

**RAPID ASSESSMENT OF
THE IMPACT OF SYRIAN CRISIS ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN
NORTH AND BEKAA**



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ISSUES AND TRENDS

The study shows that Syrian refugees do constitute a burden on hosting households as well as communities. With an average of 7-8 Syrian refugees per receiving household, and with some households receiving some 25 refugees simultaneously, communities lack the means and capacities to provide for increased numbers of refugees.

The burden of hosting is higher on North households compared to Bekaa households as most of the latter are leasing their apartments and receiving rent fees in exchange for hosting services.

Major factors that render Lebanese households burdened by Syrian refugees are related to decreased space available to Lebanese, increased household expenditure on food and non-food items and the minimal space left to allow for segregation between sexes.

Major burden on Lebanese communities stems from facts related to Lebanese hosting areas being the poorest in Lebanon. As a result of Syrian crisis, Lebanese hosting communities suffer pressures on solid waste collection and treatment services, public and private schools that might not have enough space to adapt to incoming Syrian students and primary health care services. Added to the burden of receiving Syrian refugees, Lebanese communities are being deprived of aid that used to be channeled to such communities by local NGOs, and which has been diverted to Syrian refugees rather than needy Lebanese households.

Lebanese households also suffer from increased expenditures, a phenomenon mostly demonstrated in North Lebanon where some 80% of households stated that their expenditures have increased. More than half of North hosting households expressed more than 30% increase in expenditures. Increase in expenditures basically is a result of increased bills for food, medicines, education, utilities and transportation. The total increase in household expenditures has been reported to be an average of 15% in Bekaa and 6% in Northern Lebanon.

One of the major reasons for increased expenditures pertains to what could be labeled as “regional inflation” in prices resultant of injection of large amounts of cash money into the specific areas of Tripoli, Wadi Khaled and Eرسال (by Arab donors and philanthropies). Such cash injection, in addition to closure of border and the deprivation of the locals from buying Syrian cheap goods have resulted in increased prices within areas populated by the poorest households in Lebanon.

In parallel to increased expenditures incomes of Lebanese households and communities have decreased as a result of the crisis. Some 90% of residents of North and Bekaa have reported decreased incomes as a result of the crisis. More than 90% of those who have lost incomes did not find any alternative sources of income. Of those who found (less than 10%), all the jobs found are non permanent.

Major factors that have contributed to decreased incomes are related to: increased competition between Syrian refugees and Lebanese workers, worsened security situation (Tripoli, Wadi Khaled and Eرسال), cease of smuggling and border trade, decreased inter-regional trade in Lebanon because of worsening

security situation, landmines on the Lebanese-Syrian borders that deprive Lebanese from access to agricultural lands and grazing fields and decreased import and export activity to/from and through Syrian territories.

In addition to increased expenditures and decreased incomes, the crisis has had the effects of decreasing access to health and education services within border communities, decreased access to cheaper goods, loss of feeling of security due to deteriorating security situation, higher use of scarce resources, and crowding of existing jobs that is felt most in the agriculture and construction sectors, and among non-skilled and semi-skilled workers specifically.

To cope with the financial results of Syrian crisis on Lebanese household budget, Lebanese households resorted to several coping mechanisms the most quoted of which were: purchasing of food on credit, borrowing food, reducing quality of food, buying only “can afford to” food, taking loans, spending from savings and selling assets. The last two measures are of specific concern since they deplete the households’ capacity to generate revenues on the medium to long term and thus render communities vulnerable to further shocks in the environment.

Social cohesion in North and Bekaa communities was also affected by the crisis. While Lebanese are not very vocal about negative impacts of the presence of Syrian refugees within their communities because of political and security reasons, complaints are starting to surface and could be a source of future concern and conflict if not wisely addressed. In the North, there was reported a feeling of loss of security within communities because of presence of large amounts of Syrian refugees. Women are careful not to walk around with lots of cash money in their hand bags, daughters are deprived from walking far from residences at night time. Feelings of anxiety, fear and anxiousness are abundant in Northern Lebanon specifically. In addition to decreased feeling of security, Lebanese individuals are resentful of the fact that aid is going to Syrian refugees solely, with no attention provided to Lebanese families. Lebanese laborers are suffering from increased unfair and unregulated competition accompanied by price inflation that substantially reduces the purchasing power of lower middle income to poor households.

When asked about measures that could be taken to improve their social and economic situation, respondents listed enhanced security as a major concern, followed by improving personal incomes, job creation, provision of cheap goods and services, enhancement of skills of locals to improve their chances of getting new jobs and enhancing access to education and health.

Respondents complained about lack of coordination among humanitarian aid agencies which is leading to inefficiencies in aid distribution. They also highlighted some cultural norms and practices not taken into consideration upon aid distribution.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Based on an emergency allocation provided by UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), UNDP Lebanon has conducted a rapid socio-economic assessment to gain a deeper understanding of the emerging needs of Lebanese communities impacted by the Syrian crisis, in order to develop programmatic approaches. The socio-economic assessment was conducted in May/June 2012, and it aimed at:

- Assessing the socio-economic impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanese communities in the North and Bekaa, which are hosting Syrian refugees and/or whose livelihoods have been negatively impacted by the closure of the border;
- Recommending possible immediate and medium term measures to mitigate this pressure; and,
- Advising on the development of an integrated socio-economic strategy for the North and the Bekaa, inclusive of the livelihoods needs of the displaced population.

To achieve the above objectives, a survey was conducted on 600 households in Bekaa and Northern Lebanon to assess impact of Syrian crisis on Lebanese households. Seven focus groups were convened with economic actors and local NGOs/CSOs, and fourteen interviews were conducted with local officials and notables. Following are the assessment results.

Burden of Hosting:

The assessment revealed that the average number of hosted Syrian refugees per household is 8 in Bekaa and 7 in Northern Lebanon. In Bekaa, 6% of the hosted are relatives to head of household, while in the North the number rises to 53%. Tripoli's number is 74%. In Bekaa, 7% of hosting households have hosted refugees for 1 month, 84% have hosted for 3-6 months, and 8% have hosted for a year or more. In North, 2% of the respondents have hosted refugees for one month, 47% have hosted for 3-6 months, and 51% have hosted refugees for a year or more. In some cases, the number of Syrian refugees hosted in one Lebanese household exceeded 25 individuals.

82% of respondents in Bekaa are receiving cash subsidies from Syrian refugees, compared to only 12% of respondents in the North. 96.5% of North respondents declared that they are burdened by hosting Syrian refugees compared to 43% of Bekaa respondents. 100% of Wadi Khaled respondents indicated that Syrian refugees do constitute a burden. Decreased space, increased expenditures, increased consumption of food and non-food items, and the need for additional space to segregate males and females were the highest quoted reasons for burden/concern.

Several other pressures on the hosting communities were cited. Bekaa communities have noted increased amounts of solid waste as taxing the capacities of local authorities. Communities in Tripoli, Wadi Khaled and Ersal noted increased pressures on public and private schools as a result of increased number of Syrian students. Difficulties include, in addition to lack of space, the adaptation of Syrian students to Lebanese curricula. Communities in Bekaa also noted an increased demand on the services

of primary health care institutions. Last, it was noted that the resources of Lebanese NGOs traditionally serving Lebanese needy households have been diverted to Syrian refugees.

Increased Expenditures:

An impact of the closure of border and the hosting of Syrian refugees is increased household and community expenditure. 60% of Bekaa respondents (who are hosting Syrian refugees) noted that their food expenditures increased as a result of hosting Syrian refugees, compared to 79% of North respondents. Expenditures on food have increased by 5-10% for 43% of Bekaa respondents, 11-30% for 29% of the respondents and more than 30% for 28% of the respondents. In North Lebanon, expenditures on food have increased by 5-10% for 1% of the respondents, 11-30% for 48% of the respondents and more than 30% for 51% of the respondents.

The average inflation (in expenditures) was calculated to be 15% for Bekaa and 6% for North Lebanon. For Bekaa, inflation in expenditures was noted to be 18% for food items, 5% for medicines, 35% for education fees, 9% for utility bills, 8% for washing water and 40% for transportation. In the North, expenditure inflation levels were noted to be 12% for food items, 34% for medicines, and 6% for water and utility bills.

Increased expenditures were attributed to hosting Syrian refugees, increased demand and thus prices, regional inflation of prices as a result of incoming cash from Arab countries to Syrian refugees, increased costs of transporting products to Lebanese markets due to increased prices of fuel, and border closure which led to Lebanese purchasing goods and services from Lebanon when they used to purchase them from Syria. Examples of goods and services that used to be provided through Syria are health care services, agricultural products, veterinary services, pesticides, seeds, fertilizers, livestock and forage, medications for beekeeping, diesel for transportation and other consumer goods.

Decreased Incomes:

The assessment revealed that the main engines of economic growth both in Bekaa and North are suffering due to closure of borders and the decreased ability of Lebanese producers to export their products to Syrian markets as well as to other Arab and regional markets through Syrian territories.

Reduced economic growth, among other factors, has resulted in loss of income to Lebanese communities. 91% of Bekaa respondents noted a decline in income compared to 89% of North respondents. In both cases, no more than 7% found alternative jobs to compensate for loss of income. 70% -100% (in Bekaa and North respectively) of those jobs were non-permanent.

Loss of income was related to several factors. Increased competition between Lebanese workers and Syrian refugees rates high among the cited reasons for reduced incomes. Newly incoming Syrian workers do accept half of the fees that Lebanese workers charge. Some Syrians are even starting their own businesses (car maintenance for example) and charging lower prices than Lebanese. The worsening security situation in Tripoli, Wadi Khaled and Eرسال has further contributed to deterioration of economic

situation. In Tripoli, it was cited that sales have decreased by 75% for some industries. End of smuggling and border commerce was cited as major reason for loss of income, especially in places like Wadi Khaled where smuggling and border commerce were the main sources of livelihood in the area before crisis. Decreased inter-regional commerce in Lebanon because of security situation in Northern Lebanon is also one of the reasons for decreased incomes. Decreased access to agricultural lands and grazing lots next to Syrian border, landmines across the border line, decline of import/export activity, decline of demand from Syrian markets and the security situation in Northern Lebanon are all reasons that were provided for decreased incomes of hosting communities, thus compounding the problem of increased expenditures.

Other Impacts:

Decreased incomes and increased expenditures are not the only results of Syrian crisis. Loss of feeling of security, higher prices for goods and services, and crowded job opportunities rate high among the results of Syrian crisis. In Bekaa, the top three cited results are: decreased income (81% of respondents), inflated prices (80% of respondents) and crowded job opportunities (79% of respondents). These were immediately followed by a decreased feeling of security with 71% of respondents citing it. North Lebanon respondents were more likely to cite the lost feeling of security (99%), followed closely by inflated food prices and crowded job opportunities (97% and 94% respectively). The security situation in Akkar and Tripoli has exacerbated the feeling of insecurity among North residents and hence respondents.

Crowded job market has been highlighted as a serious by-product of the crisis. The sectors identified by respondents as most crowded are the agricultural sector (82% of Bekaa respondents and 89% of North respondents) and construction (97% of Bekaa respondents and 75% of North respondents). Competition is mainly on jobs with no or relatively moderate skill requirements that attract non-skilled and semi-skilled laborers.

Decreased Access to Health and Education:

Decreased access to health and education has been highlighted as yet another impact of Syrian crisis. In Bekaa, lack of access to health care has been majorly attributed to lack of ability to pay for health care on the Lebanese side of the borders (94% of the respondents) and absence of primary health care centers within the community (52% of the respondents). Still in Bekaa, lack of access to education was majorly attributed to lack of ability to pay for educational services on the Lebanese side of borders (93%) and absence of affordable schools within the Lebanese territories (61%).

In the North, lack of access to health care was majorly attributed to lack of access to Syrian border hospitals (69%), lack of ability to pay for health care on the Lebanese side of the borders (90%) and absence of primary health care centers within community (54%). As for education, North respondents cited lack of access to Syrian border schools (69%), lack of ability to pay for educational services on the Lebanese side of the borders (82%) and absence of affordable schools within Lebanese territories (53%) as major reasons for lack of access to education. In Wadi Khaled, most of the residents used to depend

on Syria for health care, and the closure of border has added financial burden on households who now have to seek such services through Lebanese institutions.

Food Security and Coping Mechanisms:

Food security is a major concern in crisis situations. The study examined the availability of food stock in hosting communities. It was noted that 61% of Bekaa respondents have no food stock, and 82% of North respondents have food stock for less than two weeks, hence rendering them more vulnerable to external shocks like wars and escalation in security situation, Tripoli being an example. 19% of Bekaa respondents and 9% of North respondents are purchasing food on credit and/or borrowing food. Only 7% of Bekaa respondents acquire food through their own production/stocks compared to 37% of North respondents. 4% of Bekaa respondents rely on aid providers for food, compared to 13% of North respondents, thus highlighting the efforts to distribute food portions by international and national organizations in the North. 100% of Bekaa and North respondents noted increases in food prices after the crisis. 34% of Bekaa respondents noted that they are not able to find the same food items in the local market. The percentage goes up to 73% in the North.

To cope with increased expenditures and decreased incomes, Bekaa residents mostly purchase food on credit (59%), borrow food (42%), take loans (37%) and are spending from their own savings (37%). North residents buy “only afford to” food items (43%), reduce quality of meals (40%) and spend from savings (40%). Spending from savings indicates that Lebanese households might not be able to sustain the current situation in the near future, as savings become depleted and incomes remain declining, with no foreseen reduction in prices and/or household expenditures. Wadi Khaled residents are more innovative when it comes to coping mechanisms. 50% of respondents in Wadi Khaled cited growing herbs next to their residences. 50% cited cooking with relatives to save on gas and 42% cited using wood as fuel for cooking. A dangerous phenomenon pertains to selling livestock (36% in Wadi Khaled) as a coping mechanism. Such practice threatens to deplete community assets, thus exacerbating its vulnerability to current crisis and future shocks.

Safety and Social Cohesion:

The crisis has had impact on feeling of safety and social cohesion within hosting communities. 80% of Bekaa respondents and 98% of North respondents have indicated that they have safety and security concerns in the community. 81% of Bekaa respondents and 96% of North respondents noted that women safety and security have not changed after crisis. The explanation for the seemingly two contradictory indicators is that safety and security concerns are not related to the presence of Syrian refugees per-se, but to the overall security situation in border areas. While the survey did not highlight feelings of insecurity within community, focus group discussions revealed feelings of resentment and lack of safety that are still fermenting yet not much openly expressed. Focus group participants in Tripoli reported feelings of loss of security among women who stopped roaming the streets with large amounts of cash money in their hand bags. There were also noted feelings of fear, anxiety and anxiousness especially in Tebbaneh and Jabal

Mohsen areas. In the cities of Tripoli, Mina, and Beddawi, there were reported feelings of insecurity and absence of law and order that have escalated after crisis.

Such feelings are still nascent and have not yet affected interactions among Syrian refugees and Lebanese households in general. It was reported that the most common forms of interaction between Lebanese and Syrian communities in Bekaa are hosting in own household (89%), provision of food (79%), provision of utilities (75%), marriages between Lebanese males and Syrian females (69%), and short term employment of Syrian refugees (67%). In the North, the most common forms of interaction are hosting in own household (84%), marriage between Lebanese males and Syrian females (78%), marriage between Lebanese females and Syrian males (74%), and provision of food to refugees (61%).

Such interaction however, is accompanied by reservations noted by Lebanese hosts, which threaten to come to surface as the crisis prolongs for longer. In Bekaa, it was noted by one of the NGOs that the Lebanese community is very sensitive to any further stepping up of aid assistance to Syrian refugees. Lebanese households expressed their “unhappiness” to see aid going to Syrian refugees exclusively while the Lebanese hosting households are not receiving any aid. Lebanese laborers also voiced their concern about “tough and unfair” competition that Syrian workers are putting up. Last, Lebanese are aware of the inflationary pressures and are working hard to cope with the deteriorating finances of their households, yet they are not happy to see Syrian refugees receiving cash and in-kind donations that allow them to “live easy” without even having to work.

Priorities for Intervention:

When asked to denote and rank interventions by priority to maintain and/or restore the living conditions and livelihood, the majority of respondents in Bekaa cited enhancing security situation as the top concern (83%). Improved personal income ranked second in Bekaa with 74% of all respondents noting it as most important. Job creation came third in rank below increased income with 68% of respondents citing it as most important. Whether the reason was food price inflation or increased need for food and non-food items, the provision of cheap goods as compared to Syrian goods is an important factor for Bekaa respondents who ranked the provision of moderately priced food goods as number four (51%). Equally ranked by all respondents is enhanced skills of locals to gain better access to job market and enhanced access to educational and health services which were cited by 36% of all Bekaa respondents.

The top named priority intervention area in the North is the provision of cheap goods as compared to Syrian goods that used to flow to border communities with 83% ranking it as most important, closely followed by improved income (77%), enhanced access to education and health (71%) and enhanced skills (69%). Job creation and improved security situation follow as fifth and sixth (40% and 38% respectively).

Security is the foremost concern for Tripoli respondents (98.8% of respondents) compared to 13% in Wadi Khaled area. The same applies for job creation (98.8% and 16% for Tripoli and Wadi Khaled

respectively) and the need to enhance skills of locals for better access to the job market with 83% citing this in Tripoli and none of Wadi Khaled respondents.

Humanitarian Aid:

When asked if they or the Syrian refugees they host are receiving aid, 63% of Bekaa respondents noted that they or their Syrian guests are currently receiving aid, namely in the form of food items (99%), non-food items (84%), and cash subsidies (14%). 78% of North respondents indicated that they or their Syrian guests are currently receiving aid, namely in the form of food items (98%), non-food items (17%) and cash subsidies (6%). Several points are noted when it comes to delivery of aid.

- One weakness of aid provision is lack of coordination especially between Lebanese and international NGOs. As a result, some refugees are receiving 2 or 3 aid packages per month, while others who are not registered are not receiving any.
- Cash payments provided by Arab organizations to refugees are inflating the prices of goods, thus adversely affecting the Lebanese;
- In Bekaa, religious institutions play key roles in aid delivery, except for Eرسال;
- It is suggested that coupons be followed instead of aid packages because of easiness of administration and less problems it raises for beneficiaries.

Main Livelihood Challenges:

The main livelihood challenges in Wadi Khaled:

- Inability to buy goods and services from Syria, which translates into increased expenditures since residents have to acquire such goods and services from Lebanon;
- Decreased incomes as a result of border closure and inability to access lands on borders;
- Increased household and community expenditures as a result of hosting Syrian refugees and inflated prices of goods and services;
- Local economy based on smuggling and commerce with Syria as a basic source for livelihood;
- Inability to define a new economic identity/role for Wadi Khaled in isolation from Syria;
- Decreased mobility and ability to exchange goods and services with Tripoli because of security situation in Tripoli and security restrictions on Wadi Khaled;
- Decreased access to health and education.

The main livelihood challenges in Tripoli:

- Inability to buy goods from Syria;
- Decreased income as a result of security situation, competition with Syrians, and closure of border;
- Increased household and community expenditures as a result of hosting Syrian refugees and inflated prices of goods and services (especially rent and food items);

- Lack of feeling of security within community and deteriorating image of Tripoli as a secure place the latter of which is suffocating Tripoli industries and services;
- Decreased access to health and education;

The main livelihoods challenges in Bekaa:

- Inability to buy goods and raw materials from Syria;
- Inability to export Bekaa products to Syrian and Arab markets through land;
- Decreased income as a result of security situation, competition with Syrians, and inability to export, which leads to decline in selling prices of Bekaa products (by 50% for some products);
- Increased household and community expenditures as a result of inflated prices of goods and services;
- Decreased access to health and education.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that immediate measures be taken to ameliorate the current situation of inflated expenditures and reduced incomes.

On the short term, it is recommended that cash/coupons for work be provided to Lebanese households as well as Syrian refugees. The kinds of work for which cash/coupons are to be provided range from forestation and landscaping projects, to agricultural roads, to renovating and painting local markets, to renovating and painting and equipping schools and primary health care centers so as to increase their services, to addressing specific community projects (such as sports courts) that would benefit youth and other vulnerable and needy segments of community. Such short term interventions are recommended to be labor intensive and income generating.

As short term measures cannot persist for long and are not sustainable by nature, medium to long term measures are recommended to sustain income generation within targeted communities. The first axis of intervention recommended on the medium to long term is improving the incomes of local communities. Improving security situation, solving the exports challenge, organizing competition and implementing income generating schemes within a framework of local development plans are recommended themes under this axis of intervention.

The second recommended axis of intervention on the medium to long term is decreasing household and community expenditures in targeted areas. This could be achieved through decreasing regional inflation (through reducing amount of incoming cash) and providing for other sources of raw materials the latter of which are to replace cheap raw materials that used to be imported from Syria.

The third recommended axis of intervention is enhancing social cohesion. Assistance to Syrian refugees has to pass through supporting Lebanese households. In case support to Syrian refugees does not take into consideration the needs of Lebanese hosting communities, social unrest and community cleavages might result. It is recommended that security and safety feelings within affected communities be

improved, cultural differences between Lebanese hosting and Syrian hosted refugees be managed, price inflation in targeted areas be reduced, and project/program schemes to employ Lebanese and Syrian refugees in community development be designed.

The fourth recommended axis of intervention is to strengthen institutional capacities of local and central government agencies and ministries in order to improve their aid delivery and development planning and implementation capacities. Under this axis, it is recommended to improve institutional capacities of local governments, establishing cooperation mechanisms between donor organizations, and establishing a national task force to address crisis composed of central agencies/ministries, international aid organizations and major local NGOs/CSOs working in aid.

1. INTRODUCTION:

1.1 Background

Following the deterioration of the situation in Syria, Lebanon has been witnessing an influx of refugees along the eastern border. The Syrian refugee population is concentrated in North Lebanon with over 9000 in the Wadi Khaled area and an estimated 3000 in Tripoli (numbers are true as of June 2012). Latest assessments provided by UNHCR indicate a population of approximately 8500 displaced Syrians in the Bekaa Valley, although higher numbers are expected to rise once the registration has been completed. The refugee population is largely reliant on the Lebanese host households in largely poor and undeserved regions of the country, as well as humanitarian organizations to address immediate needs. The High Relief Committee (HRC) leads the coordination of humanitarian assistance in the North of Lebanon, partnering with the UNHCR and other national and international organizations. Such coordination by the Government, through the High Relief Committee, is not in place yet in the Bekaa region.

As far as the North of the country is concerned, the crisis in Syria also resulted in the closure of border, thereby putting an end to ongoing cross-border trade and dramatically diminishing access to the services and goods by the Lebanese border communities. In particular, communities depending on cheaper services, goods or work in Syria can no longer rely on their traditional sources of income, with limited livelihood alternatives. A recent report from the Danish Refugee Council noted the increasing number of Lebanese households who are making increased use of their savings to face the current situation, thereby increasing their overall vulnerability.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

As a response to the escalating humanitarian situation, UNDP established an internal team with knowledge and expertise in socio-economic development and crisis recovery, to design and implement an appropriate response targeting the North and the Bekaa. It is now in the process of strengthening the capacity of local actors, such as selected municipalities to respond to the emerging situation. Based on an emergency allocation provided by UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), UNDP

Lebanon is conducting a socio-economic assessment to further ascertain emerging needs of Lebanese communities impacted by the Syrian crisis, in order to develop programmatic approaches. The socio-economic assessment will serve to achieve the following objectives:

- 1- Assess the socio-economic impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanese communities in the North and Bekaa, which are hosting Syrian refugees and/or whose livelihoods have been negatively impacted by the closure of the border;
- 2- Recommend possible immediate and medium term measures to mitigate this pressure;
- 3- Advice on the development of an integrated socio-economic strategy for the North and the Bekaa, inclusive of the livelihoods needs of the displaced population.

1.3 Methodology of the Study

The socio-economic assessment comprises of two complementary approaches, consisting of a desk review and a field assessment. The purpose of the desk review is to provide a picture of the socioeconomic situation of the North and the Bekaa in comparison to other regions of Lebanon by studying the available literature and statistics on the region. In addition, information was gathered on the humanitarian relief and assistance for Syrian refugees of various local and international governmental and non-governmental players. A substantial number of documents and reports were reviewed, and meetings were held with national organizations concerned. As for the field assessment, three methods were triangulated to guarantee depth and preciseness of data generated.

Questionnaire/ Survey:

A survey was conducted on a sample of Lebanese households to investigate the impact of the Syrian crisis on the livelihoods of local communities. A probability-proportional-to-size sampling method was used to determine the number of households selected in the sample. The sample size of the survey is n=600 households/families. The sample has the following characteristics:

- 300 questionnaires were administered in Northern Lebanon, with 200 questionnaires in Wadi Khaled region and 100 in Tripoli (Tebbeh, Quobbeh, Zehriyyeh, Mina, Qalmoun);
- In Wadi Khaled region, 14 villages were sampled (out of the 22 villages of Wadi Khaled). 7 of the 14 villages have high number of Syrian refugees, and another 7 villages have low number of Syrian refugees. This technique was followed to control for the impact of Syrian refugees as being isolated from other impacts of Syrian crisis, namely border closure;
- 300 questionnaires were administered in Bekaa region, distributed among Central Bekaa (Saadnayel), Northern Bekaa (Ersal), and Western Bekaa (Bar –Elias and Mdousha and Al-Marj);
- In administering all the questionnaires, 2/3 of the questionnaires were conducted on households hosting Syrian refugees, and 1/3 of the questionnaires were conducted on households not hosting Syrian refugees. The objective was also to take into consideration the impact of Syrian crisis on hosting communities, not only households;

- The distribution of sample in North Lebanon was based on the distribution of Syrian refugees in Northern Lebanon, compiled by UNHCR based on the latter's field work;
- The distribution of the sample in Bekaa was based on the distribution of Syrian refugees in Bekaa, as compiled by UNHCR. Out of the 300 questionnaires administered in Bekaa, 200 were conducted in Ersal, which hosts alone around 3600 refugees out of the 9000 refugees estimated to be residing currently in Bekaa. The questionnaire is attached in Annex 1.

Focus Group Discussions:

Seven focus group discussions FDGs were conducted, 4 in North Lebanon and 3 in Bekaa. In North Lebanon, one focus group was conducted in Tripoli with economic actors to determine the economic impacts of Syrian crisis and suggest short to medium term interventions. Another focus group in Tripoli was conducted with CSOs/NGOs to determine mainly social impacts of the crisis as well as economic impacts and suggested ways to move forward on short and medium run. Similarly, two focus groups were conducted in Akkar region (Wadi Khaled Municipality for economic actors and Minyara for CSOs/NGOs).

In Bekaa, three focus groups were conducted. One focus group was convened in Ersal for economic actors. Another focus group was conducted in Saadnayel for economic actors. A third focus group was conducted in Beirut for CSOs/NGOs working in Bekaa region.

Outputs of the focus groups, designed to measure the social and economic impacts of the Syrian crisis and to suggest short to medium term interventions, were triangulated with the quantitative analysis provided by the questionnaire-survey. Focus Group Discussion questions and attendees as well as locations are attached in Annex 2.

Individual Interviews:

A total of 13 interviews were conducted with local notables and community leaders within targeted areas. Interviews revealed in-depth information about impact of Syrian crisis and ways to mitigate and improve economic situation through job creation and income generation. Interview questions, interviewees and locations are attached in Annex 3.

Limitations:

- Being a rapid impact assessment, the field work had to be conducted in less than 3 weeks, thus losing some of the richness in quantitative as well as qualitative data;
- The tense security situation in Wadi Khaled and Tripoli delayed field work and imposed prior collaboration with local notables and municipal police, which increased the time budgeted for field research;
- The political nature of the Syrian crisis restrained some participants from responding to sensitive questions, such as whether Syrian refugees constitute a burden on Lebanese hosting households;
- Continuous change in the residence addresses of Syrian refugees forced the research team to hire local focal points to locate Lebanese households hosting Syrian refugees; in Northern Lebanon

(Tripoli), the trend is toward Syrian refugees relocating from Tebbaneh and Kobbeh to Minnieh-Dannieh and Kalmoun. In Bekaa, as Ersal became saturated, newly arriving refugees are heading to neighboring Labweh and El-Ein villages.

- The sample is not a random sample, since there is no final official list of all Syrian refugees in Lebanon. In addition, refugees keep changing their places of residence in a way that makes it hard to track them (by city and residence address).

2. FINDINGS:

2.1 Characteristics of the Sample:

303 households were surveyed in Bekaa Area. Of those, the majority resides in Ersal 61.5%, followed by Saadnayel (27%), Bar Elias (5%) and Marj, Mdoukha and El-Ain (2%). Thus, the majority of the respondents reside in North Bekaa (65%), 32% in Central Bekaa, and 2% in West Bekaa. Of those, 78% are males and 22% are females. The majority of the households are headed by males (95%), with merely 5% of female headed households.

As for North Lebanon, 292 households were surveyed. 91% of respondents were males who are heads of households, compared to 9% of female respondents who head their households. Of those, 68.5% reside in Wadi Khaled region, and 31.5% live in Tripoli.

2.2. Household and Community Income:

Sources of Income:

The main source of revenue for Bekaa respondents is in the public service as 24% of respondents are army officials, retirees or municipal/governmental employees. The informal skilled labor force follows with 20% with artisanal jobs mainly related to carpentry, construction and ownership/employment in stone mills and factories. Unskilled labor follows with 17% where residents noted ownership of gas stations and barbershops. Shop keeping is another informal employment sector revolving mainly around groceries with 17% followed immediately by Land ownership and real estate with many respondents noting rental, trading and selling houses as a main source of income (10%).

In North Lebanon, the main source of income is Landownership as cited by 27% of respondents, followed by shop keeping and skilled wage Labor (11% and 10% respectively). Public service employment ranks fourth with 7% of respondents citing it. Livestock is another source of income for northern Lebanon residents where 5% cite it, followed by share-cropping (3%) and remittances (2%). Tripoli region is more likely to cite remittances, skilled and unskilled labor force and formal/public sector employment as main sources of income as compared to Wadi Khaled region.

Members of Household Engaged in Economic Activities:

Men (fathers, husbands and brothers) are the sole bread winners for households in Bekaa where approximately 99% of the respondents cited that father, brothers/sons engage in economic activities. Women employment is very low. Similarly, men are mostly the bread winners in North households with 96% of respondents citing the father and the son as providers. Five cases only cited working mothers/wives and 1 case cited a working daughter. Additionally, when asked to denote the type of activities that they engage in, the majority of respondents noted the same type of activities that their fathers are engaged in, for example, support in the shop or stone mill. This is particularly linked to family businesses (stone mills, shops, etc...) or public employment (army).

According to DRC assessment, both the refugee and host communities are extremely gender-segregated. Livelihood activities are generally divided by gender. Female host community members in Wadi Khaled gave very gender-segregated responses to their main livelihood needs repeatedly citing the lack of employment opportunities as the major livelihood need for men. The women said the primary livelihood need for women is to gain more skills through home-based projects that could hopefully become home-based businesses so as not to create problems with men who traditionally generate income and control household finances.

2.3. Burden of Hosting:

The number of surveyed households in Bekaa hosting Syrian refugees is 195 houses which accounts to 66% of total sample. The average number of hosts per family stands at 8¹. Some 62% of the respondents who are hosting Syrian refugees indicated hosting more than 5 Syrian refugees per household. 21% reported hosting 5 refugees per household. 17% of respondents reported hosting less than five refugees per household. When asked whether the accommodated refugees are relatives to the head of household, merely 6 % of cases were positive whereas 94% of the respondents noted that hosts are not relatives. The average hosting duration is 4 months with 80% of the respondents noting that they have been hosting the Syrian refugees between 3 and 6 months, 7% have had Syrian refugees for one month and 9% have been hosting refugees for over 12 months (since early onset of the crisis).

In the North, 69% of surveyed households are hosting Syrian refugees where each hosting household caters for 7 Syrian refugees on average. 32% of households are hosting more than 5 Syrian refugees. 23% are hosting 5 refugees, 25% are hosting 4 refugees, and 18% of households are hosting less than 4 refugees. Some 53% of North hosting respondents have indicated that they are hosting relatives/family members. 34% of those have been hosting refugees for almost a year and 33% for a six months period. 17% of North hosting respondents have been hosting the refugees for more than 12 months. Minimal

¹ Respondents to this question could have selected from one to five members; however approximately half of the population indicated that they were hosting more than five members. Thus a sixth variable was added to complement the findings (more than five members). Thus the data is distributed across 6 variables instead of five.

differences are cited between Wadi Khaled and Tripoli. 43% of Wadi Khaled respondents cited that they are hosting relatives, as compared to 74% of Tripoli respondents. Thus Wadi Khaled population hosts more non-family members than Tripoli and are more likely to cite hosting Syrians for more than 12 months (38% Wadi Khaled, 22% Tripoli); Tripoli respondents are more likely to cite hosting for 6 months (37% for Tripoli as compared to 32% for Wadi Khaled).

In Bekaa, 82% of the hosting respondents cited receiving rent cash subsidies from the refugees compared to 18% who do not. Central Bekaa region is more likely to cite receiving cash subsidies in lieu of rent from the Syrian refugees (94%) as compared to North Bekaa residents, where merely 61% receive cash. Four cases in West Bekaa cited receiving cash subsidies from Syrian refugees in exchange for rent.

Merely 7 hosts in North Lebanon receive rent subsidies in lieu of accommodation from Syrian refugees. Of those, two are in Wadi Khaled and five in Tripoli. 14 hosts receive contribution from the Syrian refugees in the form of food supply accounting to 8% of total respondents in the North. Thus 88% of hosting households of North are not receiving subsidies or support.

Hence, while in Bekaa 82% of the hosting respondents cited receiving cash subsidies from Syrian refugees, only 12 % of North hosting respondents cited receiving any form of subsidies. This indicates different types of social relationships between the hosted and their hosts in Northern Lebanon and Bekaa. It also indicates that the burden of hosting is higher in Northern Lebanon (and especially in Wadi Khaled) as compared to Bekaa regions. It is for such reasons that the Mukhtar in Al-Rama (Wadi Khaled) noted that if the crisis prolongs and the border remains closed, the local community will suffer and will not be able to host the refugees for longer.

According to a study conducted by ACF in June 2012 commissioned by UNICEF, the majority of the displaced refugees are women and children, as many men/heads of households could not leave Syria. Displaced dependents in Lebanon are therefore socially and economically vulnerable and thus they pose a burden on hosting Lebanese households². Thus, it comes to no surprise that 43% of Bekaa respondents noted that Syrian refugees constitute a burden. Respondents were asked to note their concerns/reasons behind this heavy burden. The findings were as follows:

TABLE 1
CONCERN REASONS FOR HOSTS – BEKAA

Decreased space	68.00%
Increased household expenditure	68.00%
Increased food and non-food items consumption	45.00%

² WASH Assessment for the Humanitarian Response the Syrian Refugees in the Beqaa Valley- ACF Spain- June 2012


Different social and cultural habits	30.00%
Worry about female family members (wives, daughters and sisters)	24.00%
Minimal space to ensure segregation between sexes is required	12.00%
Displaced require special protection	10.00%

The vast majority of hosting respondents in Bekaa noted that decreased space and increased household expenditure are the major burdens that the Syrian refugees are instigating (68%), followed by increased consumption of both food and non-food items (45%). Different cultural and social habits accounted for 30% of respondents citing concerns, and 24% noted increased fear on female family members.

Similarly and yet more extensively, North residents are heavily burdened by the influx of Syrian refugees, as 96.5% of the hosting respondents stated. Wadi Khaled is more likely however to cite this than Tripoli (100% and 88.5% respectively) given that it hosts around 46.5% of the refugees as per DRC. The first and foremost concern is increased household expenditure (98%) followed by occupied space (82%), increased food and non-food items consumption (73%) and need for additional space to separate between sexes (62%). Two closely cited elements are difference in habits and need for protective measures with 29% and 21% respectively.

Except for increased expenditure (98% VS. 96%), respondents of Wadi Khaled region are more concerned than respondents in Tripoli and are more likely to cite at least twice all the listed burdens.

FIGURE 1
CONCERN/RESONS FOR HOST – NORTH



North respondents are more burdened by hosting Syrian refugees as compared to Bekaa respondents (96.5% and 43% respectively). 100% of Wadi Khaled respondents have indicated that Syrian refugees do

constitute a burden. Focus group discussions have shown some interesting issues/trends that are worth noting:

- In some cases, the number of Syrian refugees hosted in one Lebanese household exceeds 25 individuals;
- Syrian hosted individuals are not necessarily members of the same family. In some cases, they are laborers;
- There needs to be further examination of the relationship between refugees' destination in Lebanon and their socio-economic status. Middle income and rich Syrian refugees are renting and sometimes buying apartments in places like Tripoli. Lower middle income and poor Syrian refugees are being hosted for free, and in case they are renting, they are moving to places where they can afford the rent (for example, out of Tripoli towards Minnieh-Dannieh);

The burden of hosting transcends the households and is taxing community resources in areas considered the poorest in Lebanon. Issues/concerns expressed by community members during focus group discussions and pertaining to burden of Syrian crisis:

- Some communities (Ersal for example) mentioned increased amounts of solid waste as burdening the solid waste collection system in their villages;
- Communities in Tripoli, Wadi Khaled and Ersal mentioned increased pressures on public and private schools, as a result of increased number of Syrian students (Some 800 Syrian students are expected to attend the schools of Ersal for the 2012-2013 academic year); difficulties include, in addition to lack of physical space, the adaptation of Syrian students to Lebanese curricula;
- Communities in Bekaa mentioned increased demand on the services of primary health care institutions;
- Within some incoming Syrian refugees, there is a high level of illiteracy among children, especially among poor households. This makes it hard to co-opt such children in community schools;
- Resources of Lebanese NGOs traditionally functioning in Lebanese communities have been diverted to Syrian refugees.

2.4 Increased Expenditures:


The assessment revealed that household expenditures have increased after the crisis. Increases in household expenditures have been detected in DRC earlier study on Syrian refugees. DRC noted that “since the unrest in Syria, the flow of goods has been severely limited, and residents are forced to buy the same goods within Lebanon, but in much smaller quantities due to the higher prices. Lebanese have also stopped crossing into Syria for seasonal work; the lack of “unofficial” border access, coupled with continued violence in Syria, have also affected habitual Bedouin cross-border movements. Even local organizations have had to scale back livelihood activities, such as women’s sewing groups, because they cannot buy material in bulk from Syria anymore. Additionally, host community households that depended

on cheaper goods or employment in Syria are cut off from their income sources, often with no financial alternatives³.

60% of Bekaa hosting respondents have cited that their food expenditures have increased as a result of hosting Syrian refugees. Food Expenditures have increased by 5-10% for 43% of respondents, 11-30% for 29% of respondents and more than 30% for 28% of respondents. Thus, two-thirds of the respondents in Bekaa noted a 5%-20% increase in food expenditure and one third noted more than 20% increase

In the North, 79% of hosting respondents noted increased food expenditures (100% in Tripoli and 74% in Wadi Khaled). 1% of respondents indicated 5%-10% increase, 48% of respondents noted 11% - 20% increase, and 51% of respondents noted more than 30% increase.

FIGURE 2
INCREASE IN FOOD EXPENDITURES – NORTH




An analysis was conducted on the amount of change in cost of selected goods and services that included: food, medicines, education fees, house rent, utility bills, drinking water, washing water and transportation. In Bekaa, on average the total cost of listed items before the crisis was 1,468,000 LBP compared to 1,680,000 LBP after the crisis, thus an increase of 212,000 LBP (USD 141), equivalent to 15% inflation rate. Inflation rates were reported at 18% for food, 5% for medicines, 35% for education fees, 9% for utility bills, 8% for washing water and 40% for transportation.

In the North, on average the total cost of listed items before the crisis was 1,207,000 LBP compared to 1,275,000 LBP after the crisis, thus an increase of 68,000 LBP (USD 45), equivalent to 6% inflation rate. Food prices increased by 12% after the crisis, medicine fees were inflated by 34% and 6% for water and utility bills.

³ Akkar Livelihood Assessment, Danish Refugee Council- February 2012

**FIGURE 3
TOTAL INCREASE IN BASKET OF GOODS – BEKAA AND NORTH**



The reasons mentioned in focus group discussions for increased expenditures are:

- Increased prices of all consumption items as a result of the overall performance of the Lebanese economy;
- Regional inflation of prices as a result of incoming cash from Arab countries to Syrian refugees (for political and humanitarian reasons);
- Increased cost of transporting goods because of increased prices of fuel;
- Closure of border which has deprived the Lebanese from goods and services that used to flow from Syria. This includes for example health care services, agricultural products, veterinary services, pesticides, seeds, fertilizers, and other agricultural goods and supplies, Livestock and forage, special medications for beekeeping, fuel for transportation and water pumping, and other consumer goods.

2.5 Decreased Incomes:

91% of the Bekaa respondents noted an income decline after the closure of the borders with Syria compared to 89% of North Lebanon respondents. Merely 7% of all respondents in Bekaa noted that they have found an alternative source of income, compared to 5% of North respondents. Of those who have found new jobs, those jobs were temporary for 75% of Bekaa respondents and 100% of North respondents. While the substitute source of income in Bekaa was the services sector (43% of respondents), agriculture (35% of respondents), and construction and industry (7% of respondents), the substitute source of income in the North was in agriculture (100% of respondents). The North result is affected by 2/3 of the sample being in Wadi Khaled that does not have a developed services or construction and industry sectors.

Focus group discussions revealed some reasons for the decline in income, noted in Bekaa and North:

- Increased competition between Syrian refugees and Lebanese laborers; Syrian refugees are charging half wages as compared to Lebanese laborers;

- Worsening security situation and hence economic performance of communities close to the border; in Tripoli for example, it was noted that sales have decreased by more than 75% for some industries, specifically the furniture industry, a decrease described as “unprecedented” and “catastrophic” for the industry;
- End of smuggling and border commerce which constituted the major source of income for communities like Wadi Khaled and Eرسال;
- Decreased access to agricultural lands and grazing fields next to Syrian borders;
- Landmines on the borders which are becoming a threat to the cattle and the humans;
- Decreased import/export traffic from/to/through Syria.

2.6 Other Impacts:

Bekaa responden were asked to cite the compounding effect of the Syrian crisis where impact hits close to their homes, families and communities. The top three answers closely cited were: decreased income (81%), inflated prices (80%) and crowded job opportunities (79%). These were immediately followed by a decreased feeling of security with 71%.

North Lebanon respondents were more likely to cite the lost feeling of security (99%) followed closely by inflated food prices and crowded job opportunities (97% and 94% respectively). The security situation in Akkar and Tripoli, ranging from crossing of Syrian troops through the Lebanese borders to Tebbeneh and Jabal-Mohsen conflict has exacerbated the feeling of insecurity among North residents and hence respondents.

TABLE 2
IMPACTS OF SYRIAN CRISIS – BEKAA & NORTH

Crisis Impact	North Bekaa	Central Bekaa	West Bekaa	Wadi Khaled	Tripoli
Decreased access to basic services (e.g. education, health, etc...)	37%	31%	30%	99%	14%
Decreased Access to cheaper goods	59%	70%	100%	100%	46%
Decreased family income	87%	70%	80%	100%	59%
Higher prices for goods and services	79%	79%	90%	99.5%	92%
Loss of feeling of security	71%	70%	60%	100%	96.5%
Higher use of already scarce natural resources	10%	5%	10%	98%	8%
Crowding existing job opportunities	74%	90%	80%	100%	82%
Strain on local health, education services	6%	10%	40%	99.5%	2.5%

In Bekaa the most cited impact of the crisis on hosting households was decreased family income as cited by 81% of residents who are currently hosting refugees, followed by crowded job opportunities (80%),

increased food prices (75%), access to cheaper products (66%), lost feeling of security (65%), decreased access to services, used resources and strained services (37,10 and 8% respectively). As for those who are not hosting Syrian refugees, the first cited impact was increased cost of goods (89%) followed by lost feeling of security and decreased family income (81%), crowded job opportunities (79%), decreased access to cheap goods, decreased access to services, strained local services and higher use of resources (59, 34, 8 and 5% respectively).

For North Lebanon respondents who have noted that they are currently hosting Syrian refugees, the most noted impact of the crisis was the loss of feeling of security (99%) closely followed by increased prices for goods and services (96.5%), crowded job opportunities (93%), decreased family income (87%) and decreased access to cheap products (84%). Strained local health and education services as well as decreased access to services were noted by 73% of respondents, and lastly came higher use of resources with 70%. As for respondents who are not currently hosting refugees, the first and foremost impact was also the loss of security which was equal to higher prices of goods (99%), closely followed by crowded jobs (98%), decreased access to cheap goods (83%), strained local services (74%), higher use of resources (73%), and decreased access to services (71%).

As highlighted in Table 3 above, “crowded jobs” is a significant byproduct of the Syrian crisis. Syrian workers are competing with Lebanese workers. According to DRC assessment, the majority of refugees depended for their livelihood on unskilled males namely in construction, agriculture and daily labor⁴ which could have translated in overcrowded jobs in the above listed sectors. For those who cited crowded job opportunities as a major impact of Syrian crisis in Bekaa, major sectors that were cited as having suffered most were the construction sector (97% of respondents) followed by agriculture (82%), services (64%), industry and handcrafts (45% and 31% respectively). As for North respondents, the majority of respondents cited the agricultural sector (89%) followed by construction (75%) and the handcraft sector (49%).

TABLE 3

CROWDED JOBS – BEKAA AND NORTH

Crowded Jobs	Bekaa	North
Agriculture	82%	89%
Construction	97%	75%
Handcrafts	41%	49%
Services	64%	21%

⁴ Akkar Livelihood Assessment, Danish Refugee Council- February 2012

Industries	35%	5%
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20% of respondents in Bekaa noted that women and men are competing for the same jobs. As for the North, this percentage drops to 2%.

It is worth noting that competition is mainly on jobs with no or relatively moderate skill requirements that attract non-skilled to semi-skilled laborers from Syria. For such jobs, there is no protection whatsoever to Lebanese laborers through government regulations. As the “pay” becomes the only criterion to select someone for a job in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs, Syrian laborers have the upper hand. If the situation persists for long, Lebanese unskilled and semi-skilled laborers will find themselves out of the labor market in the medium run, especially in border areas.

Focus group discussions have revealed several indicators on the decline of economic activity and thus incomes in border communities:

- Cheap raw materials from Syria to Tripoli traders, that is not being provided anymore because of security situation;
- Tripoli Furniture industry is threatening to shut down all its show rooms because of sharp drop in sales (about 75%) to the extent that they cannot cover their overheads anymore;
- There are some 450 “Majmoua” funded projects in Tebbeneh and Jabal Mohsen. For the month of May, no one has worked in their workshops;
- For the month of May, “Majmoua” in Tripoli refrained from distributing USD 450,000 worth of SME funding because of security situation and increased tensions;
- Stocks in businesses are not being replenished, hence, owners are selling stock to provide for consumption items and overheads only; this warns that the situation (poverty and vulnerability) will get worse in months to come;
- BIAT (Business Incubator Association in Tripoli) has stated that incomes have decreased in Tripoli by 80% in the past 2 years;
- The percentage of North applicants to “Majmoua” loans has decreased 50% in 2012 as compared to 2010 ;
- 50-60% of stone sculpture workshops have stopped working in Ersal, because of weakness in demand;
- 1 kg of cherries or apricot used to be sold for LP. 1500. Now it is sold for LP. 500 in Ersal; this is because of decline in demand (from Syria);
- Syrian factories used to consume low quality cherries. Now, farmers are disposing of low quality cherry fruits since it cannot be sold anymore.

2.7 Access to Health and Education:

Access to Health:

Several studies that were conducted earlier showed that Bekaa and North citizens often access Syrian health care centers due to decreased cost of services when compared to the Lebanese health care system and/or the proximity of the centers. Furthermore, many border villages and towns sought education in Syria for the same reasons noted above. Thus, the current assessment detected the impact of the crisis on access to health care and education services.

For Bekaa respondents, the main cited reasons leading to decreased access to health were the lack of ability to pay for health services in Lebanon (94% of respondents), absence of primary health care centers within community (52%), and lack of access to Syrian border hospitals (14%).

North respondents cited the lack of ability to pay for health care on the Lebanese side of the borders (90%) as the leading reason for lack of access to health care, with more than 20 percentage point difference with the second most cited lack of access to Syrian border hospitals (69%). Respondents cited absence of primary health care centers (54%) and absence of hospitals within community (15%) as other reasons for lack of access to health services.

Within North, Wadi Khaled respondents cited “lack of access to Syrian hospitals” (100% of Wadi Khaled respondents and 0% of Tripoli respondents) and/or the “absence of primary health care centers and hospitals in the community (98% of Wadi Khaled respondents and 2% of Tripoli respondents) as leading factors for lack of access to health care. 66% of Wadi Khaled respondents cited “lack of ability to pay for the health costs” as a reason for lack of access to health care as compared to 34% of respondents in Tripoli, thus making the former very vulnerable.

Access to Education:

The vast majority of respondents in Bekaa have cited lack of ability to pay for educational services on the Lebanese side of the borders (93%) as the main reason for lack of access to educational services, followed by absence of affordable schools within Lebanese territories (61%) and lack of access to Syrian border schools (13%) as major reasons for lack of access to education.

In the North, the major reasons for lack of access to education were lack of ability to pay for educational services on the Lebanese side of the borders (82.5%), followed by lack of access to Syrian border schools (68.50%) and absence of affordable schools and absence of schools within the community (53% and 2% respectively).

With respect to access to education, Wadi Khaled respondents are more likely to cite all four aspects, notably absence of schools within their community (100% of Wadi Khaled respondents and 0% of Tripoli respondents), lack of access to Syrian schools (100% of Wadi Khaled respondents and 0% of Tripoli respondents), lack of ability to pay for educational services on the Lebanese side of the borders (64% of

Wadi Khaled respondents and 36% of Tripoli respondents) and absence of affordable schools within Lebanese territories (99% of Wadi Khaled respondents and 1% of Tripoli respondents). This puts Wadi Khaled at a much more vulnerable position than Tripoli when it comes to access to educational services.

2.8 Food Security and Coping Mechanisms:

Food Expenditure:

30% of Bekaa respondents noted that they spend more than 30% of their income on purchasing food as compared to 0% of North respondents. 57% of Bekaa respondents noted that they spend between 21 and 30% of their income on purchasing food as compared to 7% of North respondents. 14% of Bekaa respondents noted that they spend 11-20% of their income on purchasing food as compared to 40% of North respondents. 0% of Bekaa respondents noted that they spend 5-10% of their income on purchasing food as compared to 53% of North respondents. In brief, approximately 93% of North respondents spend less than 20% of their income to cover food needs compared to 13% in Bekaa. This could be explained by differences in spending habits or differences in levels of income in the two regions.

Food Stock Availability:

Respondents were asked to cite whether they have staple food reserved and the duration that it would last. 61% of Bekaa respondents noted that they have no food stock available, compared to 16.4% of North respondents. 18% of Bekaa respondents noted that they have food stock available for less than two weeks, compared to 82.29% of North respondents. 9% of Bekaa respondents noted that they have food stock available for 2-4 weeks, compared to 1.3% of North respondents. 6% of Bekaa respondents noted that they have food stock available for more than 1 month, compared to 0.04% of North respondents. However, after crosstabulating the regions, Wadi Khaled respondents were more likely to cite staple food for less than two weeks with 99% citing this compared to 44% in Tripoli. The vast majority of Tripoli respondents have noted that they have no food supply (54%). The high number of respondents with no food stock available (61% in Bekaa and 54% in Tripoli) indicates high vulnerability to shocks in environment.

Main Sources of Food for the Household:

The current main source of food for Bekaa respondents is through direct purchase from stores (77%), followed by borrowing and taking credits (19%) and own production (7%). The main source of food in the North is through direct purchase from stores (98%) followed by own production or stocks (37%). Food aid and buying on credit were rated by North respondents as third and fourth (13% and 9% respectively). Direct food purchase is extremely prevalent in both regions of the North which indicated a 99% citation followed by own production only in Wadi Khaled region (53%) and food aid (19% in Wadi Khaled vs. 2% in Tripoli). 13% of Wadi Khaled respondents borrow food whereas merely 1% of Tripoli respondents apply this approach.

Contribution of Family Members to Food Provision:

Men contribute the most to providing food to family in Bekaa (75% of respondents). 92% of respondents in Bekaa cited men as contributing to 75% and above of food provision in the household. The same applies to the North where men contribute to more than 75% of the food needs of the household (98% of respondents).


Change in Prices of Food Items as a Result of Crisis/ Availability of Food Items in Local Markets:

All the respondents from the three regions of Bekaa noted that food prices augmented after the crisis. 66% cited that they are still able to find the main commodities in the local market. Thus a 34% deficit or shortage may have taken place due to the influx of Syrian refugees and increased need for additional food supplies. 100% of the respondents in North Lebanon cited an increase in food prices, and merely 27% noted that they can still find the same items at the local market.

Coping Mechanisms:

In order to assess the coping mechanisms or strategies used by Lebanese to cope with the Syrian crisis, a list of 26 coping strategies was designed. The objective was to rate each strategy from most to least used.

FIGURE 4
MOST USED COPING MECHANISMS – BEKAA



In Bekaa, purchasing food on credit ranked first with 59% of respondents⁵. Borrowing food ranked second with 42% of respondents, followed by taking loans and spending from savings both of which were noted by 37% of respondents. 33% of respondents noted that now they buy only “can afford” foods. 20% have cited decreased expenditure on healthcare. Other categories follow with asset sales, reduced food

⁵ Given that several mechanisms were rated as number one by the respondents, the findings were aggregated by priority, thus the answer for each strategy was compiled according to its rating by the respondents. Thus food purchase was cited by 59% of respondents as the top priority.

quality, skipping meals and resorting to charity organizations and support from non-governmental organizations (16% to 9%). Other less frequently used strategies involve refraining from paying bills (5%), using wood for cooking and fuel (5%) and cooking with relatives.


FIGURE 5
MOST USED COPING MECHANISMS – NORTH



The most used coping mechanisms in North Lebanon are buying can only afford food items (43% of respondents) followed by reducing quality of meals and spending from own savings (40% for both). Growing own products and sharing cooking with relatives scored third with 37% each. Using wood as fuel ranked fourth (31%). Reducing expenditure on health care (27%), selling livestock (26%) and shifting to less preferred food follow.

Respondents from the North seem to substitute the quality and quantity of food to cope with the effects of the crisis. Furthermore, they are spending from their savings and are not hesitant to sell livestock and consume what they produce. Important mechanisms that are worth noting are refraining from sending their children to school and universities and inserting them in the labor force.

FIGURE 6
COPING MECHANISMS BY REGION – NORTH



The two most notable significant differences between Wadi Khaled and Tripoli in terms of most used coping mechanisms are:

- 1- Tripoli respondents are more likely to cite “can only afford foods” and “reduction of the quality of meals” than Wadi Khaled respondents (98% and 89% Tripoli vs. 19% and 20% in Wadi Khaled)
- 2- Wadi Khaled respondents on the other hand are more likely to cite spending income from savings, growing herbs for food, cooking with relatives, using wood as fuel for cooking, reducing of health care expenditures, selling livestock, stopping to send children to school, and sending children to work, as compared to Tripoli. There is a clear urban/rural dimension to coping mechanisms that is worth further investigation.

Bekaa respondents act similarly with respect to selecting the coping mechanisms regardless of whether they are hosting households or not, where they are more likely to borrow food, take credits and loans and spend their savings. The most frequently used strategy by households hosting Syrian refugees in Bekaa is purchasing food on credit (56% of respondents) followed by borrowing food (45%), taking loans (38%), spending from savings (37%) and using income solely to buy food (35%). Households who are not hosting Syrians are more likely to cite purchasing food on credit with a higher frequency than those hosting (65%), borrowing food/spending their savings (35%), buying can only afford food (31%) and reducing expenditure on health care (29%).

North Lebanon households who are hosting Syrian refugees rely on using their savings to buy food (48%), reducing the quality of their meals (43%), reducing health care expenditure (33%), selling livestock (33%) and growing herbs (30%) as coping strategies. Households that are not currently hosting Syrian refugees are more likely to spend from their savings (73%), use more primitive techniques to save food and money by cooking with relatives, growing herbs , using wood as fuel and lastly they reduce the quality of meals (56, 54, 47 and 35% respectively).

The information above indicates that a widely used coping mechanism is “spending from own savings” (37% of Bekaa respondents and 40% of North respondents). This trend, if continued, threatens to deplete savings of North and Bekaa communities and to render them incapable of diverting any meaningful resources for future investments and/or business development activities.

Another trend that is worrisome on the medium term is selling livestock (36% of Wadi Khaled respondents) which also threatens future economic development efforts and renders residents vulnerable towards further shocks in environment.

2.9 Community Cohesion:

The influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanese communities could have caused some social cleavages within hosting communities due to differing cultures, social norms, political affiliations, economic differences, and/or differences in access to basic services between the hosting and the hosted. The study

explored community cohesion in an attempt to detect potentially needed future interventions aimed at improving community cohesion.

Concerns for Safety in Local Community:

80% of Bekaa respondents have indicated that there are security and safety concerns in the community; correspondingly, merely 21% of respondents feel safe in their villages and 79% have concerns. However, 81% noted that women safety and security has not changed after the crisis. The scope and extent of fear among respondents in North Lebanon is widespread with 98% noting security and safety concerns. Of those, merely 4 individuals cited that they feel safe in their community. However, 96% noted that women feel safe in their community. The numbers indicate that while there are concerns about safety and security within the community, such concerns may not be related to the presence of Syrian refugees, as evident from high rate of responses related to women feeling safe within their community, but to factors related to military conflict in study areas (Tripoli, Wadi Khaled and Ersal).

Interaction with Syrian Refugees:

The top ranking interaction type between Lebanese communities and Syrian refugees in Bekaa was hosting the displaced in respondents' homes (89% of respondents), followed by food provision (79%) and utilities provision (electricity, water, etc...) (75.5%). Short-term employment was cited by 67% of respondents which is associated with earlier questions with respect to overcrowded job opportunities. Inter-country marriages were also measured, and strikingly 69% of respondents noted marriage of Lebanese males to Syrian females and 45% noted marriage between Syrian males and Lebanese females. Long term employment was cited by 14% of respondents, whereas 3% of respondents noted that moral and psychosocial support is being provided to the refugees. None of the respondents noted lack of interaction with their hosts.

As for the community interaction with the Syrian refugees in the North, 84% of North respondents cited hosting refugees in own households. Instances of mixed Lebanese-Syrian marriages stand high at an average of 76%. 61% of the Lebanese hosts provide food for the refugees, while 14% provide utilities. Employment (short and long term) stands at 13.5% as an average. Some significant differences were noted between Wadi Khaled and Tripoli. Wadi Khaled respondents are more likely to marry incoming Syrian refugees (98% in Wadi Khaled and 22% in Tripoli). Tripoli respondents are more likely to host refugees in their own houses (99% of Tripoli respondents and 78% of Wadi Khaled respondents) and provide refugees with food (99% of Tripoli respondents and 44% of Wadi Khaled respondents).

Focus group discussions have revealed some "publically unexpressed" attitudes of Lebanese population towards Syrian refugees; such attitudes would not show in questionnaire-surveys, but they do come strong in focus group discussions.

- In Bekaa, it was noted by one of the national NGOs that the Lebanese community is very sensitive to any further stepping up of aid to Syrian refugees;

- Some Lebanese households who have hosted Syrian refugees at the outset of the crisis have fired them because of cultural differences and misbehaviors on the part of the hosted;
- Lebanese respondents are not happy to see aid going to Syrian refugees exclusively while the hosting Lebanese are not receiving any aid;
- Lebanese laborers are not happy with “tough and unfair competition” that Syrian refugee/workers are putting up. New areas/sectors of competition (in addition to construction and agriculture) pertain to “car maintenance workshops” where Syrians are opening their own and slashing prices that the Lebanese usually charge;
- There are feelings of loss of security among women who stopped wondering in public places with large amounts of cash money in their handbags;
- There were reported families that have stopped allowing their daughters to attend specific areas of Tripoli alone or at night or ever;
- There were also cited in Tripoli feelings of anxiety, fear, and anxiousness about the future, especially in Tebbeneh and Jabal Mohsen;
- In the three cities of Fayhaa (Tripoli, Mina and Beddawi), there is a general feeling of insecurity and absence of law and order, which has escalated after Syrian crisis. Many Lebanese and Syrians have illegally occupied the sidewalks and public spaces, and it is impossible to remove them during this period in time.

Women’s Safety and Security:

While the quantitative data analysis has not produced any alarming figures on women’s safety and security, focus group discussions have revealed some insights into women’s perception of security and safety within their community. Following are some quotes from Tripoli focus group on CSOs/NGOs which were majorly represented by women:

- “I cannot open my suitcase anymore in public. There is a good chance I would get robbed”;
- “I have a reduced feeling of security, however this might be related to the situation in Lebanon as a whole, not the presence of Syrian refugees per se”;
- “There is a general feeling of lack of security because of Syrian crisis; we now forbid our daughters to go to specific places in Tripoli”.

In addition, Ersal focus group discussed the phenomenon of Lebanese men marrying Syrian single or widowed females as a means to protect such women. This goes in line with tribal practices common to Lebanese and Syrian tribes residing across the border line.

2.10 Priority Areas for Intervention:

When asked to denote and rank by priority areas to maintain and/or restore the living conditions and livelihood, the majority of respondents in Bekaa cited enhancing security situation as the top concern (83% of respondents). Improved personal income ranked second in Bekaa with 74% of all respondents

noting it as most important and cited most by Central Bekaa respondents (81%). Job creation comes third with 68% of respondents citing it as most important. Whether the reason was food price inflation or increased need for food and non-food items, the provision of cheap goods as compared to Syrian goods is an important factor for Bekaa residents who ranked the provision of moderately priced food goods as number four (51%). Equally ranked by all residents is enhanced skills of locals to gain better access to job market and enhanced access to educational and health services which were cited by 36% of all Bekaa respondents.

The top named priority intervention area in the North is the provision of cheap goods as compared to Syrian goods that used to flow to border communities with 83% ranking it as most important, closely followed by improved income (77%), enhanced access to education and health (71%) and enhanced skills (69%). Job creation and improved security situation follow as fifth and sixth (40% and 38% respectively).

If one is to take note of Tripoli respondents' priority areas of intervention, security is the foremost concern (98.8%) compared to 13% in Wadi Khaled area. The same applies for job creation (98.8% and 16% respectively) and the need to enhance skills of locals for better access to the job market with 84% of respondents citing this in Tripoli and none of Wadi Khaled respondents.

2.11 Humanitarian Relief:

The KAP study conducted by ACF in June 2012 commissioned by UNICEF noted that there is a gap in terms of WASH activities in Bekaa Valley. The survey showed that 70 % of the households are not receiving any assistance related to WASH; 17 % of the households are receiving support from Azhar (Muslim Charitas) and others NGOs; 12 % of households are receiving aid from the local authorities and 3% from friends and relatives. The survey shows that from the target population assisted on WASH, around 59% of the households are being assisted on Hygiene and 5% of the households on water and sanitation.

The current impact assessment conducted by UNDP showed that 85% of Bekaa respondents cited that at the moment, a number of organizations are active in their community. The most cited organizations in Bekaa were Medecins sans Frontiers (MSF), Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The top named faith-based organizations were Islamic Aid Association, Al Irshad and Al Jamaa Islamiya. As noted earlier, the areas of intervention revolve around basic services namely the distribution of food and non-food items by DRC and NRC, whereas MSF caters for health and education services. Hariri Foundation intervenes in a number of districts to complement the relief activities provided by municipalities and local associations most prevalent in Central Bekaa. The length of service provision ranges between 3 months for the local community, municipalities and MSF, six months for DRC and NRC and 12 months for United Nations agencies.

In order to assess the needs of the hosting population and the required support, Bekaa respondents were asked to cite whether their households and/or hosts are benefiting from any type of assistance to cater to the needs of the hosted refugees. 63% noted that they (and/or their hosted refugees) are currently receiving aid. The form of assistance provided ranged between food items (99%), non-food items (84%) and cash subsidies (14%). Similarly, DRC assessment noted that assistance (through monthly distributions) is the main livelihood strategy for most refugees.

In the North, very few organizations were cited for providing relief and humanitarian assistance. Of those were Al Bashaer Association, the United Nations High Relief Council for Refugees, Al Fadila and Beit al-Zakat. Providing in-kind assistance was named as the main mode of intervention.

Although very few managed to name the intervening organizations in the North, 78% indicated that they (and/or their hosted refugees) are currently receiving aid namely in the form of food items (98%). Second came the distribution of non-food items with merely 17% citing this, and 6% cited cash subsidies.

97.5% of North Lebanon residents who are currently hosting displaced Syrian refugees have noted that they (and/or their hosted refugees) are receiving humanitarian assistance from NGOs compared to 16% of non-hosting households. As for Bekaa households who are hosting refugees, 86.5% have noted receiving assistance from NGOs whereas 1.5% of non-hosting households are receiving assistance too.

Thus, north Lebanon respondents in general are more likely to cite receiving support from relief agencies than those in Bekaa; this is both true for hosting and non-hosting households although practically 1/5 of non-hosting households are receiving support compared to approximately 3/4 of hosting households.

Focus group discussions have revealed several facts/notes on the delivery of humanitarian aid in Bekaa and the North.

- One weakness of humanitarian aid provision is lack of coordination, especially between the Lebanese and international NGOs. As a result, some refugees are receiving 2 or 3 aid packages per month, while others who are not registered are not receiving any;
- Cash payments provided by Arab organizations to refugees are inflating prices of goods, thus adversely affecting the Lebanese;
- Distributing aid packages sometimes does not take into consideration cultural, social, and gender concerns of the recipients. Beneficiaries in places like Wadi Khaled are called to attend to distribution points and wait in line (where men and women are grouped in crowded lines) to collect their packages. Receivers most of the time do not have the means to commute back to their places of residence;
- It was suggested that coupons be followed instead of aid packages because of the easiness of administration and less problems it raises for beneficiaries;

- It was also suggested that Lebanese hosting households receive aid, since their incomes have decreased and expenditures increased, which deprived them of significant amount of cash at the end of the month. Such situation cannot persist for long, as stated by participants.
- In Bekaa, religious institutions play key roles in aid packages distribution. Dar AL-Fatwa (Al-Azhar) oversees distribution in Sunni localities of Bekaa; Dar Al-Iftaa (Shiites) oversees distribution in Baalbek and Shiite localities. Only in Ersal, the municipality itself took over distribution of aid packages in collaboration with national and international NGOs.

3. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

3.1 Intervention Scenarios:

The scope of intervention can range from the provision of relief to refugees and hosting households on the short term to the institution of mechanisms that would allow for later recovery and sustainable development of affected communities. Following are 5 scenarios for intervention:

	Type of Intervention	Impact +tive	Impact –tive
Scenario Zero	No Intervention		Deteriorating humanitarian condition + Social unrest
Scenario 1	Improve delivery of aid to refugees	Improve humanitarian condition of refugees	Social cleavages & potential conflict between Syrian refugees and Lebanese hosting communities
Scenario 2	Improve delivery of aid to refugees and hosts	Improve humanitarian condition of refugees + support expenditures of Lebanese hosts + enhanced social cohesion	
Scenario 3	Improve delivery of aid to refugees and hosts + design short term income-generating, labor intensive program	Improve humanitarian condition of refugees + support expenditures of Lebanese hosts + create additional short term incomes to refugees and hosts + enhanced social cohesion	
Scenario 4	Improve delivery of aid to refugees and hosts + design short term income-generating, labor intensive program + design medium to long term development program	Improve humanitarian condition of refugees + support expenditures of Lebanese hosts + create additional short term incomes to refugees and hosts + lay down the foundations for future economic development of affected areas + enhanced social cohesion	

Since the current conflict, physical destruction and economic deterioration will have long lasting effects on Syrian population and economy, and thus the economies of Lebanese border communities, it is

recommended that Scenario 4 be adopted. Improving aid delivery to refugees and hosts would stabilize the humanitarian situation on the short term, and support the expenditures of most needy Lebanese households and thus assist them throughout the conflict phase in Syria. The design of labor intensive, income generating scheme would assist the refugees and the hosts to re-capture part of the income they have lost during the crisis, and render them less dependent on aid. Designing medium to long term interventions would contribute to assisting local communities to adapt to long term consequences of Syrian crisis, consequences that are foreseen to persist years after the end of military conflict.

3.2 Main Livelihood Challenges and Suggested Interventions:

Wadi Khaled Region		
Major Economic Impact of Crisis on Region		
<p>Wadi Khaled economy and its population livelihoods relied basically on cross-border trade and smuggling between Lebanon and Syria. Due to Syrian crisis and closure of borders, Wadi Khaled lost its previous source of income and is unable of defining a new role and compensating lost income. In addition, Wadi Khaled residents most consumption items, production materials and services they used to get from Syria.</p>		
Main Livelihood Challenges:	Recommended Interventions	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inability to buy goods and services from Syria; i.e., increased expenditures; - Decreased incomes as a result of border closure and inability to access lands on borders and security situation; - Increased household and community expenditures as a result of hosting Syrian refugees and inflated prices of goods and services (especially agricultural, veterinary and health services); - Decreased mobility and ability to exchange goods and services with Tripoli because of security situation in Tripoli and security restrictions on Wadi Khaled; - Decreased Access to health and education. 	Aid Delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support expenditures through provision of food and non-food items through coupons to Syrian refugees and hosting Lebanese households (short run)
	Short Term Interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support incomes through labor intensive jobs on the short run (cash/coupons for work);
	Medium to Long Term Interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support incomes through job creation on medium to long term through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Capacity building for youth and women on productive skills; ▪ Support dairy products sector through grants (cows), capacity building for veterinary services, and provision of orientation and training services by Ministry of Agriculture; ▪ Support olive and olive oil production through provision of olive press machine and provision of orientation and training; ▪ Support Beekeepers through provision of cheap medications and training on branding and selling; ▪ Assist in provision of new irrigation schemes (drip irrigation); ▪ Support environmental projects/initiatives pertaining to solid waste treatment and management, liquid waste treatment and management, conservation and development of eco-systems, improving grazing practices, provision of irrigation water, provision of loans to needy farmers, and training on organic cultivations. - Improve Access to Health and Education

Tripoli

Major Economic Impact of Crisis on Region

Tripoli economy was reliant on Syria for cheap raw materials used in Tripoli industries, a source which it lost due to closure of border. Due to political consequences of Syrian Crisis, Tripoli is witnessing a deteriorating security situation that has negatively affected sources of incomes of its residents. The cash injections made to Syrian refugees residing in Tripoli had resulted in local inflation, especially on rental fees and food items, which has increased expenditures of the locals.

Main Livelihood Challenges:	Recommended Interventions	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inability to buy goods and raw materials from Syria; - Decreased Income as a result of security situation, competition with Syrians, and closure of border; - Increased household and community expenditures as a result of hosting Syrian refugees and inflated prices of goods and services (especially rent and food); - Lack of feeling of security within community and deteriorating image of Tripoli as an insecure place, which is suffocating Tripoli industries and services; 	Aid Delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support expenditures through provision of food and non-food items through coupons (short run) to Syrian refugees and Hosting Lebanese households
	Short Term Interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support incomes through labor intensive jobs on the short run (cash/coupons for work);
	Medium to Long Term Interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support incomes through job creation on medium to long term through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provision of loans to SMEs (especially new start ups); ▪ Assisting women coops in branding and selling artisanal products; ▪ Advocate for lower level of tensions and security accidents within the city; ▪ Improve the image of Tripoli as safe and hospital city for investors and shoppers;

Bekaa	
Major Economic Impact of Crisis on Region	
<p>Bekaa has been heavily reliant on Syria to export its agro-products to and through Syrian territories to other Arab markets. As a result of the crisis, access to Syrian markets and territories decreased significantly. Bekaa producers cannot export all their agro-products and they cannot import all cheap raw materials they need for their agro-industries. Exports have decreased sharply, hence affecting incomes of Bekaa residents.</p>	
Main Livelihood Challenges:	Recommended Interventions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inability to buy goods and raw materials from Syria; - Inability to export Bekaa products to Syrian and Arab markets through land; non-existence of cost-efficient alternatives for export; - Decreased Income as a result of security situation, competition with Syrians, and inability to export which lead the prices of Bekaa products to decline by more than 50% for some products; - Increased household and community expenditures as a result inflated prices of goods and services (especially rent and food); - Decreased Access to health and education. 	Aid Delivery
	Short Term Interventions
	Medium to Long Term Interventions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support expenditures through provision of food and non-food items through coupons (short run) - Support incomes through labor intensive jobs on the short run (cash/coupons for work); - Support incomes through job creation on medium to long term through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Advocacy for alternative/efficient ways/routes to export Bekaa products to Arab countries; ▪ Capacity building on branding and selling in local markets; ▪ Provision of cooling units for Bekaa products where products could be stored until being sold; ▪ Assistance in provision of new irrigation schemes (drip irrigation); ▪ Assistance farmers to produce new/alternative cultivations of high demand in local markets and other regional markets (Mushrooms for example), and in establishing selling channels; - Improve Access to Health and Education

Suggested Short Term, Labor Intensive, Income Generating Schemes

Region	Suggested Interventions
Wadi Khaled	<p><u><i>Agricultural Roads (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> At the level of Agriculture and agro-products, the provision of roads to agricultural lands in the villages of Wadi Khaled, Central Bekaa, North Bekaa and West Bekaa is suggested as a short-medium term measure for income generation.</p> <p><u><i>Irrigation Canals (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> Extending irrigation canals to non-irrigated lands in Wadi Khaled, Central Bekaa, North Bekaa, and West Bekaa would allow for the increase in total area of irrigated lands.</p> <p><u><i>Rehabilitation of Local Springs for Irrigation and Daily Use Water (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> The rehabilitation of local sources of water would protect water from polluting sources of liquid and industrial waste. It would provide residents with clean water.</p> <p><u><i>Forestation Campaigns (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> Forestation campaigns in Bekaa (Ersal for example) and Wadi Khaled would lead to combating desertification that is advancing due to climate change, enhance community natural assets through planting thousands of fruit trees, and create instant jobs needed for land cultivation, planting, maintaining and irrigating in currently non-agricultural lands. In Ersal specifically, reforestation around and next to quarries is essential for ameliorating negative environmental effects of quarries that spread in and around Ersal.</p> <p><u><i>School Renovation and Rehabilitation (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> Renovating public schools would contribute to hosting an increased number of Syrian and Lebanese students during the academic year 2012-2013. Public schools need to be painted and provided with furniture and equipment to accommodate newly coming Syrian and Lebanese students. In places like Wadi Khaled and Bekaa, schools need to be provided with heating devices for tough winters that are characteristic of Wadi Khaled and Bekaa especially.</p> <p><u><i>Support Primary Health Centers (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> Due to increased demand for the services of primary health centers in North and Bekaa, most of which are run by local NGOs, there is a need to rehabilitate such centers and provide them with adequate staff, medications, and equipment especially in rural areas of Wadi Khaled and Bekaa. There is also a need to subsidize NGOs that are planning to address such needs by opening new primary health care centers in targeted areas.</p> <p><u><i>Establishing/Renovating Public Spaces for Children and Youth (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> Lebanese youth and their Syrian counterparts need public spaces to interact and to avoid destructive habits such as drugs and weapon use. Municipal public gardens, football, basketball, volleyball courts were suggested by presidents of municipal councils as being essential to get the youth busy in their after-school time.</p>
Tripoli	<p><u><i>Landscaping (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> Landscaping through planting trees in urban settings would contribute to improving air quality in urban settings and local market places.</p> <p><u><i>Establishing/Renovating Public Spaces for Children and Youth (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> Lebanese youth and their Syrian counterparts need public spaces to interact and to avoid destructive habits such as drugs and weapon use. Municipal public gardens, football, basketball, volleyball courts were suggested by presidents of municipal councils as being essential to get the youth busy in their after-school time.</p> <p><u><i>Grants to SMEs:</i></u> The provision of grants to needy SMEs would assist such SMEs to procure needed equipment and machinery. SMEs such as bakeries, mechanics, barbers, butchers could all benefit from grants to procure equipment and machinery to provide new services and attract new clients. This is true to all targeted areas of interventions.</p>
Bekaa	<p><u><i>Agricultural Roads (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> At the level of Agriculture and agro-products, the provision of roads to agricultural lands in the villages of Wadi Khaled, Central Bekaa, North Bekaa and West Bekaa is suggested as a short-medium term measure for income generation.</p> <p><u><i>Irrigation Canals (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> Extending irrigation canals to non-irrigated lands in Wadi Khaled, Central Bekaa, North Bekaa, and West Bekaa would allow for the increase in total area of irrigated lands.</p> <p><u><i>Rehabilitation of Local Springs for Irrigation and Daily Use Water (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> The rehabilitation of local sources of water would protect water from polluting sources of liquid and industrial waste. It would provide residents with clean water.</p> <p><u><i>Forestation Campaigns (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> Forestation campaigns in Bekaa (Ersal for example) and Wadi Khaled would lead to combating desertification that is advancing due to climate change, enhance community natural assets through planting thousands of fruit trees, and create instant jobs needed for land cultivation, planting, maintaining and irrigating in currently non-agricultural lands. In Ersal specifically, reforestation around and next to quarries is essential for ameliorating negative environmental effects of quarries that spread in and around Ersal.</p> <p><u><i>Grants to SMEs:</i></u> The provision of grants to needy SMEs would assist such SMEs to procure needed equipment and machinery. SMEs such as bakeries, mechanics, barbers, butchers could all benefit from grants to procure equipment and machinery to provide new services and attract new clients. This is true to all targeted areas of interventions.</p> <p><u><i>Landscaping (coupon and/or cash for work):</i></u> Landscaping through planting trees in urban settings (Saadnayel, Taanayel, Shtoura, Zahleh and Baalbek) would contribute to improving air quality in urban settings and local market places.</p>

School Renovation and Rehabilitation (coupon and/or cash for work):


Renovating public schools would contribute to hosting an increased number of Syrian and Lebanese students during the academic year 2012-2013. Public schools need to be painted and provided with furniture and equipment to accommodate newly coming Syrian and Lebanese students. In places like Wadi Khaled and Bekaa, schools need to be provided with heating devices for tough winters that are characteristic of Wadi Khaled and Bekaa especially.

Establishing/Renovating Public Spaces for Children and Youth (coupon and/or cash for work):


Lebanese youth and their Syrian counterparts need public spaces to interact and to avoid destructive habits such as drugs and weapon use. Municipal public gardens, football, basketball, volleyball courts were suggested by presidents of municipal councils as being essential to get the youth busy in their after-school time.

3.3 Problem Tree and Objectives Tree:

Problem Tree:



Objectives Tree:



3.4 Institutional Mechanisms:

The design and implementation of short to medium and long term interventions aimed at improving livelihoods of targeted communities cannot be achieved with the current institutional setup characterized by weak administrative structures, lack of communication and coordination, and lack of capacity to plan and implement. Hence, it is recommended that:

- The capacity of local governments in targeted areas is improved to allow for better implementation of short term, labor intensive, income generating schemes at the municipal level. Institution building activities could include provision of equipment, equipping storage places and trainings for municipal staff on topics as recovery planning, project cycle management, and sustainable development. Building synergies with the USAID Baladi and Baladi Plus programs (to be launched in September and October of 2012) both of which aim at providing funding for municipal development projects and building institutional capacities of municipalities is highly recommended.
- The capacity of local NGOs be improved, especially in areas with weak NGO structure and capacities such as Wadi Khaled. This would allow GOs to shoulder part of the humanitarian relief effort and plan for development after withdrawal of international aid organizations.
- A national task force be established that includes representatives of concerned Lebanese Ministries and Agencies (MOSA, MOPH, MEHE, CDR...), presidents of municipal unions concerned, international donors and major local NGOs to plan for response and later recovery and development. Such mechanism would need the approval and support of the Council of Ministers.