


# Responding to the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Lebanon

Recovery Framework for Wadi Khaled and Akroum, Akkar **March 2014**



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CDR's "Local Development Plan for the Community of Akroum Cluster" (2006) and UNDP's: "Wadi Khaled Socio-Economic Needs Assessment and Local Development Strategy" (2013) were key resource documents in this consultation process and were subsequently validated and updated.

This report would not have been possible without the diligent supervision and insight of SDC's programme officer, Ms. Dalia Lakiss.

SDC hopes that these reflections can positively serve the response to the impact of the Syria crisis on Lebanon and in particular, Wadi Khaled and Akroum.

Heba Hage-Felder  
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## ACRONYMS

CB	Central Bank
CDR	Council for Development and Reconstruction
DFID	Department for International Development
ESFD	Economic and Social Fund for Development
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GoL	Government of Lebanon
HCT	Humanitarian Coordination Team
HRC	High Relief Commission
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IO	International Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IMF	Independent Municipal Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
LCPS	Lebanese Center for Policy Studies
LHCS	Lebanese Host Communities Support project
LIHF	Lebanese INGO Humanitarian Forum
LRF	Lebanon Recovery Fund
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPTP	National Poverty Targeting Programme
OMSAR	Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform
RRP	United Nations Regional Response Plan for Refugees from Syria
SDC	Social Development Center (MoSA)
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollars
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Lebanon is in the throes of a protracted Syria crisis. This report presents the findings from a consultation facilitated by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation October 2013-January 2014, that aimed to better understand the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis and its response, and through a wide consultative process to propose a way forward, focusing on the border areas of Wadi Khaled and Akroum, in Akkar, North Lebanon. Linking what is pertinent regionally to the national response, the process can be adapted to other regions of Lebanon and to the specificities of each in order to ameliorate the shape and nature of the response.

### Scope and methodology

Three years after the onset of the Syria conflict, 2.5 million people have fled Syria to neighboring countries. Despite its small surface and fragile situation, Lebanon is hosting over 37% of displaced Syrian (934,895 Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon –February 2014). This number is the highest per capita refugee population on earth with around 1.2 million vulnerable Lebanese who are further affected by the crisis. The impact of this huge displacement has been enormous on all sectors throughout the whole country.

Entrenched in history, familial, social, trade and business relations between Lebanon and Syria made settlement of thousands of Syrian refugees in villages and towns close to the border a natural process. However, the burden of increased refugee movement into Lebanon and the protracted nature has reached a point beyond the ability of hosting villages and towns.

This report will shed light on the impact of the crisis at national level but more precisely on Wadi Khaled and Akroum looking at different aspects: economy, basic infrastructure, health, education, host communities, security, and municipalities. The findings of both consultations (local and national) have contributed to the formulation of an early recovery framework for the targeted area.

### The methodology consisted of the following:

- Situational analysis on the impact of the crisis on national and local level (via desk review)
- Local level (October – November 2013):
  - Interviews with 10 local-international NGOs and UN agencies working in Wadi Khaled and Akroum;
  - Focused meetings with 36 key actors from the community (including active people from all sectors mukhtars and mayors).
  - Joint workshop in the presence of 46 participants from the community (mayors, mukhtars)
- National level (December 2013-January 2014):
  - 18 semi-structured interviews with representative from governmental institutions, donors, IOs.
  - National workshop where 52 representatives from local community and central governmental, donor community and international and UN agencies participated.
- Development of the final report including all the findings and the recovery framework.

### The report is divided into 3 components:

#### Component 1: Situational analysis of the impact of the crisis.

The two areas of Wadi Khaled and Akroum in North Lebanon are made up of a cluster of 13 fragile municipalities (29 villages), estimated to have a combined population of 50,000 people, hosting around 21,500 Syrian refugees (by March 2014) who are mostly living with Lebanese families.

The villages of Wadi Khaled and Akroum are among the poorest and most underserved in North Lebanon, estimated to contain 46% of the poorest Lebanese in the country. Prior to the crisis, the region had already been struggling with high poverty rates, minimal employment opportunities and poor infrastructure and social services. The closure of the Syrian border has heavily weighed down on the inhabitants of Wadi Khaled and Akroum, decreasing residents' access to cheaper goods and services in Syria and hindering economic activity and cross-border trade. Furthermore, the fragile security condition at the border disrupted the labour of many farmers, as it hampered access to agricultural lands and irrigation water. Lebanese families have reported a decrease in wages and the availability of jobs for the Lebanese; around 50% decrease in the total number of days worked per month and almost 60% drop in wages.

However, the impact on Wadi Khaled and Akroum goes beyond direct economic conditions; it also includes reduced access to health and educational services, as well as burdening an already poor infrastructure.

Most municipalities have been recently elected and do not have the financial, organizational and human capacity to provide the necessary support and services neither to Lebanese communities nor to Syrian refugees.

Growing dissatisfaction of host communities due to increased economic and social factors has been as well observed.

#### Component 2: Response to the crisis- analysis of consultations with governmental entities, donors and international organizations.

In-depth interviews were conducted with representatives of the Government of Lebanon, Donors and International Organizations to better understand the current response and more importantly their view for a recovery framework that could address the impact of crisis. Nine main topics emerged from these interviews, and reflect the response to the crisis:

- Flexibility of response
- Aid architecture
- Move towards further aid harmonization
- Emerging focus on host communities
- Government's increased engagement in the response
- Coordination efforts and mechanisms
- Current Implementation Frameworks
- Assistance modalities
- National and region-specific approaches

#### Component 3: Recovery framework for Wadi Khaled and Akroum.

- **Linking humanitarian response to longer-term development of the region through existing structures and programmes:**
  - This kind of approach leads to more stabilization and development in the regions.
  - Remember the pre-crisis local challenges that remain valid:
    - Weak public and private facilities
    - Lack of financial and human resources
    - Limitations in all sectors: health, social education, infrastructure, water, livelihood and education.
  - Avoid burdening humanitarian agencies and organizations with development programmes; especially due to their lack of experience in development and knowledge of the context.
  - Build on national development and humanitarian plans:
    - National Poverty Targeting Programme -MoSA already has plans to include Wadi Khaled and Akroum in the forthcoming activities through the local SDCs.
    - National Water Sector Strategy 2012
    - Lebanese host-communities support project – MoSA and UNDP

- UNDP stabilization programme –UNDP
- Roadmap for stabilization – GoL, WB and UN
- Regional Response Plan – GoL and UN
- Work through local governmental institutions in charge of Akkar Caza (starting with the assessment and design phase):
  - SDCs
  - Water establishment
  - Primary health clinics
  - Schools
- Build on existing regional development references:
  - CDR/ESFD local development plans
  - UNDP development programmes
- Empower and involve the local community in the humanitarian and longer-term development
  - Pre-crisis local community groups – UNDP
  - Local community groups (Lebanese and Syrian) – UNHCR –DRC-AND
- **Proposed short-term and development goals for Wadi Khaled and Akroum**
  - Short-term
    1. Reduce household expenditures on food and energy
    2. Improve livelihoods, create job opportunities and enhance people’s assets
    3. Enhance people’s access to healthcare services and reduce their vulnerability to epidemics and diseases
    4. Enhance people’s access to safe water
    5. Strengthen access to and quality of educational and separate Syrian and Lebanese students administratively and in terms of school shifts
    6. Upgrade basic infrastructure and provide municipalities with solid waste collection trucks, sewage tankers and electricity generators
    7. Promote community organization and civic action
  - Development goals
    1. Upgrading and development of basic infrastructure
    2. Promoting economic growth
    3. Improving health conditions
    4. Improving access to education
    5. Empowering municipalities & local community to participate in local development
    6. Environmental protection
- **Enhance the ownership and role of the national and local government**
  - Government should have a steering role in the suggested framework.
  - Appointment of representative from each concerned ministries to ensure more presence and participation to the local level planning and actions. These representatives should have delegated decision-making power.
  - Creation of a local committee composed of ministries’ representatives, municipalities, UN and international and national organizations.
  - Strengthen the role of Kaymakam and Muhafez of north.
  - Recovery fund should be upstream and monitored by the Ministry of Finance’s procedures for reporting cash grants in order to ensure transparency in public financial management and more accountability towards donors.
  - Consider LCPS’ recommendations for the government to address Lebanon’s socio-economic challenges:
    - Release municipal share of the Independent Municipal Fund (IMF) punctually every year and make the disbursement in one instalment as stated in decree 1917.
    - Limit all activities financed by the IMF which do not benefit all municipalities.
    - Release the USD 1.5-2 billion currently at the Ministry of Telecommunications which has been withheld from municipalities.
    - Engage with the private sector including banks to provide loans to creditworthy municipalities that wish to implement development projects.

- Raising awareness among community members on their obligations and the limitation of municipal capacity to respond to all needs.
- Fair allocation of governmental resources, giving priority to the most deprived regions.
- Apply administrative decentralization giving authority to municipalities and flexibility to deal with emergency situations and to receive donations and aid.
- Build the capacity of municipalities to be able to contribute to the immediate response and to be able to play the role of chief local development actor in longer – term interventions. This would include financial, human resources and technical assistance.
- Employ a fixed focal point (development officer) within each municipality to coordinate development and aid interventions. This person can coordinate with UN agencies the current interventions, guarantee continuity of development projects (regardless of the change in municipal council), monitor and supervise the ongoing projects and communicate with local community in a systematic way.
- Apply the Lebanese municipal law in relation to hiring a “municipal guide” responsible for working with municipalities to enhance development plans. This position has not been filled to date but could have a very positive impact.
- Encourage and support twinning programmes with other municipalities from other regions in Lebanon or in Europe.
- Support municipalities to contribute to the security and stability of the region.

- **Improve coordination and communication**

- A national strategic steering committee (PMO, representatives of central ministries, donor, UN, CDR, HRC, CB)
- Technical sectoral steering committees (related ministries and UN agencies and INGOs and NGOs)
- Regional coordination committee (regional representatives from ministries, UN, INGOs, NGOs and include local authorities – municipalities (development officer or municipal guide) and key local stakeholders )
- Coordination mechanisms and communication channels within the same committee and between all the committees to be defined and replicated at central and regional level.
- Related ministries should be more involved in the planning and coordination of the recovery phase.
- A unified information platform that allows sharing of information and avoids duplication to be elaborated including data from central and regional levels. All related ministries, donors, UN, organizations and regional stakeholders and beneficiaries would contribute to and make use of such tool. Existing platforms such as: UNHCR portal, OCHA humanitarian bulletin, Lebanon Support’s Daleel-Madani and Civil Society Knowledge center, are useful but should focus on analysis of information for better programming.

- **Ensure participatory approach in design and implementation**

- Involve the local communities in the assessment, design and implementation phase.
- New actors should coordinate with the local authorities, organizations and representative from ministries prior to starting any assessment or study in order to avoid duplication and waste of resources.
- Regional characteristics should be understood and integrated in the design interventions.
- Monitoring and evaluation must be planned to enable actors to measure the impact of their intervention.

- **Increase accountability and transparency**

- Government must put in place a transparent mechanism for donations and financial aid management. This would apply for UN, INGOs and NGOs municipalities and ministries and would convince more donors to provide additional support.
- Enhance the capacity of municipalities to monitor the work of IOs and NGOs
- Independent watchdog that can monitor and audit donors, INGOs , related ministries and municipalities
- Establish a conflict resolution committee at UNHCR that handles suggestions and



complaints from local communities regarding activities and staff of INGOs, municipalities or any other actor.

- Proper monitoring of field staff is desirable to guarantee good conduct, integrity, transparency and avoid corruption and favouritism.
  - Training and awareness sessions for INGO staff on communication, social skills, conflict prevention and local culture and habits.
  - New actors should understand the geographic scope (in this case Wadi Khaled and Akroum) and take this in consideration while planning and implementing.
  - Efficient and transparent criteria for distribution of resources and selection of beneficiaries must be ensured to reach the people most in need.
  - Improve monitoring of implementing partners and reporting focused on beneficiaries' satisfaction rates and the quality of end results rather than on services.
- **Improve efficiency and effectiveness of aid response**
    - Better investment of available fund for development purposes and decrease the high expenses on running cost, salaries and repetition of assessment and studies.
    - Better coordination among donors on funding implementing agencies.
    - Tackle the short-term relief needs for Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees while adopting a development approach.
    - Continue the distribution of food aid to maintain security in the region. Revival of agriculture sector could provide medium to long-term food security for Wadi Khaled and Akroum.
  - **Social Cohesion: Apply conflict-sensitive programming**
    - Assistance to Syrian refugees must factor in and measure support to Lebanese host families, increasing social cohesion. Fair equitable provision of assistance increase social cohesion between both communities.
    - Service delivery should target impoverished neighbourhoods where Syrian refugee communities live alongside lower-income Lebanese communities.
    - The choice of area of operation, staff and suppliers must be carefully chosen. Special focus should be in undeserved remote villages as well as villages without municipalities.
    - Organizations should deal in a respectful manner with local community and work with honesty, integrity and transparency.
    - Activities should be carried out in close coordination and cooperation with municipalities and properly communicated, including procedures and criteria for beneficiary selection. Proper and effective use of funds and called for and more participatory reflection with the local community on how best to invest available funding.
    - Boost local economy through purchase of local goods and creation of new jobs for local community.

## OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

### OBJECTIVES

With no clear and sustainable political solution to the Syria crisis in sight, it becomes vital to have medium- and longer-term strategies to tackle the consequences of a protracted crisis on displaced Syrians as well as on affected Lebanese host communities.

This report presents the findings from consultations facilitated by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation to better understand the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis and propose a way forward in addressing this crisis, focusing on Wadi Khaled and Akroum in Akkar, north Lebanon. Consultations with key national, international and local stakeholders aimed to first highlight how the international community and donors can best respond to locally identified priorities in the medium- and long-term as well as to identify mechanisms and modalities for interventions. Second, to recommend how government-led propositions for financing modalities can be translated into practice targeting a specific region. The final outcome is a recovery framework, using Wadi Khaled and Akroum as an example.

### METHODOLOGY

The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation undertook two consultancy missions:

- The first mission took place in October/November 2013 at the local level, and consisted of consulting with local authorities and key stakeholders from the community and organisations in Wadi Khaled and Akroum active in the response.
- The second mission was conducted in December 2013 at the national level, with donors, governmental entities and UN agencies.

#### The local consultation included:

A **situational analysis** conducted via desk review and content analysis of existing studies and assessments<sup>1</sup> on Wadi Khaled and Akroum and the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on the host communities in these areas, followed by a **mapping of key stakeholders and institutions** in both areas to define which key stakeholders to contact for the consultative meetings and workshops to be held.

**14 interviews** were conducted with 22 aid practitioners from **10 organizations** that carry out interventions in the area of Wadi Khaled and Akroum, including UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, Save the Children, Norwegian Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council, Premiere Urgence, Handicap International, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and Akkar Network for Development.

**Field visits and 26 focused meetings** were held with **36 key actors** from the community of Wadi Khaled and Akroum representing the different sectors, including mayors, deputy mayors, mukhtars, heads of community-based organizations, agricultural cooperatives, health dispensaries, school directors, teachers, religious figures, in addition to students and housewives. The meetings helped understand the impact of the crisis and the challenges faced by local authorities and communities.

**Workshop Wadi Khaled (20 October 2013):** 15 participants representing local authorities and key stakeholders from various sectors came together to define priority short-term action plans and development goals for the area of Wadi Khaled, using the findings of "Wadi Khaled Socio-Economic Needs Assessment and Local Development Strategy", of UNDP (2013) as a reference document to be validated and updated.

**Workshop Akroum (27 October 2013):** 18 participants representing local authorities and key stakeholders from various sectors came together to define priority short-term action plans and development goals for the area of Akroum, using the findings of "Local Development Plan for the community of Akroum cluster", of CDR-ESFD (2006) as basis to be validated and updated.

<sup>1</sup> Refer to Annex 3

**Joint workshop for Wadi Khaled and Akroum** (3 November 2013): 46 participants attended, consisting of mayors and key stakeholders from the community of Wadi Khaled and Akroum in the presence of the the Swiss Ambassador, UNDP, representatives from UNHCR and different ministries (MoSA, MEHE, MoPH). The objective was to establish a dialogue between both areas on their priorities and needs. The agenda of the workshop included:

- Presentations and validation of short-term action plans and development goals for both areas, followed by best practices and challenges of local authorities and community
- Developing recommendations to central government, international agencies and donors to improve humanitarian aid and local development efforts
- Forming working groups to exchange on how donors' trust in municipal abilities can be increased and how to improve communication and advocacy with key national counterparts, donors and international agencies.

#### **National consultation:**

**18 semi-structured interviews** were held in December 2013 with representatives of governmental entities, donors and international organizations to better understand the current response, challenges and more importantly their view for a recovery framework that could address the impact of the crisis in general and specifically in the region of Wadi Khaled and Akroum. These entities included delegates from EU; Embassies of U.S., U.K., Kuwait, Canada, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Australia, Sweden; Office of the Prime Minister, CDR, ESMF, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, HRC, OCHA, UNHCR, UNDP and UN ESCWA. Upon completion of all interviews, information generated was transcribed and analyzed. The emerging themes are presented in this report with contextual elaboration and stakeholder viewpoints.

**National Workshop** was held on 14 January 2014 in Beirut, bringing together 52 participants from governmental entities, donors and international agencies with local authorities and key stakeholders from the communities of Wadi Khaled and Akroum to elaborate a framework for recovery. The workshop consisted of:

- Presentation and discussion of the main findings of the regional and national consultations
- Presentation of the small-scale projects identified and prepared by the Danish Refugee Council and Akkar Network for Development.

#### **STRUCTURE**

The report is divided into three main components:

**Component 1:** Analysis of the desk review undertaken to assess the impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanese host communities with emphasis on Wadi Khaled and Akroum in North Lebanon. This component also highlights challenges faced by local authorities and communities in dealing with the response.

**Component 2:** Analysis of the in-depth interviews held with representatives of governmental entities, donors and international organizations, divided into the following eight themes:

- Flexibility of Response
- Aid Architecture
- Move towards further aid harmonization
- Emerging focus on host communities
- Government's engagement in the response
- Coordination efforts and mechanisms
- Current implementation frameworks
- Assistance modalities
- National and region-specific approaches

**Component 3:** Recovery framework for Akroum and Wadi Khaled including a proposed short-term action plan and development goals to promote socio-economic development of both areas. This includes recommendations to national counterparts, international agencies and donors on how to improve the current response framework and modalities as well as better tailor humanitarian aid and local development efforts to local needs.

The report concludes with a record of useful studies and assessments as well as a list of institutions and key stakeholders in Wadi Khaled and Akroum.






## IMPACT ON NATIONAL LEVEL


The conflict that started in Syria in March 2011 has resulted in one of the largest movements of people since the Second World War. As of Feb 2014, 2.5 million people had fled Syria into neighbouring countries seeking refuge.

Lebanon, a small and fragile country with an estimated population of 4.2 million people, has been bearing a significant proportion of the economic, political and social burden of the strife across its borders. Lebanon is hosting the largest number (37%) of displaced Syrians. In February 2014, UNHCR registered 934,895 Syrian refugees in Lebanon<sup>2</sup>. Refugees make up more than 20 percent of the population in Lebanon and, based on the situation in Syria, the current arrival trends are expected to continue which would result in the **Syrian refugee population in Lebanon reaching 1.5 million by end of 2014**<sup>3</sup>.



The Syrian crisis and refugee influx has brought with it many destabilizing consequences for Lebanon. This has put a huge strain on the country's already scarce resources and weak basic infrastructure and services. The sudden rise in population has dramatically increased the demand for public facilities and services such as electricity, water, sewage and waste management, while the quality of and access to education and health services have reportedly deteriorated, according to UN agencies and ministries, also for poor Lebanese.

## EQUITY IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION REACHING THE MOST VULNERABLE LOCALITIES IN LEBANON OCTOBER 2013



<sup>2</sup> UNHCR data: 23 February 2014 (<http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122>).

<sup>3</sup> According to estimates also made in the Syria Regional Response Plan - Lebanon, 2014.




Lebanon's economy was unprepared to absorb such a large number of refugees. A recent assessment by the World Bank and United Nations points to a **reduction in GDP growth by 2.85 % each year since the crisis began**. The economic impact is severe with an estimated loss of USD 7.5 billion in economic activity and the government deficit is expected to widen by USD 2.6 billion over the 2012-2014 period<sup>4</sup>.

The crisis also had a significant impact on the income and expenditure of host communities. Prices for basic necessities such as fuel and rental accommodation increased, while competition for jobs has become a source of tension between the host and refugee communities, with Syrians willing to work for considerably lower wages. According to the World Bank, up to 340,000 Lebanese, mainly youth and low-skilled workers, may be unemployed by end 2014 as a result, **pushing the unemployment rate to 20 %**.

Mapping data from October 2013 has revealed that the **vast majority of refugees (86%) live in 225 localities where most of the vulnerable Lebanese (66%) also reside**<sup>5</sup>. The settlement of refugees in these already deprived areas of high poverty rates is further deepening the vulnerability of the Lebanese and exacerbating socio-economic tensions as competition for jobs, services and resources increase<sup>6</sup>.

Around 1.2 million Lebanese citizens are thought to be affected by the displacement from Syria. The World Bank expects that around **170,000 Lebanese will be pushed into poverty by end 2014** as a result of the impact of the crisis. The Ministry of Social Affairs already registered a 40% increase in the utilization of its health and social programmes. Furthermore, it has noted a large increase in requests to the National Poverty Targeting Programme (NPTP) between December 2012 and March 2013 in the areas with the highest concentrations of poverty, demonstrating an increased vulnerability of Lebanese living in the same areas as refugees<sup>7</sup>.

### **IMPACT ON WADI KHALED AND AKROUM**



<sup>4</sup> Lebanon - Economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian conflict (ESIA), World Bank, September 2013.

<sup>5</sup> Equity in humanitarian action: Reaching the most vulnerable localities in Lebanon, October 2013, UNICEF, UNHCR, and Republic of Lebanon Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

<sup>6</sup> The MoSA has seen demand for its services increase and pressure mounting on its already stretched financial resources and capacity as a direct implication of its adopted policy of allowing refugees to access the services of its Social Development Centers.

<sup>7</sup> Increases in applications to the National Poverty Targeting Programme between December 2012 and March 2013: Beka'a 30 percent, North Lebanon 24 percent, Mount Lebanon 15 percent (Source: Lebanon - Economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian conflict (ESIA), World Bank, September 2013.

This report focuses specifically on the areas of Wadi Khaled and Akroum in Akkar: two extremely vulnerable areas in the far north-east of Lebanon, with an estimated population of 50,000 Lebanese<sup>8</sup>. **Akkar contains around 46% of the poorest Lebanese** in the country prior to the Syria crisis, struggling with high poverty rates<sup>9</sup>, limited livelihood opportunities and poor basic infrastructure and social services<sup>10</sup>.

This region has been especially affected by the crisis due to its close geographical proximity to the border and the familial, social, trade and business relations that link its inhabitants with their Syrian neighbours. **The initial thousands of refugees, who fled the conflict, took shelter in Lebanese villages and towns close to the border in Akkar**. In the absence of official camps, Lebanese individuals in this area showed great hospitality hosting refugees in their homes. The extended duration of the conflict – and thereby the extended hospitality for Syrian refugees – coupled with the burden of continuous increasing refugee movement has reached a point beyond the coping ability of hosting villages and towns.

**The areas of Wadi Khaled and Akroum, a cluster of 13 underserved municipalities (29 villages) with an estimated population of 50,000 people, have been hosting over 21,500 Syrian refugees; most of whom are living with Lebanese host families**<sup>11</sup>. On average, a Lebanese household in the region hosts some 7-8 refugees, and in few cases up to 25 refugees<sup>12</sup>. Clearly, such a situation of a high influx of refugees into an already vulnerable area cannot be sustained without significant support.

### **ECONOMIC IMPACT ON HOST COMMUNITIES**

The closure of the Syrian border has weighed heavily on the inhabitants of Wadi Khaled and Akroum, decreasing residents' access to cheaper goods and services in Syria and **hindering economic activity and cross-border trade**. Furthermore, fragile security conditions at the border disrupted the labour of many farmers as it hampered irrigation and access to agricultural lands. The economic effects were especially severe on the residents of Wadi Khaled who mainly rely on informal border commerce, unlike residents of Akroum, many of whom have steady public service incomes.

The influx of refugees has also led to an **increase in unemployment due to competition over jobs and local commerce**. This has been felt mostly by non-skilled and semi-skilled workers as well as those working in the agriculture and construction sector. Lebanese who own small local shops are confronted with Syrians accepting lower wages and opening new shops with competing prices. Furthermore, there are claims that some Syrian refugees sell surplus food and non-food items provided to them by aid agencies on the local market for lower prices.

Lebanese families have reported a decrease in wages and availability of jobs amounting to approximately 50% decrease in the total number of days worked per month and an almost **60% drop in wages**. This has been accompanied by escalating tension between Lebanese and Syrian refugees.

<sup>8</sup> Equity in humanitarian action: Reaching the most vulnerable localities in Lebanon, October 2013, UNICEF, UNHCR, and Republic of Lebanon Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

<sup>9</sup> 63.3 percent of the families in Akkar are living in poverty. Source: "Progress in the Living Conditions in Lebanon between 1995 and 2004," by the Ministry of Social Affairs and UNDP.

<sup>10</sup> "Forgotten Akkar: Socio Economic Assessment of the Akkar Region", Mada, 2008.

<sup>11</sup> UNHCR map of refugees in Akkar district (6 March 2014), <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/region.php?id=87&country=122>

<sup>12</sup> "Rapid Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Crisis on Socio-Economic Situation in North and Bekaa", Development Management International, July 2012.

The financial burden on households is further impacted by the cost of hosting Syrian refugees in their homes. Many hosts have cited an additional 230,000 Lebanese Pounds per month in expenditures on food, fuel and other household items. This situation has **exhausted host family resources**<sup>13</sup>. To cope with the financial consequences of the Syrian crisis and be able to maintain their hosting capacity, many Lebanese households have resorted to purchasing food on credit; reducing the quality of food; taking loans; spending from their savings; and selling assets<sup>14</sup>. Moreover, Lebanese families are now complaining that the area is almost saturated and that they are running out of space to host additional refugees<sup>15</sup>.

With the conflict continuing in Syria, **the number of Syrian refugees coming into the area is likely to continue**. Local stakeholders underlined the pressing need to ensure viable housing solutions for refugees. Some municipalities in Wadi Khaled expressed the need to establish refugee camps to reduce the burden on the local population.

### **ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF REFUGEES**

Livelihood assessments have shown that household expenses of Syrian refugees are much greater than income-earning opportunities. In June 2013, WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF surveyed 1,400 refugee households to assess vulnerability and found that 68% of them were entirely dependent on the assistance they were receiving, while a second or third year in exile would bring entrenched hardship and deprivation<sup>16</sup>. The vulnerability assessment further indicated that **at least 72% of the refugees will require continuous international assistance in 2014**.

The main expenditures reported by Syrian refugees include rent, cooking and heating fuel, food, and medical expenses. Coping strategies to deal with their financial expenditures often include taking on debt, sending children to work, and/or selling their assets<sup>17</sup>. In addition, Syrians have also opened businesses such as butcheries, vegetable shops and barber shops near those of Lebanese, with competing prices<sup>18</sup>.

### **IMPACT ON BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE**

The high influx of refugees into Wadi Khaled and Akroum has been translated into doubling of village populations, which is accompanied with **increased demand on already weak basic services and infrastructure**. Increased electricity cuts and water shortages have become the norm. There is a serious problem with waste management, as solid wastes are reaching very high levels, with insufficient municipality funds to collect and manage them. Solid wastes are often burned in the wilderness producing bad odours that affect both human health and environmental safety<sup>19</sup>. The municipality of Wadi Khaled currently produces 27 tons of solid waste per month, in comparison to only 9 tons prior to the crisis.

The high influx of refugees has also exhausted public funds and the municipal budget cannot handle the additional costs to collect the increased amount of solid waste and answer to these growing demands<sup>20</sup>. Many municipalities, like Wadi Khaled, need greater credit lines. **The World Bank estimated that about USD 11 billion will be required to counteract the negative impact of the refugee situation in 2014**<sup>21</sup>.

With regards to water supply, there had already been a deficiency in access to clean water due to a lack of proper installation of water storage tanks and reservoirs, obliging inhabitants to purchase water. This situation has now worsened with the influx of refugees<sup>22</sup>. **Both areas of Wadi Khaled and Akroum are faced with additional costs to purchase water** as needed and to fill water tanks. As for sewage, no operational wastewater network or treatment plant exists in these areas. Moreover, the high cost of emptying the septic tanks causes over-spilling and thereby high risk to public health.

### **ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES**

The health sector is severely strained. A survey showed that already in December 2012 some 40% of primary health treatments were for Syrian refugees. Challenges in meeting the demand has resulted in a sharp rise in communicable diseases, the emergence of new diseases not present in Lebanon prior to the crisis, and an increasing risk of epidemics. Depending on the refugee projection, **health care costs needed to restore the health system to its pre-refugee access and quality levels is estimated at USD 216-306 million in 2014**<sup>23</sup>.

Furthermore, access to basic health services for both host communities and refugees have been challenging. Inhabitants have reported a lack of access to cheaper hospitals in Syria as well as an inability to pay for health care on the Lebanese side of the border. Both constitute major barriers for access to health care<sup>24</sup>. In addition, many residents lack health insurance and social security, given that health insurance and social security is predominantly accessible only by people employed in the military sector or public services. **In 2013, MoSA noted a 40% increase in the utilization of its health and social programme. Around USD 176 million will be needed by end 2014** (of which USD 50 million to scale up the National Poverty Targeting Programme for poor and vulnerable Lebanese)<sup>25</sup>. This disadvantage in accessing health services has further increased the vulnerability of these populations<sup>26</sup>.

Although there are a number of dispensaries in the region of Wadi Khaled and Akroum (two public centers and four private ones), they are in poor condition, i.e. plagued by a lack of maintenance, non-functional equipment, and inadequate medical supplies. There is also a shortage in physicians<sup>27</sup>. **What makes access even worse for host communities is the prioritization of Syrian refugees over Lebanese patients in hospitals and health centers**. This is mainly due to the fact that these facilities have contracts with humanitarian organizations that support care to Syrian refugees, which in turn also leaves Lebanese residents unsatisfied and skeptical of the fairness of organizations' support<sup>28</sup>. Notwithstanding access to primary health care in all health care centers

<sup>13</sup> IRC & Save the Children, *Livelihoods Assessment Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2012.

<http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=885>

<sup>14</sup> "Rapid Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Crisis on Socio-Economic Situation in North and Bekaa", *Development Management International*, July 2012.

<sup>15</sup> NRC, *Host communities running out of space*, April 30 2013. <http://www.trust.org/item/20130430125150-z9lei/>

<sup>16</sup> *Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees*, WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, November 2013.

<sup>17</sup> IRC & Save the Children, *Livelihoods Assessment Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*, October 2012. <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=885>

<sup>18</sup> *Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis*, IRC, Save the Children, DRC, Oxfam, UK Aid, April 2013

<sup>19</sup> ADELNORD, *Local Development Plan for the cluster of Eastern Wadi Khaled*, March 2012, [http://www.cdr-adelnord.org/5/8/5/6/9/9/LDP-wadi\\_khaled\\_east-final-soft.pdf](http://www.cdr-adelnord.org/5/8/5/6/9/9/LDP-wadi_khaled_east-final-soft.pdf)

<sup>20</sup> Oxfam; *Survey on the livelihood of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*, November 2013; <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-bric-livelihoods-syrian-refugees-lebanon-211113-en.pdf>

<sup>21</sup> World Bank, *Lebanon: economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian conflict*; September 2013

<sup>22</sup> UNDP, *Wadi Khaled Socio-Economic Needs Assessment and Local Development Strategy*, 2013.

<sup>23</sup> World Bank, *Lebanon: economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian conflict*; September 2013.

<sup>24</sup> UNDP, *Wadi Khaled Socio-Economic Needs Assessment and Local Development Strategy*, 2013.

<sup>25</sup> Refer to footnote 24

<sup>26</sup> DMI, *Rapid Assessment of Impact of Syrian Crisis on Socio-Economic Situation in North and Bekaa*, August 2012, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrian-refugees/download.php?id=957>

<sup>27</sup> UNDP, *Wadi Khaled Socio-Economic Needs Assessment and Local Development Strategy*, 2013.

<sup>28</sup> DMI, *Rapid Assessment of Impact of Syrian Crisis on Socio-Economic Situation in North and Bekaa*, August 2012, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrian-refugees/download.php?id=957>



in Akkar for both consultation and medicine being free for Syrian refugees, many Syrian families have reported having had to pay fees. This has been linked to lack of information regarding their right to free access, shortage of drugs in village health centers and absence of medicine for chronic diseases<sup>29</sup>.

### **ACCESS TO EDUCATIONAL SERVICES**

Prior to the refugee crisis, Wadi Khaled and Akroum already had been suffering from poor quality of educational services. **The continuing influx of refugees from Syria has overwhelmed the absorption capacity of the public school system.** Schools suffer from overcrowded classrooms as well as inadequate facilities and supplies, which affect the students' learning environment. Without scaled-up support to public schools, the educational system risks becoming weaker, with the most disadvantaged Lebanese citizens bearing a disproportionate burden. Moreover, the number of available places in schools is far less than the number of Syrian refugee children of school age<sup>30</sup>.

At the beginning of the 2013-2014 school year, there were approximately 280,000 Syrian refugee children aged between 3-18 years registered with UNHCR in Lebanon, and 20,000 Palestine Refugee children from Syria. The Lebanese public school system currently caters for roughly 300,000 school-age children. MEHE has indicated that only an additional 90,000 children can be accommodated in the public school system in 2013-2014, with support from the international community. However, **based on projections, around 693,000 children (Syrians, Lebanese returnees and Palestine Refugees from Syria) will need access to education by end of 2014. Most will be outside the formal public system**<sup>31</sup>.

A prerequisite to increasing the capacity of public schools, to match the growing need, is the rehabilitation and modernization of the existing schools in the villages of Wadi Khaled and Akroum. The quality of education is relatively poor; most public schools lack necessary teaching material and equipment, and more importantly, many schools do not have qualified teachers<sup>32</sup>. Sources estimate that the cost to cover **administrative expenses, hourly wages, fees and book costs per pupil for second shift in a public school exceed \$650/year**<sup>33</sup>.

Furthermore, the **integration of Syrian students into the Lebanese curriculum has been a challenge for teachers, especially for French-taught subjects.** Consequently, the academic performance and achievement of both Lebanese and Syrian students has been jeopardized with an **increasing risk of school dropouts.**

In the North, residents' lack of ability to pay for educational services on the Lebanese side of the borders coupled with the lack of access to schools across the Syrian border have been main reasons for not sending children to school<sup>34</sup>.

### **GROWING DISSATISFACTION OF HOST COMMUNITIES**

Despite the generosity of Lebanese families, signs of increasing tension between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees have been surfacing; from shop keepers and traders petitioning

against refugees competing in local markets to residents blocking roads in protest of growing competition for jobs<sup>35</sup> to a few incidents of violence targeting refugees. Studies have also highlighted tensions between Lebanese and refugees in both community and school settings due to economic, social and cultural factors<sup>36</sup>. **Resources and charity funds previously available for disadvantaged Lebanese families having been diverted to Syrian refugees further exacerbating the frustration of affected host communities who feel neglected by international support.**

### **SECURITY SITUATION**

The overall security situation in Lebanon has deteriorated since the start of the Syrian Crisis. Unofficial curfews have been imposed on Syrian refugees by some municipalities who feel intimidated. The Ministry of Interior proposed the idea to create a national plan to support the municipalities in September 2013, including building the capacity of the municipal council and boosting the capabilities of the municipal police to help in maintaining security across Lebanon. It remains to be seen whether this will materialise.

**Both Wadi Khaled and Akroum communities have witnessed a decline in security.** Not only is this due to sporadic incidents involving heavy shelling and gunfire from the Syrian side of the border into Lebanon, which has seen the loss of over a dozen lives, but also due to political tensions that have been reported recently in Wadi Khaled. The area has witnessed increased skirmishes between Lebanese and Syrian residents and the Syrian army. The fact that there was **no police station in Wadi Khaled and only one in Akroum (with a shortage in staff and equipment) was mentioned as a major challenge by both communities.**

### **MUNICIPAL CHALLENGES IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS**

The high influx of refugees into the area of Akroum and Wadi Khaled triggered a situation greater than any even well-established municipality could have handled. The municipalities of Wadi Khaled and Akroum, most of which are relatively new and inexperienced, have received limited financial, organizational or human capacity support to deal with such a crisis. Nevertheless, mayors and municipal councils in this region are actively involved in responding to the crisis, showing high interest in the wellbeing of their residents and in improving basic infrastructure and the economic climate in their area. **With their limited resources and capacities, local authorities are struggling to meet communication and coordination demands of organizations engaged in the humanitarian aid response.** This leads to frustrations on both sides. At the same time, the delay in transfer of municipal funds by the central government and the lack of commitment on the part of citizens to pay municipal taxes further decreases the financial ability of municipalities.

<sup>29</sup> *Prèmière Urgence, Syrian Refugees in Akkar: Assessment Report, May-August 2012.* <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=921>

<sup>30</sup> *Syria Regional Response Plan 5*

<sup>31</sup> *Syria Regional Response Plan 6*

<sup>32</sup> *UNDP, Wadi Khaled Socio-Economic Needs Assessment and Local Development Strategy, 2013.*

<sup>33</sup> *Al-Safir-Lebanon's public schools open doors to Syrian refugees-Nov 17, 2013*

<sup>34</sup> *DMI, Rapid Assessment of Impact of Syrian Crisis on Socio-Economic Situation in North and Bekaa, August 2012,* <http://data.unhcr.org/syrian-refugees/download.php?id=957>

<sup>35</sup> *Growing anger against INGOs from local communities in Wadi Khaled (road blockage – protest against INGOs) have been observed. These have been mainly linked to demands from local Lebanese citizens to be employed by the INGOs.*

<sup>36</sup> *UNDP conflict assessment undertaken in the Wadi Khaled area in late 2012.*



## From Local consultations

The new municipalities in Wadi Khaled are inexperienced with municipal and community work, they have little awareness regarding municipal role and mandate. In addition, they **lack the know-how in demanding benefits and services from central government**. In Akroum, municipalities are a bit more structured and have more experience in dealing with ministries. However, in Wadi Khaled, most mayors and municipal members lack the required **technical and organizational skills** to fulfill their mission effectively.

Given the basic educational level and lack of capacity of some municipal members, decision-making is often centralized and most responsibilities fall on the shoulders of the mayor and / or deputy, increasing their workload and causing a monopoly in power.

Both areas also mentioned municipalities' **weakness in attracting donors and funding** as a major challenge, due to their lack of knowledge on donor policies, procedures and requirements and their weak capacity to communicate, fundraise, write proposals and manage budgets.

Another challenge lowering municipalities' access to funds is the **difference in mentality and working methods between INGOs and municipalities**, as well as donors' and INGOs' lack of trust in the municipal capacities to properly handle funds and run projects.

Municipalities also mentioned that they are under great pressure from their community due to high expectations and demands that are coupled with a total lack of awareness on the part of the local community regarding the role and limitations of municipalities.

The lack of **volunteering spirit** in local communities further limits municipalities' access to support.

## **COMPONENT** **2** **RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS - ANALYSIS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, DONORS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

The series of consultative meetings and in-depth interviews with representatives of the Government of Lebanon, Donors and International Organizations have highlighted several issues on the reality of aid and response to the impact of the Syria crisis. These issues were grouped into nine themes presented in this chapter.


**FLEXIBILITY OF RESPONSE**

One of the key characteristics in the early phases of the response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon was the flexibility at different levels, including international agencies, donor countries and institutions and coordination bodies. **The flexibility was seen at both implementation and funding mechanisms, despite the gulf between humanitarian and development sources of money.** Such flexibility was necessitated by the changing dynamic of the crisis. For example, assistance during the early waves of refugees was focused on urgent issues, such as food assistance, immediate hygiene, and baby kits. As the crisis extended in scope and duration, the needs shifted more to issues such as shelter, water and sanitation; and then with time to issues such as gender based violence, child protection, educational and health needs. The heavy winter storm that hit the eastern Mediterranean region in December 2013 required immediate action as well.

**Snapshot of the Syria Regional Response Plan since 2012**


Plan	Date of Appeal lunch	Budget (USD)	Funded at end of the respective appeal	No. of Refugees	Time period
RRP 1	23 March 2012	84.1 million		96,500	March-September 2012 (6 months)
RRP 2	30 June 2012	193 million	29%	185,000	March-December 2012 (9 months)
RRP 3	27 September 2012	487.9 million	51%	710,000	March-December 2012 (9 months)
RRP 4	19 December 2012	1 billion		1 million	January-June 2013 (6 months)
RRP 5	7 July 2013	2.98 billion	70%	3.59 million	July-December 2013 (6 months)
RRP 6	16 December 2013	3.74 billion	37%	3.5 million	January-December 2014 (12 months)

**Top 10 Donors Kuwait Conference II commitments (USD)**



37

**Funding by Country / Sector**



38


<sup>37</sup> Financial Tracking Services (fts.unocha.org)

<sup>38</sup> RRP5 preliminary year-end report 30 November 2013

Stakeholders involved in the response must be given credit for their flexible approach in dealing with such changing dynamics. On multiple occasions, financial support had to be drawn from contingency funds or allocated into different items with full support from donors. Similarly, operational priorities had to be shifted. For example, stockpiles had to be deployed at times to respond to issues for which they were not originally intended.

In 2013, the scale and speed of influx of displaced Syrians to Lebanon was overwhelming: growing from under 150,000 refugees from Syria in January 2013 to over 934,895 in February 2014. Humanitarian agencies, donors as well as Lebanese governmental entities expressed being overwhelmed by this sudden increase of over 500%.

### UNHCR Lebanon - Refugee Influx April 2013 - March 2014



The RRP5 appeal was adjusted and upgraded from USD 267 million to USD 2.9 billion<sup>39</sup>, Source: Financial Tracking Service (fts.unocha.org), donor and recipient organization reports. requesting more funds to answer the growing humanitarian demands. Many donors have answered to this appeal and by 31 December 2013, the RRP5 was funded by 70 percent (USD 2.1 billion)<sup>40</sup>. Source: "How humanitarian funds for the Syria Crisis were spent, 2013 – SHARP and RRP", United Nations, 2013. On 30 January 2013 - First International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria. 43 Member States pledged USD1.5 billion towards humanitarian efforts. On 15 January 2014 - Second International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria. RRP5 funds were mostly used to provide life-saving assistance including.

<sup>39</sup> Source: Financial Tracking Service (fts.unocha.org), donor and recipient organization reports.  
<sup>40</sup> Source: "How humanitarian funds for the Syria Crisis were spent, 2013 – SHARP and RRP", United Nations, 2013. On 30 January 2013 - First International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria. 43 Member States pledged USD1.5 billion towards humanitarian efforts. On 15 January 2014 - Second International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria

### Syria Regional Response Plan 6

By end February 2014, only 14% of the total appeal was funded. The total appeal is USD 1.7 billion for the inter-agency response across eight sectors. This includes USD 80 million presented by the Government of Lebanon (GoL) with UNDP and WFP as well as USD 165 million presented by the Government for health, education, protection and social cohesion/livelihoods activities. The RRP 6 has been developed jointly by the GoL, UN agencies and NGO partners aiming to be consistent with complementary initiatives, such as the GoL's National Roadmap for Stabilization and the No Lost Generation Initiative.

- The response includes:**
- prioritization and targeted assistance across all sectors
  - the introduction of new programming efficiencies
  - enhanced capacity for government institutions impacted the most by the refugee influx and support to hosting communities, prioritizing areas with both high concentrations of Lebanese poor and high numbers of refugees from Syria.
- Targeted Beneficiaries**
- 1.5 million Syrian refugees,
  - 100,000 Palestine Refugees from Syria,
  - 50,000 Lebanese returnees, and
  - 1.5 million affected Lebanese.

Source: <http://fts.unocha.org> (Table ref: R3), as of 24/March/2014

### AID ARCHITECTURE





The interviews with stakeholders have shown that there are currently multiple aid modalities and structures. **Chief among these is the financial aid channeled to multilateral agencies** that are providing humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees such as the UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF within the inter-agency response.

**Other aid modalities include direct implementation**, as it is the case with Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) that has been providing, among other interventions, one of the first direct cash support to Lebanese host families in Wadi Khaled and Akroum district<sup>41</sup>. In the same vein, some donors have opted for direct funding of local networks and local non-governmental organizations (NGO), mostly the modus operandi of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) donor states. Many Western donors have mechanisms that directly fund NGOs and municipalities.

**Bilateral support in the form of budget support to the GoL has been rare mainly due to the fact that Lebanon is considered a middle-income country.** Moreover, some donors mentioned the Lebanese government's non-compliance with the conditions for financial support, such as proper financial management, accountability, transparency and feasibility, as a factor for the absence of financial support. The Government counters this argument by highlighting existing procedures to receive bilateral, co-financing and multi-donor trust funds. The Ministry of Finance since August 2011 has procedures for reporting cash grants in General Budget and the Treasury. Those were developed to ensure transparency in public financial management. Bilateral support to the government still has to go through the Council of Ministers for approval and given how often they meet or unanimously decide, this remains a major hurdle for donors.

Bilateral support in the form of technical assistance is carried out for example by the EU to CDR and OMSAR. While the latter partnership between the EU and GoL started earlier than the Syrian crisis, it continued to include interventions that address the impact of the crisis.

In relation to the impact of the crisis, **almost all of the donors expressed their ongoing preference to support the humanitarian response, through multilateral funding of UN agencies, IOs or INGOs.** Donors prefer the multilateral track as it allows for better and centralized coordination, enhanced accountability mechanisms and flexibility. For some donors, their respective governments mandate such an approach.

While the multilateral approach is understandable given the need of IOs and UN organizations at times of crises, there was dissatisfaction with such an approach at all levels of governmental entities (central, ministerial, municipal) dealing with the crisis. The dissatisfaction stemmed from the fact that these governmental entities are bearing, with little support to date, a significant load of the humanitarian response, such as the strained infrastructural resources (electricity, solid waste, water, health, education). Governmental representatives did not doubt the positive contribution and role of direct support to refugee communities. However, **there are concerns on the lack of sufficient, if any, support through bilateral channels.**

Even if Lebanon is categorized as a middle-income country, the effects of refugee crisis threaten that Lebanon fall into further fragility and poverty. The current response mechanism becomes inadequate. **The silos between humanitarian and development need to be broken down to deal with an unprecedented protracted crisis that threatens the existence of Lebanon and that may lead to a complex emergency.** This requires that donors stay engaged with flexible financial instruments and longer-term planning. One example is the EU adapted stability instrument.

In an effort to attract funds to support the Lebanese Government to cope with the impact of the Syrian crisis and the increased demand on its services, the Lebanese government in conjunction

with the World Bank and the UN launched in November 2013, the **“Lebanon Roadmap of Priority Interventions for Stabilization from the Syrian Conflict”** to address the most critical economic and social impacts of the crisis on Lebanon along four tracks. A Multi-Donor Trust Fund has been set up for Lebanon as an additional mechanism for channeling donor support to the Lebanese government. As a World Bank-administered fund, it is supposed to reassure donors. The aim is **to mobilize up to USD 400 million to support the short-term increase in spending by Lebanese public institutions, such as healthcare, education and sanitation services.**

### Roadmap of Priority Interventions for Stabilization From the Syrian Conflict

#### Stabilization priorities include:

- Strengthening public health systems and surveillance
- rehabilitation of schools; strengthening national education systems
- support to the **National Poverty Targeting Programme**
- enhancing the capacity of Social Development Centres
- **Lebanese Host Communities Support Project**
- fostering peace-building mechanisms to mitigate tensions in areas hosting refugees
- Meeting urgent water and sanitation needs and support to municipal waste management

**Opinions of consulted donors regarding the MDTF varied considerably.** Three donors expressed commitment to fund the Roadmap through the MDTF, with a special interest in track one and two. Three others are awaiting their governments' decision, while two donors showed skepticism regarding how the money will be used. They preferred to wait and see if the MDTF proves effective or not. In general most interviewed stakeholders had some concerns about proper spending of the funds and there is still uncertainty on how the Trust Fund will be operationalized.

#### Roadmap will strengthen the following (Poverty and Social Safety Net):

- **Lebanese Host Communities Support project (LHCS) and Community Social Development (CSD) (Tracks 1 and 3 of Roadmap)**  
Launched on 4 March 2013 by MoSA and UNDP. Objectives are to strengthen municipal services, livelihoods and social cohesion in affected communities. LHSP is complementary to CSD project at MoSA which finances community-based sub-projects through grants and is central to its 2011 National Social Development Strategy. Starting with the immediate LHSP, building effective CSD-type interventions will pave the way to transform MoSA from a Ministry of Social Affairs to a Ministry of Social Development. The complementarities with the National Poverty Targeting Programme (NPTP) are high.
- **Scale-up of the National Poverty Targeting Programme (Track 1 of Roadmap)**  
Established in October 2011 by MoSA. It is the first programme for the poorest and most vulnerable Lebanese families. It is based on the proxy means testing targeting mechanism and covers benefits in health and education. Coverage in 2013 was 93,900 beneficiaries. Plans exist to upscale the NPTP through the MDTF to reach 300,000 people in 2014-2015.
- **Enhance the administrative and operational capacity of Social Development Centres (SDCs) (Roadmap - Track 1)**  
MoSA as the main government entity responsible for the provision of social safety nets and reaching some 350,000 beneficiaries annually provides social services to specific categories of vulnerable groups, either through its SDCs, or through contracting of NGOs or social welfare institutions. SDCs offer health services, childcare, youth services and women empowerment activities.

Several respondents stressed that the MDTF should not be the only funding option. **Some donors for political reasons decide not to fund the current government and welcome additional funding mechanisms** to help address Lebanon's immediate and longer-term structural and development needs, for example through the UNDP Stabilization and Recovery Programme.

### **MOVE TOWARDS FURTHER AID HARMONIZATION**

There seems to be harmony among donors in the areas they fund in the context of humanitarian response to Syrian refugees with an **emphasis on child protection, food aid, shelter and winterization**. This was noticed among the bigger donors such as the US, ECHO and the UK. The regional response plans are indeed mechanisms that help in the harmonization of aid. However, stakeholders noted that most of the funding at this stage is directed towards a humanitarian response.

The international community implemented a range of humanitarian support interventions for the refugees that included some benefits for host communities; however, these efforts have remained largely secondary under RRP 5. **But as the refugee influx amplified in mid-2013 and refugee numbers approached one million, spread in more than 1600 localities in Lebanon, mainly hosted in the most deprived communities, the negative impact of this influx becomes evident**. The protracted nature of the Syria crisis and its impact on the surrounding countries has galvanized an international consensus that this is not only a political and humanitarian crisis but also a development crisis. The majority of interviewed stakeholders have noted the **importance of adding a greater focus on stabilisation and development funds that would reduce host community burdens**.

It is a crisis that challenges operational approaches and coordination mechanism. Development Assistance Committee (DAC) stresses the need for better harmonization of aid and coordination so as to avoid duplication. **Implicit is the question of efficiency and effectiveness of aid and the set-up required to ensure optimal delivery methods**. With almost one million refugees spread all over the country, there needs to be a revision of bulk assistance and a move towards a monetized form of multi-sectorial assistance based on credible vulnerability criteria. Moreover, **material assistance needs to be complemented by a focus on local recovery in host communities given that Lebanon hosts the highest per capita refugee population on earth with around 1.2 million vulnerable Lebanese who are further affected by the crisis**. The presence of 24 UN agencies and over 70 INGOs may speak for capacity in the early stages of the response. But in a protracted context and with dwindling funds over time, this may not be optimal in reducing operational costs. In terms of sustaining assistance, **priority needs to be given to national NGOs – many of whom have first-hand experience from the civil war (and subsequent wars) as well as post-crisis Lebanon and can better bridge between emergency assistance and recovery**.

### **EMERGING FOCUS ON HOST COMMUNITIES**

As alluded to in an earlier section, the main focus of humanitarian response has mostly been directed towards refugees from Syria. In the absence of official camps, host communities played a critical role in absorbing the refugee influx during the early phases of the crisis. In many regions, including Wadi Khaled and Akroum, the familial and social linkages were a key factor in Syrian families fleeing to this area and local communities providing shelter and basic needs. However, with time, it was clear that the magnitude of the needs is beyond what a local community can provide, necessitating support from the government and aid agencies. During the last months, the local resources of many communities became strained and there was an increasing dissatisfaction among vulnerable Lebanese communities and **a growing dissent directed towards humanitarian assistance agencies and donors for their lack of support for host communities**. It is fortunate in that it was not directed towards Syrian refugees - so far very little and sporadic cases have been

reported in Wadi Khaled and Akroum of conflict between refugees and their host communities. Tensions have arisen more between Lebanese families and their municipalities.

To prevent social tension, donors, multilateral agencies and INGOs have been increasingly focusing on host communities. Recent discussions and plans, for example **RRP6, factor in programmes and services targeting host communities at different levels**. One specifically sound approach is to invest in sustainable development of host communities that would benefit refugees and local residents even after the crisis ends. **Clear examples are enhancing the capacities of educational and health infrastructure to absorb the additional beneficiaries**. Ongoing discussions between the government and donors are focusing on mechanisms to adopt given the political and administrative challenges on the supporting end (donors and implementation agencies) and the receiving end (municipalities, ministries and the central government).

In relation to the growing awareness on the need to invest in the host community, a **Task Force on Support to Host Communities** was formed in October 2012, co-chaired by UNDP and UNHCR, together with the Prime Minister's Office and MoSA, bringing together more than 30 partner UN, NGO and Government organizations concerned with the increasingly critical impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanese communities from social, economic and security perspectives. The Taskforce's mission is to enhance coordination and information sharing as well as support strategic planning, advocacy and communication efforts. Monthly meetings are being held and so far the Task Force developed an indicative strategic framework highlighting **three priority areas of intervention, namely: livelihoods and income generation, basic service delivery and social cohesion**.

On 4 March 2013, MoSA in coordination with UNDP launched the **Lebanese Host Communities Support Programme**<sup>42</sup>, an emergency initiative aiming at supporting vulnerable Lebanese host communities struggling to cope with the tremendous burden in an already harsh socio-economic environment. The programme seeks **to strengthen municipal services, livelihoods and social cohesion in affected communities**.

In the same line, UNDP launched in September 2013 its **Stabilization and Recovery Programme**<sup>43</sup>, which aims to support the resilience of vulnerable host communities, promote peace building and conflict prevention, while also strengthening the capacity of key national institutions to coordinate recovery and manage the response to the crisis. Part of the funding for this programme will be covered by the RRP6. This stabilization instrument of UNDP/GoL was found promising by many stakeholders but was perceived as a delayed response.

<sup>42</sup> <http://arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/presscenter/articles/2013/03/04/launching-of-the-lebanese-host-communities-support-programme-.html>

<sup>43</sup> Source: "Resilience Based Development Response to the Syrian Crisis", UNDP, December 2013.

### UNDP Lebanon Stabilization and Recovery Programme (September 2013)

#### GOAL 1: Fostering the Resilience of Vulnerable Host Communities

**Output 1:** Livelihood, employment and economic opportunities increased

**Output 2:** Local capacity strengthened to deliver basic services through participatory and inclusive approaches

**Output 3:** Living conditions in Palestinian gatherings improved

**Output 4:** Mitigating the environmental impact of the crisis

#### GOAL 2: Promoting Peace Building and Conflict Prevention

**Output 5:** Local mechanisms for peaceful co-existence and conflict resolution strengthened

#### GOAL 3: Strengthening the Capacity of Key National Institutions for Recovery Coordination and Crisis Management and Response

**Output 6:** Increased government capacity for crisis management and response

**Output 7:** Enhanced stability and conflict prevention through support to the “Civil-Military Coordination Programme” (CIMIC) of the Lebanese Armed Forces

**Output 8:** Programme Management, Implementation Support, Advocacy and Partnerships

Another instrument proposed by the Lebanese government to channel direct assistance to the most vulnerable Lebanese, is the existing **National Poverty Targeting Programme**. **Launched in October 2011 by MoSA, it was the first poverty-targeted social assistance for the poorest and most vulnerable Lebanese families.** It is based on the proxy means testing targeting mechanism and offers benefits such as: payment of the beneficiary portion of health bills in public and private hospitals; coverage of chronic disease prescription medications through the MoSA Social Development Centers; and registration fee waivers and free books for students in primary and secondary public schools. It is planned that this Social Security Net will be scaled up through USD 50 million funding from the Roadmap to cover 300,000 beneficiaries among the Lebanese vulnerable between 2014 and 2016.

There are stabilization components in the Roadmap as well as RRP6 and UNDP Stabilization and Recovery Programme (the latter being funded through RRP6). The Roadmap funds NPTP and Social Development Centres of MoSA as well as the LHSP.

Obviously with a **multitude of proposed instruments, many donors are apprehensive about overlap and duplication. There is demand for a more streamlined coordination that clarifies the linkages among the various instruments.**

### GOVERNMENT'S ENGAGEMENT IN THE RESPONSE

The **governmental entities were a little late to engage in operational efforts** for several reasons. The first and strategic reason is the **governmental position of the “policy of disassociation” from the Syria crisis.** This policy meant that governmental entities could not formally engage in large-scale humanitarian assistance, and thus hampered their leading responsibility in the humanitarian response. The second reason was linked to the political landscape in Lebanon. There was a **lack of consensus on how to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis**, ranging from closure of borders, building refugee camps to an open door laissez-faire policy. Such political divergence caused confusion among governmental entities that could not actively engage in humanitarian response efforts with lack of national consensus. Thirdly, **lack of clarity about the scale and duration of the crisis coupled with slow governmental engagement translated into delayed implementation.** The fourth reason is bureaucracy that is **exacerbated by a care-taking government**, hence the reduced ability to engage in strategic decisions related to the response.

The unexpected rise in the number of refugees in 2013 obliged the government's leadership to respond to the refugee crisis and step up its role.

### Mandated Government Actors

- **Prime Minister Office, Central Bank and Council for Development and Reconstruction** lead the inter-ministerial committee and together with the World Bank lead the roadmap steering committee.
- **Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA)** is mandated to lead the planning and implementation of shelter, primary health care and psycho-social programmes.
- **Higher Relief Commission (HRC)** is responsible to address the needs of Lebanese returnees from Syria
- **Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE)** is engaged with UNICEF, UNHCR and UNESCO to ensure an inclusive education policy.
- **UN agencies and NGOs** are working with the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) to address urgent health needs.
- **Ministry of Finance** to receive and report on bilateral grants in General budget and Treasury.
- **Ministry of Interior and Municipalities** is responsible for establishing regional security plans and cells.

### COORDINATION EFFORTS AND MECHANISMS

In March 2011, the Government of Lebanon established a tripartite committee that was headed at the time by the High Relief Council in partnership with the Ministry of Social Affairs and the UNHCR. This committee was supposed to supervise any aid directed towards the Syrian refugees<sup>44</sup>.

**Since 2013, MoSA has been mandated to coordinate the refugee response in the country and through their 212 Social Development Centres, albeit not all of them active.** It has established an inter-agency coordination structure, which it co-leads with the UNHCR. The coordination structure seeks to ensure efficiency and equity of response from the central level. However, given the need to involve all relevant ministries, **the inter-ministerial steering committee in the Prime Minister's Office needs to be reinforced.**

At the local level, MoSA has assigned sub-regional coordinators to act as focal points representing the Ministry in local coordination structures. Those sub-regional coordinators will liaise with international organizations and NGOs operating in the regions under their responsibility. At the time of writing this report, the work of the local coordinators had not been put in practice but eventually it would enhance efficiency at the local level.

**UNHCR holds sectoral coordination meetings at central and local levels** (WASH, Education, Shelter, Protection, Health, Food security and Agriculture, Basic needs Non-Food Items, Social Cohesion and Livelihood). Nevertheless there is a weakness in communication flow between local and central levels which does not always reach those involved in planning and steering.

**The local sectoral meetings are hardly attended by local authorities and community representatives.** Competition between different agencies about the existing funds sometimes limits the coordination effectiveness during those sectoral meetings.

All consulted stakeholders, at the local or central level, in addition to governmental entities unanimously agreed that the passive role of the government in the crisis response and the absence of a national strategy to deal with the refugee crisis has negatively affected aid interventions and coordination. They all stressed on the **need for the government to take the lead in coordinating the response and developing a master plan.**

<sup>44</sup> Abu Faour: High relief committee responsible for Syrian refugees (October 2011). Now Lebanon.



All consulted stakeholders including governmental entities unanimously agreed that proper coordination remain a big challenge. They stressed on **the need to improve coordination mechanisms at both central and local levels in horizontal and vertical directions**. The lack of coordination between different ministries was also hindering effectiveness of response. There is a need to increase the engagement and leadership of concerned ministries. The **lack of coordination in funding and planning between different donors has also resulted in duplication and irrelevant interventions**.

Moreover, CDR and ESFD stressed on the **weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation of aid and interventions** and called for a mechanism to ensure that activities are done in an efficient and comprehensive way. They also mentioned the lack of framework that would identify priorities and hence the logic of selecting some projects to implement as opposed to others.


Within a deteriorating humanitarian situation, multiplicity of actors, security issues and a continuously evolving humanitarian context in Lebanon, **information and communication remain key**. A persistent challenge is how to develop and coordinate information tools for improved data-sharing and exchanges as well as managing multi-sectoral activities, assessments and impact monitoring. What is essential is making use of the collective knowledge of governmental, UN, national and international organisations and **churning data into analysis that can inform programming**. Indeed, many efforts have been made. Inter-agency information management and coordination foras exist as well as webportals: UNHCR webportal (including Activity Info), UNRWA updates, OCHA humanitarian bulletin, including Financial Tracking System (FTS), LIHF Forum, Lebanon Support, ACAPs/SNAP. Lebanon Support, a national NGO, established in 2006, has been acting as an online space to facilitate aid-related information sharing and management, as well as to foster cooperation and partnerships between the different bodies involved in relief and recovery activities in Lebanon. It currently provides information and knowledge services to more than 1,300 organizations through its two main portals: Daleel Madani (daleel-madani.org) and the Civil Society Knowledge Center (cskc.daleel-madani.org).

However, there remains a **large gap for a comprehensive information management system incorporating all related entities, including ministries, NGOs and “non-traditional” donors and organisations as well as stakeholders and beneficiaries in the regions** in one platform. A large part of the problem relates to weak integration and coordination, sensitivities associated with gathering and sharing information on the affected population as well as restricted access to the field.

The diagram below illustrates the varying stakeholders and their involvement in the established coordination mechanisms and programmes :



- GoL mechanism/programmes**
- Roadmap for stabilization and Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MTDF)
  - Lebanon Stabilization and Recovery Programme
  - Lebanon Host Community Support Programme (LHCS)
  - Lebanon Recovery Fund (LRF)
  - National Poverty Targeting Programme (NPTP)
  - Community Social Development project
  - Local Development Plans and Programmes
  - Regional Response Plan 6 (RRP6)
  - Lebanese Returnees emergency
  - Response plan for PRS



### CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORKS

The stakeholder analysis revealed that **most humanitarian assistance implementation, including that to host communities, is being conducted through international and nongovernmental organizations (IOs and NGOs).** For IOs, that is mostly attributed to the mandate and extensive experience of such organizations (e.g. UNHCR, WFP) in dealing with humanitarian crisis. As for local NGOs, their active participation in the assistance efforts stemmed from their knowledge of the local context and their flexible governance and operational structures compared to governmental entities.

With the increased role of government in response coordination and the interest in supporting the host communities, there was a near consensus among stakeholders on the **need to implement through the existing governmental/public structures both central and local.** The NPTP was seen as a suitable existing structure to target the vulnerable Lebanese population<sup>46</sup>. Similarly, the move to strengthen some of the 212 MoSA's Social Development Centers and enhance existing public schools and primary health care centers was arguably an effective and efficient way of implementing interventions. Although such a move would surely require an upgrade of the existing structures and capacity building of staff, it is essentially more sustainable and would enhance the ownership of government. Reinforcing such implementation framework is desirable, in terms of cost effectiveness and sustainability but

would require the implementing partners to fulfill conditions such as good governance, transparency, effective budget management and reporting. **Some donors expressed their concern on the ability of existing governmental/public structures to meet the needed administrative and financial requirements and perform quality implementation** according to international standards.

### ASSISTANCE MODALITIES

There are ongoing discussions among stakeholders on assistance modalities to refugees. According to RRP6, **programming efficiencies include the centralized procurement of medications; a focus on lower-cost high-impact non-formal education opportunities; the identification and development of additional shelter options by local authorities and a move to provision of assistance through cash transfer including food.** Humanitarian partners are planning to expand and harmonize cash assistance programme, with the aim of delivering a multi-sectoral and comprehensive package of assistance through a single ATM card. **Given the wide dispersal of the displaced population, the move from in-kind distribution to unconditional cash assistance is expected to bring cost efficiencies.** First, cash will empower beneficiaries to use assistance in a way that best meets their needs. Second, it also increases operational efficiency as it entails less administrative costs especially given the responsiveness of the commodities market. Most items needed by the refugees can be purchased from the local market, compared to humanitarian responses in other parts of the world where there is a need to transport aid into the country. Third, it injects resources into the local economy. According to WFP, every USD 1 investment accrues USD 1.2 in benefits. As for the vulnerable host communities, the National Poverty Targeting Programme for vulnerable Lebanese families could be a mechanism for direct cash support. It would build on a government national safety net and can include transfer of tools and knowledge.

There are concerns whether leaving aid assistance (such as food, NFIs, shelter,) to market conditions might overexpose refugees to fluctuations in prices and market dynamics, although the experience in Lebanon confirms that the local context is very well suited for cash modalities. **The private sector is well developed and demonstrates readiness to be involved in cash transfers despite limitations in some regions where market mechanisms may not yet be fully developed.** An important note is that cash is a modality, not a sector. Some interventions such as in education and health may not be suitable for cash modalities and will continue to be directly delivered by partners.

### NATIONAL AND REGION-SPECIFIC APPROACHES

Approaching the refugee crisis from a national perspective is important for coordination and harmonization of aid, smart allocation of resources and flexibility in funding and implementation. Moving forward, it seems that the direction is to have a **mixed approach with central coordination and execution of national plans combined with focused interventions in affected areas based on needs.** It was obvious from the early phases that targeted regions in Lebanon, most notably in the Bekaa and North (including Wadi Khaled and Akroum) needed focused interventions. Several agencies under the inter-agency response have established regional offices in these areas to better assess and coordinate assistance efforts.

The CDR-UNDP regional development programmes, as well as that of Economic and Social Fund for Development (ESFD), were suggested as suitable structures to facilitate regional-specific approaches, especially in the Bekaa and North.

Focused and tailor-made interventions at the sub-regional/local levels were seen as only logical albeit challenging given the under-resourced municipalities hosting the vast majority of the Syrian

<sup>46</sup> World Bank, Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict, September 2013.

refugees. This is the case in point as a recent mapping exercise has shown that 86% of the registered refugee population and 66% of vulnerable Lebanese live side-by-side in 225 localities. The assumption is that these **225 localities fall under the jurisdiction of under-resourced and under-staffed municipal and local authorities. They are expected to play the role of 'first responders', but as elected bodies they have to deal with dissatisfied and much in need host communities** (discussed as a separate theme in this report).

A study by the Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies (LCPS) has made policy recommendations for region-specific initiatives and investments to be directed at regional development in infrastructure, water, waste treatment, electricity, among others, in regions, which were already vulnerable prior to the Syrian crisis<sup>47</sup>. **There are around 1,000 municipalities, 80% of which are administratively weak and have few resources.** LCPS recommends the following: First that the government releases their share of the Independent Municipal Fund (IMF) punctually every year and makes the disbursement in one installment as stated in decree 1917. Second, the central government ought to limit all activities financed by the IMF which do not benefit all municipalities. Third, the government ought to release the USD 1.5-2 billion currently at the Ministry of Telecommunications which it has withheld from municipalities. Fourth, engage with the private sector including banks to provide loans to creditworthy municipalities that wish to implement development projects.

## COMPONENT 3

### RECOVERY FRAMEWORK FOR WADI KHALED AND AKROUM



The suggested framework for a sustainable response in Wadi Khaled and Akroum is a product of the situational analysis undertaken on the impact of the crisis on the national and local level, the stakeholders' consultation, and the proceedings of the national workshop that was held on 14 January 2014.

### **LINKING HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO LONGER-TERM DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGION THROUGH EXISTING STRUCTURES AND PROGRAMMES**

The communities of Wadi Khaled and Akroum, similar to other underserved areas, have been historically marginalized from a range of well-documented development needs. **The Recovery Framework should be inherently based on the linkages between humanitarian responses to alleviate the impact of the Syrian crisis on local communities and, mid-longer-term multi-dimensional development initiatives.** This will stabilise the region and revitalize its focus on development. The pre-crisis challenges remain valid and can be a basis for planning short-, medium- and long-term interventions.

According to the opinion of the consulted stakeholders in last year's workshop, a large part of the development-oriented activities were being implemented in an ad-hoc and disorganized manner by humanitarian organizations that have little or no experience in and knowledge of the regions. **Focus has been more on fast implementation and spending funds rather than on quality implementation and positive impact.**

The parallel emergency and recovery/development needs, require more adaptive approaches.

Stakeholders raised the **concern of sustainability of the response and the 'aftermath' of newly created structures. It was stressed that the response should capitalize and strengthen existing structures.**

Traditional humanitarian interventions cannot be burdened with the responsibility for recovery and development initiatives. The international community must bring in development actors and financial resources to steer such long-term processes. To implement development efforts mandated and specialized agencies as well as the assigned resources are needed. Any kind of **future regional intervention has to be designed based on existing national/local structures and recovery programmes.** This will avoid duplication and notably prove more efficient, effective and sustainable.

#### **Several development instruments and frameworks addressing development priorities in the region of Wadi Khaled and Akroum exist including:**

- Local Development Plan for the cluster of Eastern and Western Wadi Khaled Akroum (CDR/ESFD 2012)
- Local Development Plan for the community of Akroum (CDR/ESFD 2006)
- National Water Sector Strategy (Ministry of Energy and Water 2012)

#### **On a national level, there are also:**

- National Poverty Targeting Programme –(MoSA through the SDCs)
- Lebanon Recovery Fund (Ministry of Economy and UNDP)
- Lebanese Host Communities Support Project- (MoSA-UNDP)
- UNDP Stabilization Programme (UNDP)
- Roadmap for Stabilization (GoL, WB, UN) – Multi-Donor Trust Fund
- Regional Response Plan 6 (Inter-agency)

Although having some complementary features, **a lot of overlap exists between these different plans. Hence the need for coordination and clarity on added-value.**

When talking about local structures in Akkar and more precisely in Wadi Khaled and Akroum<sup>48</sup>, one must keep in mind **local challenges related to public and private facilities including limited financial and human resources (health, social services, infrastructure, water, schools etc.) which existed prior to Syria crisis.** As an example, the 27 villages in Wadi Khaled and Akroum, with a population of over 50,000 inhabitants (and additional estimated 21,563 refugees) only had access to two SDCs. The one in Akroum was totally inactive, whilst the SDC in Wadi Khaled provided only limited services as well as being poorly equipped, understaffed, and social workers needing capacity building and professional certification<sup>49</sup>.

Hence, **working through regional development programmes such as the ESFD<sup>50</sup>, CDR and UNDP projects and structures<sup>51</sup> is highly recommended as a way forward, especially given the historical presence of these initiatives.** These organizations have established working relations and local working groups that can act as local catalysts for early recovery.

The National Poverty Targeting Programme (NPTP) is another existing structure that has been considered in locating and monitoring the number of poor as well as in addressing the needs of the most vulnerable in Lebanon, such as in Wadi Khaled and Akroum. In 2009, through the MoSA, the GoL launched the NPTP, with WB, CIDA and Italian funding amounting to USD 9.34 million.

The objective of this initiative is to improve the effectiveness of social security and safety nets by establishing a national targeting system that delivers social transfers and services to the most needy. Launching and application process started in October 2011 by MoSA. Coverage in 2013 was for 93,900 beneficiaries.

**The NPTP is the first-ever poverty targeted social assistance programme for the poorest and most vulnerable Lebanese families in Lebanon.** It is based on the proxy means testing (PMT) targeting mechanism. NPTP offers the following benefits:

- 1) Payment of the beneficiary portion of health bills in public and private hospitals
- 2) Coverage of chronic disease prescription medications through the MOSA SDCs
- 3) Registration fee waivers and free books for students in primary and secondary public schools.

MoSA already has plans to include the region of Wadi Khaled and Akroum in the forthcoming activities of the NPTP and work of the local SDC<sup>52</sup>. Given the government's responsibility, governmental institutions in charge of the Caza of Akkar should be consulted and involved from the beginning regarding any assessment and design of an intervention. **The approval of the relevant directorate is recommended as a pre-requisite before starting any project so as to ensure alignment of the intervention with sector plans as well as the capacity and willingness of the ministry to manage and sustain the services (for example, the water establishment).** At the same time, these institutions must be present and engaged in the local emerging challenges and on a regular basis.

In addition, following the Syria crisis, **many local community groups were recently formed, some of which include both Syrian and Lebanese representatives.** These entities also need to be taken into the fold and merged in a way to serve the community and avoid duplication.

<sup>48</sup> An overview of all institutions and key actors in Wadi Khaled and Akroum is annexed in this report.

<sup>49</sup> The location of SDCs is not proportional to the spread of poverty and vulnerability across the country, i.e. the most disadvantaged North and Bekaa regions are only served by 75 SDCs out of the 212 SDCs (source: MoSA, 2013).

<sup>50</sup> ESFD is present in Wadi Khaled through the AdelNord project and follows on the Local Development Plans projects that are running in both Wadi Khaled and Akroum.

<sup>51</sup> UNDP uses the municipalities and territorial/thematic community working groups as entry point for implementation. Together with these entities, "strategic" local development plans are developed and projects are drafted based on identified community needs. UNDP signs grant agreements with municipalities and provides in parallel capacity building and technical support to municipalities. In the crisis response, UNDP made use of the municipalities and existing as well as new local working groups, such as the crisis mitigation working groups.

<sup>52</sup> A targeted Social Security Net Programme will require scaling up with USD 50 million through the Roadmap to cover 350,000 beneficiaries among the Lebanese vulnerable between 2014-2017. Up to 320,000 persons (8% of population) were eligible to receive assistance through the NPTP. The estimate today is that 170,000 persons have joined this group of most vulnerable.

An increase in communities' engagement in local development efforts and support to the municipalities can be achieved by organizing activities for community groups (youth and women groups, school committees, teachers, associations) that help **develop a spirit of volunteerism and active citizenship in the community in parallel to awareness sessions on the roles, responsibilities and limitations of municipalities.**

### **PROPOSED SHORT-TERM AND DEVELOPMENT GOALS FOR WADI KHAED AND AKROUM**

In close consultation with local authorities and key stakeholders from different sectors in Wadi Khaled and Akroum, a Short Term Action Plan and Strategic Development Goals were defined, facilitated by SDC. These proposals aimed to alleviate the impact of border closure and the Syrian displacement in Wadi Khaled and Akroum as well as to reduce the difficulties confronting the hosting community. This section presents a summary of priority actions, in order of priority. In addition, a chain of sub-interventions were proposed by local stakeholders to achieve each goal. These sub-interventions are presented as an annex to this report.

#### **Proposed Short Term Action Plan for Wadi Khaled and Akroum**<sup>53</sup>

**GOAL 1:** Reduce household expenditures on food and energy

**GOAL 2:** Improve livelihoods, create job opportunities and enhance people's assets

**GOAL 3:** Enhance people's access to healthcare services and reduce their vulnerability to epidemics and diseases

**GOAL 4:** Enhance people's access to safe water

**GOAL 5:** Strengthen access to and quality of educational and separate Syrian and Lebanese students administratively and in terms of school shifts

**GOAL 6:** Upgrade basic infrastructure and provide municipalities with solid waste collection trucks, sewage tankers and electricity generators

**GOAL 7:** Promote community organization and civic action

#### **Proposed Development Goals for Wadi Khaled and Akroum**

##### **GOAL 1: Upgrading & Development of Basic Infrastructure**

- Improve road infrastructure and area connectivity
- Improve the supply and quality of water
- Improve the supply of electricity

##### **GOAL 2: Promoting Economic Growth**

- Intensification of agriculture and agro-industries
- Expanding the livestock and dairy products sector
- Reviving traditional light industries and crafts and introducing new potential ones
- Developing the private sector and creating new job opportunities
- Valorisation of the region's natural and cultural heritage and promotion of "alternative tourism"
- Encouraging women participation in economic activities
- Speed up the cadastral surveying and official registration to allow more agricultural and industrial investments in the area and to increase access to loans and benefits

##### **GOAL 3: Improving Health Conditions**

- Improving access to health care services (Including refugees without official papers especially in emergency situations)
- Increasing awareness regarding health issues
- Protecting water sources and the natural environment from pollution generated at household level (develop a waste water and solid waste management plan)

##### **GOAL 4: Improving Access to Education**

- Strengthening the quality of education and diversifying options
- Improving access to cultural and sports facilities

##### **GOAL 5: Empower Municipalities & Local Community to Participate in Local Development**

- Capacity building of municipalities in strategic planning and service delivery, local governance, project management, communication, conflict management, fundraising, advocacy, computer skills
- Provide municipalities with proper venue, equipment, human resources (focal person for development & aid coordination) and increase their budget
- Grant municipalities more flexibility and greater authority (apply administrative decentralization)
- Activate civil society groups and build their capacities
- Twinning programme with well-established municipalities from other regions in Lebanon or in Europe capable to provide technical and financial support

##### **GOAL 6: Environmental Protection**

- Optimal management and protection of natural resources
- Raising local awareness to environmental friendly practices
- Mobilizing local actors (municipalities, NGOs, schools) to work together for the purpose of creating a better environment for work and living

#### **ENHANCING OWNERSHIP AND ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND MUNICIPALITIES**

Although governmental entities are not historically active in Wadi Khaled and Akroum, it is vital that the Government 'own' the suggested Recovery Framework and steer it.

This means monitoring the funds for recovery through existing structures such as the one at the Ministry of Finance to ensure the implementation is undertaken based on need and longer-term benefit for communities. This option has to be weighed against government's efforts to reassure donors of the accountability of the government to properly administer those funds.

To deal with the current crisis and overcome the challenges faced by the doubling in population size, **municipalities urgently need financial and material support from the central government and donors.**

<sup>53</sup> These plans are the results of the focused meetings and workshops, held in October and November 2013, by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. SDC took as basis CDR's "Local Development Plan for the Community of Akroum Cluster" (2006) and UNDP's: "Wadi Khaled Socio-Economic Needs Assessment and Local Development Strategy" (2013). These plans were validated and updated to present the current needs.

The recommendations of LCPS<sup>54</sup> study mentioned under component 2 (national and region-specific approaches) may be considered:

- Central government to release municipalities' share of the Independent Municipal Fund (IMF) punctually every year and make the disbursement in one instalment as stated in decree 1917.
- IMF activities which do not benefit all municipalities should be limited.
- USD 1.5-2 billion currently at the Ministry of Telecommunications which has been withheld from municipalities should be released.
- Engagement with the private sector including banks to provide loans to creditworthy municipalities that wish to implement development projects.

Municipalities are very apprehensive about their lack of resources. They went to the extent of suggesting that INGOs and donors help municipalities in expanding their budgets, by demanding from beneficiaries, to pay municipal taxes due and make it a precondition for registration and benefit from services. Obviously, the international community cannot be the port-parole of local authorities on tax collection, but this request highlights the need to raise awareness among community members not only on their obligations, but also on what the municipalities can realistically offer.

At the same time, it is suggested that the Government amplifies its presence and hence participation through the activation and/or appointment of representatives from various concerned ministries in the regions that are harbouring the highest proportion of vulnerable host communities and witnessing the highest influx of Syrian refugees. **Stakeholders indicated the need to establish a committee in Akkar composed of local representatives from each ministry involved in the crisis response in addition to representatives from municipalities, donors, UN, INGOs and NGOs.** These representatives should have delegated decision-making power, to enhance timeliness of response, lower bureaucratic procedures, while promoting better coordination and accountability. Another recommendation was to **strengthen the role that the kaymakam (governor of the provincial district of Akkar) and the Muhafez of the North (governor)<sup>55</sup> can play in the development process.**

#### Recommendations from local authorities:

- Fair allocation of governmental resources, giving priority to the most deprived regions in the country.
- Apply administrative decentralization giving greater authority to municipalities (especially in relation to receiving donations and aid)
- Grant more flexibility to municipalities dealing with emergency situations

Working through municipalities and enhancing their role as chief local development actors and as first responders is highly recommended. **Technical assistance is essential to support municipalities in setting up organizational structures, administrative procedures and coordination mechanisms that help them better perform** and work more effectively with other actors including ministries and the donor community. On the longer term, municipalities also need technical support to develop strategic local development plans and improve basic infrastructure and public services that will foster socio-economic growth in their area.

Municipal members underlined their weaknesses and requested training on a variety of topics, including: local governance and management skills; municipal law and responsibilities of municipalities; conflict resolution; proposal writing; reporting; budget and financial management; fundraising, networking, lobbying and advocacy; computer skills and social media; communication techniques and working methods of INGOs and donors (partnership guidelines and criteria).

Moreover, **municipalities expressed a commitment to build trust and accountability so as to improve relations with international organizations and donors.**

To increase the effectiveness of municipalities as developmental actors and guarantee sustainability of action, despite changes within the leadership of the municipality, it is **suggested to employ a fixed focal point (development officer) within each municipality to coordinate development and aid interventions.** This will not only ensure better aid coordination at the local level but also guarantee continuity of development projects that have been initiated despite changes within the administration of the municipality (new municipal council). This technical "development" officer/unit can be delegated to communicate with donors, supervise implementation of projects, attend UNHCR coordination meetings and communicate with local community on existing aid and development initiatives.

**According to the Lebanese municipal law, a "municipal guide"<sup>56</sup> is responsible for working with the municipality to enhance development plans.** Yet this position is not filled. Having this focal person would help ensure continuity of activities, as there would be a stable solid structure within the municipality, or even union of municipalities, for any future reference.

**Twinning programmes with municipalities from other regions** in Lebanon or in Europe would be of interest for the municipalities of Wadi Khaled and Akroum and could help them improve their capacities. Encouraging the **creation of union of municipalities** would increase the capacity of municipalities to face joint challenges and to increase lobbying power.

Finally, an essential role can be attributed to municipalities in terms of supporting the security institutions in the region to maintain stability and safety.

### IMPROVING COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION

With the presence of diverse national and local coordination committees, in addition to many response mechanisms and frameworks, communication and coordination between the Government (related ministries), IOs/NGOs/Donors, the municipalities and representatives from both Lebanese and Syrian communities remains challenging.

In addition to streamlined coordination, there is also a **high need for clarity in roles and responsibilities of each entity.** A suggested comprehensive structure may be composed of:

- A national strategic steering committee (PMO, representatives of central ministries, donor, UN, CDR, HRC, CB)
- Technical sectoral steering committees (related ministries and UN agencies and INGOs and NGOs)
- Regional coordination committee (regional representatives from ministries, UN, INGOs, NGOs and local authorities including municipalities - development officer or municipal guide - and key local stakeholders )

Coordination mechanisms and communication channels within the same committee and between all the committees need to be delineated and replicated both at the regional as well as central levels.

**Related line ministries have to be more involved especially in the planning and coordination of the recovery phase.** These ministries, e.g. ministry of agriculture, have the technical know-how and resources including regional representatives that allow them to contribute to feasible solutions. **More participation of local authorities and local communities' representatives** in coordination meetings at regional level would increase the ownership and support of the local entities to any kind of intervention. In addition, **regional opinion and challenges should then be**

<sup>54</sup> LCPS, "A Three-Pronged Strategy for the New Government to Address Lebanon's Socio-Economic Challenges", January 2014.

<sup>55</sup> 2 additional new governorates were approved in 2003 (Akkar and Baalbeck-Hermel).

<sup>56</sup> الموجه البلدي (Arabic for municipal guide)



**relayed at the central level.** To increase the coordination, local stakeholders suggested having the municipal guide on their behalf in the existing UNHCR coordination meetings.

**A comprehensive unified information management system** incorporating all related entities, including ministries NGOs and “non-traditional” donors UN and organisations as well as stakeholders and beneficiaries, is to be developed. This should capture central and regional sources and be designed in a user-friendly format to reach the majority of concerned entities. This can serve both transparency as well as accountability of aid.

### **ENSURING PARTICIPATORY APPROACH IN DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION**

In order to identify the most suitable projects and interventions in communities, it is imperative to **enhance community engagement in crisis response initiatives.** This may be achieved through increasing discussions with municipalities and community members before designing projects, in order to promote initiatives that better meet the needs of the community. It is also crucial to ensure that selected representatives, focus group participants and focal points, in assessments and implementation phase, are well representing the community and knowledgeable of the local needs.

In order to avoid duplication and maximize the impact of the interventions, all actors should coordinate from the very beginning and share all and any relevant data. Many assessments and initiatives had already been undertaken in the regions before the Syria crisis not to mention development strategies and programmes that have been in place since many years. Therefore, **any new actor should consult with existing ministries and organizations in order to better design, integrate or add on to plans.**

Often overlooked but crucial for success are local and regional characteristics that have to be respected and taken into account while designing and implementing programmes. Both Lebanese and Syrian engaged persons would be main sources of information for this.

Monitoring and evaluation must also be planned from the beginning of any programme so as to enable agencies to measure progress and remedy identified gaps.

### **INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY**

The government must work on good governance and put in place a transparent mechanism to **ensure that money goes to the right beneficiaries through an effective monitoring and accountability mechanism.** This would apply for UN, INGOs, NGOs, municipalities and ministries and could convince more donors to provide financial assistance to Lebanon.

A higher degree of accountability and transparency would ensure more investment confidence of donors. It is recommended that IOs and NGOs active in the region hold regular meetings with municipalities and local actors to ensure information sharing and transparency. This should go hand in hand with enhancing the capacities of municipalities in monitoring the work of IOs and NGOs. This would bring substantial benefit as municipalities are at the frontline of the response. Specific recommendations include:

- **An independent watchdog** that can monitor and audit donors, INGOs and even the related ministries and municipalities
- **Establish a committee at UNHCR that handles suggestions and complaints from local communities** regarding INGO's, municipalities or any other actor' activities and staff (conflict resolution committee).

- **Proper monitoring of field staff** is desirable to guarantee good conduct, integrity, transparency and avoid corruption and favouritism.
- **Training and awareness sessions for INGO staff** on communication, social skills, conflict prevention and local culture and habits.

Regarding Wadi Khaled and Akroum specifically, when determining the geographical scope of interventions, INGOs should take into consideration the scope of the area that is intended to be addressed. For example, Wadi Khaled and Akroum are not two villages, but rather two large areas containing 13 municipalities and 29 villages. **Special focus is needed in remote villages** in the area such as Hnaider, Knaiseh and Mounseh as well as on villages without municipalities.

It is of equal importance to take into consideration existing political and sectarian cleavages so as to actively ensure impartiality of service delivery. Efficient and **transparent criteria for distribution of resources and selection of beneficiaries** must be ensured so as to guarantee that the people most in need are reached. This will also help prevent misunderstandings among local authorities and communities (prevent favouritism and corruption). Including municipalities and key persons from the community in the identification and selection process of beneficiaries is hereby essential.

Better **monitoring of implementing partners** is essential to guarantee that the quality of goods and services paid for by donors is the same as those received by refugees. Reports to donors should be focused on **beneficiaries' satisfaction rates and the quality** of end results rather than on services delivered and numbers reached. Organizations should conduct more beneficiary surveys to know their opinion about services and aid received.

### **IMPROVING EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF AID RESPONSE**

Interviews with local authorities and key stakeholders have shown that the **perception of wasted resources is increasingly obstructing the current relief effort** and worsening tensions between relief agencies and Syrians and Lebanese communities. Several respondents were of the opinion that the funds received by relief agencies in Lebanon were squandered on redundant assessment studies, multiple survey teams and excessive security by INGO's and UN agencies. Most local stakeholders consulted advised to better invest the available funds for development purposes and avoid high expenditure on running costs, salaries and repetition of assessments and studies. Moreover, in the interviews with UN agencies, donors and governmental entities, respondents further stressed on the need for better coordination in funding between donors and between implementing agencies.

At the international level, discussions are underway on how to **make aid interventions more cost-effective** and what changes are needed in the long-term given the current modus operandi. Under RRP6, the main actors are considering an increasingly monetized approach (unconditional cash transfer programming) and better operational efficiency.

The trend to **shift from a humanitarian to a development approach must not overlook the fact that the impoverished Lebanese host communities have short-term relief needs** as well, like the refugees (basic needs such as food, water, health). The question is what will happen if refugees hosted in affected and impoverished Lebanese communities receive cash assistance and Lebanese families receive nothing, except for a community project in the village? This could exacerbate tensions and trigger violence against refugees.

It is understandable that with the protracted nature of the crisis and the ever-growing number of refugees, the international community cannot sustain the financial means needed to support all refugees. UNHCR / UNICEF vulnerability assessment, followed by the targeting of beneficiaries and hence a reduction of assistance will have severe implications in Lebanon and in particular the region of Wadi Khaled and Akroum. **Several municipalities reported that the distribution of food**

**aid was essential to maintaining security in their region** for both refugees and vulnerable host families since the lack of sufficient food would increase the levels of criminality.

Another approach to mitigate this problem and explore medium- to long-term food security is expanding livelihood opportunities. **Reviving the agricultural sector** in close collaboration with the relevant authorities and agencies could be an entry point in the region of Wadi Khaled and Akroum, taking into consideration market competition and previous existing initiatives and mechanisms.

### **SOCIAL COHESION: APPLYING CONFLICT-SENSITIVE PROGRAMMING**<sup>57</sup>

Conflict sensitive programming is important to promote greater social cohesion and many donors are developing programmes to build social cohesion and mitigate tension. While such investments are crucial, **one must not overlook the fact that the source of some tension / dissatisfaction is socio-economic**. Host communities perceive that aid and services are going to refugees while vulnerable Lebanese are left without any support.

- Assistance to Syrian refugees must **factor in and measure support to Lebanese** host families (increasing social cohesion).
- Service delivery should **target impoverished neighbourhoods where Syrian refugee communities live alongside lower-income Lebanese communities**.

Humanitarian delivery methods sometimes harm the host community. **A “Do no Harm” approach is needed** to reflect on consequences of activities implemented. This includes choice of area of operation, staff, suppliers and donors.

A further challenge mentioned by local communities was the fact that aid interventions are bolstering local economies of some villages in Akkar, including recruiting staff, renting offices, cars and purchasing goods, while excluding others. A specific example of this is the voucher system introduced by some organizations, which is seen as harmful to small shop owners in the area. Although introducing cash assistance or an open voucher system can help small shop owners improve their livelihoods, some could not fulfill the strict requirements and criteria set by the respective organizations. In general, purchasing of local goods and services and **giving priority to the residents of the region when it comes to recruiting staff and consultants helps promote the local economy**. Special focus is needed for underserved remote villages as well as on villages without municipalities and **where there are security threats (near the border), interventions should be adapted and through existing local capacities**.

### **From local consultation with Wadi Khaled and Akroum municipalities**

#### **Good Practices to promote:**

Municipalities and local community highly valued organizations that:

- Deal in a respectful manner with local community and work with honesty, integrity and transparency
- Carry out their activities in close coordination and cooperation with municipalities and properly communicate to local authorities and community their activities, procedures and criteria for beneficiary selection
- Properly and effectively use the funds and consult closely with the local community on how to best invest available funding

#### **Initiatives and projects that should be encouraged are those that:**

- Provide assistance and development interventions in a fair and equitable manner for both Lebanese and Syrians, in order to increase the cohesion between the two communities.
- Boost the local economy and create job opportunities
- Purchase local goods and services for aid interventions to promote the local economy and give priority to the residents of the region while recruiting staff and consultants.
- Offering financial aid that grants freedom to beneficiaries on how to spend the money to cover their individual needs (i.e. unconditional cash assistance, open voucher systems)
- Provide municipalities with needed equipment as well as capacity building and technical assistance

## **CONCLUSION**

Each region has its challenges, priorities and capacities in responding to the impact of the Syrian crisis. That is what the SDC facilitated national workshop on a recovery framework for Wadi Khaled and Akroum attempted to highlight through dialogue among local, regional, national and international stakeholders. This document is a snapshot that requires continuous updates depending on the changing context. Such a dialogue process can be replicated in other parts of Lebanon to evaluate what challenges and recommendations are similar and to align priority response and recovery interventions with the needs and capacities of a region.

Feedback on the suggested framework would be enriching and would contribute to the collective knowledge of stakeholders currently responding to the crisis. Such a baseline can then be reviewed regularly to track implemented recommendations and highlight remaining gaps.

# ANNEXES

Annex 1	Proposed Short-Term Action Plan for Akroum
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	Proposed Development Goals for Wadi Khaled
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## Annex 1

### Proposed Short-Term Action Plan for Akroum

In close consultation with Akroum’s local authorities and key stakeholders from different sectors, a short term action plan was developed aiming to alleviate the most pressing difficulties confronting the hosting community in this area. This action plan includes five main objectives with sub-interventions, presented below in order of priority:

- **Objective 1: Increase access to basic infrastructural services**
  - Provision of 2 solid waste collection trucks to municipalities to enhance solid waste collection and 2 sewage tankers to empty the (sewage pits) cesspools of village houses at lower costs.
  - Secure municipalities with electricity generators to organize electricity subscription system to compensate for electricity cuts.
- **Objective 2: Increase the capacity of the population to access clean water**
  - Installation of water storage tanks and water reservoirs to supply potable water to the community.
  - Distribution of water filters and aqua tablets.
- **Objective 3: Improve access to health services**
  - Provision of equipped ambulances.
  - Provide health care services for Lebanese as well as for refugees.
- **Objective 4: Improve livelihood and create job opportunities**
  - Small loans provision to compensate for the losses in agricultural revenues and the increased costs of living.
  - Recruitment of people from Akroum for aid interventions.
- **Objective 5: Strengthen educational services in the area**
  - Open public schools in villages that have none.
  - Rehabilitate and modernize existing schools.

### Proposed Short-Term Action Plan for Wadi Khaled<sup>1</sup>

This section defines priority interventions needed on the short term in order to alleviate the impact of border closure and the Syrian displacement in Wadi Khaled and reduce the difficulties confronting the hosting community. This Short Term Action Plan includes eight objectives followed by proposed interventions to achieve each objective. In a workshop with local authorities and key stakeholders from the community of Wadi Khaled these objectives were validated and put in the following order of priority:

- **Objective 1: Reduce household expenditures on food and energy**
  - Financial support and aid to families that host Syrian refugees and ensuring their subsistence.
  - Provision of food assistance (food vouchers and parcels).
  - Distribution of winter kits with heat and fuel vouchers.
  - Provision of household appliances for host families.
  - Provision of winter fuel (vouchers), heating stoves, and blankets for hosting families.
  - Control on prices of items (especially food) in stores and supermarkets and ensure supplies inflow at all times.

<sup>1</sup> Based on “Wadi Khaled Socio-Economic Needs Assessment and Local Development Strategy”, UNDP 2013



- **Objective 2: Promote the creation of new jobs**
  - Prompting international agencies working in the region to recruit local staff (drivers, administrative assistants, field surveyors) and to engage the educated youth in aid and humanitarian activities with special focus on employing women.
  - Conducting formal and informal training to enhance local capacity to undertake work with international agencies and public sector institutions working in the area.
  - Provision of soft loans to encourage people to start their own business (this may include loans to cover start-up costs of new small and medium enterprises).
- **Objective 3: Enhance people's access to healthcare services and reduce their vulnerability to epidemics and diseases**
  - Enhancing the capacity of primary health care centres to meet people's needs by providing them with the necessary medical equipment and increasing the number of their staff (e.g. by encouraging doctors to volunteer in the area taking into account that more female doctors maybe need).
  - Provision of ambulatory services (at least one ambulance for the region) to transfer emergency cases to nearby hospitals in Halba and/or Tripoli.
  - Implementation of an awareness campaign on most pressing and crucial indigenous diseases (particularly waterborne diseases), importance of hygiene and water sterilization, and available healthcare services and associated contact numbers.
  - Offering free services to vulnerable families (e.g. vaccination schemes for children with appropriate means of scheduling, and free check-ups for adults).
  - Distribution of First Aid kits and medication for primary care.
  - Provision of solid waste collection trucks to municipalities to enhance solid waste collection and stop haphazard dumping and open burning of waste, which is leading to many health problems.
- **Objective 4: Enhance people's assets and improve their livelihoods**
  - Restoration of smallholder agricultural production through: 1) the distribution of fertilizers and pesticides to smallholders at reduced prices; 2) ensuring sufficient irrigation water; 3) activation of extension services with proper guidance for short and long term implications; and 4) supporting farmers to sell their produce.
  - Enhancement of agricultural products transportation by rehabilitating and maintaining main and alternative roads.
  - Enhancement of the animal production sector through: 1) provision of subsidized fodder for livestock and free of charge veterinary care and vaccines; and 2) training in production of dairy products and promotion of raising poultry at household level.
- **Objective 5: Enhance people's access to safe water**
  - Proper activation of the water sub-station and pumps that have been already installed in the area.
  - Supply of potable water to the community through the installation of water reservoirs.
  - Installation of water storage tanks and localized and decentralized wastewater treatment solutions.
  - Distribution of water filters and aqua tablets.
- **Objective 6: Improve local schools and people's ability to access education**
  - Improving the physical environment for education (e.g. by ensuring that all schools have proper sanitary facilities and good fenestration to keep heat).
  - Enhancing school capacities to accommodate more pupils (e.g. by hiring new teachers including volunteers and Syrian teachers and/or holding double shifts to accommodate the increasing number of students due to the influx of Syrian refugees).
  - Provision of "Back to School" support for children in Wadi Khaled (e.g. through providing them with stationary, school books and uniforms).
  - Exemption students in public schools from registration fees.
  - Design and implementation of psycho-social support and extra-curricular recreational activities.

- **Objective 7: Promote community organization and civic action**
  - Strengthening local NGOs technically and logistically through financial support and training on leadership skills and community work.
  - Supporting local schools to implement extra circular activities that can promote volunteerism and team spirit.
  - Establishing new facilities and playgrounds and rehabilitating existing open spaces that can be used for the activities of Wadi Khaled residents (mainly youth).
  - Supporting local organization and community dialogue e.g. by: 1) establishing community dialogue groups between families, youth, municipal councils, active societies, and others; and 2) creating a "Youth of Wadi Khaled" committee to engage the youth in volunteerism and public service activities (e.g. in the implementation of humanitarian programmes targeting their villages).
- **Objective 8: Upgrade infrastructure**
  - Enhancing safety measures on roads to reduce the risk of accidents.
  - Introducing renewable energy techniques, mainly: solar panels in households (to reduce people's expenditure on electricity) and solar bulbs for lighting main and secondary roads.

### Proposed Development Goals for Akroum

This section presents the results of the rapid assessment implemented by SDC on Akroum's priorities and needs existing of 15 focused meetings and a workshop undertaken with local authorities and key stakeholders, in which CDR's "Local Development Plan for the community of Akroum cluster -2006" was used as baseline and updated to represent the current needs of the community of Akroum. The updated Local Development Plan includes five main development goals with their related objectives and proposed sub interventions needed to achieve each objective. The development goals are presented below in order of priority:

#### **GOAL 1: Upgrading and Development of Basic Infrastructure**

- **Objective 1: Improving road infrastructure and area connectivity**
  - Widening and rehabilitation of existing roads.
  - Building support walls and channel on the side of the roads to divert rainwater.
  - Establishing an efficient public transportation network.
- **Objective 2: Improving the supply and quality of water**
  - Developing the capacity of the "Saba' spring" to be able to withdraw a larger amount of water in a shorter time.
  - Securing other sources of water (i.e. from the village of Al Sahleh to the villages Mrah Al Khokh, Qenieh and Al Basatin).
  - Awareness raising campaigns to avoid the waste of water.
- **Objective 3: Improving the supply of electricity**
  - Replacing the old electricity grid with a modern one (Torsades) and move the grid underground.
  - Securing the area with electricity transformers and generators to have electricity subscription options for inhabitants during the prolonged electricity cuts.
- **Objective 4: Installing the telephone network underground**

**GOAL 2: Promoting Economic Growth**

- **Objective 1: Improving revenues from the agricultural sector**
  - Improving access to irrigation systems through establishing water harvesting systems (such as ponds, dams), drilling artesian wells and efficient irrigation systems (i.e. drop irrigation).
  - Improving access to agricultural lands by rehabilitating existing agricultural roads and establish new ones to reach most of the usable lands.
  - Upgrading technical skills and Agricultural know-how, through provision of training to farmers on new techniques of production, on organic farming and alternative crops.
  - Establishing a unit for the production of soap from olive oil by-products.
  - Establishing a packaging and marketing unit for regular and organic olive oil and olive products and encourage the Lebanese army to buy olive oil from Akroum.
  - Improving the level of farmers' organization:
    - Create efficiently managed and specialized agricultural cooperatives.
    - Access to know-how in technical, managerial, financial and conflict management.
    - Provide access to small loans and credit facilities to farmers.
- **Objective 2: Developing the tourism sector**
  - Developing the local infrastructure for tourism:
    - Protect and rehabilitate the archaeological sites.
    - Establish a protected area.
    - Put the major archaeological sites on the Ministry of Tourism official map and establish agreements with travel agencies to attract tourists to the area.
    - Promotion of alternative tourism (such as eco-tourism, rural tourism and agricultural tourism).
    - Build a hotel and encourage the establishment of guest houses in the area.
    - Develop written material (brochures) on the various sites.
    - Establish roads to reach the touristic sites.
    - Create a local organization within the future municipalities for the adequate management of the natural and archaeological sites.
    - Provide adequate training and capacity building in local guiding.
    - Activate the Mount Akroum civil defense centre and provide it with human resources and equipment to be able to protect the area's rich natural wealth from the frequent forest fires.
  - Improving local and national awareness on archaeological and tourism potentials:
    - Organize local traditional and cultural festivals and exhibitions.
    - Organize awareness campaigns in secondary schools and trips to the region and sites with ecotourism operators.
    - Establish a touristic village for cultural heritage.
    - Encourage local handicrafts production and create a cultural heritage club (for traditional dances and Dabke).
- **Objective 3: Developing the private sector and creating new opportunities for jobs**
  - Improve access to loans and credits for young entrepreneurs to develop projects and small businesses in the agricultural and hospitality sector.
  - Assist and coach entrepreneurs in the development of business plans.
  - Organize intensified vocational training courses.
  - Establish a money employment office, that studies the economic feasibility of potential projects and businesses and stimulate the retired persons from the army and security forces to invest their retirement funds into lucrative projects that will boost up the local economy.

- **Objective 4: Encouraging women participation in economic activities**
  - Foreign languages courses.
  - Organizing trainings in beekeeping, cultivation of mushrooms, roses for trading, etc...
  - Establishment of specialized agricultural cooperatives for food processing and local handicraft.
  - Capacity building and awareness sessions on pedagogy and childcare.
  - Establishing a women leadership academy to increase women's role in community and building society's trust in women's abilities.

**GOAL 3: Lowering Risks for Human Health - Improving health conditions**

- **Objective 1: Improving health care services**
  - Establishing fully equipped and effective health dispensaries.
  - Activating and equipping Kfartoun health centre and ensure continuous provision of medicines.
  - Providing equipped ambulances.
- **Objective 2: Increasing awareness regarding health issues**
  - Organizing regular awareness campaigns on first aid and general safety.
  - Organizing regular awareness campaigns for women on maternal and childcare issues.
- **Objective 3: Minimizing pollution from waste water**
  - Establishing a sewage network and linking it to a waste water plant.
  - Providing municipalities with 2 sewage tankers to empty the cesspools of the houses in the village at lower costs.
- **Objective 4: Minimizing pollution from solid waste**
  - Providing municipalities with 2 trucks for solid waste collection, which will allow them to save costs and use the money to meet other needs.
  - Implementing a project that ensures the application and practice of solid waste sorting and recycling and manufacturing of compost for agriculture.
  - Raising awareness of the local community on environment preservation and training community on solid waste sorting, recycling and reusing principles.

**GOAL 4: Improving educational services and raising the educational level**

- **Objective 1: Improving the quality of educational services and diversifying the options**
  - Rehabilitation and upgrading of school infrastructure.
  - Establishing high quality public schools in villages.
  - Supplying technical schools with needed laboratories and material and introducing new fields of studies.
  - Training and capacity building for the local education and management teams in schools.
  - Improving students' skills in foreign languages and computer.
  - Upgrading professional and technical skills of students who dropped out from school.
  - Establishing a coordination body for private schools in Akroum.
  - Following up with the curriculum for students who have difficulties finding help in their studies from their uneducated parents at home.
  - Stimulating schools to take a pro-active role in the local development process and introduce classes on local development for secondary school students.

- **Objective 2: Improving access to cultural and sports facilities**
  - Establishing a socio educational centre for children and youth, including a public library, computer centre and theatre.
  - Establishing sports clubs and sports playgrounds (Football and Basketball).
  - Establishing public gardens and children's playgrounds.

#### **GOAL 5: Empower municipalities and local community to participate in local development**

- **Objective 1: Provide municipalities with proper venue, equipment and increase their budget**
- **Objective 2:** Build the capacity of municipal councils to undertake actions that promote economic activity and improve the quality of the living and work environments
  - Organize technical training and supporting municipalities in planning.
  - Build the capacity of municipal councils in organizational skills and coordination mechanisms.
- **Objective 3: Activate the role of civil society**
  - Activate the role of local organizations and build their capacities.
  - Establishing youth clubs and organizations and creating a group for the “scouts of national education” in local schools.
  - Training and capacity building of youth to enable them to participate in decision-making and local governance.

#### **Proposed Development Goals - Wadi Khaled**

This section presents the findings of UNDP's Local Development Strategy that was validated in a workshop by local authorities and key stakeholders from the community of Wadi Khaled. The five validated strategic goals for the development of the area were put in the following order of priority with their corresponding objectives and proposed interventions:

#### **GOAL 1: Infrastructure Upgrading and Development**

Upgrade the physical infrastructure and utility services in order to improve the economic climate in the area, reduce household expenses, and protect the natural environment.

- **Objective 1: Improve road infrastructure and area connectivity**
  - Rehabilitation of the internal roads of villages.
  - Establishment of a good transportation network that connects the region with various Lebanese areas and adheres to safety requirements.
- **Objective 2: Improve water and electricity supply**
  - Supply of potable water.
  - Upgrading the existing electricity transformers.
  - Rehabilitation of the existing water network and household connections.
  - Construction of wind turbines for electricity production (since the area was identified by the “Wind Atlas” as favourable for such venture).
  - Promotion of solar panels use at household level, especially solar water heaters.
  - Installation, if feasible, of photovoltaic systems for targeted electrical production (to operate well pumps and boost water supply whether for potable or agricultural use).

#### **GOAL 2: Local Economy Diversification**

Enhance and diversify the region's economic base and income generation opportunities by valorizing and capitalizing on the existing economic, natural, and cultural resources.

- **Objective 1: Intensification of agriculture and agro-industries**
  - Construction of agricultural roads to provide access to arable land.
  - Construction of channels and rainwater collection ponds for irrigation.
  - Facilitating farmers' access to financial resources to fund new green initiatives (and publicizing available funding opportunities).
  - Establishment of an extension centre to offer support and guidance to farmers (on issues such as: introduction of new crops, use of fertilizers, promotion of organic farming and products, selling and marketing their produce).
  - Training local community (particularly women) on the generation of crops and fruit products (vinegar, jam, apple dough, dried fruit like apple).
  - Land reclamation to expand arable land.
  - Providing farmers and local entrepreneurs with training and incentives to invest sustainable agro-industries.
  - Introduction and promotion of new value added varieties, aromatic and wild plants, and organic farming practices.
  - Promoting and strengthening agricultural cooperatives and councils.
  - Cadastral mapping of agricultural lands to better establish boundaries and ownership.
  - Branding the region with certain agricultural produce.

#### **Objective 2: Expanding the livestock and dairy products sector**

- Investing in the feed and forage sector (mainly by provision of input services to enhance local production).
- Introducing a programme for the support and provision of veterinary care, guidance, and fodder to livestock farmers.
- Provision of training on management and operation to local entrepreneurs, particularly guidance on financial feasibility of new businesses and appropriate management system (e.g. individual management, cooperative, private company).
- Offering training to farmers on dairy products processing technologies.
- Facilitating access to soft loans to support new ventures in the livestock and dairy products sector, whether these are by individuals or small and medium-sized enterprises.
- Activating cooperatives and emphasizing their role as development partners.

#### **Objective 3: Reviving traditional light industries and crafts and introducing new potential ones**

- Provision of financial incentives to local entrepreneurs to encourage investment in business ventures that create job opportunities, especially for women and youth (options to be analyzed include industries such as soap production, leather hides and skins tanning).
- Supporting small and medium enterprises and local entrepreneurs (the youth in particular) in identifying and accessing affordable financing schemes.
- Promoting technical learning (equipping existing institutes with the needed human resources and know-how) with specific emphasis on crafts.
- Developing vocational training programmes (in health, hospitality, management, information technology and other needed disciplines) aimed at enhancing local capacities and skills and making them more responsive to market demands.
- Direct investments in the physical infrastructure and equipment of the vocational centres of the area.
- Supporting artesian associations, particularly potential women associations, through the establishment of a specialized workshop (atelier) that can simultaneously act as a training centre, an exhibition space and a selling point run by local associations to ensure its sustainability and efficiency.
- Setting up a “light” industrial zone in order to promote investments in light industrial activities.



- Promoting the creation of trade unions and cooperatives.
- Branding the region for certain handicrafts and services, such as agricultural machinery maintenance.
- **Objective 4: Valorization of the region's natural and cultural heritage and promotion of "alternative tourism" trends (such as eco-tourism, rural tourism, and agricultural tourism)**
  - Identifying and mapping the cultural and natural assets of the area.
  - Producing a reference booklet of the region's natural and cultural assets for guidance and promotional purposes.
  - Rehabilitation of hiking trails and, possibly, cycling circuits.
  - Financial incentives to local entrepreneurs and municipalities to invest in tourism projects (such as eco-lodges, bed and breakfast).
  - Training programmes, at a later stage, in tourism development and management and hospitality (such programmes will be feasible once local attractions are identified and support to tourism in the region is endorsed at national level).
  - Developing a long-term tourism promotion and marketing strategy for the area.

### GOAL 3: Education and Health Services

Improve access to education and health services.

- **Objective 1: Strengthening the quality of education and diversifying options**
  - Providing funding and technical support to schools.
  - Upgrading and updating school infrastructure.
  - Introducing new fields of studies to existing vocational schools and supplying them with needed material.
  - Promoting vocational training.
  - Training teachers on new teaching models and extra-curricular activities.
- **Objective 2: Improving delivery of health services and increasing awareness pertaining to health issues**
  - Supporting cooperation and effective partnerships between different local groups and entities in the health care sector (e.g. private clinics, dispensaries, doctors, nurses) as well as between public and private actors in the sector.
  - Raising awareness on prevalent diseases, maternal and childcare, environmental health issues, and personal care.
  - Improving provision of primary health care services.
  - Training nurses on meeting the needs of Wadi Khaled population, since the region has around 180 nurses.

### GOAL 4: Municipal Capacity Building

Capacity building of local councils in strategic planning and service delivery and the development of technical and organizational skills related to asset and financial management.

- **Objective 1: Provide municipalities with proper venue and equipment and increase their budget.**
- **Objective 2: Provision of technical training and planning support to municipalities**
  - Developing and delivering training programmes to elected mayors and municipal members on issues of local participation, bottom-up planning approaches and good local governance and management.
  - Supporting municipalities in developing appropriate mechanisms for service delivery at the local level.

- Supporting municipalities in planning, implementing and managing interventions that help them generate their own resources.

- **Objective 3: Building the organizational capacity and coordination mechanisms of municipal councils**

- Supporting municipalities in creating local development units that can plan for development projects, prepare project documents, and solicit funding (through national and international donors) for implementation.
- Assisting municipalities in setting up organizational structures, administrative procedures, and coordination mechanisms that help them perform their responsibilities and work more effectively together and with other actors including line ministries and local administrations.
- Building the communication skills of municipal councils to enable them to interact with national and international actors, mainly potential partners in the local development process.
- Supporting the municipalities of the region in establishing a Union of Municipalities.

Annex 2

List of small projects -Prepared by UNHCR/Danish Refugee Council and Akkar Network for Development

Wadi Khaled									
Village	Number of Lebanese Population	Number of Syrian Refugees	Type of Project	Objectives	Timeline	Budget estimation USD	Local contribution	Focal Person	Contact of Focal Person
El Mquaybleh	4067	2000	Health: Equip a public Dispensary	Provide basic medical services Raise awareness of health and medical issues Reduce the mortality rate in cases of emergency and critical accidents. Provide low-cost medication for chronic disease Provide local staff in health centers with trainings to develop their management skills	10 Weeks	55 000\$	HR	Ahmad Akkari	70 39 40 10
El Hisheh	3400	3600	Agriculture: Establish irrigation channels	Facilitate the irrigation of land Use irrigation to diversify the agricultural produce of the land Increase the income of households that rely on agriculture. Create job opportunities in the agricultural sector.	10 Weeks	106.250\$	NA	Ahmad Al Ali	70 56 93 72
Bani Sakher	800	560	Agriculture: Equip a factory for the collection and storage of milk	Encourage the production and distribution of local milk in the village. Collect and cool milk using modern technology to maintain the quality and hygiene standards. Increase the income of farmers and ranchers by 25%. Revive the agricultural and farming sectors	12 weeks	60 000\$	Provide the venue for the factory	Ahmad El Waridi	71 93 81 10
Khatt El Petrol	1400	970	Provide the village with a Bobcat bulldozer	Clean the residue left behind by the flooding of the Great River in Winter. Clear patches of land used for agricultural purposes Remove waste, dirt, and sediments accumulated on the roads.	4 Weeks	35 000\$	N/A	Faraj El Othman	76 05 79 22
El fared	1700	1000	Agriculture: Establish a 2421-meter-long road.	Extinguish wildfires that affect the forest yearly. Provide firefighters and vehicles from the Ministry of Agriculture with easy access to the forest. Encourage the farmers to keep their land, maintain it, and replant the areas affected by the fires.	8 Weeks	36 000\$	N/A	Berri El Khalaf	03 37 06 04
El Amayer - Rajem Issa	3657	3700	WASH: Waste water treatment plant	Treat waste water in a responsible way to reduce pollution and disease. Protect underground water and preserve the environment. Benefit from the multiple uses of treated water.	12 Weeks	120 630\$	N/A	Bassam Khalifa	03 57 54 05

Wadi Khaled	15000	15000	Agriculture: Establish a 4 Km long agricultural road	Provide farmers with access to their cultivated lands to boost their productivity. Create job opportunities in the agricultural sector. Facilitate road access for firefighters in cases of fire. Facilitate the cultivation of new and diversified crops. Facilitate the use of new irrigation techniques, and make possible the transportation of chemical fertilizers and pesticides.	6 weeks	35 000\$	N/A	Issam Dweiry	70 53 57 99
El Ramah - Germanayeh	5700	4500	Agriculture: Establish a 1200 meter long agricultural road.	Provide farmers with access to their cultivated lands to boost their productivity. Create job opportunities in the agricultural sector. Facilitate road access for firefighters in cases of fire. Facilitate the cultivation of new and diversified crops. Facilitate the use of new irrigation techniques, and make possible the transportation of chemical fertilizers and pesticides.	6 weeks	18 000\$	N/A	Khaled El Badwi	03 46 89 07
El Sehleh	1726	450	Agriculture: Build a pond to collect rain water for irrigation purposes	Irrigate the land to improve and increase crop production. Limit the spread of fire as a result of water scarcity	10 weeks	150 000\$	N/A	Adnan El Khatib	03 53 48 40
Quenyeh	2000	800	Finish and equip the football stadium	Provide a place for youths to spend time and participate in sports activities. Develop social skills and sportsmanship through group activities. Form clubs for various age categories and organize local and regional competitions.	12 weeks	21 466\$	Cost of Lawn growing	Dr Ghazi Khaled	03 44 40 26
El Mwansseh	1500	950	Soap factory to market local olive oil	Use the surplus of olive oil to produce and market soap. Create job opportunities.	12 Weeks	26 000\$	Providing the venue for the factory	Ahmad Neaman	03 57 21 10
Kfartoun	7000	2400	Provide the village with garbage containers and a truck for garbage collection	Collect garbage and dispose of it in a healthy and environmentally-friendly manner. Help ease the burden on the municipality which enables it to focus on other projects.	4 Weeks	35 000\$	N/A	Hassan El Adraa	03 12 89 53
Akroum	4000	1950	Build a basketball and mini football stadium	Encourage the local participation in sports events. Encourage sports activities to promote social bonds between the youths. Create a sports club that can represent the village in sports competition.	10 Weeks	15 000\$	Provide the location	Faysal Diab	70 29 04 49

### Annex 3

#### Institutions & Key Stakeholders in Wadi Khaled

##### Local Authorities

1	Municipality Wadi Khaled	Nour Al Din Al Ahmad	Mayor	Wadi Khaled
		<b>Issam Al Douwayri</b>	Mayor's Deputy	
	Rojm Khalaf	Ahmad Al Mekhel	Mukhtar	Rojm Khalaf
	Rojm Hsein	Ahmad Al Mekhel	Mukhtar	Rojm Hsein
	Al Majdal	Mostafa Al Mostafa	Mukhtar	Al Majdal
	Knayseh	Ali Hamoud	Mukhtar	Knayseh
	Hnayder	Talal Al Ali	Mukhtar	Hnayder
	Qarha	No Mukhtar	No Mukhtar	Qarha
2	Municipality – Al Amayer / Rojm Issa	<b>Dr. Bassam Khalifeh</b>	Mayor	Al 'Amayer-Rojm Issa
		<b>Dr. Mostafa Yasin</b>	Mayor's Deputy	
	Al Amayer	Khoder Al Hajji	Mukhtar of Al Amayer	Al Amayer
	Rojm Issa	Sa'd Khalil	Mukhtar of Rojm Issa	Rojm Issa
3	Municipality – Rama	Khaled Al Badawi	Mayor	Rama
		Bashir Al Mostafa	Mayor's Deputy	
		Hsein Al Othman	Treasurer	
		Ali Al Badawi	Mukhtar	
4	Municipality - Mqaybleh / West Beqai'a	<b>Abdallah Fayyad</b>	Mayor	Mqaybleh
		Ahmad Akkari	Mayor's Deputy	
		Mohammad Ahmad	Mukhtar	
5	Municipality – Al Fared	<b>Dr. Berri Al Khalaf</b>	Mayor	Al Fared
		Aref Al Khalaf	Mukhtar	
6	Municipality - Hisheh	Dahham Al Nayef	Mayor	Hisheh
		<b>Ahmad Al Ali</b>	Mayor's Deputy	
7	Municipality - Khat Al Petrol	Ahmad Al As'ad	Mayor	Khat Al Petrol
		Fayez Al Ali	Mayor's Deputy	
8	<b>Municipality - Bani Sakher</b>	Khaled Al Sawan	Mayor	Bani Sakher
9	Village - Al Awadeh (no municipality)	Fayez Sarkas Abdallah	Mukhtar of Al Awadeh	Al Awadeh

##### Community Based Organizations

1	Al Tafawoq w Al Sa'ade	<b>As'ad Al Hassan</b>	Head	Wadi Khaled
2	Al 'Aranseh Al Khayriye	<b>Zakaria Al Ali</b>	Head	Al Awada
3	Jam3iyet Wadi Khaled Al Inma'iye	Khaled Ismail	Head	Hisheh
4	Local Development Committee - Wadi Khaled Center established by UNDP	<b>As'ad Shahade</b>	Head	Al Amayer

##### Agricultural Cooperatives

1	Qarha Agricultural Cooperative	<b>Sa'doun Obeid</b>	Head	Qarha
2	Rojm Hsein Agricultural Cooperative	As'ad Al Hassan	Head	Rojm Hussein
3	Al Jam'iye al Ta'awouniye Al Zira'iye	<b>Malak Dandashi</b>	Head	Al Amayer

##### Health

1	MoSA Health Dispensary in Al 'Amayer	<b>Ahmad Khalaf</b>	Head	Al Amayer
2	MoSA Health Dispensary in Qarha	<b>Sa'doun Al Obeid</b>	Head	Qarha
3	Al Maqased Health Dispensary in Hisheh	<b>Khaled Al Moustafa</b>	Head	Hisheh
4	Hisheh Private Health Dispensary	Mazyad Al Mahmoud	Head	Hisheh
5	Lebanese Red Cross Centre	Walid Nemess	Responsible	Mqaybleh
6	Health focal Point	<b>Dr. Mostafa Isma'il</b>	Physician	Hisheh

##### Education

1	Wadi Khaled Public Technical Institute	Khaled Al Obeid	Director	Hisheh
2	Rafiq Al Hariri Technical School	Lodi Moustafa Al Rashidi	Director	Al Majdal
3	Hisheh Secondary Public School	<b>Harfoush Hussein</b>	Director	Hisheh
4	Walid Eido Secondary School - Al Beqai'a	Maarouf Al Dikwein	Director	Al Beqai'a
5	Al Amayer Public School	<b>Mohammad Al Da'as</b>	Director	Al 'Amayer
6	Rojm Hussein Public school	<b>Walid Khalifeh</b>	Director	Rojm Hussein
7	Qarha Public School	<b>Rayeq Obeid</b>	Director	Qarha
8	Bani Sakher Elementary Public School	<b>Halloum Othman</b>	Director	Bani Sakher
9	Al Rama Wadi Khaled Mixed public school	Mohamad Al Kanj	Director	Al Rama
10	Al Kenayset Mixed Public School	Khalil Aliass Hanna	Director	Al Knayseh



11	Rojm Issa Mixed Public School	Ibrahim Jabbour	Director	Al Amayer
12	Hisheh Mixed Public School	Abed Al Nasser Hussein Rashidi	Director	Hisheh
13	Mrs. Bahiya Al Hariri Public School	Tamer Dandashi	Director	Al Majdal
14	Rojm Khalaf Al Kalkha Public School	Fatme Al Raii	Director	Rojm Khalaf
15	Rojm Khalaf Public school	Jamal Jouneyd	Director	Rojm Khalaf
16	Hnayder Public School	Mohammad Jneid	Director	Hnayder
17	Nabeh Al 'Awadeh Public School	Khayrallah Al Daas	Director	Al 'Awadeh
18	Al 'Awadeh Public School	Jerjess Shdid	Director	Al 'Awadeh
19	Al Beqai'a Public School	Atallah Al Daas	Director	Al Beqai'a
20	Khat Al Petrol Public School	Nouhad Hammoudi	Director	Khat Al Petrol
21	Al Mqaybleh Public School	Akram Bitar	Director	Al Mqaybleh
22	Al Fared Public School	Marie Kobersi	Director	Al Fared
23	Bara'em Al Moustaqbal Public school	Abdallah Al Mohammad	Director	North

<b>Police station in Mashta Hassan</b>	<b>Abdallah Al Haj</b>	<b>Head</b>	<b>Mashta Hassan</b>
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## Annex 4

### Institutions & Key Stakeholders in Akroum

#### Local Authorities

1	Municipality – Akroum	<b>Faysal Diab</b>	Mayor	Akroum
		Atef Abou Ali	Mukhtar	
2	Municipality - Al Mounseh	<b>Ahmad No'man</b>	Mayor	Al Mounseh
		Hasan Hamido	Mukhtar	
		Fadlallah Al Fahel	Mukhtar	
3	Municipality - Al Sahleh	<b>Adnan Al Khatib</b>	Mayor	Al Sahleh
		Basma Farhat	Mayor's Deputy	
		Moti' Al Khatib	Mukhtar	
4	Municipality – Kfartoun	Hsein Al Adra'	Mayor	Kfartoun
		<b>Ali Al Zein</b>	Mukhtar	
		Hsein Youssef	Mukhtar	
5	Municipality – Qenieh	<b>Dr. Ghazi Khaled</b>	Mayor	Qenieh
		Mostafa Isma'il	Mukhtar	
6	Village - Mrah Al Khokh	Nasser Adra	Mukhtar	Mrah Al Khokh
7	Village - Al Basatin	Hsein Salah	Mukhtar	Al Basatin

#### Community Based Organizations

1	Mount Akroum Developmental Organization	<b>Khoder Milhim</b>	Head	Akroum
2	Jam3iyit Qenieh Al Khayriye Al Ijtime3iyye	Moustafa Ismail	Head	Qenieh

#### Health

1	Health Dispensary of MOSA in Kfartoun	Hani Al Adra'	Head	Kfartoun
2	Physician and health focal point	<b>Dr. Ghazi Khaled</b>	Also Mayor	Qenieh

**Education**

1	Kfartoun Public School	Moustafa Na'man	Director	Kfartoun
2	Kfartoun Secondary Public School	<b>Khaled Al Adra'</b>	Director	Kfartoun
3	Kfartoun Technical Public School	Omar Hamoud	Director	Kfartoun
4	Al Intilaqa Private School	Kawna Al Adra'	Director	Kfartoun
5	Sanawiyit Ajyal (Modern Education School)	Ahmed Al Zein	Director	Kfartoun
6	Al-Nahda Private School	<b>Ali Isbir</b>	Director	Akroum
7	Qenieh Secondary Public School	Hanan Shahoud	Director	Qenieh
8	Al Salam Secondary Private School	Ziad Al Adra'	Director	Qenieh
9	Nour Private School (Dar Al Mustaqbal)	<b>Ahmed Isbir</b>	Director	Qenieh

**Key Persons**

1	Education and youth	<b>Khaled Al Zein</b>	Teacher	Kfartoun
2	Education, youth, religious figure	Moustafa Abdallah	Sheikh and teacher	Akroum
3	Focal point (development and refugee issues)	<b>Ali Abdul Qader</b>	Municipal	Akroum

**Annex 5**

**List of Interviewed Donors, Governmental Entities and UN Agencies**

	Organization	Affiliation	Focal Point
1	EU Delegation	Donor	Simon Bojsen-Moller
2	Economic and Social Fund for Development	Donor	Dima Sader
3	Australian Embassy	Donor	Lou-Ellen Martin
4	HRC	Donor	Elie Khoury
5	Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands	Donor	Jacco Bos
6	Swedish Embassy in Syria and Lebanon	Donor	Fredrick Lee-Ohlsson
7	Embassy of Canada	Donor	Sumita Dixit
8	Embassy of Kuwait	Donor	Mohamad Al Wakyan
9	U.S. Embassy	Donor	Jennifer Williams & Michael Griffith
10	U.K. Embassy	Donor	Simon Little
11	UNDP	UN Agency	Luca Renda
12	UN ESCWA	UN Agency	Adib Nehme
13	UNHCR	UN Agency	Frederic Cussigh
14	OCHA	UN Agency	Abdul Haq Amiri
15	CDR	Government	Wafa Sharafeddine & Amal Karake
16	Ministry of Social Affairs	Government	Makram Malaeb
17	Ministry of Interior & Municipalities	Government	Ahmad El Rajab
18	Prime Minister Office	Government	Marylise Abou Jaoude

## ▪ Annex 6

### List of Available Studies and Assessment on Wadi Khaled and Akroum

#### Community Profiles and Local Development Plans

- “Focus group Discussion Analysis Report and Needs Assessment in Akroum and Wadi Khaled” under project: “Empowering Municipalities: Serving Communities”, Danish Refugee Council, Akkar Network for Development, October 2013.
- “Wadi Khaled Socio-Economic Needs Assessment and Local Development Strategy”, UNDP, 2013.
- “Local Development Plan for the Cluster of Eastern Wadi Khaled”, Council for Development and Reconstruction, Economic and Social Fund for Development (ADELNORD), March 2012.
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- “Leaflet: Discover the Cluster of Wadi Khaled», Council for Development and Reconstruction, Economic and Social Fund for Development (ADELNORD), 2012.
- **تجمع وادي خالد الشرقي يعرف عن نفسه** - Council for Development and Reconstruction, Economic and Social Fund for Development, October 2011.
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- “Community Profile - Akroum Cluster (Akroum, Kfartoun, Mrah Al Khokh and Al Sahleh)”, Council for Development and Reconstruction - Economic and Social Fund for Development, November 2006.
- “Local Development Plan for the Community of Akroum Cluster”, Council for Development and Reconstruction - Economic and Social Fund for Development, October 2006.
- “Local Development Plan for the Community of Akroum Akroum - Olive Oil Mill”, Council for Development and Reconstruction - Economic and Social Fund for Development, October 2006.

#### Livelihoods and Impact Assessments

- “Lebanon - Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict”, World Bank, 2013.
- “Assessment Phase Report: Capacity Development of Local Officials in Times of Crisis”, UNDP Peace Building Project, Beyond Reform & Development, 2013.
- “Proposed Response Plan for Phase II: Capacity Development of Local Officials in Times of Crisis”, UNDP Peace Building Project, Beyond Reform & Development, 2013.
- “Advocacy Report: Under Pressure, the Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Host Communities in Lebanon”, World Vision, July 2013.
- “Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis (EMMA) - Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis (EMMA) of the Construction, Service Sector and Agricultural Labor Systems”, IRC, Save the Children, DRC, Oxfam, UK Aid, April 2013.
- “Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis (EMMA) - Executive Briefing for Analyses of the Construction, Service Sector and Agricultural Labor Systems”, IRC, Save the Children, DRC, Oxfam, UK Aid, April 2013.
- “UNHCR Lebanon Community Support Projects in Refugee Hosting Communities”, UNHCR, July 2013.
- “Livelihoods Assessment: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon - Bekaa Valley and North Governorates”, Save the Children, International Rescue Committee, October 2012.
- “Akkar Livelihoods Assessment”, Danish Refugee Council Lebanon, February 2012.
- “Rapid Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Crisis on Socio-Economic Situation in North and Bekaa”, UNDP, Development Management International, August 2012.
- PowerPoint of “Rapid Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Crisis on Socio-Economic Situation in North and Bekaa”, UNDP, Development Management International, July 2012.
- Briefing of Rapid Assessment under «Strengthening Civil Peace in Lebanon” Project, UNDP, October 2012.

- “The Lebanon Host Communities Support Programmeme - Programmeme Brief”, UNDP, Ministry of Social Affairs, 2012.
- “Report of the Joint Assessment Mission to Wadi Khaled”, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRCO, MoSA, 2011.
- “Assessing Basic Socio Economic Indicators in Northern Lebanon: RAP for the Planning the Development of Vulnerable Communities”, International Organization for Migration, 2010.
- “Multi Sector Assessment of Lebanese - Syrian Border Communities”, ECE Consultants, 2010.
- “Wadi Khaled in Perspective: A Report to the British Embassy”, School of Social Work, Wayne State University, Detroit, USA, Royce A. Hutson, 2009.
- “Forgotten Akkar: Socio Economic Assessment of the Akkar Region”, Mada, 2008.

#### Health and Shelter

- “WASH Assessment in North Lebanon - Syrian Refugees and Vulnerable Lebanese Households”, UNICEF, June 2012.
- “Assessment of Reproductive Health and Gender-Based Violence among Displaced Syrian Women in Lebanon”, UNFPA, UNHCR, IMC, September 2012.
- “Syrian Refugees in Akkar Assessment Report - Overview of the Situation of the Akkar District”, Premiere Urgence, August 2012.
- Health assessment implemented by Al Makased in Wadi Khaled in 2005.

#### Conflict Mapping

- “Community Conflicts in Northern Lebanon - Establishing Conflict Resilient Communities in the North of Lebanon”, Partners for Democratic Change International, Peace Labz, European Union, August 2013.
- “Things Fall Apart: political, economical and social instability in Lebanon”, Mercy Corps, June 2013.
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