the central government and are responsible for the implementation of the central government's decisions and decrees. Special attention to local institutions could prove effective in mitigating rising conflicts and humanitarian needs.

Humanitarian actors also need to devise a general plan that targets institutions of local governance by assisting



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municipalities to take a leading role in conflict mitigation, economic development as well as local security and safety. Assisting municipalities to deal with the flow of refugees should be mainstreamed into various programming activities. Accordingly, municipalities should be encouraged to take a stronger role in serving the Syrian refugee community, allocating resources, and devising plans to deal with expected future arrivals of Syrian refugees.

## 3. EMPOWER NASCENT SYRIAN ENGAGEMENT AS WELL AS PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL AFFAIRS AND INSTITUTIONS

Syrian refugees should be encouraged to participate in meetings with local municipalities and organizations and to take initiative within their communities. The lack of Syrian representation and or strong community leadership complicates aid disbursement, conflicts with locals, and perceptions of safety and security. Opening up local institutions to Syrian participation and encouraging them to take part in local development efforts can encourage mutual dialogue between the Lebanese and the Syrians and help in resolving conflicts over resources and services.

## 4. CONDUCT COMMUNITY-BASED CAMPAIGNS TO PROMOTE SOCIAL INCLUSION OF SYRIAN REFUGEES

The Lebanese harbour discriminatory notions towards Syrians, which is fuelling Syrian resentment. Investment in local campaigns, videos, and national broadcasts tackling stereotypes could prove useful to diffuse tensions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese residents. Such projects could also be successful in breaking discriminatory barriers, assumptions, and common prejudices.

Results indicate that what Lebanese perceive as the root causes of the conflict are generally not actually experienced. Rather, these perceptions are the result of rumours spread by word of mouth or through the media. As such, campaigns should frame the difficulties faced by local communities as a common problem in the public arena, as well as include Syrian perspectives in resolving the issues at hand.

Such tools could be effective against the blaming of Syrian refugees who commonly experience discrimination by Lebanese who widely perceive them as manual workers and/or as poor, uneducated, and unhygienic.

## BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

As the Syrian civil war continues into its fourth year, Lebanon's fragile political system is struggling to achieve cohesion and stability. In the absence of a functional government and legislature, Lebanon has had to absorb record high refugee influxes over the course of 2012 and 2013. According to May 2014 figures, there are more than 1,024,887 registered refugees in Lebanon.<sup>9</sup> If we consider those who have not registered or who are awaiting registration, the number is likely to be much higher.

This, however, is not merely a humanitarian crisis of magnanimous proportions, but a deep political one that could send Lebanon into protracted civil strife. The Lebanese government's official position with respect to the Syrian crisis has so far been defined by former Prime Minister's Najib Mikati's policy of "dissociation," which calls for Lebanese political parties to disengage from the war in Syria.<sup>10</sup> However, this policy failed to limit the involvement of Lebanese political parties in the Syrian war.

From a socioeconomic perspective, the Syrian crisis has also had widespread effects on Lebanon. According to World Bank estimates, the effects of the Syrian refugee crisis will push another 170,000 Lebanese into poverty while doubling unemployment rate to above 20% from 2012 to 2014.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, Lebanese GDP growth is estimated to contract by 2.9% over the same period, costing Lebanon billions of dollars in lost economic activity.<sup>12</sup> Refugees have already placed a relatively large burden on the country's finances due to increased demand for public services, housing, health care, and employment opportunities.<sup>13</sup> An estimated \$USD2.5 billion is required in order to restore the quality of public services to their pre-crisis levels.<sup>14</sup>

Tensions between Lebanese and Syrians go back more than three decades, since the start of the Syrian presence in Lebanon in 1976. After that, Syria proceeded to consolidate its grip on Lebanon's political system despite resistance by many political



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<sup>9</sup> UNHCR (2014) Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal. Available online at: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122>; accessed 27 May 2014

<sup>10</sup> The Daily Star, 29 September 2012. Available at:

<http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Sep-29/189558-leaders-maintain-dissociation-policy-but-urge-aid-to-refugees.ashx>

<sup>11</sup> The World Bank: Lebanon Bears the Brunt of the Economic and Social Spillovers of the Syrian Conflict. 24 September 2013. Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/09/24/lebanon-bears-the-brunt-of-the-economic-and-social-spillovers-of-the-syrian-conflict>

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> World Bank, Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict, page 1, September 2013. Available at: <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/SyriaResponse/Lebanon%20Economic%20and%20Social%20Impact%20Assessment%20of%20the%20Syrian%20Conflict.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

and popular elements of Lebanese society. A popular uproar following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri resulted in the end of Syria's military presence in Lebanon in 2005. However, the Syrian government still has significant influence over many political segments of Lebanon.

Over the years, many Syrian workers from rural villages have come to Lebanese coastal towns and cities to find work. This phenomenon has resulted in stereotypes of Syrians as either military officers or as menial workers with low social standing.<sup>15</sup>

Residents of Tripoli have an especially dark history with regard to the Syrian government. When Syrian troops entered Tripoli in the 1980s, the city rose up against them and was eventually put down. At the time, the Syrian government empowered minority Alawites in the Jabal Mohsen district of the city to overpower the Sunni majority, sowing resentment between the two sects. In the South of Lebanon, there has been a consolidation of power among two major political actors, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement (Amal). Both Hezbollah and Amal have close ties with the Syrian government, and many Hezbollah supporters have gone to Syria to aid the government in their fight against the Syrian opposition.

Lebanon's divided political system has a tendency to reproduce regional conflicts in sectarian garbs, and the conflict in Syria is by no means an exception. Syrian refugees arriving in Lebanese host communities of Tripoli and the South find themselves immersed in the Lebanese political divisions where they must tread carefully. The Syrian refugee crisis inserts yet another element in an already volatile political and cultural context. Thus, there is a great need for an integrated, comprehensive approach to deal with the various economic, cultural, and political factors that manifest themselves differently in each local context.

Local and international agencies have conducted numerous studies assessing the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on Lebanon. Assessments focus on different aspects of the crisis, including economic instability, human rights abuses, health concerns, gender-related issues, and a rise in conflicts between refugees and Lebanon's host communities.

In 2013, at the request of the Government of Lebanon, the World Bank, in collaboration with the UN, the EU and the INF, undertook the most comprehensive study available on the economic and social impacts of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon from 2012 to 2014. By the close of 2013, the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon was estimated at 1.3 million.<sup>16</sup> While the initial spillover effects were primarily humanitarian in nature, the escalation of the Syrian conflict has contributed to economic and social decline in Lebanon. Lebanon's GDP is declining by almost 3 percent annually, "entailing large losses in terms of wages, profits, taxes, or private consumption and investment."<sup>17</sup> As a result of the large influx of refugees, government expenditures have increased by over one billion USD, poverty rates have climbed, and the quality of public service delivery has declined substantially. Furthermore, spillover effects from the Syrian crisis exacerbate existing strains on Lebanon's labor market. According to the World Bank, the influx of Syrian refugees is expected to "increase the labor supply by between 30 and 50 percent – with the largest impacts on women, youth, and unskilled workers."<sup>18</sup> Lebanon's youth unemployment rate is expected to double during the assessment period. Finally, Lebanon's infrastructure, under strain prior to the Syrian crisis, is ill-equipped to sustain the influx of refugees.

In addition to the economic impact of the refugee crisis, Lebanon's health and education systems are struggling to absorb the increase in demand for services. Overcrowding, lack of clean water and

<sup>15</sup> Lebanese are fond of telling jokes about Syria's perceived under-development compared to what they perceive as Lebanese 'sophistication' and 'progress'.

<sup>16</sup> World Bank. Lebanon - Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict. September 2013, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18292074/lebanon-economic-social-impact-assessment-syrian-conflict>

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

proper sanitation pose health risks to Lebanese and Syrians alike. Lebanon has witnessed a rise in communicable and infectious diseases since the start of the Syrian conflict. Demand for health services has skyrocketed. For example, in December 2012 alone, “40 percent of primary health care visits were for Syrian refugees.”<sup>19</sup> Hospitals are overcrowded and Lebanon faces a shortage of health care specialists to accommodate demand. Additionally, the increased number of Syrian children refugees has placed enormous strains on Lebanon’s education sector and contributed to the decline in quality and provision of public education.

Lebanon has seen a rise in human rights abuses stemming from the Syrian refugee crisis. In September 2013, Association Libanese pour l’Education and la Formation mapped the rising tensions between refugees and host communities in Nabatieh, Jezzine, Shouf, Tyre, Saida, Metn, and Wadi Khaled.<sup>20</sup> According to the assessment, there is a tendency for personal conflicts between Syrians and Lebanese, (including conflicts between landlords and tenants and between employers and employees) to escalate into more widespread confrontations. This trend is notable particularly in areas with a strong presence of political parties, where conflicts can escalate into supporters vs. opponents of the Syrian regime.<sup>21</sup>

Lebanon has witnessed rising levels of violence and resentment against refugees within Lebanese host communities. Also noted was the increased vulnerability of women and girls to forced early marriages and gender-based violence. Finally, the imposition of illegal curfews for refugees in some areas represents violations of human dignity.<sup>22</sup>

Lastly, the influx of Syrian refugees has created, and in some places exacerbated existing inter-group tensions. World Vision’s July 2013 assessment of inter-group relations demonstrated that there is a widespread perception amongst Lebanese communities that Syrians are benefitting disproportionately from the national and international response to the Syrian conflict.<sup>23</sup> Lebanese communities have “hardened against them [Syrian refugees] as prolonged hardship has spread” to

Lebanese homes.<sup>24</sup>

As a result, there is declining sympathy by Lebanese host communities for Syrian refugees. MercyCorps’ assessment of 1,200 households found that as the Syrian crisis worsens, Lebanese host communities are increasingly blaming Syrian refugees by blaming increased crime rates on newcomers, and are also perpetuating negative stereotypes, which contributes to rising tensions between the two groups.<sup>25</sup> Curfews, community policing, and checkpoint security have diminished socializing between Syrian refugees and Lebanese, and hence social cohesion within Lebanese communities is suffering.<sup>26</sup>

At the same time, a gender analysis of host communities conducted by Amel in August 2013 emphasized that the crisis reinforces conflicts about cultural differences and incompatibilities between the two communities.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> UNDP-CRI, *The Syrian Crisis: Implications for Development Indicators and Development Planning*, October 2013

<sup>21</sup> Alef, *Two years on: Syrian refugees in Lebanon*, August 2013

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> WorldVision, *Under Pressure: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon*, July 2013

<sup>24</sup> MercyCorps, *Things Fall Apart*, April 2013

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Forum ZFD, *Conflict Analysis Lebanon*, December 2013

<sup>27</sup> Amel, *Gender Analysis of Host Communities affected by Syrian Refugee*, August 2013



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## RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY

SFCG’s experience working with refugees around the world has shown that understanding the perceptions of those affected by a refugee crisis – both the refugees and host communities – is a necessary first step in breaking down stereotypes and resentment and filling information gaps that hinder peaceful social coexistence.

This conflict analysis covered 11 locations in Lebanon (five in Tripoli and six in the South) and was designed to accomplish the following objectives:

- Allow SFCG to tailor its interventions to address

specific knowledge and skills gaps as well as to address existing causes of conflict and tension in a manner that is the most relevant to specific local contexts;

- Set a baseline for evaluating the results of interventions in refugee and host communities’ attitudes, rumour-management abilities, and behaviour vis-à-vis each other; and
- Contribute to a comprehensive conflict sensitive strategy among humanitarian actors by sharing this report’s findings with United Nations agencies, relevant Lebanese government institutions, and NGOs working with the targeted communities.

The conflict scan has been developed in a participatory manner with national peacebuilding organisations that have a strong grassroots presence in the targeted communities.<sup>28</sup>

The mapping activities of this report consisted of a survey targeting 900 respondents<sup>29</sup> (50% Syrians and 50% Lebanese)<sup>30</sup> across all target communities, a total of 40 qualitative focus groups<sup>31</sup>, and 41 key informant interviews.<sup>32</sup> Respondents were spread equally across genders.

This conflict scan will be followed by quarterly rapid conflict scans during project implementation in order to monitor the changes in context and the impact of the project itself on the dynamics between Syrians and Lebanese. This approach allows SFCG to have regular access to information from beneficiaries, not only about the rapidly-changing nature of community tensions and dynamics, but also on issues that should be the focus of rumour management and roundtable discussions. Accordingly, this report, coupled with quarterly conflict scans, will also allow SFCG to adjust its project interventions to fit the evolving situation on the ground.<sup>33</sup>



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<sup>28</sup> SFCG Lebanon is implementing this project in partnership with Utopia (<http://utopialeb.wordpress.com/about/>) in Tripoli and the Development for People and Nature Association (DPNA - <http://www.dpna-lb.org/>) in the South.

<sup>29</sup> For a breakdown of the respondents' profiles see Annex 4.

<sup>30</sup> For the sampling statistical methodology, for each targeted community, 50% Lebanese respondents/50% Syrian respondents and 50% men/50% women from each group were targeted. Because most data was collected at the household level, surveys targeted Syria refugees registered, awaiting registration, as well as unregistered refugees. The registration status of refugees was not collected, so this data cannot be separated. That being said, although the data is presented for overall Syrian refugees, we should assume there are differences between these groups.

<sup>31</sup> An average of 4 FGDs was conducted in each community to collect data from Lebanese men, Lebanese women, Syrian men, and Syrian women separately.

<sup>32</sup> SFCG interviewed influential individuals within the 11 target communities, such as municipality representatives, Mukhtars, religious leaders, peacebuilding CSOs and local associations, local humanitarian aid actors, women's representatives, parents, school principals, leaders of the refugee community, and other relevant stakeholders.

<sup>33</sup> In contrast to other assessments and reports carried out in Lebanon, the finding of this study are strictly relevant to the target communities and purposely focus on the dynamics at play at the community level; thus they cannot be generalised as applicable to the rest of the country although similarities will be encountered.

## RESEARCH PURPOSE

1. Understand what different layers/dynamics of conflict/cooperation are prominent in the community and which conflict resolution mechanisms are already in place. If conflict resolution mechanisms exist, this report seeks to find ways to strengthen them and develop inclusive conflict response mechanisms for stakeholders to actively engage and participate in social cohesion projects that aim to mitigate tensions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese in host communities.
2. Identify community leaders who are trustworthy agents of change.
3. Involve the stakeholders in project design in order to ensure objectives are realistic and meet their needs.
4. Set baseline values for all project indicators.

## TARGET GROUPS AND SAMPLING

The selection of sampled communities was based on a study conducted by UNHCR, the GoL and UNICEF to map the most affected and vulnerable communities in Lebanon.<sup>34</sup> Looking at the recurrence of reported discrimination and violence, as well as communities at high risk of violent conflict, further refined the report's findings. Based on this analysis, SFCG, in collaboration with its partners, decided to target 11 communities distributed throughout the Governorates of Tripoli and South Lebanon. The locations under study in this report are detailed in Figure 1. Following the study of these 11 communities, SFCG-Lebanon will implement a pilot project aimed at reinforcing dialogue and conflict response mechanisms while taking community specifics into account.

Figure 1  
Distribution of districts under study by location

Governorate	Districts
Tripoli	Abou Samra
	Bab el Ramel
	Mina
	Qobbeh
South Lebanon	Zahrieh/Tabbaneh
	Bourj Ech Chamali
	Ghaziyeh
	Jezzine
	Kfarsir
	Miyeh w Miyeh
	Sarafand
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11 Districts</b>

## Population profile of the 11 communities

Community	Lebanese population (estimate)	Lebanese population under 4 USD per day	Total of registered refugees as of 30 Jan 2014 (UNHCR)	% of refugees compared to total population in Cadastral zone (based on UNHCR estimates)	Estimated refugee population by local municipality
Abou Samra	4902	2780	14368		NA
Bab El Ramel	57625	32685	1660	6.5%	NA
Mina	9595	5442	2673	18.7%	NA
Qobbe	55817	31659	9946	14.7%	NA
Zahrieh/Tabbaneh	23926	13571	8251		NA
Bourj El Chamali	22311**	8123	2570	10.3%	6000
Ghazieh	13143	5985	4683	26.2%	6000
Jezzine	5280	2405	545	9.3%	2000
Kfarsir	4330	492	637	12.8%	1000
Miyeh w Miyeh	23184*	10558	1965	7.8%	1200
Sarafand	12483	5685	5685	16.1%	4500

\* In addition to 4,500 Palestinian and 1,000 Syrian Palestinian

\*\* In addition to 19,000 Palestinian and 8,600 Syrian Palestinian

<sup>34</sup> UNHCR, Meeting on vulnerable municipalities, 26 July 2013 <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=2490>

## LIMITATIONS

A number of challenges arose during the implementation of the conflict scan. First, SFCG and its partners operated within extreme time constraints as the data collection was completed within one month. This factor limited the possibility of adjustment and fine tuning of the data collection methods. While the survey was tested through a pilot and adjusted accordingly, focus groups and interviews were conducted in a very short period of time.

Therefore, we could only partially assess the effectiveness of the discussion guides which limited our ability to adjust and thus to ensure that the relevant information was collected. Quantitative data showed that data collectors require closer supervision while administering the survey on the ground in order to ensure consistency and soundness of the information collected.

Second, the security situation, especially in Tripoli, caused several delays for the data collection while at the same time influenced respondents' attitudes and answers, which changed depending on the levels of tensions experienced in the city at the time of data collection.

In the target communities of the South, the data collection team faced reluctance from the Lebanese respondents to share their experience and perspectives. Lebanese participants required more intense probing during facilitated sessions. On the other hand, Syrian respondents were not used to expressing their thoughts on such issues and therefore found it difficult to articulate their opinions about the topics covered by the conflict scan.

To overcome such challenges, it is crucial to work with very experienced and conflict/context sensitive data collectors, including facilitators and note takers for focus groups.

Research findings show the need for further research on the role of municipalities in lowering potential violent conflict. In addition, contradictory responses regarding Lebanese and Syrians' need for separation, while confessing weak cultural barriers, shows the need for an anthropological assessment of these communal dynamics. This is something that goes beyond the scope of this study but at the same time it is essential for a clearer understanding of the conflict dynamics.



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## MAIN FINDINGS

The relationship between Syrians and Lebanese cannot simply be summed up by disagreements over job opportunities, rising rental prices, and shortages in housing. Historical animosity between both nationalities runs deep and spans decades, especially with regard to the previous Syrian military presence and its continuing political intervention in Lebanon's affairs. The fact that Lebanese are fighting on opposite sides of the conflict in Syria also plays a key role in fuelling tensions and triggering violence.

That said, results indicate that economic factors, and particularly competition over employment opportunities, are seen as the main sources of division. Economic pressures facing the Lebanese host communities are expressed in resentment towards the international aid community as well as Syrian refugees. Results also indicate that inter-communal tensions are on the rise and the majority of both communities preferring to be separated from one another. Survey responses and focus group results showed differences between the South and Tripoli were mainly a result of stronger law enforcement, political parties, and municipalities in the former. In general, both Syrians and Lebanese felt more secure in the South.

This report also shows that perceptions of safety go hand-in-hand with perceptions of municipal capacity. Strong municipalities are able to relieve Lebanese host communities of feelings of anxiety in dealing with the refugee crisis. Residents who reported that municipalities were playing a positive role in their community also reported using more collaborative conflict resolution methods and mediation. Inter-group perceptions between Syrians and Lebanese are mixed. Data shows that, although both communities would like to live in separate confines, they still have positive experiences and encounters on a daily basis. Cultural barriers between the Syrians and Lebanese groups are not prominent and both share a set of common traits such as language, religion, and cuisine. Thus, there is space to implement a

set of conflict mitigation policies in order to diffuse inter-group tensions.

Finally, the conflict scan found that a propensity to engage in violence exists and tensions are growing. Lebanese have a higher propensity to resort to violence while Syrians are more conciliatory, but a propensity to violence still exists. The imposition of unofficial curfews on Syrian refugees in Lebanese host communities is becoming common practice.

These curfews cause feelings of seclusion among Syrian refugees who feel intimidated by them. At the same time, results indicate that Syrians react passively to such practices because they see their situation as refugees to be a temporary one.

However, as the political situation becomes more complicated, it is expected that inter-communal tensions between Lebanese and Syrians will rise.

## ECONOMIC PRESSURE AND INSECURITY

**The lack of employment opportunities, general poverty as well as access to affordable housing and services are deemed to be the main sources of division between Syrians and Lebanese.**

Data overwhelmingly indicates that both Syrians and Lebanese perceive unemployment, access to affordable housing as well as pressure on communal resources and services to constitute the main drivers of division between Lebanese and Syrians. According to a Lebanese resident from Kfarsir, South Lebanon, “The main conflict in our region is due to refugees; they are increasing daily, constituting a burden on us. They are taking our jobs because they can afford to work for less.”<sup>35</sup>

According to Figure 2, a total of 47% of Syrians and 71% of Lebanese indicated that the lack of employment opportunities is the most divisive factor impeding coexistence in host communities. Access to and shortages in living spaces come second with 40% and 29% of Lebanese and Syrians, respectively, citing this reason as the main driver of division.

Focus groups conducted with Syrians and Lebanese in Abou Samra, Qobbeh, and Tabbeneh, as well as other poor neighbourhoods in Tripoli, confirm the above results. In particular, both Syrians and Lebanese respondents continuously mention the perception that Syrians take ‘Lebanese’ jobs and increase rental prices as a source of division. According to a Lebanese male from Tripoli, “The rent is so expensive, \$500 a month. That’s taking advantage of us. [Syrians] kick Lebanese out of their homes, because Syrians can afford to pay more when there is more than one family renting.”<sup>36</sup>

Economic pressures have become a significant burden on Lebanese host communities. In the absence of a political solution in Syria, the Lebanese seem weary of their ability to cater to the number of refugees arriving from Syria. According to a Lebanese resident from Zahrieh, “We are available to provide help, but the problem is that we are suffering too, and we are also in need of help.”<sup>37</sup>



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
<sup>35</sup> FG, Lebanese males, Kfarsir, Dec. 2013.

<sup>36</sup> FG, Lebanese males, Bab Al Ramel, Dec. 2013.

<sup>37</sup> FG, Lebanese males, Zahrieh, Dec. 2013.

Figure 2

“What are the main issues that cause divisions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese citizens in your area?”



Controlling for perceptions, the conflict scan found that Lebanese tend to exaggerate the extent of economic hardships they experienced. **Almost none of the 40% of Lebanese respondents who claim that access to and shortages in housing is one of the main causes of divisions between Lebanese and Syrians actually report having personally experienced such an issue.** By contrast, 31% of Syrians say they experienced high rental prices.

Focus groups sessions confirm the quantitative results with regard to this divide between perception and personal experience. When Lebanese survey respondents were probed, they insisted that Syrians were driving up housing prices.

In fact, some Lebanese respondents in the South even attested to benefiting from the refugee influx by being able to rent their previously unoccupied houses.

Lebanese perceive the distribution of assistance such as rent, food, and school tuition fees solely to Syrians as an injustice. Lebanese host communities, particularly low-income groups, harbour feelings of inequity because Syrians receive aid from international and local organisations.<sup>38</sup> When probed, Lebanese admit they feel resentment towards aid agencies, and as a result, Syrian aid recipients. This sentiment was also identified as a driver of tension between Lebanese and Syrians.

<sup>38</sup> Christophersen, Mona & Thorleifsson, Catherine (2013) Lebanese Contradictory Responses to Syrian Refugees Include Stress, Hospitality, Resentment. Available at: [http://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/policy\\_memo/20130705ifi\\_memo\\_Fafo\\_IFI\\_Policy\\_brief\\_Syrians\\_in\\_Lebanon.pdf](http://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/policy_memo/20130705ifi_memo_Fafo_IFI_Policy_brief_Syrians_in_Lebanon.pdf)

The Lebanese were also prone to exaggerating the levels of assistance offered to Syrian refugees. A widespread belief among Lebanese is that all Syrians benefit from cash for rent or unconditional cash or in-kind assistance, while host communities are left aside by the international community. According to a woman from Ghaziyeh, “My neighbour buys gold and clothes while I am unable to do so. [Syrians] get aid in the form of food and even housing, which is free! [Syrians] have a life of luxury in Lebanon.”<sup>39</sup>

During qualitative focus group sessions, the majority of Syrians said they were aware of the aid discrimination issue and expressed their desire that assistance be granted to Lebanese as well. According to a Syrian male refugee in Sarafand, “Emergency and relief support that comes to Syrian refugees causes some problems since it ignores poor Lebanese families.”<sup>40</sup>

**Neither political allegiances nor the sectarian identity of either Syrians or Lebanese are predominate sources of division or subsequent conflict. Nonetheless, both remain greatly divisive factors when conflict occurs.** A total of 17% of Lebanese and 9% of Syrians cited the political allegiances of the other as a major source of division. During qualitative focus group sessions, several Lebanese and Syrians described political and sectarian factors as the main issue that exacerbates conflict once it occurs.

In the Southern districts of Kfarsir, Sarafand, Bourj Ech Chamali, and Ghaziyeh, Lebanese residents regarded political differences as a source of anxiety, adding to their existing frustration over the lack of employment opportunities and perceived impact of increased housing prices on the Lebanese communities. In predominately Sunni Tripoli, political issues were less pronounced, with economic sources of division presenting the most potential for conflict. Both Lebanese and Syrians cite the lack of job opportunities in host communities as having the highest potential to spur bloody conflict, especially among the Lebanese. According to a Syrian female participant in Tripoli, “Lebanese think we took their rights and jobs. They

say we are coming here to divide them. They don’t understand that we’ve left a war, that we left a fortune at home and we don’t want to be here, but we have no choice.”<sup>41</sup>


### SYRIAN AND LEBANESE INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS

Results indicate that Lebanese tend to view Syrians more negatively and associate them with rising rent prices, unemployment, and overstretched resources. This association has been confirmed in focus groups where Lebanese regularly mentioned the pressures on their communities associated with the influx of Syrians. Many have insistently objected to receiving more refugees. Perceptions of safety among Lebanese have also dwindled. Fear of strangers, sexual harassment, and the changing nature of their community heighten feelings of anxiety and impatience towards what they perceive as a protracted refugee crisis. According to a Lebanese woman from Ghaziyeh in Southern Lebanon, “Lebanon will not be able to accommodate these large numbers; we are also afraid of the security situation because as the Syrian numbers grow, problems increase.”<sup>42</sup> However, some milder perceptions expressed by Lebanese are also noteworthy and reflected a certain degree of empathy. Quantitative data are inconclusive on this point. Qualitative data on the other hand give more cues as more positive attitudes toward refugees were expressed during most focus group discussions with Lebanese. However, these views were generally overcome by growing fears of loss of livelihoods combined with political differences. The base for sympathy and empathy exists but is overshadowed by the extreme pressure on infrastructure and livelihood. According to a woman from Miyeh w Miyeh, “We were once refugees, and we understand the suffering.”<sup>43</sup> Lebanese and Syrian communities are well aware of the commonalities that tie them together, including language, customs, and at times, even kinship. However, despite this awareness, evidence solicited from the indicators

described below reveals a prevalence of antagonism in the perception of the “other.”

The level of sensitivity and apprehension between the two communities is on the rise and requires urgent intervention to diffuse the rising tension.

**Figure 3**  
In what areas do Syrian/Lebanese tend to be more separated?



<sup>39</sup> FG, Lebanese females, Ghaziyeh, Dec. 2013.

<sup>40</sup> FG, Syrian males, Sarafand, Dec. 2013.

<sup>41</sup> FG, Syrian females, El Mina, Dec. 2013.

<sup>42</sup> FG, Lebanese females, Ghaziyeh, Dec. 2013.

<sup>43</sup> FG, Lebanese females, Miyeh ou Miyeh, Dec. 2013.

### Data shows that both Syrians and Lebanese prefer to reside in separate neighbourhoods and seem reluctant to share living spaces.<sup>44</sup>

Syrians also experience hostility and discrimination from the Lebanese regardless of the latter's geographic location, political allegiances, or sectarian identity. A total of 42% of Lebanese and 35% of Syrian respondents expressed a preference that the other not be present in their buildings of residence or their neighbourhoods. In addition, 21% of Lebanese and 16% of Syrians do not prefer the presence of the other nationality in their private domiciles. More than half of Lebanese and Syrian respondents preferred not to see each other in the private sphere, demonstrating existent tension between the two communities. Focus groups indicate that many Syrians perceive the Lebanese as hostile and expressed their desire to go back to Syria. Syrians seemed to blame the Lebanese for a perceived lack of hospitality. According to a Syrian female refugee, "We have assisted during 2006 when they came to Syria; they don't do the same to us."<sup>45</sup>

Focus groups show divergent opinions about establishing refugee camps among the Lebanese. Several participants in the focus groups mentioned the need to establish formal camps in order to accommodate the increasing number of Syrian refugees, while at the same time this solution raises fears of increased security issues, although the idea of establishing camps was not prevalent in the quantitative data. This desire was linked to the perception that if the refugees were living in camps, their needs would be met by the aid community and they would not need to work. However, others disagreed. Those against establishing refugee camps for Syrians cited Lebanon's historical experience with Palestinian refugee camps that, over time, turned into permanent structures.

The majority of Syrians interviewed in focus groups had positive views of Lebanese but expressed astonishment at the level of hostility they face from them. Many referred to the situation as

undignified and were frustrated that the Lebanese looked down on them. According to one Syrian female from Miyeh w Miyeh, "We feel we are more willing to get closer to the Lebanese than they are. They do not put the effort."<sup>46</sup> When probed about the possibility of meeting Syrians in dialogue sessions, the Lebanese were hesitant. Those who accepted to participate did so in a manner that was condescending towards Syrians. One focus group participant explained that it would be a good idea for Lebanese and Syrians to meet in dialogue discussions in order to, "teach them how to clean their kids and how not to have lots of babies."<sup>47</sup> The perception of Syrians as dirty, un-sophisticated, and prone to having many children is prevalent among Lebanese participants and influences Lebanese perceptions. According to a Lebanese male from Ghaziyeh, "All Syrian students have lice, and I don't accept for my children to communicate with them or sit with them."<sup>48</sup>

Political affiliation and sectarian identity were not seen to affect the prejudices towards Syrians of Lebanese residents in host communities. The majority of Lebanese citizens interviewed as part of this study looked down at Syrians and regarded them as being poor, uneducated, unhygienic, and generally of a lower social class than the Lebanese.

Data collected from the field shows contradictory perceptions between both nationalities. It was found that the majority of Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees interact on a daily basis and are relatively comfortable with each other. Results indicate that 65% of Lebanese survey respondents said they interact with Syrians more than once a day. Against this backdrop of frequent inter-communal interaction, more than half of Lebanese and Syrians were also seen to be relatively comfortable with one and other. A total of 57% of Syrians and 51% of Lebanese said they generally felt comfortable dealing with the opposite nationality. As such, there is apparent room for collaboration in peacebuilding.

<sup>44</sup> The survey question asked where separation between Syrians and Lebanese tends to occur or is desired. From the qualitative side, this finding emerged naturally during focus groups and was not asked directly. Lebanese mentioned the need for separation in many focus groups, specifically the idea that "strangers are everywhere now and they need to be sent to their quarters."

<sup>45</sup> FG, Syrian females, El Mina, Dec. 2013.


<sup>46</sup> FG, Syrian females, Miyeh w Miyeh, Dec. 2013.

<sup>47</sup> FG, Lebanese females, Jezzine, Dec. 2013.


<sup>48</sup> FG, Lebanese males, Ghaziyeh, Dec. 2013.

This was in contradiction to past responses where relations were seen to be tense enough to call for separation in living spaces. If daily interactions were positive, why would the same respondents call for separation between Syrians and Lebanese? When probed in focus groups, participants expressed that both communities shared common cultural norms, practices and customs. There were no severe cultural barriers between the two groups, but both wanted separation. A reason for this can be found in the specific context of Lebanon which aggravates divisions often along identity lines, even more so with non-Lebanese. Therefore the preference for separation reflects rather an increased sense of insecurity and fear linked to the influx of "external" elements within the target communities. At the same time the contradictory nature of the response indicates that there is significant potential for harnessing the connectors between the two communities, such as the cultural elements that Syrian and Lebanese share, and capitalise on them in order to create opportunity for dialogue and relationship building.

Figure 4  
How often do you see someone who is Syrian/Lebanese?



**Figure 5**  
In the last 4 months, during your interactions with Syrians/Lebanese have you felt comfortable or safe?  
(September to December 2013)



When probed in focus groups, Syrians cited the condescending attitudes of Lebanese towards them as a major source of discomfort.

For their part, the Lebanese confirmed this sentiment, with the majority saying they looked down on Syrians. However, the Lebanese also stated that communication with Syrians was clear and there were no severe cultural barriers.

Economic pressures facing the host community are the main driver of hostility towards Syrians.


At the same time, prejudices related to the historical experience of Lebanese with Syrians cannot be

discounted. According to a Lebanese woman from Qobbeh, "Before the events in Syria, we always used to visit them, and they used to visit us.

There is familiarity. We don't hate them, we are sad for them and we hope they can go home, but we are also suffering."<sup>49</sup>

<sup>49</sup> FG, Lebanese females, Qobbeh, Dec. 2013.

**Figure 6**  
Compared to four months ago, how safe is the area?  
(September to December 2013)



**The perception of safety has deteriorated in Tripoli while security in the South is viewed as relatively stable.**

The perception of safety in Tripoli has deteriorated, especially among the Lebanese. A total of 48% of the Lebanese residents in Tripoli view the situation as less peaceful in December 2013 compared to four months prior. This perception is mirrored by responses from Syrians in Tripoli, of which 40% agreed that the level of safety had fallen from September to December 2013. Focus groups reveal similar findings. Lebanese and Syrians were worried about Tripoli's slip into protracted violence. This is especially true given the various gun battles that occurred in the past 4 months, which required a military intervention from the Lebanese

army. Furthermore, many explained that Tripoli is critically affected with what is happening in Syria. The proximity of Tripoli to the Syrian border, in addition to hosting refugees and Syrian opposition militants, makes the security more volatile. Also, the protracted conflict between the majority Alawite Jabal Mohsen and the majority Sunni Babel Tabbeneh, seems to exert tremendous influence on peoples' perceptions of security.

The perception of safety in the South has remained relatively unchanged over the covered period. A total of 83% of survey respondents said that their perception of safety had not changed from September to December 2013. Notably, the proportion of Lebanese residents who believe

that safety levels have fallen (35%) is higher than that of Syrian refugees (20%) during the covered period. Findings from the qualitative focus groups demonstrate that both Syrians and Lebanese residents in the South experience higher perceptions to safety because of the stronger capacity of municipalities to enforce security. This perception is associated with a positive outlook of the role of Lebanese political parties and municipalities. Several participants expressed their trust in the political parties operating in the South. The majority sensed the presence of a strong security establishment that could enforce laws and alleviate perceptions of insecurity.

### The perception among Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees of sexual harassment and assault by their counterparts prevails.

Both Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees claim that sexual harassment and assault by the opposing nationality is prevalent in their communities. The Lebanese regularly mention stories they have heard about Syrian men that harass and assault Lebanese women in public. Syrians describe the opposite, whereby Lebanese men harass and assault Syrian women. This issue was more recurrent in Tripoli and urban areas, but it also emerged in Ghazieh, Jezzine, and Sarafand. This finding was triangulated with Lebanese males who expressed that Lebanese men now prefer Syrian women because they are 'cheaper' in terms demanding less financial support than Lebanese women.

While Lebanese respondents have rarely experienced such occurrences in person, Syrians had significantly more first-hand accounts of such actions. According to one participant in Sarafand, "Imagine that I wear a veil, and when I'm walking in the street I face much harassment, and Lebanese men offer me money for sex. What do they think of us, do they think we don't have families, values, and religion? Aren't we people like them?"<sup>50</sup> The issue of sexual harassment was mentioned consistently and the majority of focus groups indicated that it is a real problem facing relations between Syrian

refugees and host communities.

### Lebanese residents of host communities perceive Syrian refugees as a possible security threat, with differences according to geographic locations.

Across host communities in Lebanon, the Syrian refugee influx is perceived to constitute a possible security issue in the future. The nature of the threat, however, was perceived differently in the South and in Tripoli. Many Lebanese residents in southern host communities expressed fears that Syrians would eventually conduct revenge attacks against local populations because of Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian war. Syrians in Southern Lebanon seemed to be convinced that local municipalities were collecting their names to share them with Syrian authorities. Syrian participants were reluctant to come to focus groups for fear of being targeted later; at the same time, many said they do not leave their homes except to collect assistance or go to work. Women were particularly afraid, and their perception of danger was more apparent. The interplay of sectarian identities between Southern residents and Syrian newcomers expressed itself differently than in Tripoli. The fact that many Syrians saw Southern Lebanon as a hostile place politically influenced their perception of the other. Religion and sect play a role in the intersection of paranoia and fear in host communities. In Shiite dominated areas of the South, there is a greater perception of potential danger from Syrian refugees, who are predominately Sunni. The residents of the southern village of Bourj Ech Chamali were especially worried. "We never closed our doors, but now we are afraid. I think [Syrians] will attack us one night and kill us all," said one resident.<sup>51</sup>

In Tripoli, the security threat posed by Syrian refugees was perceived in terms of theft, sexual harassment, and petty crime. Many Lebanese perceived the number of petty crimes, such as robbery and theft to have increased due to Syrian influx. This perception seemed to be correlated with a general perception of the deterioration of security in Tripoli in the past four months.


<sup>50</sup> FG, Syrian females, Sarafand, Dec. 2013.

<sup>51</sup> FG, Lebanese males, Bourj Ech Chamali, Jan. 2014

## ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN CONFLICT

One purpose of this study was to consider the different stakeholders who play a positive or negative role in conflicts between Syrians and Lebanese. The findings show a divergence between the South and Tripoli. Local institutions, it seems, as well as political parties, are seen to be more effective in addressing conflicts in the South than in Tripoli.

**Figure 7**  
Is there anyone trying to play a positive role in addressing conflicts?



In the South, 46% of respondents stated that municipalities played a positive role in conflict resolution, compared to zero respondents in Tripoli. Such perceptions are also common in regards to political parties. A total of 32% of respondents in the South perceive that only political parties play a positive role, while only 6% of their counterparts in Tripoli agree. Lebanese seem to be generally more approving of political parties' role, and 35% of Lebanese said that political parties play a positive role in conflict resolution as opposed to 12% of Syrian respondents. More respondents in Tripoli viewed NGOs and the UN as having a positive role (35%), in contrast to only 14% of respondents in

the South. In the absence of strong local authorities and political parties, respondents in Tripoli seem to rely more on NGOs and UN agencies intervention.

Further inspection reveals the role of other local actors in conflict resolution. In various districts under study in Tripoli, respondents stated that religious leaders, local NGOs, and 'military cadres' – or local armed strong men – are the main arbiters of conflict. According to one participant from Abou Samra in Tripoli, "The police have not been to our neighbourhood for more than two years. They are afraid. We have no state here, and the people who resolve problems are the religious sheikhs and the 'military cadres'."<sup>52</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Interview, local youth, Tabbeneh, Jan. 2014.

Focus group participants were intentionally probed about their attitudes towards the role of municipalities in and around Tripoli. The majority were ambivalent to the role of municipalities in conflict resolution and viewed them as either negligible and/or unimportant. When probed further, respondents from Tripoli admitted that they viewed municipalities to be weak and thus incapable of resolving conflicts in a successful manner. Syrian and Lebanese respondents in Tripoli also both expressed their distrust and displeasure with national and local authorities, especially with regards to the Municipality of Tripoli. These sentiments were rooted in the lack of public service provision, especially among Syrians. If compared to perceptions of safety in the section above, there seems to be an association between perceptions of insecurity and a weak municipal role. When probed, participants confirmed this attitude. Participants in Tripoli complained that local authorities were not implementing a comprehensive plan to deal with the Syrian refugee problem through local law enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and public service works.

It is important to note that both Syrians and Lebanese are reluctant to identify the actors who cause violent conflicts. From available responses, political parties are seen as the main instigators of violent conflict in Tripoli, while individuals are perceived as the main conflict initiators in the South. In Tripoli, where political parties and local strongmen do not exercise total control over security,<sup>53</sup> and there are frequent occurrences of inter-communal sectarian violence, respondents are reluctant to answer questions about who instigates violence. When heavily probed, respondents blame the lack of a monopoly on power for conflict in general, but they are not able or willing to identify specific actors.

Empowering community leadership among Syrian refugees was referred to as a possible method of diffusing conflict. Throughout several qualitative focus groups sessions, Syrians and Lebanese raised the issue of the lack of credible representation among refugees. The lack of representation

increases feelings of anxiety, particularly among Syrians, because they perceive the Lebanese authorities to be unable or unwilling to protect them in cases of conflict. According to a Syrian male from Zahrieh in Tripoli, “In Lebanon, it’s every man for himself. You can’t trust anyone, and you have to have the right connections – something we don’t have as Syrians.”<sup>54</sup>

Lebanese focus group participants also expressed that one of the main challenges for constructive dialogue between both nationalities is the lack of credible collective Syrian representation. This is likely the result of different factors. On one side, Syrian families tend to move within Lebanon in search of work and shelter, thus limiting their ability to organize themselves. On the other side, the feeling shared by many Syrians of being “guests” in Lebanon also affects their propensity to establish clear representational structures.

Moreover, the lack of refugee camps for Syrians in the country minimises the opportunities for the emergence of clearly defined leadership and collective representation. Lebanese participants understood this clearly and hence were sceptical about the ability of Syrians to enforce any decisions taken during dialogue sessions and preferred to deal with Syrians through local authorities.


<sup>53</sup> Strongmen in poor suburbs of Tripoli are militants who patrol their own community. They are not organized and do not have a strong political or military organization, in comparison to other political parties in the South.

<sup>54</sup> FG, Lebanese males, Tripoli, Zahrieh, Dec. 2013.

**PROPENSITY TO VIOLENCE**

The conflict scan found that Lebanese and Syrians are generally conflict averse. The majority preferred to avoid conflicts and said that mediation was the most employed tool of conflict resolution between the two groups.<sup>55</sup> This, however, does not mean that the propensity for violence is low. Contrary to that, focus groups have shown a strong level of tension between the two groups. In South of Lebanon where curfews were being implemented against Syrian refugees, the level of hostility between the two groups was apparent. Even in Tripoli, where no curfew was being implemented, Syrians felt discriminated against, and often times intimidated by Lebanese residents. Syrians, who perceive their situation as temporary, react passively to these practices. As the Syrian conflict becomes more complicated with the failure of negotiation, inter-communal tensions between the two communities is expected to rise. Despite this, the fact that Lebanese and Syrians prefer avoidance and mediation rather than confrontational methods show that the possibilities of conflict mitigation are strong. Interventions to support this general trend could prove helpful.

**Figure 8**  
When faced with conflict resulting from issues that cause division, how do you react?




<sup>55</sup> Interview, local youth, Tabbeneh, Jan. 2014.

**Both Syrians and Lebanese are conflict averse, with a minority preferring to address issues that cause division through discussions with family or legal recourse.** The majority of survey respondents (43% of Lebanese and 62% of Syrians) prefer to avoid the conflict altogether.

Only a few respondents file complaints through official channels, with the overwhelming majority of these being Lebanese (26% of Lebanese and 5% of Syrians). When probed during focus groups, two main attitudes emerge: **both Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees exhibited a resentment of police interference in private matters**, and both **preferred consensus** to forcing solutions on one another. According to a community leader from Bab Al Ramel in Tripoli, “The most effective way to resolve conflicts is through diplomatic compromises between both sides. The least effective is by having to take a one-sided decision and applying it by force.”<sup>56</sup> It is important to mention that Syrians generally tend to be more conflict averse than Lebanese residents. This trend was confirmed in focus group discussions.

Figure 9

What methods are groups or individuals employing to take action that encourages peace?



<sup>56</sup> Interview, local leader, Bab El Ramel, Dec. 2013

**Mediation is the most prominent action that respondents perceive is being taken to resolve conflicts, but distinct differences appeared between the South and Tripoli.** The intervention of a third party, or mediation between Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees, is perceived as the method that is employed the most to resolve conflicts. Mediation is perceived to be more prevalent in the South than in Tripoli, with 63% and 32% of respondents identifying this method as the most prevalent method of conflict resolution, respectively. The divergence between the South and Tripoli is consistent with other findings. Those who perceived a negligible role for the municipality have a low perception of security and are less prone to use mediation and collaborative methods in conflict resolution. Qualitative findings show that mediation is utilized more in the South due to the relative size of community. The majority of mapped localities in the South were relatively small neighbourhoods and towns. The ability for a third party, such as community or municipal leader, to interfere in conflict resolution was higher. Traditional mediation in the Lebanese context operates in a communal space where individuals know each other through clan or bloodlines. When conflict occurs, elders or people of high social status (such as religious, municipal, and community leaders) intervene to settle or diffuse tension between parties. In Tripoli, neighbourhoods with high population density do not permit the level of one-on-one relations that exists in the smaller communities in the South. Moreover, due to the perceived weak municipal role in Tripoli, the majority of respondents did not have any institutional framework to act as a reference. The fact that political parties also play a minimal role in implementing a strong law enforcement mechanism through the municipality means that a propensity to violence in Tripoli is higher than in the South.

**Acts of intimidation targeting Syrian refugees in host communities are frequent and widespread.**

Respondents and field researchers cited intimidation of Syrians by Lebanese residents in host communities as being widely practiced at both official and unofficial levels. Syrians expressed feelings of intimidation by municipalities as a result of non-legally mandated curfews as well as exploitation in the workplace and rampant bullying in some neighbourhoods.<sup>57</sup>

Syrians also feel helpless when they attempt to respond to intimidation. Many Syrian respondents professed that employers and residents threatened to ensure they would be deported back to Syria if they denounced intimidators to the authorities. Many Syrians also claimed that municipalities had ‘security files’ on all Syrian inhabitants within their jurisdictions, especially in Southern areas.


**The nature of violent acts that take place in host communities between Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees is diverse, but the majority of conflicts are confined to verbal arguments.**

A total of 49% of survey respondents identified verbal arguments as a major form of violence that took place in the community from September to December 2013. Armed conflict, however, remains prominent, with 37% of respondents saying they had witnessed a shooting that did not result in a fatality, while 19% have witnessed or heard about shootings resulting in death in their area. Furthermore, respondents in Tripoli cited more frequent occurrences of a violent nature, with 32% witnessing more than 10 violent incidents during the covered period, compared to 5% in the South. Responses from both Syrians and Lebanese were relatively uniform. Qualitative focus groups also revealed a geographic divide in the frequency and nature of violent incidents. According to Lebanese and Syrian survey respondents, on the whole the South experienced less violent incidents due to the presence of strong political parties, security apparatuses, and the role of local municipalities.

<sup>57</sup> This question was asked in relation to the community where the respondents reside.

Figure 10

Have there been any incidents of violence in the past four months?



**In rural areas, informal curfews make Lebanese feel more secure, while Syrians view it as act of intimidation and prejudice.**

Curfews for Syrian refugees in host communities have begun to be implemented at the communal and municipal levels, despite the fact that there is no legal justification or mandate for such activities under Lebanese law. In most cases, Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees in rural areas also have opposing views on the principle of imposing curfews on Syrians. Curfews do not exist in urban centres.<sup>58</sup>

Lebanese residents in rural areas express concern at the presence of 'strangers' in their villages. The Lebanese also cite a perception that crime and sexual assault are on the rise as a result of the appearance of Syrian refugees, even though Lebanese respondents

could not offer any personal experience of such occurrences. Lebanese residents view curfews as a tool to assert their control over their villages, whether or not they are legally permitted to carry out such acts. For their part, Syrians are dissatisfied with the principle of a curfew, but they are also accommodating to the perceptions Lebanese harbour towards them in order to avoid conflict. For the time being, Syrians are weary of challenging the imposition of curfews due to their perception that they are in Lebanon as 'guests', and hence they should not impose their will on host communities. It is important to note that Syrians also resort to self-imposed restrictions on movement. Several participants (especially women) in focus group in Berj Shamali, Ghaziyeh, Sarafand, and also in Bab-Al-Ramel and El Mina in Tripoli, expressed their reluctance to venture outside their homes.

<sup>58</sup> The findings are based on respondents' answers from the South as there are no curfews imposed on Syrians in Tripoli.



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**Their reasons varied from crime and possible harassment, to unstable security conditions in Lebanon. Many went out of their houses only in times of necessity, either to look for work or to collect assistance from aid agencies.**

**In line with shared cultural traditions, Syrians overwhelmingly perceive themselves as 'guests'.**

In traditional Levantine hospitality, hosts must fulfil their obligation to be generous while guests should

be modest and polite; guests are not entitled to protest but rather to receive without demands. Due to the protracted nature of the crisis, the Lebanese seem weary and tired of playing the role of the host. The dynamics and ramifications of this new relationship are playing themselves out throughout the neighbourhoods of urban centres as well as the rural villages and towns hosting Syrian refugees.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE AID COMMUNITY

In view of the major findings of this research, we propose a number of recommendations in relation to the ensuing refugee crisis:

### ► Implement economic and poverty reduction programs targeting Syrians and Lebanese in host communities

The crux of conflict between Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees is overwhelmingly seen to stem from economic issues, particularly the lack of employment opportunities, poverty, and aid distribution. These elements were seen to be crosscutting in terms of geography, population density, and even confession.

The government's decision not to isolate the Syrians in camps has transferred the pressure to deal with the humanitarian needs of the Syrian refugee crisis into the major cities and their neighbouring countryside. Host communities in major urban centres, small towns, and villages are bearing the brunt of receiving thousands of Syrians in need. The lack of support mechanisms could prove disastrous given the politically volatile situation Lebanon finds itself in. Lebanese host communities are feeling the costs of the refugee crisis through strains on public services, rising rents, and competition for jobs. This is occurring in a context where the Lebanese economy is severely affected by the shrinking of the tourist industry, capital flight, and the resulting decrease in economic activity. This report recommends that a comprehensive policy to empower host and refugee communities be drafted by the government and international organizations. Assistance given to Syrian refugees should take into consideration the host community's needs.

It is crucial to support vulnerable Lebanese not only at the community level via Community Support Projects but also at the household level in order to consolidate the resilience of local host communities to receive and host Syrian refugees. Since a political solution in Syria seems ephemeral, the refugee crisis is expected to last for some time. In the absence of a strong support for host communities, tensions might eventually lead to violence. The security and stability of Lebanon depend on a structured, politically-backed process that diffuses tension in local communities and assists Syrians and Lebanese to face the economic downturn and the immediate and long term effects of the refugee crisis.

Recommended interventions include supplying development aid to local economic sectors such as agro-industry, small finance projects to Syrian and Lebanese families, as well as wider job creation programmes to enhance employment opportunities for both Syrian and host communities. Vocational training for women and youth from both nationalities could be very helpful in assisting Syrian and Lebanese poor households to mitigate the effects of the crisis, including training for Syrian refugees in jobs that Lebanese typically shy away from such as domestic labour, construction, and labour intensive agriculture, although this could reinforce some stereotypes. These recommendations should also be combined with aid to Syrian refugees that is not perceived by Lebanese to take the form of hand-outs, but rather cash-for-work and conditional cash transfers. Lebanese residents should also be provided support to maintain longer-term sustainable economic development through enterprise development and microfinance interventions that are suited to low-income populations in rural areas.

Such interventions can serve to increase division of labour between Lebanese and Syrians, thus diffusing some pressure over job competition between nationalities in local labour markets. This requires large scale public works or other ambitious business creation initiatives that could address effectively the lack of livelihood opportunities.

### ► Invest in local municipalities and institutions

Results of the conflict scan indicate that stronger local institutions in the South had a positive effect on conflict mitigation. The research observed an association between collaborative methods of conflict resolution and stronger local institutions. Furthermore, perceptions of safety came hand-in-hand with perception of a strong municipal role. The scattering of refugees across various *Muhafazat* and Casas requires a response plan that targets the various *Muhafazat* councils, which are appointed by the central government and are responsible for the implementation of the central government's decisions and decrees. Any humanitarian response plan should be directed towards Lebanese public institutions in order to strengthen their medium and long-term capabilities to deal with the refugee crisis. A decentralized humanitarian response would empower local institutions to respond to local needs and perceptions. These institutions have a better

understanding of local needs, political affiliations, and the delicate sectarian and communal balances of the Lebanese political system. Special attention should be given to coordination between the aid community, *Muhafaza* councils, local municipalities, and central government authorities.

Local municipalities should be trained on issues related to 1) management of local humanitarian response, 2) WASH elements such as water, hygiene and operating local shelters, 3) protection issues such as gender based violence and child protection, and 4) conflict resolution techniques and inter-communal dialogue. These projects, however, should take into consideration that municipalities reflect the political and social landscape they operate in. Municipalities are rarely neutral spaces and can be politically charged.

### ► Empower nascent Syrian engagement and participation in local affairs and institutions

Syrian refugees should be encouraged to participate in meetings with local municipalities and organizations and to take initiative in their community. The lack

of Syrian representation and strong community leadership complicates the situation of aid disbursement, conflicts with locals, and perceptions of safety and security. Opening local institutions to local Syrian participation and encouraging Syrians to participate in local development efforts would encourage mutual dialogue between the Lebanese and the Syrians and help in resolving conflicts over resources and services.

However, the imbalance of power between Syrian refugees and Lebanese needs to be addressed at the same time through activities that promote relationship building between community leaders in order to create the space for mutual acceptance and positive interaction.

Capacity building for Syrian leadership could also strengthen their capacity to engage with the host community and effectively represent the Syrian refugee communities. Women should specifically be encouraged to participate in community organizing and to enter the work force. With many Syrian families having lost their male relatives, empowerment of women would assist Syrian households and reduce poverty.



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### ► Conduct community-based campaigns to promote social inclusion of Syrian refugees

The Lebanese harbour discriminatory notions towards Syrians, which in turn are fuelling Syrian resentment. Investment in local campaigns, videos, and national television shows that tackle stereotypes between the two peoples is necessary to diffuse tension between Syrian refugees and Lebanese residents. Such projects could be successful in breaking barriers and debunking rumours and common prejudices. The conflict scan results indicate that what Lebanese perceive as the root causes of the conflict – such as higher rents and overloading of services – are not always experienced personally but transmitted through word of mouth or the media. Campaigns should frame the difficulties faced by local communities as a common public problem and include the Syrian perspective in resolving it. Such tools could break the blaming of Syrian refugees who experience first-hand discrimination by Lebanese who look down at Syrians as manual workers, poor, and uneducated. Furthermore, special attention should be given to conflict mitigation projects. These projects should aim to bring Lebanese and Syrians together in constructive dialogue while providing them with tools of empowerment. Community leaders from Syrian and Lebanese communities, in addition to local municipalities, should be brought together in community organizing projects. These small projects could provide spaces for dialogue and coordination to diffuse growing tension and assist host communities to deal with a growing and seemingly long refugee crisis.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PEACEBUILDING ACTORS

### ► Empower beneficiaries and ensure ownership

It is important for any dialogue sessions to empower beneficiaries by providing them with the space to express themselves, by listening to their concerns and allowing them to think about how to regain control over their lives. The sustainability of such project depends on peoples' ability to

claim the dialogue process as their own.

### ► Encourage Syrians and Lebanese to work together rather than simply talk together

Both communities are impatient and eager for direct results and are skeptical of projects that involve peacebuilding initiatives with no tangible results. The majority of respondents had difficulties moving beyond the socio-economic issues, and they considered any dialogue opportunities as a luxury. Any dialogue process that omits the basic problems they are facing will be destined to fail. Participants from the South and Tripoli were sceptical about elongated discussions that do not resolve their basic problems (specifically competition over jobs and rising rent prices). Therefore, dialogue sessions, tangible results, raising awareness, and training should build upon each other. Participants will be more interested in the dialogue process if they can see concrete changes in their lives.

### ► A desire to meet exists, but with conditions

Both communities expressed a general desire and intent to meet and engage in discussions together. However, this energy is undermined by certain limitations, particularly the time constraint of Syrian community members who are concerned with meeting their basic needs and the reluctance of the Lebanese to participate based on widespread stereotypes and prejudices against Syrians. Since Syrians do not have collective representation or bargaining power, and the Lebanese harbour discriminatory attitudes towards Syrians, conflict resolution activities should take place in two phases. First, the Syrians and Lebanese should meet alone to express their concerns and increase their openness to dialogue within their respective groups. Only then should both nationalities be brought in any formal conflict resolution setting. This will give conflict resolution facilitators time to break down preconceived notions about the other group and fine-tune their approaches towards seeking comprehensive and workable solutions to underlying tensions. The Lebanese will have to appreciate the added value of engaging with Syrians in their communities and to work

towards common goals. Trust-building activities could be extremely beneficial where Syrians and Lebanese are prepared to meet each other in constructive dialogue.

### ► Be conscious of the power dynamics affecting the inter-communities dialogue

Overall, Lebanese come to the table from a more powerful position, and the facilitator needs to keep this power imbalance in mind during the dialogue process. Since Lebanese bear strong negative stereotypes about Syrians, they will tend to preach or look down at Syrian participants. This might undermine the willingness of Syrians to engage in these peacebuilding projects. There is a need to work on Lebanese attitudes and stereotypes towards Syrians and vice versa. Projects' interventions should also place greater attention on the political, religious, and geographic realities of the different regions of Lebanon, as well as the corresponding allegiances of Syrian refugees in different areas. In the South, prior and constant coordination with local authorities and political parties will be essential to projects' successes. In Tripoli, because of the urban, low-income nature of the city and the lack of confidence in local authorities, interventions should continue to be funnelled through trusted local NGOs that have the support of community leaders. That being said, projects should also involve the municipality in order to build its capacity to play an active role in responding to the current crisis and its impact on the host communities.

### ► Take into account that different political dynamics that exists in the South and the Tripoli.

The main difference between Tripoli and the 6 targeted communities of the South is the way the society is organized politically. The municipality and community leaders are connected to major political parties, and the peacebuilding interventions have to pass through their non-formal or formal consent. While always taking "power dynamics" into account, it is important to coordinate in the South with local municipal forces and if possible meet with local parliamentarians to explain the project and the intended outcomes. A positive atmosphere should be created among

high-profile officials regarding the reason and purpose of such programs.

In Tripoli, this type of political hierarchy does not exist. At the same time, access to the poor areas of Tripoli cannot be ensured without accessing local NGOs operating there and working with various local leaders who should give their approval and support in order to facilitate community participation. As mentioned earlier, this strategy should be complemented by the involvement of local authorities such as municipalities in order to empower them to be part of the process and eventually play an active role in addressing conflicts within the communities they serve.

### ► Build the capacity of Syrian leaders among the refugee population

One of the main issues highlighted during focus groups was the lack of leadership within the Syrian community. Hence, it is crucial to build the capacity of Syrian refugees' leaders in order to effectively assist their communities to organize themselves. Leadership training should be done where Syrian community leaders are encouraged to take initiative, ideally with the collaboration of Lebanese community members present during the dialogue process. Syrians will first need to build the capacity to advocate collectively, principally by identifying key individuals among themselves as well as prioritising and mediating communal demands. Throughout any programme, it should be kept in mind that Syrians remain the weaker party vis-à-vis the Lebanese and are currently averse to public displays of power or protest.

### ► Take specific gender dynamics into account

Special attention should be given to gender dynamics both in Syrian refugee and host communities. Roundtable discussions should separate women from men whenever needed. Women are not always comfortable participating in a dialogue that spans social, political, and economic issues alongside men. This holds true especially when participants come from conservative backgrounds with traditional views of women. The initial phase should take note of

these dynamics and separate women and men into different groups if needed to allow women the space to fully participate. Only after the project achieves strong inter-group dynamics should the two groups be brought together to work for a unified goal.

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## ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1: DATA COLLECTION TOOL 1: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE.

#### 1. CONFLICTS/INTERACTION DYNAMICS

This section aims at understanding what are the sources of tensions which may lead to violence between the two communities, what are the sources of cooperation which may lead to peace/interaction, and what are the current CR mechanisms prevalent within and between the communities.

1. What do you share with the other community that makes you to feel connected to them? What do you consider as peace drivers between LB and SY?
2. Can you give examples of positive interaction/common initiatives between LB and SY? How do you feel about this? Do you think we can build on this? How?
3. If you think about the last four months, can you tell us what issues are causing tensions between the two communities?
4. How do you personally react to these issues? How would you react if problems like this happened in your life?
5. Which methods of conflict resolution/problem solving do you see as most effective and least effective? Why?

#### 2. IDENTIFYING THE LEADERS

This section aims at ensuring the leaders (all society level) who will be targeted by project's trainings are the one who are trusted, who will have the greatest impact on their community and the ability to interact with the other community leaders.

1. Who do people go to when they want to address each of these conflict issues? Are there any community or public figures who are trusted to help work on important issues between people?
2. What is the role of each of these leaders? How do they help people with their issues?
3. Who are trusted sources of information? Where do people go for information about events in their communities?
4. Beyond usual leader figures, who do you trust to effectively represent your voice, to defend your interests?

### 3. PROJECT DESIGN

This section is about involving FGD participants in the project design in order to ensure it fits the reality of their daily life and needs.

1. In a project aiming at bringing Syrian and Lebanese around the same table to discuss common issues, will you be willing/able to attend? If not, why? If yes, why?
2. What do you think is needed for people to feel comfortable? What kind of issues/challenges could arise? How to avoid it?
3. Do you think that improved communication/mediation between the two communities will contribute to mitigate the tensions? Why and how?
4. Do you think that Lebanese citizens of the targeted communities are willing to discuss common issues and possible solutions with Syrian refugees and vice versa? If not, why? If yes, why? Do you have any advice?
5. What do you think could motivate/incite or prevent people to sit together and discuss about issues of common interest and which issues do you think they should address?

### ANNEX 2: DATA COLLECTION TOOL 2: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE.

#### 1. LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP CR MECHANISMS

This section aims at understanding what are the sources of tensions and source of cooperation which may lead to violence between the two communities, who are the key people, and what are the current CR mechanisms prevalent within and between the communities.

1. What do you consider as peace drivers between LB and SY? And how do you think we can build on these?
2. Can you give examples of positive interaction/common initiatives between LB and SY? How do you feel about this? Do you think this could be replicated in other communities? if yes, How?
3. What are the sources of tensions in your area?
4. Which methods of conflict resolution/problem solving do you use?
5. Which methods of conflict resolution/problem solving do you see as most effective and least effective? Why?
6. Who are the community (grassroots level) or public figures (from both communities) you can work with

to solve important issues between people?  
7. How do they help people with their issues and how effective do you think their actions are?  
8. How do you share information with your community? What are the main challenges for you to communicate with the general public?

## 2. OWNERSHIP AND INPUTS ON PROJECT DESIGN

This section aims at ensuring the ownership towards this project by the interviewee and what input/role that can play towards achieving project objectives.

1. The project aims at bringing Syrian and Lebanese key influential persons around the same table in order to discuss common issues and how to solve it. What do you think of this approach? Is it something you see as useful in your area? What do you think is needed to make it succeed?
2. Do you think that improved communication/mediation between the two communities will contribute to mitigate the tensions? Why and how?
3. Will you be willing/able to attend to such discussion? If no, why? If yes, why?
4. Would you feel safe to attend the roundtable discussions?
5. Which issues do you think are priority to address in such roundtables?
6. Which issues should the roundtables avoid/be careful to address in order to not create more tensions?
7. What role do you think you can play to support these roundtables? What are you expecting from other leaders from both communities?
8. What kind of support/capacity building would like to receive that could enhance this role?
9. According to you what kind of role/support shall SFCG provide to help you to mitigate tensions between the two communities?

## ANNEX 3: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS AND INTERVIEWS AMENDED QUESTIONS

### 1. CONFLICTS/INTERACTION DYNAMICS

1. What do you think of the situation in your region? Why?
2. What are the main problems you are facing in your society?
3. We heard that there is a curfew on Syrians here and

in other regions? What do you think of that? Why?  
4. Have you experienced tensions between Lebanese and Syrians in the last four months? What are they? What are the major reasons? How did you know that?  
5. Can you list for me a couple of positive things that happened due to Syrians coming to the region? What are the major negative things?  
6. To whom do people generally go when they want to ask for help in issues related to Syrians and Lebanese? Do they go to the police? Why?  
7. If the situation gets out of the hands of the local leaders, to whom do you go?

### 2. LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP CR MECHANISMS

1. If people wanted to find information about the situation, humanitarian needs, political situation, legal issues, do they approach you? Why do they think they come to you? Where do you get your information?
2. How do you share your information with the community? Do you think there could be a better way to share this information? How?

### 3. OWNERSHIP AND INPUTS ON PROJECT DESIGN

1. What do you think is the main need so that people could feel secure? What are the Syrian's needs? What are the Lebanese needs? Do you think there is a difference?
2. What are the main common problems that face both Syrians and Lebanese? What are they? How can it be resolved?
3. Do you think meetings between Lebanese and Syrians where they could meet and discuss the situation/ solutions/problems can contribute to this? Do you think such meetings are feasible? Are you prepared to host such a meeting?
4. What are the main issues that could encourage people to sit down and discuss these common issues together? What are the main issues or problems that these sessions should handle? Why?
5. Do you think the Lebanese are ready to discuss such a matter with the Syrian community? Do you have any advices?
6. What is missing from such an intervention? What do you think are the major things that such an intervention does not provide? What do you recommend?

## ANNEX 4: BREAKDOWN OF THE SURVEY RESPONDENTS' PROFILE

		Syrians		Lebanese	
		Count	Column N %	Count	Column N %
Gender	Female	227	48.7%	215	48.1%
	Male	239	51.3%	232	51.9%
Tripoli	Qoubeh	34	7.3%	56	12.5%
	Abou Samra	35	7.5%	45	10.1%
	Zahriyeh	48	10.3%	32	7.2%
	Mina	39	8.4%	41	9.2%
	Bab El-Ramel	45	9.7%	34	7.6%
South	Jezzine	42	9.0%	40	8.9%
	Miye w Miye	47	10.1%	39	8.7%
	Kfarssir	41	8.8%	42	9.4%
	Sarafand	46	9.9%	38	8.5%
	Bourj El-Chimaly	46	9.9%	39	8.7%
Age	Ghaziyeh	43	9.2%	41	9.2%
	15 to 18	49	10.5%	44	9.9%
	18 to 30	155	33.3%	124	27.7%
	31 to 45	153	32.8%	152	34.0%
	45 to 65	84	18.0%	108	24.2%
Marital Status	65+	25	5.4%	19	4.3%
	Single	121	26.0%	133	29.8%
	Married	291	62.4%	268	60.0%
	Divorced	9	1.9%	12	2.7%
	Widowed	34	7.3%	32	7.2%
	Spouse missing or away	10	2.1%	1	0.2%
Level of Education	Prefer not to answer	1	0.2%	1	0.2%
	Never gone to school	72	15.5%	37	8.3%
	Attended Arabic/Koran schools	8	1.7%	5	1.1%
	Some primary studies (P.1P.4)	82	17.6%	57	12.8%
	Completed primary studies	115	24.7%	66	14.8%
	Some elementary studies	74	15.9%	55	12.3%
	Complete elementary studies	58	12.4%	80	17.9%
	Secondary (1 <sup>st</sup> -3 <sup>rd</sup> )	31	6.7%	52	11.6%
	Tertiary institutions	13	2.8%	21	4.7%
	College/University	11	2.4%	67	15.0%
Current and Main Occupation	Refuse to answer	2	0.4%	7	1.6%
	Working (regular job)	17	3.6%	81	18.1%
	Daily worker	112	24.0%	56	12.5%
	Unemployed	109	23.4%	29	6.5%
	Student	9	1.9%	59	13.2%
	Student but got disrupted	14	3.0%	2	0.4%
	Working at home/home maker	164	35.2%	117	26.2%
	Retired	6	1.3%	12	2.7%
	Other	34	7.3%	89	19.9%
	Don't know	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Refuse to answer	1	0.2%	2	0.4%	

## ANNEX 5: DATA COLLECTION TOOL 3: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE.

Survey Questionnaire	
Survey Code	
Date	
Area and Street	

## INTRODUCTION AND CONSENSUS: (READ OUT LOUD)

Hello. My name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I'm conducting research for an organization called Search for Common Ground partnering with UTOPIA/Caritas. We are collecting opinions and perceptions about social issues. I'd like to ask you some questions. This survey will not take more than 15 minutes and by completing it you will help us better understand how people relate to each other and how society deals with social problems.

**All of your answers are completely confidential (We will not share this information with anyone) and anonymous (We will not ask any personal information that may lead to identify you).** We are collecting opinions from other parts of Lebanon too. We want to know your views and get general opinions of the public in different places. **It is ok to ask me to repeat the question if you do not hear it well the first time.**

Would you like to participate in this survey?  1. Yes  2. No

If the person answers NO, please fill out questions 1 and 2 anyway based on your observation. (Gender and Nationality)

## Time Start

Before we begin this survey, do you have any particular questions you would like to ask?

## Instructions to the data collectors:

- Do not read the Answers to the questions unless it is stated in the question
- Please put the number corresponding to the answer in the right hand box for each question

Q#	IDENTIFICATION	A#
1. What Community or city do you live in? (Read the options)	<p><b>Tripoli</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Qoubeh</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Abou Smara</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Zahriyeh</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Mina</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Bab El-Ramel</li> </ol> <p><b>The South</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Jezzine</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Miyeh ou Miyeh</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Kfarsir</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Sarafand</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Bourj El-Chimaly</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Ghaziyeh</li> </ol> <p>Other (thank them, do not complete the survey)</p>	
2. Mark the person gender	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Male</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Female (By observation)</li> </ol>	
3. Mark the person nationality	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Lebanese</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Syrian (Read the options if needed)</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Other</li> </ol>	
4. In what age range do you fall? (Read the options)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Less than 15 (thank them, do not complete the survey)</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 15 to 18</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 18 to 30</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 31 to 45</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> 45 to 65</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Older than 65</li> </ol>	
5. What is the highest level of education you have attained? (Read the options)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Never gone to school</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Attended Arabic school/ Koran learning or schools</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Some primary studies (P.1-P. 4)</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Completed primary studies</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Some elementary studies</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Complete elementary studies ( Brevet )</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Secondary (1st – 3rd )</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Tertiary institutions</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> College /University</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to answer</li> </ol>	
6. What is your current and main occupation? (Read the options)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Working (regular job)</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Daily worker</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Unemployed (want to be working but can't find a job)</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Student</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Student but got disrupted</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Working at home/home maker</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Retired</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Other specify: _____</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Don't know</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to answer</li> </ol>	



	<p>15. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>16. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>17. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</p> <p>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</p>	
14.	<p>Do you face some of these issues personally? (Do not read the options)</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</p> <p>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</p>	<p>If NO or 98/99 go to Q#17.</p>
15.	<p>Which ones? (Do not read the options, allow up to 3 options)</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> Housing shortages/rent increase</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Job shortages</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Overstretched resources (water, food, electricity, land, etc.)</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Overstretched public services (garbage collection, public health)</p> <p>5. <input type="checkbox"/> Overstretched education resources</p> <p>6. <input type="checkbox"/> Targeted aid and foreign assistance</p> <p>7. <input type="checkbox"/> Youth violence, and youth unemployment</p> <p>8. <input type="checkbox"/> Political affiliations</p> <p>9. <input type="checkbox"/> Historical problems between Syrian and Lebanese</p> <p>10. <input type="checkbox"/> Historical problems related to Palestinian refugees</p> <p>11. <input type="checkbox"/> Religious/ideological differences</p> <p>12. <input type="checkbox"/> Cultural differences (like how women behave)</p> <p>13. <input type="checkbox"/> Begging and general poverty</p> <p>14. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>15. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>16. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</p> <p>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</p>	
16.	<p>When you face these issues, how do you react? (Do not read the options, allow up to 3 max) (Baseline Question)</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> I ignore it</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> I speak to person directly</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> I discuss it with my family</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> I ask support from my friends and relatives to attack the responsible of the problem</p>	

	<p>5. <input type="checkbox"/> I complain to governmental authorities</p> <p>6. <input type="checkbox"/> I complain to persons/groups responsible for security</p> <p>7. <input type="checkbox"/> I enter in a verbal argument with the responsible</p> <p>8. <input type="checkbox"/> I enter into a physical fight with the responsible</p> <p>9. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</p> <p>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</p>	
16A.	Issue #1 (A#1 for Q#15)	
16B.	Issue #2 (A#2 for Q#15)	
16C.	Issue #3 (A#3 for Q#15)	
17.	<p>Which of these issues from the last four questions do you think is most likely to lead to violence (blood) right now? (Do not read the options, allow up to 3 options)</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> Housing shortages/rent increase</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Job shortages</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Overstretched resources (water, food, electricity, land, etc.)</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Overstretched public services (garbage collection, public health)</p> <p>5. <input type="checkbox"/> Overstretched education resources</p> <p>6. <input type="checkbox"/> Targeted aid and foreign assistance</p> <p>7. <input type="checkbox"/> Youth violence, and youth unemployment</p> <p>8. <input type="checkbox"/> Political affiliations</p> <p>9. <input type="checkbox"/> Historical problems between Syrian and Lebanese</p> <p>10. <input type="checkbox"/> Historical problems related to Palestinian refugees</p> <p>11. <input type="checkbox"/> Religious/ideological differences</p> <p>12. <input type="checkbox"/> Cultural differences (like how women behave)</p> <p>13. <input type="checkbox"/> Begging and general poverty</p> <p>14. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>15. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>16. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</p> <p>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</p>	

Q#	B. CONFLICT RESOLUTION ACTORS AND MECHANISMS	A#
18.	In your opinion, is there anyone trying to play a positive role in addressing the tensions or clashes? <b>(Do not read the options)</b>  1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No 98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know 99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond	<input type="text"/>  If NO or 98/99 go to Q#24.
19.	Who Are they? <b>(Do not read the options, write down up to 3 names and contacts if possible)</b>  1. <input type="checkbox"/> CSO/NGO 2. <input type="checkbox"/> INGO 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Individuals 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Political Parties 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Youth 6. <input type="checkbox"/> Religious Leaders 7. <input type="checkbox"/> Police 8. <input type="checkbox"/> Municipality 9. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 10. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 11. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know 99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond	<input type="text"/>  If 98/99 go to Q#24.
19A.	Name: _____ Contacts: _____	<input type="text"/>
19B.	Name: _____ Contacts: _____	<input type="text"/>
19C.	Name: _____ Contacts: _____	<input type="text"/>
20.	What is this group or person doing to bring about peace in the situation (Baseline Question)? <b>(Do not read the options, write down up to 3 mechanisms and contacts if possible)</b>  1. <input type="checkbox"/> Listening 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Mediating 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Judging (decision making) 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Enforcing Solution	<input type="text"/>

	5. <input type="checkbox"/> Raising the issue in a public space 6. <input type="checkbox"/> Taking Responsibility 7. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 8. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 9. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know 99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond	<input type="text"/>
20A.	Mechanism #1	<input type="text"/>
20A.	Mechanism #2	<input type="text"/>
20A.	Mechanism #3	<input type="text"/>
21.	To what degree do you think this approach is effective? <b>(Read the options)</b>  1. <input type="checkbox"/> Failing completely 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Mostly failing 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Working little bit 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Working very well 98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know 99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond	<input type="text"/>
21A.	Mechanism #1	<input type="text"/>
21C.	Mechanism #2	<input type="text"/>
21C.	Mechanism #1	<input type="text"/>
22.	In general, are there any other important people or groups that people turn to help them with problems? <b>(Do not read the options)</b>  1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No 98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know 99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond	<input type="text"/>  If NO or 98/99 Go to Q# 28.

23.	Who Are they? (Do not read the options, write down up to 3 names and contacts if possible)	
	1. <input type="checkbox"/> CSO/NGO 2. <input type="checkbox"/> INGO 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Individuals 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Political Parties 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Youth 6. <input type="checkbox"/> Religious Leaders 7. <input type="checkbox"/> Police 8. <input type="checkbox"/> Municipality 9. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 10. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 11. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know 99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond	
23A.	Name: _____ Contacts: _____	
23B.	Name: _____ Contacts: _____	
23C.	Name: _____ Contacts: _____	
24.	What type of issue do people bring to them? (Do not read the options, write down up to 3 names and contacts if possible)	
	1. <input type="checkbox"/> Personal 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Request for services 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Protection 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Public issues 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Conflict between different groups (Syrian – Syrian) 6. <input type="checkbox"/> Conflict between different groups (Syrian – Lebanese) 7. <input type="checkbox"/> Conflict between different groups (Lebanese – Lebanese) 8. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 9. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 10. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 11. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know 12. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond	
24A.	Type #1	
24B.	Type #1	

24C.	Type #1	
25.	How satisfied are you with the way they help people resolve important issues (Baseline Question)? (Read the options)	
	1. <input type="checkbox"/> Very satisfied 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat satisfied 3. <input type="checkbox"/> A little unsatisfied 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Very unsatisfied 98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know 99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond	
25A.	Name #1	
25B.	Name #2	
25C.	Name #2	
26.	In your opinion, is there anyone playing a negative role in increasing the tensions or clashes?	
	1. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes 2. <input type="checkbox"/> No 98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know 99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond	If NO or 98/99 go to Q#28.
27.	In your opinion, who are the main actors that are primarily involved as participants in clashes or tension? (Do not read the answers, allow up to 3 actors)	
	1. <input type="checkbox"/> CSO/NGO 2. <input type="checkbox"/> INGO 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Individuals 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Political Parties 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Youth 6. <input type="checkbox"/> Religious Leaders 7. <input type="checkbox"/> Police 8. <input type="checkbox"/> Municipality 9. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 10. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 11. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____ 98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know 99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond	

Q#	C. POTENTIAL CONNECTORS	A#
28.	<p>Are there any common communal issues in your area that affect both Syrians and Lebanese? <b>(Do not read the options, write down up to 3 issues if possible)</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <input type="checkbox"/> No common communal issues</li> <li>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Housing shortages/rent increase</li> <li>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Job shortages</li> <li>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of basic resources (water, food, electricity, land, etc.)</li> <li>5. <input type="checkbox"/> Overstretched public services (garbage collection, taxi, public health)</li> <li>6. <input type="checkbox"/> Overstretched education resources</li> <li>7. <input type="checkbox"/> Youth problems</li> <li>8. <input type="checkbox"/> Political affiliations</li> <li>9. <input type="checkbox"/> Religious affiliations</li> <li>10. <input type="checkbox"/> Begging and general poverty</li> <li>11. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</li> <li>12. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</li> <li>13. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</li> <li>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</li> <li>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</li> </ol>	[ ]
28A.	Issue #1	[ ]
28B.	Issue #2	[ ]
28C.	Issue #3	[ ]
29.	<p>On what kind of communal issues do you think that people like you could be more active in addressing? <b>(Do not read the options, write down up to 3 issues if possible)</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <input type="checkbox"/> I cannot work on any</li> <li>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Housing shortages/rent increase</li> <li>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Job shortages</li> <li>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of basic resources (water, food, electricity, land, etc.)</li> <li>5. <input type="checkbox"/> Overstretched public services (garbage collection, taxi, public health)</li> <li>6. <input type="checkbox"/> Overstretched education resources</li> <li>7. <input type="checkbox"/> Youth problems</li> <li>8. <input type="checkbox"/> Political affiliations</li> <li>9. <input type="checkbox"/> Religious affiliations</li> </ol>	[ ]

	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10. <input type="checkbox"/> Begging and general poverty</li> <li>11. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</li> <li>12. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</li> <li>13. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</li> <li>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</li> <li>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</li> </ol>	[ ]
29A.	Issue #1	[ ]
29B.	Issue #2	[ ]
29C.	Issue #3	[ ]
30.	<p>What kind of role do you think that people like you could play in addressing these communal issues? <b>(Do not read the options, write down up to 3 roles if possible)</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. No role</li> <li>2. Other Specify: _____</li> <li>3. Other Specify: _____</li> <li>4. Other Specify: _____</li> <li>98. I don't know</li> <li>99. Refuse to respond</li> </ol>	[ ]
30A.	Role #1	[ ]
30B.	Role #2	[ ]
30C.	Role #3	[ ]

Q#	D. INTRA-COMMUNITY INTERACTIONS	A#
31.	<p>How often do you see someone who is Syrian/Lebanese? (Read the options)</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> More than once per day</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Once per day</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Many times per week but less than one per day</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> One per week</p> <p>5. <input type="checkbox"/> One per month</p> <p>6. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely/never</p> <p>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</p> <p>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</p>	[ ]
32.	<p>In the last 4 months, in your interactions with SY/LB have you felt comfortable or safe (Baseline Question)? (Read the options)</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> Always</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Most of the time</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Sometimes</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely</p> <p>5. <input type="checkbox"/> Never</p> <p>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</p> <p>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</p>	[ ]
33.	<p>Can you give an example? (Write down the example)</p>	
34.	<p>In the last month, in how many interactions with Syrian/Lebanese have you felt upset or unsafe? (Read the options) (Baseline Question)</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> Always</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Sometimes</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Never</p> <p>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</p> <p>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</p>	[ ]
35.	<p>Can you give an example? (Write down the example)</p>	

36.	<p>In what areas do you usually see Syrian/Lebanese the most? (Do not read options, allow up to 3 max) (Baseline Question)</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> Apartment building/neighborhood</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Shopping area/market</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Public or health facilities</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Schools</p> <p>5. <input type="checkbox"/> Attend the same religious center</p> <p>6. <input type="checkbox"/> In private homes</p> <p>7. <input type="checkbox"/> Government offices</p> <p>8. <input type="checkbox"/> Workspace</p> <p>9. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>10. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>11. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</p> <p>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</p>	[ ]
37.	<p>What usually happens when they meet? (Do not read options)</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> We ignore each other and go about our business</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> We smile and exchange greetings</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> We are exchange harsh words/arguments</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> We drink coffee or have another exchange</p> <p>5. <input type="checkbox"/> We make a business exchange</p> <p>6. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</p> <p>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</p>	[ ]
38.	<p>In what areas do Syrian/Lebanese tend to be more separated (Baseline Question)? (Do not read options)</p> <p>1. <input type="checkbox"/> Apartment building/neighborhood</p> <p>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Shopping area/market</p> <p>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Public or health facilities</p> <p>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Schools</p> <p>5. <input type="checkbox"/> Religious center</p> <p>6. <input type="checkbox"/> In private homes</p> <p>7. <input type="checkbox"/> Government offices</p> <p>8. <input type="checkbox"/> Workspace</p> <p>9. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>10. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>11. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</p> <p>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</p> <p>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</p>	[ ]

39.	<p>After you see or talk with a person who is Syrian/Lebanese, how do you usually feel? (Do not read options)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <input type="checkbox"/> Frustrated</li> <li>2. <input type="checkbox"/> Angry</li> <li>3. <input type="checkbox"/> Happy</li> <li>4. <input type="checkbox"/> Scared/nervous</li> <li>5. <input type="checkbox"/> Don't care/dismissive</li> <li>6. <input type="checkbox"/> Normal/neutral</li> <li>7. <input type="checkbox"/> Burdened/obliged</li> <li>8. <input type="checkbox"/> Compassionate/sad for them</li> <li>9. <input type="checkbox"/> Sympathetic</li> <li>10. <input type="checkbox"/> Desire to be helpful</li> <li>11. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</li> <li>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</li> <li>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</li> </ol>	
40.	<p>In your opinion, what would the perfect situation look like in your community? Write down the response:</p>	

Thank you, do you have questions or comments?

<b>Comments</b>	

<b>Time End</b>	
-----------------	--

<b>Comment from the interviewer</b>	

41.	<p>Who do you think effectively represents your voice within your community? (Do not read the options, write down up to 3 roles if possible)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</li> <li>6. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</li> <li>7. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Specify: _____</li> <li>98. <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</li> <li>99. <input type="checkbox"/> Refuse to respond</li> </ol>	
41A.	#1	
41B.	#2	
41C.	#3	

**ANNEX 6: RESEARCHER BIOGRAPHY**

Nizar Ghanem is a co-founder of Menapolis, a research consultancy based in Istanbul. Nizar has more than 9 years experience as a trainer and researcher on development, conflict resolution, and non-violent strategies. Before founding Menapolis, Nizar was a Senior Analyst at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies and the regional program director for Iraq with the Lebanon-based Forum for Development Culture and Dialogue. He has served as a consultant with various international organizations, including the World Bank, UNICEF, and Save the Children.

Nizar has authored reports and published scholarly articles on a variety of topics related to governance and development in the Middle East region, and he lectured on conflict resolution at the Lebanese American University in Lebanon. He holds a Masters in International Relations and Economics from Johns Hopkins University, The School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a BA from Notre Dame University in Lebanon.

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***“This assessment was implemented by SFCG in partnership with UNHCR with the financial support of the European Union”.***

تم تنفيذ هذا التقييم من قبل منظمة البحث عن أرضية مشتركة (SFCG) بالشراكة مع المفوضية السامية للأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين (UNHCR) وبدعم مالي من الاتحاد الأوروبي (EU).